Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist nicht, die vielbekannte Kontroverse um das Politische "bei"/"ab" bzw. "nach" Heideggers \(\textit {Sein und Zeit}\) wiederaufzunehmen. Unsere Überlegungen beschränken sich vielmehr auf den weniger unternommenen Versuch, eine solche politische Dimension in der Philosophie des frühen Heidegger (1919-1923) zu entdecken und zu erörtern. Das Hauptthema der frühen Philosophie Heideggers lässt sich auf eine fundamental-phänomenologische Frage zurückführen: die Frage nach einem Denken des Ursprungs, d.h. einem Denken, das sich fähig erklärt, einen echten und adäquaten Zugang zur ursprünglichen Struktur der faktischen Lebenserfahrung zu gewinnen. Die Frage lautet nun: Wie lässt sich überhaupt die Thematik des Politischen in einer solchen phänomenologischen Dimension entdecken und artikulieren?
In letter 56, Spinoza does not recognize ancient philosophers' authority and urges Hugo Boxel to follow only his reason in order to acquire knowledge. Notwithstanding this radical stance, Spinoza quotes, makes references and gives examples which are mostly excerpted from Roman historians; he takes Tacitus', Sallut's , Quintus Curtius Rufus' words and histories seriously to the point that he says, in the TP, that "no one that knows Histories" – the Histories by Tacitus – "can ignore" the rightness of his argumentation. In this work, my aim is to address this apparent contradiction. Articulated in four sections, my dissertation shows how Spinoza uses his sources and which role they play in formulating his political philosophy.Each section focuses on a different aspect of this relationship: the first one is devoted to Spinoza's education, to his cultural background and to Early modern's forms of quoting. In the second one, I highlight the existence of a monarchist political current, Tacitism, which makes a consistent use of ancient historian's quotes; Spinoza confronts this tradition, giving to the ancient writers' words and maximes a completely different sense. Nevertheless, Spinoza quotes not only for a polemical purpose. In contrast, the references and the exemples seem to fulfil four functions: rhetoric, argumentative, polemic and anthropologic. The last one indicates that thr Roman historians' words and stories are an integral part of Spinoza's political philosophy. Finally, in section four, I identify the roles that narrations and stories play in a political philosophy whose aim is to be, at the same time, scientific as well as pragmatic. ; Dans la lettre 56 Spinoza ne reconnait pas l'autorité des anciens, incitant son interlocuteur à raisonner par soi-même, ne suivant que sa raison. Toutefois, face à cette prise de position radicale, Spinoza cite, fait référence et propose des exemples, dont la plupart sont extraits des historiens latins; il semble prendre au sérieux les mots de Tacite, Quinte-Curce, ...
In letter 56, Spinoza does not recognize ancient philosophers' authority and urges Hugo Boxel to follow only his reason in order to acquire knowledge. Notwithstanding this radical stance, Spinoza quotes, makes references and gives examples which are mostly excerpted from Roman historians; he takes Tacitus', Sallut's , Quintus Curtius Rufus' words and histories seriously to the point that he says, in the TP, that "no one that knows Histories" – the Histories by Tacitus – "can ignore" the rightness of his argumentation. In this work, my aim is to address this apparent contradiction. Articulated in four sections, my dissertation shows how Spinoza uses his sources and which role they play in formulating his political philosophy.Each section focuses on a different aspect of this relationship: the first one is devoted to Spinoza's education, to his cultural background and to Early modern's forms of quoting. In the second one, I highlight the existence of a monarchist political current, Tacitism, which makes a consistent use of ancient historian's quotes; Spinoza confronts this tradition, giving to the ancient writers' words and maximes a completely different sense. Nevertheless, Spinoza quotes not only for a polemical purpose. In contrast, the references and the exemples seem to fulfil four functions: rhetoric, argumentative, polemic and anthropologic. The last one indicates that thr Roman historians' words and stories are an integral part of Spinoza's political philosophy. Finally, in section four, I identify the roles that narrations and stories play in a political philosophy whose aim is to be, at the same time, scientific as well as pragmatic. ; Dans la lettre 56 Spinoza ne reconnait pas l'autorité des anciens, incitant son interlocuteur à raisonner par soi-même, ne suivant que sa raison. Toutefois, face à cette prise de position radicale, Spinoza cite, fait référence et propose des exemples, dont la plupart sont extraits des historiens latins; il semble prendre au sérieux les mots de Tacite, Quinte-Curce, ...
