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The article examines the legal scope of the so-called Petersberg Tasks in Article 17(2) TEU and of their modified version in the Constitutional Treaty. The Petersberg Tasks provide the only specific catalogue of military activities of the EU. Therefore, they offer important insight as to the legal scope of the European Security and Defence Policy. The article argues that the various mission types listed in the Petersberg Tasks have a fairly wide scope. In this context, it is the last mission type – "tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking" – which raises the most difficulties. It is suggested in this paper that the term "crisis management" comprises military interventions in any conflicts that constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace as long as they are outside the scope of the mutual defence clauses of NATO and the WEU. Crisis management interventions must be of a containing nature but they may include the repulse of aggression and the restoration of the integrity of the international legal order. The term "peacemaking" describes a specific aspect of crisis management: the forcible pacification of a conflict between third parties ("triangular peace enforcement"). The modifications introduced by the Constitutional Treaty are of limited importance. However, to a certain extent they mark a conceptual step from reactive emergency measures to a more proactive, constant and holistic policy.

Seit dem Beitritt Österreichs zur Europäischen Union kam es vor allem innerhalb der GASP zu einer weitreichenden Weiterentwicklung, welche von einem neutralitätsrechtlichen und neutralitätspolitischen Standpunkt aus äußerst interessant ist. So wurden beispielsweise mit dem Vertrag von Amsterdam die Petersberg-Aufgaben in die EU übernommen, durch den Vertrag von Lissabon eine Beistandsklausel in den EUV aufgenommen, und die GASP weiter zur ESVP/GSVP ausgebaut, die nun auch ein umfassendes ?Battle-Group?-Konzept beinhaltet. In dieser Arbeit werden einerseits diese Entwicklungen besprochen, und andererseits aufgezeigt, wie Österreich, parallel zu diesen Entwicklungen, seine Neutralität verändert und angepasst hat.So hat Österreich versucht, den EU-Beitritt und die weiteren Entwicklungen mit einer Reihe von Neutralitätsdoktrinen zu rechtfertigen. Von besonderem Interesse sind dabei die ?Neutralitätsdoktrin der rein staatsrechtlichen Begründung der österreichischen Neutralität? und die ?Neutralitätsdoktrin von den bloß drei militärischen Kernelementen?. Es wird dargelegt, dass beide Theorien nicht haltbar sind. Für Öhlinger ist die dauernde Neutralität Österreichs durch Art. 23 f B-VG um etwaige, sich aus der EU-Mitgliedschaft ergebende Rechte und Verpflichtungen reduziert worden. Andere sehen das Ende der österreichischen Neutralität erst mit dem Vertrag von Amsterdam erreicht. Mit ihm wurden die Petersberg-Aufgaben in die EU übernommen, die als ?ultima ratio? sogar ?Kampfeinsätze bei der Krisenbewältigung, einschließlich friedenschaffender Maßnahmen? vorsehen. In Bezug auf die Vereinbarkeit der diversen Entwicklungen mit der österreichischen Neutralität wird neben der verfassungsrechtlichen Ebene aber auch auf die völkerrechtliche und neutralitätspolitische Ebene eingegangen, und festgestellt, dass Österreich eine Neutralitätspolitik führt, aufgrund der es nicht mehr erwarten kann, dass Drittstaaten seine Neutralität noch respektieren. ; Since Austria joined the EU, a lot of changes took place within the CFSP, which are very interesting in the light of the law of neutrality and the light of the policy of neutrality. Some of these changes are for example the incorporation of the so called ?Petersberg tasks? into the EU with the Amsterdam treaty, the incorporation of a mutual assistance clause with the Lisbon Treaty, and the development of the CFSP into ESDP, which includes a ?battle-group? concept. In my thesis, I am discussing these various changes, and point out, how the Austrian government reacted, and changed it?s neutrality to adjust it to the diverse European changes. I am showing, how the Austrian permanent neutrality came into existence, what its full content is, and how the neutrality could be changed or brought to an end. Austria tried to legitimate its accession to the EU by creating various ?Neutrality Doctrines?, such as the Neutrality Doctrine and the Neutrality Doctrine of the three military core-obligations. I am showing, that both doctrines are not grounded.The Neutrality-BVG wasn?t changed itself, but due to the incorporation of Art. 23 f B-VG, Austria was on a constitutional level allowed to participate within the CFSP. Öhlinger already sees the permanent neutrality of Austria with the accession to the EU finalized, as it was shortened by obligations and rights based on the membership. Others see the permanent neutrality finalized with the Amsterdam Treaty, as it contained the Petersberg-Tasks, which include as a ?ultima ratio? even ?tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking?. Regarding the compatibility of the diverse changes with the Austrian neutrality, I am not only discussing the compatibility in the light of constitutional law, but also in the light of public international law and the light of policy of neutrality. I show that Austria?s neutrality policy has reached a point, where Austria can?t trust, that third states will continue to respect it. ; eingereicht von Maria Veronika Wieser ; Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung der Verfasserin/des Verfassers ; Graz, Univ., Dipl.-Arb., 2011 ; (VLID)222526

