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In 2010, the 1923 Greek-Turkish Population Exchange Museum opened its doors as part of the Istanbul 2010 European Capital of Culture (ECoC) project. Presented as the first migration-themed museum of Turkey, it is a site of cultural recollection focused on family histories. Yet the museum, Iğsız argues, beyond being a site of memory, also crystallizes larger dynamics of cultural policy and recognition of alterity. Concentrating on the European Union Cultural Policy and the Istanbul 2010 ECoC, two official institutions that fund the museum, Iğsız analyzes the transnational dynamics of institutional and official endorsements of diversity and how such endorsements "museumize" culture for display. The article examines the limits of liberal multiculturalism as promoted in the EU cultural policy, revealing how Turkish officials have "discovered" liberal multiculturalism in the Ottoman past as a history of tolerance, which is manifested as a mode of neo-Ottomanism.

A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawlspresents a comprehensive overview of the historical development of all major aspects of analytic philosophy, the dominant Anglo-American philosophical tradition in the twentieth century.Features coverage of all the major subject areas andfiguresin analytic philosophy - including Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, Gottlob Frege, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Kripke, Putnam, and many othersContains explanatory background material to help make clear technical philosophical conceptsIncludes listings of suggested further readingsWritten in a clear, direct style that presupposes little previous knowledge of philosophy Stephen P. Schwartzis Professor Emeritus in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Ithaca College, New York. He has published numerous articles in leading analytic philosophy journals.

Throughout his career, Deleuze developed a series of original philosophies of time and applied them successfully to many different fields. Now James Williams presents Deleuze's philosophy of time as the central concept that connects his philosophy as a whole. Through this conceptual approach, the book covers all the main periods of Deleuze's philosophy: the early studies of Hume, Nietzsche, Kant, Bergson and Spinoza, the two great philosophical works, Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense, the Capitalism and Schizophrenia works with Guattari, and the late influential studies of literature, film and painting. The result is an important reading of Deleuze and the first full interpretation of his philosophy of time

The article summarizes the results of the historical and philosophical research "Collection of ancient stories" (Konjaku monogatari-shū, 1120s). This largest Ja­panese collection of setsuwa tales paints a picture of world history from the era of Buddha to the age of mappō, "Decline of Buddhist Teaching", tracing the milestones in the spread of Buddhism in India, China and Japan. The two most important Buddhist attitudes – the world is impermanent and at the same time each event is embedded into a universal system of cause-and-effect rela­tionships – are reflected not only at the level of the content of an individual story, but also at the level of connecting stories into a holistic narrative. All events have instructive educative? meaning; everyday experience always leads to the same conclusions as the teachings of Buddha. In this experience, a person in­evitably makes some connections – with other people, living and dead, with ani­mals and spirits, gods and buddhas – and these connections involving this person in the cycle of birth and death, if properly understood, provide the basis for liber­ation. The narrator draws a line between a proper and an inappropriate under­standing of what is happening, talking about the "immeasurable" (grief, joy, fear, etc.), and thus allows the readers to find the "measure", kagiri, in their relation to what is happening. The march of time can be understood both as a general move­ment from the best to the worst, and – on small intervals – as a reverse move­ment from grief to happiness, from misunderstanding to understanding. A person is free to choose which events to keep in memory and which to forget; people make this choice whilst instructive storytelling, and setsuwa tradition preserves it.

Performance philosophy commences with an impertinent gesture when it describes itself as inaugurating a 'new field' of study. Accompanying that claim is a radical proposition that 'performance thinks'; that it should be counted as a form of philosophising in its own right. But in what sense can performance be construed as 'genuinely' philosophical thought? Taking my cue from Laura Cull's alignment of performance philosophy with Laruelle's practice of 'non philosophy' – and specifically, with its introduction of 'democracy' into the dispositives of 'standard' philosophy in order to challenge its transcendental authority over the Real – I argue that performance philosophy might be seen to enact a similar disruption of the 'dispositives' of performance theory. This, however, is only partly what is at stake in the fundamental proposition of performance philosophy, and I conclude by suggesting that a more radical proposal lies behind its assertion of a new 'field' – one that does not reduce it to an empirical fact, but grasps it as a radical 'utopian' hypothesis designed to 'open up' the philosophical dimension of performance itself; utopian because what performance offers – seen in this way - is not simply another system of representation but a possible democratic thought of the Real itself.

Performance philosophy commences with an impertinent gesture when it describes itself as inaugurating a 'new field' of study. Accompanying that claim is a radical proposition that 'performance thinks'; that it should be counted as a form of philosophising in its own right. But in what sense can performance be construed as 'genuinely' philosophical thought? Taking my cue from Laura Cull's alignment of performance philosophy with Laruelle's practice of 'non philosophy' – and specifically, with its introduction of 'democracy' into the dispositives of 'standard' philosophy in order to challenge its transcendental authority over the Real – I argue that performance philosophy might be seen to enact a similar disruption of the 'dispositives' of performance theory. This, however, is only partly what is at stake in the fundamental proposition of performance philosophy, and I conclude by suggesting that a more radical proposal lies behind its assertion of a new 'field' – one that does not reduce it to an empirical fact, but grasps it as a radical 'utopian' hypothesis designed to 'open up' the philosophical dimension of performance itself; utopian because what performance offers – seen in this way - is not simply another system of representation but a possible democratic thought of the Real itself.

AbstractThis study argues that the early philosophy of Semyon Liudvigovich Frank (1877–1950) exhibits significant intellectual correlations with nineteenth century German Idealist philosophy. The idealists in question are Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796–1879), G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831) and F.W.J. Schelling (1775–1854). It will be suggested that the critical tension of Frank's early philosophy is precisely a tension between his Hegelian and Schellingian tendencies. The paper will first introduce Frank's theory of a "personal absolute", exploring its surprising parallels with the religious philosophy of I. H. Fichte. The analysis then addresses the self-dispersal of Hegel's absolute, before finally turning to Schelling's immediate intuition of subject-object identity.

The purely philosophical concerns of Theodor W. Adorno's negative dialectic would seem to be far removed from the concreteness of critical theory; Adorno's philosophy considers perhaps the most traditional subject of "pure" philosophy, the structure of experience, whereas critical theory examines specific aspects of society. But, as Brian O'Connor demonstrates in this highly original interpretation of Adorno's philosophy, the negative dialectic can be seen as the theoretical foundation of the reflexivity or critical rationality required by critical theory. Adorno, O'Connor argues, is committed to the "concretion" of philosophy: his thesis of nonidentity attempts to show that reality is not reducible to appearances. This lays the foundation for the applied "concrete" critique of appearances that is essential to the possibility of critical theory. To explicate the context in which Adorno's philosophy operates--the tradition of modern German philosophy, from Kant to Heidegger--O'Connor examines in detail the ideas of these philosophers as well as Adorno's self-defining differences with them. O'Connor discusses Georg LucA cs and the influence of his "protocritical theory" on Adorno's thought; the elements of Kant's and Hegel's German idealism appropriated by Adorno for his theory of subject-object mediation; the priority of the object and the agency of the subject in Adorno's epistemology; and Adorno's important critiques of Kant and the phenomenology of Heidegger and Husserl, critiques that both illuminate Adorno's key concepts and reveal his construction of critical theory through an engagement with the problems of philosophy.