In letter 56, Spinoza does not recognize ancient philosophers' authority and urges Hugo Boxel to follow only his reason in order to acquire knowledge. Notwithstanding this radical stance, Spinoza quotes, makes references and gives examples which are mostly excerpted from Roman historians; he takes Tacitus', Sallut's , Quintus Curtius Rufus' words and histories seriously to the point that he says, in the TP, that "no one that knows Histories" – the Histories by Tacitus – "can ignore" the rightness of his argumentation. In this work, my aim is to address this apparent contradiction. Articulated in four sections, my dissertation shows how Spinoza uses his sources and which role they play in formulating his political philosophy.Each section focuses on a different aspect of this relationship: the first one is devoted to Spinoza's education, to his cultural background and to Early modern's forms of quoting. In the second one, I highlight the existence of a monarchist political current, Tacitism, which makes a consistent use of ancient historian's quotes; Spinoza confronts this tradition, giving to the ancient writers' words and maximes a completely different sense. Nevertheless, Spinoza quotes not only for a polemical purpose. In contrast, the references and the exemples seem to fulfil four functions: rhetoric, argumentative, polemic and anthropologic. The last one indicates that thr Roman historians' words and stories are an integral part of Spinoza's political philosophy. Finally, in section four, I identify the roles that narrations and stories play in a political philosophy whose aim is to be, at the same time, scientific as well as pragmatic. ; Dans la lettre 56 Spinoza ne reconnait pas l'autorité des anciens, incitant son interlocuteur à raisonner par soi-même, ne suivant que sa raison. Toutefois, face à cette prise de position radicale, Spinoza cite, fait référence et propose des exemples, dont la plupart sont extraits des historiens latins; il semble prendre au sérieux les mots de Tacite, Quinte-Curce, ...
In letter 56, Spinoza does not recognize ancient philosophers' authority and urges Hugo Boxel to follow only his reason in order to acquire knowledge. Notwithstanding this radical stance, Spinoza quotes, makes references and gives examples which are mostly excerpted from Roman historians; he takes Tacitus', Sallut's , Quintus Curtius Rufus' words and histories seriously to the point that he says, in the TP, that "no one that knows Histories" – the Histories by Tacitus – "can ignore" the rightness of his argumentation. In this work, my aim is to address this apparent contradiction. Articulated in four sections, my dissertation shows how Spinoza uses his sources and which role they play in formulating his political philosophy.Each section focuses on a different aspect of this relationship: the first one is devoted to Spinoza's education, to his cultural background and to Early modern's forms of quoting. In the second one, I highlight the existence of a monarchist political current, Tacitism, which makes a consistent use of ancient historian's quotes; Spinoza confronts this tradition, giving to the ancient writers' words and maximes a completely different sense. Nevertheless, Spinoza quotes not only for a polemical purpose. In contrast, the references and the exemples seem to fulfil four functions: rhetoric, argumentative, polemic and anthropologic. The last one indicates that thr Roman historians' words and stories are an integral part of Spinoza's political philosophy. Finally, in section four, I identify the roles that narrations and stories play in a political philosophy whose aim is to be, at the same time, scientific as well as pragmatic. ; Dans la lettre 56 Spinoza ne reconnait pas l'autorité des anciens, incitant son interlocuteur à raisonner par soi-même, ne suivant que sa raison. Toutefois, face à cette prise de position radicale, Spinoza cite, fait référence et propose des exemples, dont la plupart sont extraits des historiens latins; il semble prendre au sérieux les mots de Tacite, Quinte-Curce, ...
