Suchergebnisse

Translation and footnotes by Rosana Jardim Candeloro (UNISC).

Translation and footnotes by Rafael de Araújo e Viana Leite.

O presente trabalho foi encomendado no ano de 2014, por ocasião de conferência ministrada pelo Prof.Hilton Japiassú na UFT. Após a conferência, a então gestão da Universidade Federal do Tocantins instituiu o Prêmio Hilton Japiassú de Excelência em Pesquisa, através de sua Pró-Reitoria de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação. Em homenagem ao referido professor, a comissão editorial de Desafios decidiu manter o texto original, tal como foi enviado em sua primeira versão. O Prof.Hilton Japiassu faleceu, no Rio de Janeiro, no ano de 2015.

O presente trabalho foi encomendado no ano de 2014, por ocasião de conferência ministrada pelo Prof.Hilton Japiassú na UFT. Após a conferência, a então gestão da Universidade Federal do Tocantins instituiu o Prêmio Hilton Japiassú de Excelência em Pesquisa, através de sua Pró-Reitoria de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação. Em homenagem ao referido professor, a comissão editorial de Desafios decidiu manter o texto original, tal como foi enviado em sua primeira versão. O Prof.Hilton Japiassu faleceu, no Rio de Janeiro, no ano de 2015.

Alongside the reprimands of Diogenes the Dog, the philosophy of bitterness of Émile Cioran and the neo-Cynicism of Peter Sloterdijk, there would be - in the author's opinión - a Cynical lineage that speaks for itself, despite its "doctrinal" differences, of the survival until today of this true pariah of philosophy. The conjecture that follows is that the notion of animality is the core from which each of these "Cynical philosophies" is born. From this line, ancient Cynicism, or a good part of it, reappears in Sloterdijk's neo-Cynicism, which is supplied with a technological critique related to the "animalistic" roots of Diogenes' sect.

The purpose of this article is to try to clarify the origins and philosophical importance of the concept of objective logical validity in Frege's thinking. Our argument will try to locate Frege's philosophy within an analytic semantic tradition that arises in the nineteenth century through the thinking of Bolzano and Lotze and which is also characterized by antinaturalism, antipsychologism and by the belief in an a priori objectivity as a characteristic of logically valid units, but not real. The article will identify common points between the philosophy of these three thinkers, but above all, we want to seek in the philosophies of Bolzano and Lotze the roots to understand the distinction between the three kingdoms and the Platonic semanticism present in Frege's philosophy.

The objective this article is to investigate the problem of the formalism in moral giving emphasis to G. W. F. Hegel and its Philosophy of Right as proposal of objectivation of the normative contents of acting. The intention is to present the version of Hegel for the problem of the formalism in relation the determination of acting in the sphere ethical, politics and legal. For the concretion of such task it is necessary to investigate the consideration concerning the 'Moralität and Sittlichkeit', estimated basic to build a project stuffed for a 'Philosophy of Right' and the figure of the State politician. The contributions of Hegel to effectuate the proposal of overcoming of the formalism if find in 'Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts: Über die wissenscaftischen Behandlungsarten der Naturrechts and Phänomenologie des Geistes'. The author apresents a clarification some of the main aspects in such a way of the objections how much of the attempts of reply to the problem.

The article aims to draw a dialogue between the conception of Ethos present in the poet Patativa of the Assaré and the thought of the philosopher Manfredo Araújo de Oliveira. From the particularity to the universality, both thinkers theorize social ethos as an intrinsic characteristic of the subject. Patativa is a representative of the poetry of the Northeastern pantheon, while Manfredo Oliveira stands out for the power of synthesis and analysis of the main problems in the History of Philosophy. Both thinkers show us how it is possible to philosophize in Portuguese or how it is possible to extract from the historical specificity the dilemmas of human complexity. This article, therefore, makes a reflection that starts from the popular literature to the Northeastern philosophical thought, presented as a guiding thread to ethics.

This study aims to present the problem of moral action and normativity in Being and Time from the interpretation of Steven Crowell, expressed in the text Consciousness and Reason: Heidegger and the Fields of Intentionality [2007], in which he questions Tugendhat's interpretation exposed in the 1999 text "Wir sind nicht fest verdrahtet": Heideggers "Man" und die Tiefendimensionen der Gründe.