AbstractThis article identifies previously ignored determinants of public support for the European Union's security and defence ambitions. In contrast to public opinion vis‐à‐vis the EU in general, the literature on attitudes towards a putative European army or the existing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) suggests that the explanatory power of sociodemographic and economic variables is weak, and focuses instead on national identity as the main determinant of one's support. This article explores the possible impact of strategic culture, and argues that preferences vis‐à‐vis the EU's security and defence ambitions are formed in part through pre‐existing social representations of security. To test this proposition, 'national' strategic cultures are disaggregated and a typology is produced that contains four strategic postures: pacifism, traditionalism, humanitarianism and globalism. Applying regression analysis on individual‐level Eurobarometer survey data, it is found that strategic postures help explain both the general level of support for CSDP and support for specific Petersberg tasks.

In the second half of the first decade of the twenty-fi rst century has become apparent stagnation in the development of defense policy of the European Union. This happened in the time when the EU was to realize its ambitious plans to develop the resources and capabilities to conduct a wide range of crisis management operations (Petersberg tasks). The stagnation of the CSDP contributed reduce the political importance of the EU in the international arena. Its causes were: an increase of disparities between the member states of the EU, strengthening by the Treaty of Lisbon the mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation; the fi nancial crisis of 2008, and a general weakening of the international activity of the EU. Conditions for removal of the CSDP from stagnation stuck in the change in the security environment of the EU and in regulations of the Treaty of Lisbon. The main chance of reviving and strengthening the CSDP is not in its institutional development, but in the opportunity and conscious need to develop a new EU security strategy, as well as in strengthening the military capabilities and European defence sector, and also in increasing practical cooperation between the EU and NATO.

This book presents an up-to-date, scholarly analysis of European crisis management during the 1990s and is one of the first books to summarize European experiences in the field of peacekeeping and crisis management. With the help of eight case studies, the authors explore how European governments have responded to international crises. The book also contains in-depth studies on key concepts like humanitarian intervention, military doctrine and Petersberg tasks . The book describes Europe's increasing responsibility for the proper functioning of international society. It points to a pronounced move to collective action and highlights Europe's political and military adaptation to the post-Cold War strategic environment. The authors detect an ever stronger belief in the use of military power and thereby the contours of an emerging common European identity within the field of crisis management. The book establishes an agenda for future research on European crisis management and out-of-area operations. It will be of prime interest to students of international relations, European studies, foreign policy analysis, international organization, crisis management and conflict resolution, and will also be essential reading for all those who need a practical survey of the latest developments in the field of international crisis management