In letter 56, Spinoza does not recognize ancient philosophers' authority and urges Hugo Boxel to follow only his reason in order to acquire knowledge. Notwithstanding this radical stance, Spinoza quotes, makes references and gives examples which are mostly excerpted from Roman historians; he takes Tacitus', Sallut's , Quintus Curtius Rufus' words and histories seriously to the point that he says, in the TP, that "no one that knows Histories" – the Histories by Tacitus – "can ignore" the rightness of his argumentation. In this work, my aim is to address this apparent contradiction. Articulated in four sections, my dissertation shows how Spinoza uses his sources and which role they play in formulating his political philosophy.Each section focuses on a different aspect of this relationship: the first one is devoted to Spinoza's education, to his cultural background and to Early modern's forms of quoting. In the second one, I highlight the existence of a monarchist political current, Tacitism, which makes a consistent use of ancient historian's quotes; Spinoza confronts this tradition, giving to the ancient writers' words and maximes a completely different sense. Nevertheless, Spinoza quotes not only for a polemical purpose. In contrast, the references and the exemples seem to fulfil four functions: rhetoric, argumentative, polemic and anthropologic. The last one indicates that thr Roman historians' words and stories are an integral part of Spinoza's political philosophy. Finally, in section four, I identify the roles that narrations and stories play in a political philosophy whose aim is to be, at the same time, scientific as well as pragmatic. ; Dans la lettre 56 Spinoza ne reconnait pas l'autorité des anciens, incitant son interlocuteur à raisonner par soi-même, ne suivant que sa raison. Toutefois, face à cette prise de position radicale, Spinoza cite, fait référence et propose des exemples, dont la plupart sont extraits des historiens latins; il semble prendre au sérieux les mots de Tacite, Quinte-Curce, ...
In letter 56, Spinoza does not recognize ancient philosophers' authority and urges Hugo Boxel to follow only his reason in order to acquire knowledge. Notwithstanding this radical stance, Spinoza quotes, makes references and gives examples which are mostly excerpted from Roman historians; he takes Tacitus', Sallut's , Quintus Curtius Rufus' words and histories seriously to the point that he says, in the TP, that "no one that knows Histories" – the Histories by Tacitus – "can ignore" the rightness of his argumentation. In this work, my aim is to address this apparent contradiction. Articulated in four sections, my dissertation shows how Spinoza uses his sources and which role they play in formulating his political philosophy.Each section focuses on a different aspect of this relationship: the first one is devoted to Spinoza's education, to his cultural background and to Early modern's forms of quoting. In the second one, I highlight the existence of a monarchist political current, Tacitism, which makes a consistent use of ancient historian's quotes; Spinoza confronts this tradition, giving to the ancient writers' words and maximes a completely different sense. Nevertheless, Spinoza quotes not only for a polemical purpose. In contrast, the references and the exemples seem to fulfil four functions: rhetoric, argumentative, polemic and anthropologic. The last one indicates that thr Roman historians' words and stories are an integral part of Spinoza's political philosophy. Finally, in section four, I identify the roles that narrations and stories play in a political philosophy whose aim is to be, at the same time, scientific as well as pragmatic. ; Dans la lettre 56 Spinoza ne reconnait pas l'autorité des anciens, incitant son interlocuteur à raisonner par soi-même, ne suivant que sa raison. Toutefois, face à cette prise de position radicale, Spinoza cite, fait référence et propose des exemples, dont la plupart sont extraits des historiens latins; il semble prendre au sérieux les mots de Tacite, Quinte-Curce, ...
Das politische Denken Ernst Cassirers steht im Mittelpunkt der vorliegenden Forschungsarbeit, die von einer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit der Rezeptionsgeschichte ausgeht und eine spezifische methodische Perspektive einführt, um dieses Problem in einem neuen Licht erscheinen zu lassen und um zu erklären, wie und inwieweit legitim von einem politischen Denken im Falle der Kulturphilosophie Cassirers gesprochen werden kann. Unter der Annahme einer Kontinuitätshypothese wird auf diejenigen Hauptmomente fokussiert, in denen Cassirer die Grundsätze seiner politisch-philosophischen Auffassung entwickelte, und zwar auf die Werke "Leibniz' System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen" 1902 und "Freiheit und Form. Studien zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte" 1916: in diesen Untersuchungen über die ethisch-rechtliche Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften und über das Problem der Freiheits- und Staatsidee lassen sich zwei Grundmotive aufzeigen, die alle folgenden Entwicklungen der Cassirerschen politischen Reflexionen zwischen dem Ersten Weltkrieg, der Weimarer Republik und dem Nationalsozialismus bestimmen: vom Streit um den Begriff der Nation mit dem Philosophen Bruno Bauch über die Verteidigung des republikanischen Konstitutionalismus am Ende der 1920er Jahre und