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Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), French philosopher, followed a period of ruptures, that is, of conceptual and methodological changes in contemporary physics. He is one of several thinkers who presented important reflections for the understanding of contemporary atomistics. This article highlights the main philosophical reflections of Gaston Bachelard about the foundations of quantum mechanics. For that, it uses important concepts of its epistemology without which its ideas become incomprehensible. Thus, this work highlights how this science breaks with traditional scientific and philosophical ideas in the first half of the 20th century by presenting a new object of knowledge, namely, the quantum corpuscles. Furthermore, in order to characterize the philosophy of bachelardian quantum physics, according to the author, the nature of atomic particles stands out, as the scientific activity of this science in the creation of new phenomena is emphasized and its rationalism applied as philosophy is emphasized best suited to the new physics. Finally, it is emphasized in this work that Bachelard's ideas are different from other interpretations of quantum mechanics.

In this paper, I analyze John Dewey's concept of philosophy, in relation with its specificity within the pragmatic philosophical tradition. For this, I will approach the problem of the reconstruction of philosophy as Dewey presents in his work Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), a work in which he completely and explicitly exposes his concept of and what he believes to be the role of philosophy. In particular, I will characterize Dewey's concept of philosophy from his critique to what he think to be the problems of modern or traditional philosophies. From this point of view, I will examine Dewey's use of his postulate of immediate empiricism as a philosophical methodology to avoid the alleged misconceptions of past philosophies and to develop a philosophy of concrete experience.

Starting from our attention to the systematic divisions of the KrV, we address the chapter III of Analytic of principles and its theses on the transgression of reason and the negative expansion. Our proposal is to show the specificity of the concept of noumenon in relation to the other categories of understanding without neglecting its place within Transcendental Analytic. The peculiarity of this concept expresses in a privileged way the relation of critique to the limits of knowledge, since noumenon is a representation that is excluded from the possibility of intuition, but is included in the analysis of knowledge. We therefore intend to shed light on the arguments that, on the one hand, limit knowledge and, on the other hand, allow thought a way to go beyond experience. Thus, in the analysis activity that detaches itself from specific interests in favour of an impartial investigation, the critic's position can embrace the inside and the outside of the delimitation of knowledge.

In the "Commentary on the First Epistle of St. John", in a specific fragment of the text in which the focus is the Donatist controversy, Augustine states that despite the fact that love is an unavoidable norm for the true Christian life, in case of witnessing an action unjust, the Christian cannot passively accept such an act. However, in that same text, in another context, a kind of resignation is defended as proof that the Christian is in fact living a Christian practice permeated by the love of God. In De civitate Dei Livro XIX, in "On the customs of the Catholic Church and the Manicheans", and in other works, the same paradox persists: if on the one hand the Christian philosopher recognizes that even living in intense pain and suffering it is possible to conform and finding peace, a possible peace before the situation, on the other hand, defends that it is not fair for a man to submit to another since we are ontologically equal, therefore, apparently not encouraging eupathy in this unfair situation. Thus, our goal in this communication is: to investigate how we can understand the relationship between love and resignation, and whether both concepts can be applied to situations of flagrant injustice experienced or witnessed.

This paper aims to present, from the perspective of Edmund Husserl, the concepts of consciousness, subjectivity and time. For the development of such purpose, the following Huserlian original texts have been mainly utilized: Logical Investigations, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time and Cartesian Meditations. This text initially presents the concept of consciousness as a real phenomenological unity of the ego's experiences, as self-consciousness and as intentional experiences will be exposed. Subjectivity is approached based on the concepts of empirical self and pure self. Time, on the other hand, is explored from a phenomenological standpoint. Finally, the last item shows the intrinsic relationship established between the concepts of time and subjectivity, thus demonstrating the concept of the absolute flow of experiencing, which is timeless, and which is the ultimate and true absolute. Paradoxically, it demonstrates that it is in the actual flow that temporality is originated, and it is in the temporality, through experiences, that subjective life is put into effect and is consolidated; i.e., it clearly demonstrates that time is the catalyst for the development of subjectivity through temporal experiences and that it is in the essential autogenic relationship that conditions are created for the development of life in unity, whose process is characterized by openness to time, a flow in the live perpetuity of the now.

In this paper will investigate the criticisms presented by Gerald Allan Cohen of the difference principle asserted by the American philosopher John Rawls. Cohen claims that the difference principle allows for exorbitant inequalities and that these inequalities would undermine the ethos of solidarity assumed by Rawls. Against Cohen's criticisms, it will be emphasized the fact that the principles of justice as fairness must be read together (holistic reading), and therefore the inequalities allowed by the difference principle are much smaller than Cohen believed, since equal liberty, fair equality of opportunity, and the fair value of the equal political liberties must also be ensured. Thus, to ensure that the principles work together, it will be argued that the scope of the principle is much narrower than Cohen thought. It is emphasized that in Rawlsian thought there is no need for constant economic growth, and the principle of difference should not be seen as a market principle, on which its objective is not to be a mere principle of reparation, but a principle that affirms reciprocity between fellow citizens of a democratic society.