The aim of this article is to understand the notion of classical intellectual in Sartre's thought, more specifically in the conferences Plaidoyer pour les intellectuels. We will see that the path of transformation of the technician of practical knowledge to intellectual begins with the unveiling of the contradiction of the society and of its own role, in the discovery of the falsity of the abstract and excluding bourgeois humanism. Against the ideology that have selected and educated him, the intellectual places the need to think from the concrete and the particularities, which does not imply a subjectivist relativism. By abandoning the abstract universal, the intellectual proposes, instead, a singular universalization, assuming the paradox proposed by Kierkegaard and updated by Sartre. In this sense, to approach the 1965 conferences about the intellectual to the conference about Kierkegaard, given the following year, is fundamental to better understand the role of the classical intellectual. In the theoretical questioning of the false humanism of the ruling class and in the practical questioning of its daily attitudes, he maintains the ambiguity between universal and singular, objectivity and subjectivity. Thus, we can finally understand how existentialist humanism stands.

Sartre, in the work Notebooks for an Ethics (1947-1948), presents notes on the dimension of history that begins to develop initially within his moral reflection. Sartre, however, does not have a finalized version of his theory of history, linking his reflection to a comparison and critique of Hegel's philosophy of history and Marxian historical materialism. The aim of this article is to analyze Sartre's critique of Hegel in the Notebooks for an Ethics about history, showing an outline of Sartre's initial views on history. Sartre makes extensive use of a critique of the possibility of Hegelian dialectics, questioning the dimension of this movement of the real as true. It analyzes the idealization of this movement in the dialectic of the master and the slave in works such as Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807) and discusses the notion of the totality of history. Sartre suggests, based on this critique, his own notion of history linked to a de-totalized totality and a historical becoming centered on freedom.

This article intends to indicate a propositional use of the notion of image of thought, present in the work Diferença and Repetição by Gilles Deleuze, because according to this reference, repetition is typical of asserting itself, allowing the emergence of what differs. On the other hand, the notion of image of thought occurs in Deleuze's philosophy on three occasions, in the works Nietzsche and Philosophy, Proust and the Signs and in Difference and Repetition and in these works, this perspective does not always coincide, moving from a more critical use for more positive use. In strategic terms and methodological, it is precisely this last approach, of a constructive nature, that we will base ourselves on. The discussion revolves around an affirmative image of thought in philosophy in the face of difference in the act of repetition, which means that difference in philosophy would bring with it, in its movement, an internal process of differentiation, whose power repeats it, but not of the same way, if not transmuting it into other possibilities of what it means to think.

This paper has as main goal to investigate and circumscribe the problematic relation between intellect and brain in Arthur Schopenhauer's work, under the consideration of the well known Eduard Zeller's formulation of the problem. In this way, the concepts of intellect and brain might be considered according to the major explanation of the metaphysics of nature, having as main idea the distinction between the two ways of considering the world presented simultaneously in The world as will and representation and improved and developed in the author's posterior works. If, on the one hand, the world is object of investigation through subjectivity and its forms of existence, on the other hand it is considered through the objective way which, firstly, admit the object as existing by itself, independently of any subject. Without an independent existence, in so far each object depend on subjectivity, both modes must contribute to the complete understanding of the world as a whole as complementary parts: the intellect must be understood from the objective point of view and the brain according to the subjective analysis of the world that leads to the metaphysical conclusions of Schopenhauer's work, whose aim include putting it in the general explanation of nature.

This work aims to highlight the continuous game and the paradoxical relationship established between memory and forgetfulness based on the contributions of Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson. We will follow the hypothesis that the origin of memory and consciousness in Nietzsche is very close to that made by Bergson in Matter and Memory. I will try to expose how memory in Bergson arises in the interval between action and reaction, at the moment when man hesitates, organizes and selects the new movement. The same hesitation movement occurs in Nietzsche, when man abandons the "animalistic" realm of the instant and begins to calculate and plan his actions. In the meantime, when man acquires the capacity to remember and distances himself from the instinctive animals, forgetfulness becomes vitally important, according to Nietzsche, since an excess of memory can resent and sadden the body. In Bergson, on the other hand, the brain mechanism - an organ of attention to life - also occupies a prominent place, from the moment it temporarily removes the totality of (non-useful) memories, and allows only some of them to become conscious (the useful ones). To this end, we will observe that what is behind this infinite game between memory and forgetfulness is the maintenance of a healthy body that does not get lost in excesses - of remembering too much or forgetting everything. A body that knows how to remember, but also how to forget in order to live.