über die ethisch-rechtlichen Beiträge der Exilzeit in den 1930er Jahren bis hin zum posthumen The Myth of the State 1946. Das Leitmotiv dieser politisch-philosophischen Überlegungen Cassirers ist in der Tat die Betrachtung des Problems der idealistischen Verwandlung des Staatsbegriffs in einen normativen Kulturbegriff bzw. in eine Kulturform unter systematischer Berücksichtigung von der Geschichte der politischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft der europäischen Moderne. In Bezug auf diese Hauptmomente der Cassirerschen politischen Produktion werden ihr philosophisch-geschichtlicher und kultureller Kontext sowie ihre Quellen beleuchtet. ; The political thought of Ernst Cassirer is the focus of the present research work, which starts from a critical assessment of his reception and introduces a specific methodological approach in order to reconsider this issue and to clarify the sense in which it is legitimate to speak of a political thought in Cassirer's Philosophy of Culture. Assuming that there is a continuity in his philosophy, this research focuses on the two fundamental moments in which Cassirer develops the principles of his political thought, that is to say the works "Leibniz' System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen" (1902) and "Freiheit und Form. Studien zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte" (1916). In his investigations on the ethical-legal foundation of the Geisteswissenschaften and on the problem of freedom and state can be recognized two crucial issues as the basis of all developments in Cassirer's political thought between the World War I, the Weimar Republic and the Nazism: from the controversy with the philosopher Bruno Bauch about the concept of nation to the defense of a republican constitutionalism at the end of the 20's, from the ethical and legal contributions of the 30's till the inquiries on the political myth in his posthumous work "The Myth of the state" (1946). In this philosophical-political elaboration Cassirer's main concern is to study the problem of the idealistic transformation of the state into a normative cultural concept and into a form of culture in the light of the history of political philosophy and political science in modern Europe. For each of the main points of Cassirer's political production are therefore highlighted the historical-philosophical and cultural context, along with the sources and the most important references.
zum Gebrauch seiner Academischen Lectionen abgefasset von August Friedrich Müllern, der Philosophie und beyder Rechte Doctorn, und Organi Aristotelici Professore Publico Ordinario zu Leipzig ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- Ph.u. 364-2
The aim of this research is to delineate, within the Sartrian thought of the Sixties, the mobile perimeter inside which to define ethics as the overcoming possibility for a critical thought. In other words: as the subjective assumption of its political dimension. The shift of Sartre's historical-political thought follows a development not yet studied enough by scholars. The manuscripts of the Sixties about dialectical ethics appear as the fundamental completion of the dialectical experience of the Critique de la Raison dialectique (1960). Sartre was not able to publish the second part of the book during his life: indeed, the blockage of that work is the result of the structural limit of every attempt to conceptualize historical experience. In the Critique, the possibility to make a single history intelligible depends on a refoundation of dialectics as research method for concrete historical reality. Starting by such refoundation, it becomes possible to define the epistemological basis of a historical structural anthropology, and the conditions for the insurgence of human collective action at the same time. In our interpretation, this approach is out of a future perfect's logic that means out of the core of the modern sovereignty's system. Once fixed those points, the research moves around two principal problematic axis. The first evaluates the methodological and epistemological accuracy of Sartre's attempt to formulate a theory of knowledge for Marxism, considering this one as a theoretical-practical experiment yet to be done. At this point, Sartre's regressive-progressive method is compared to Marx's method of critique of political economy, evaluating affinity aspects and overcoming lines. Around the second axis, transverse to the first, the more properly historical-political plexus finds its profile: the dialectical comprehension of events connoting subjectively (that means politically) historical time's flow isn't detachable from questioning about the historicity of subjects involved in this flowing. For this reason, in the Sartrian thought of the Sixties the subjectivity's status is analyzed questioning the normative disposition of social sphere: focusing on normativity allows to understand the mutual implication of subjectification and objectification, in addition to locating basis for a Marxist axiology. Moreover, this perspective allows to improve historical effectiveness of praxis's ethical dimension. This one is the lens by which Sartre analyzes both Stalinism and colonial liberation struggles, but also the point of clarification of the torsion he imposes to the notion of longing. Materialistically, with the longing Sartre discovers the root of an ethics as the