The article deals with the development of legal grounds of the European Union common defence policy in a draft Constitution for Europe. In order to identify trends in the legal regulation of the EU common defence policy, the author compares respective provisions of the draft European Constitution and the Treaty on European Union. The key Art. I-40 of the draft Constitution establishing specific provisions for implementing the common security and defence policy provides for significant changes, in comparison with the respective Art. 17 of the Treaty on European Union. Apart from that, the specific provisions of Art. I-40 of the European Constitution are developed by the more detailed provisions on the common security and defence policy which are contained in Section 2, Chapter II, Title V of Part III of the Constitution (from Art. III-210 to Art. III-214 thereof). Most of these provisions are new. However, they are based on the same principles, as stated in Art. 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union and Art. I-11(4), I-15(1) and I-40(1, 2) of the draft Constitution. Namely, under the Constitution, the common defence policy will remain an integral part of the common foreign and security policy and will continue to provide operational capabilities for the Union's external actions in a specific situation when diplomatic and economic actions will be insufficient in order to achieve the common foreign and security policy goals. As previously, the main aim of the common defence policy will be to increase civilian and military capabilities assigned for the implementation of the so-called Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, crisis management and peacemaking operations). The draft Constitution also preserves sufficient legal guarantees to ensure compatibility with the activities of the NATO and corresponding legal obligations of a number of Member States. On the other hand, some new provisions of the Constitution can be assessed as the reflection of efforts of some EU countries to make the common defence policy more autonomous with respect to the NATO and the USA. Some of them may even raise a danger of duplication of the NATO's activities. With regard to implementation of the Petersberg tasks, the provisions of the Constitution remains generally unchanged in comparison with those of the Treaty on European Union, except a few provisions updating the Petersberg tasks and strengthening the institutional framework of the common defence policy. The new missions, such as joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation, were added to the range of Petersberg missions, in order to respond properly to the emerging new threats to the European security. In line with that, the solidarity clause is added by Art. I-42 which obliges the Member States to mobilise all instruments at their disposal in order to prevent terrorist threats and assist each other in case of disasters. The next novelty is that, in addition to the existent institutions of the common defence policy, the draft Constitution provides for the establishment of the European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency that will be subordinate to the Council of Ministers. Apart from the cooperation in the field of armaments, the Agency will also be responsible for supervision of the implementation by the Member States of their military capability commitments. On the one hand, that could significantly improve the fulfilment of the Union's defence policy objectives. On the other hand, there is a danger that the Agency can serve as one of the means for domination of certain Member States and, as a consequence, it can become a catalyst of different-speed and divided Europe in the field of defence policy. The subsequent novelty provided for in the draft Constitution is the possibility of the structured defence and military cooperation between certain Member States, which might be treated as a specific kind of enhanced cooperation. Despite of possible advantages of increase of the Union's military capability, this kind of cooperation could also result in a deeper division of Member States rather than a desired unity on the defence policy matters. ; Straipsnyje analizuojamos Sutarties dėl Konstitucijos Europai nuostatos, skirtos Europos Sąjungos bendrajai gynybos politikai. Šios nuostatos lyginamos su bendrąją gynybos politiką reglamentuojančiomis galiojančios Europos Sąjungos steigimo sutarties nuostatomis, įtvirtintomis Nicos sutartimi. Išryškinamos pagrindinės Europos Sąjungos bendrosios gynybos politikos teisinio reglamentavimo tendencijos Europos Konstitucijos projekte. Savo išvadoms pagrįsti, be lyginamojo, autorius taip pat taiko sisteminį, istorinį, teleologinį, loginį ir kitus tyrimo metodus. Pagrindinė autoriaus daroma išvada yra ta, kad Europos Konstitucijos projektas numato toliau stiprinti Europos Sąjungos bendrąją gynybos politiką jos autonomiškumo santykiuose su NATO didinimo linkme, nors ir iš esmės nekeičia šios politikos principų. Tokią išvadą lemia naujos, lyginant su galiojančia Europos Sąjungos steigimo sutartimi, Europos Konstitucijos projekto nuostatos, atspindinčios Europos Sąjungos bendrosios gynybos politikos institucijų stiprinimo bei struktūrinio karinio bendradarbiavimo plėtros tendencijas ir nustatančios galimybę valstybėms narėms prisiimti bendros gynybos įsipareigojimus. Pagal Europos Konstitucijos projektą taip pat sudaromos sąlygos Europos Sąjungai perimti visas Vakarų Europos Sąjungos funkcijas ir formaliai likviduoti šią organizaciją. Vis dėlto Europos Konstitucijos projekte išlieka pakankamos teisinės garantijos, kad Europos Sąjungos bendroji gynybos politika nepakeis NATO veiklos ir nepažeis valstybių, NATO narių, įsipareigojimų pagal Šiaurės Atlanto sutartį. Be to, dauguma naujų Europos Sąjungos bendrosios gynybos politikos nuostatų buvo suformuluotos siekiant veiksmingai reaguoti į naujus iššūkius tarptautinei taikai ir saugumui. Straipsnyje trumpai apžvelgiami ir Lietuvos dalyvavimo Europos Sąjungos bendrojoje gynybos politikoje pagrindai pagal nacionalinę teisę. Daroma išvada, kad Lietuvos nacionalinės teisės normos numato pakankamas sąlygas šaliai dalyvauti visose Europos Sąjungos ben-drosios gynybos politikos formose. Kita vertus, Lietuvai politiniu požiūriu gali būti netikslinga palaikyti visas galimas šios politikos raidos tendencijas.

Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP) hat sich nach Jahrzehnten rhetorischer Bekenntnisse und politischer Hindernisse in bemerkenswerter Geschwindigkeit zu einem neuen Projekt der europäischen Integrationspolitik entwickelt. Damit wird sich auch das innere Gefüge und das politische Profil der EU nach außen verändern: Das eine betrifft die Verstärkung des intergouvernementalen Momentums in der Europapolitik und das andere die Rolle der EU als militärischer Akteur in der Weltpolitik. Beides hängt zusammen, denn Vergemeinschaftung in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik bedeutet eine immer noch unzumutbare Einschränkung nationaler Souveränität. Deshalb haben sich die Regierungen für eine "freiwillige Zusammenarbeit" in der ESVP entschieden. Erste konkrete Beschlüsse zur Verwirklichung des ehrgeizigen Vorhabens werden von der Beitragskonferenz der Mitgliedstaaten am 20. und 21. November erwartet. Doch es gibt noch viele offene Fragen und unterschiedliche Auffassungen, die der Klärung bedürfen. Dabei geht es um so Grundlegendes wie: Sind Ziel und Zweck der ESVP klar definiert? Kann die geplante schnelle Eingreiftruppe die Petersberg-Aufgaben erfüllen? Welche finanziellen Anstrengungen sind zu unternehmen und welche institutionellen Voraussetzungen zu schaffen, um die EU handlungsfähiger zu machen? Wieviel Autonomie will sich die EU politisch und finanziell leisten? Wird die ESVP die NATO schwächen oder stärken? Wie betrachten die USA deren Auswirkungen auf die NATO und das transatlantische Verhältnis? Von der Beantwortung dieser Fragen wird abhängen, was von den strategischen Ambitionen der EU zu halten ist. Die hier ausgewählten Beiträge greifen die mittel- und langfristigen Perspektiven bzw. Konsequenzen der ESVP auf, die in der wissenschaftlichen Debatte und internationalen Politikberatung derzeit erörtert werden. (SWP-Zeitschriftenschau)

This new book shows how the idea of a strategic triangle can illuminate the security relationships among the United States, the European Union and Russia in the greater transatlantic sphere. This concept highlights how the relationships among these three actors may, on some issues, be closely related. A central question also follows directly from the use of the notion of the triangle: does the EU have actor capability in this policy sphere or will it get it in the future? The reason this is so important for our project is that only if the Union is regarded by the two other actors, and regards itself, as an actor in security policy does the strategic triangle really exists. Consequently, this book has a strong focus upon the development of the actor capability of the Union. In the case of the United States, it examines to what extent the concept of the strategic triangle has significance under each of five grand strategies that serve as alternative visions of the superpower's role in the world.