necessary step for every politics. ; Ce travail de recherche a pour but de circonscrire, dans la pensée sartrienne des années 1960, le périmètre au sein duquel l'éthique se constitue comme possibilité de la pensée critique, c'est-à-dire comme assomption subjective de la politicité de celle-ci. Notre lecture considère les manuscrits sartriens des années 1960 sur l'éthique dialectique comme un complément fondamental de l'expérience critique conduite dans la Critique de la Raison dialectique (avril 1960). Dans cet ouvrage majeur, Sartre lie la possibilité de rendre une histoire intelligible à une refondation de la dialectique en tant que méthode d'analyse du concret historique. A partir d'une telle refondation, il devient possible de déterminer les bases épistémologiques d'une anthropologie historique et structurelle, aussi bien que les conditions de surgissement de l'agir en commun des hommes. Une fois fixés ces points, la recherche tourne autour de deux axes principaux. Le premier évalue, sur un plan à la fois méthodologique et épistémologique, l'effort sartrien visant à fournir une théorie de la connaissance au marxisme, considéré comme une expérimentation théorico-pratique encore à accomplir. A ce niveau, la méthode régressive-progressive de Sartre a été confrontée avec celle utilisée par Marx dans la critique de l'économie politique, afin d'en évaluer les points de proximité et de dépassement. Autour du deuxième axe, transversal au premier, on voit se profiler le noyau éminemment historico-politique : la compréhension dialectique des événements qui marquent subjectivement (et donc politiquement) le cours du temps historique, n'est pas séparable d'une interrogation sur l'historicité des sujets impliqués dans ce même mouvement. Pour cette raison, le statut de la subjectivité chez le Sartre des années 1960 a été interrogé à travers une analyse concernant le caractère normatif du social. Le focus sur la notion de normativité a permis, d'un côté, de comprendre l'intériorité réciproque entre la subjectivation et l'objectivation ; et, de l'autre, de fixer les bases pour une axiologie marxiste. Une telle approche permet de valoriser l'efficacité historique de la dimension éthique de la praxis, en l'assumant comme prisme à travers lequel Sartre analyse les problèmes posés par le stalinisme et les luttes de libération anticoloniale. Cela nous a conduit enfin à questionner la torsion imposée par Sartre à la notion de besoin qui devient, d'un point de vue matérialiste, la racine d'une éthique comme passage obligé pour toute politique. ; Il lavoro di ricerca si propone di circoscrivere, all'interno del pensiero sartriano de-gli anni '60, il perimetro mobile entro cui si definice l'etica come possibilità ulteriore del pensiero critico, come assunzione soggettiva della sua politicità. Lo spostamento operato nella riflessione storico-politica di Sartre si compie in una direzione – seguita finora solo parzialmente dagli interpreti ‒ volta ad assumere i manoscritti degli anni '60 sull'etica dialettica come complemento fondamentale dell'esperienza critica condotta nella Critique de la Raison dialectique (1960) ‒ il cui blocage, esito di un limite struttu-rale ed interno ad ogni concettualizzazione dell'esperienza storica, impedirà la pubbli-cazione del secondo tomo dell'opera. Nella Critique, la possibilità di rendere una storia intelligibile è sospesa alla rifondazione della dialettica come metodo d'indagine del concreto storico. A partire da tale rifondazione è possibile determinare tanto le basi epi-stemologiche di un'antropologia storica e strutturale, quanto le condizioni d'insorgenza dell'agire in comune degli uomini. Nella nostra lettura, tale prospettiva si sottrae alla logica del futuro anteriore, caratterizzante il moderno dispositivo sovranista. Fissati questi punti, la ricerca ruota attorno a due assi problematici principali. Il primo valuta, su un piano al contempo metodologico ed epistemologico, la tenuta del tentativo sar-triano di fornire una teoria della conoscenza al marxismo, reso possibile dalla convin-zione che quest'ultimo sia un esperimento teorico-pratico ancora da compiere. A questa altezza, il metodo regressivo-progressivo di Sartre viene confrontato con quello adottato dal Marx critico dell'economia politica, per valutarne i punti di vicinanza e di supera-mento. Attorno al secondo asse, trasversale al primo, si profila il plesso più propriamen-te storico-politico: la comprensione dialettica degli eventi che connotano in senso sog-gettivo (e quindi politico) il corso del tempo storico, non è separabile da un'interroga-zione sulla storicità dei soggetti che, in tale movimento, sono implicati. Per questo mo-tivo, lo statuto della soggettività nel pensiero sartriano degli anni '60 viene analizzato mediante un'interrogazione sul carattere normativo del sociale: il focus sulla nozione di normatività permette infatti da un lato, di comprendere l'interiorità reciproca di sogget-tivazione ed oggettivazione e, dall'altro, d'individuare le basi per un'assiologia marxi-sta. Tale prospettiva consente di valorizzare l'efficacia storica della dimensione etica 4 della praxis, attraverso cui Sartre analizza i problemi posti dallo stalinismo e dalle lotte di liberazione coloniale, ma anche d'illuminare la torsione cui egli sottopone la nozione di bisogno per farne, materialisticamente, la radice di un'etica che diviene passaggio obbligato per ogni politica.
The aim of this research is to delineate, within the Sartrian thought of the Sixties, the mobile perimeter inside which to define ethics as the overcoming possibility for a critical thought. In other words: as the subjective assumption of its political dimension. The shift of Sartre's historical-political thought follows a development not yet studied enough by scholars. The manuscripts of the Sixties about dialectical ethics appear as the fundamental completion of the dialectical experience of the Critique de la Raison dialectique (1960). Sartre was not able to publish the second part of the book during his life: indeed, the blockage of that work is the result of the structural limit of every attempt to conceptualize historical experience. In the Critique, the possibility to make a single history intelligible depends on a refoundation of dialectics as research method for concrete historical reality. Starting by such refoundation, it becomes possible to define the epistemological basis of a historical structural anthropology, and the conditions for the insurgence of human collective action at the same time. In our interpretation, this approach is out of a future perfect's logic that means out of the core of the modern sovereignty's system. Once fixed those points, the research moves around two principal problematic axis. The first evaluates the methodological and epistemological accuracy of Sartre's attempt to formulate a theory of knowledge for Marxism, considering this one as a theoretical-practical experiment yet to be done. At this point, Sartre's regressive-progressive method is compared to Marx's method of critique of political economy, evaluating affinity aspects and overcoming lines. Around the second axis, transverse to the first, the more properly historical-political plexus finds its profile: the dialectical comprehension of events connoting subjectively (that means politically) historical time's flow isn't detachable from questioning about the historicity of subjects involved in this flowing. For this ...
This article surfaces the different articolations of anarchism in a classical vision, in a new perspective denominated neo-anarchism, and in a hybridation with other contemporary philosophies like post-structuralism and critical theory that propose a post-anarchist thought.
trad. dalla lingua greca nella thoscana dall'eccellente phisico Pamphilo Fiorimbene ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: Augsburg, Staats- und Stadtbibliothek -- LG 1022
International audience ; Luca Salza, « Rosa Luxemburg, divenire-donna di Spartaco, o su una politica comunista a venire » K. Revue trans-européenne de philosophie et arts, 3-2/2019, pp.48-62 K. Revue trans-européenne de philosophie et arts, 3-2/2019 Luca Salza Rosa Luxemburg, divenire-donna di Spartaco, o su una politica comunista a venire ABSTRACT: In 73 B.C., the slaves rose up in Rome. This revolt founded a new myth for posterity, the War of the Poor, epitomized by a name: Spartacus. Two thousand years later, Spartacus reappears in Germany. To oppose the war. To determine another course of events. The return of the myth of Spartacus provides a revolutionary becoming for the German communists. The hypothesis of these pages is that, during the meeting with Rosa Luxemburg, Spartacus also experiences several metamorphosis. There is perhaps a becoming-woman of Spartacus. Certainly there are in the pages of Luxemburg leads for another communism to come.
International audience ; Luca Salza, « Rosa Luxemburg, divenire-donna di Spartaco, o su una politica comunista a venire » K. Revue trans-européenne de philosophie et arts, 3-2/2019, pp.48-62 K. Revue trans-européenne de philosophie et arts, 3-2/2019 Luca Salza Rosa Luxemburg, divenire-donna di Spartaco, o su una politica comunista a venire ABSTRACT: In 73 B.C., the slaves rose up in Rome. This revolt founded a new myth for posterity, the War of the Poor, epitomized by a name: Spartacus. Two thousand years later, Spartacus reappears in Germany. To oppose the war. To determine another course of events. The return of the myth of Spartacus provides a revolutionary becoming for the German communists. The hypothesis of these pages is that, during the meeting with Rosa Luxemburg, Spartacus also experiences several metamorphosis. There is perhaps a becoming-woman of Spartacus. Certainly there are in the pages of Luxemburg leads for another communism to come.
