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I / Preliminary Distinctions -- 1. Language and Linguistic Utterances -- 2. Descriptive Statements -- 3. The Use and Mention of Signs -- II / Theories of Meaning -- 1. Realistic Semantic Theories -- 2. Behavioristic Theories of Meaning -- 3. Quine's Philosophy of Language -- 4. Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language in the Philosophical Investigations -- III / Theories of Grammar -- 1. Traditional Grammar -- 2. Logical Grammar -- 3. Generative Grammar -- IV / Language and Reality -- 1. The Thesis of the Role Language Plays in Experience -- 2. The Role of Vocabulary -- 3. The Role of Grammar -- 4. The Epistemological Problematic of the Relativity Thesis -- Index of Subjects -- Index of Logical Symbols.

In this bold new book, Jim Vernon develops the general theory of language implicitly contained in the writings of G.W.F. Hegel. Vernon offers novel readings of Hegel's central works in order to explain his views on some long neglected topics and as such demonstrates that his accounts of representation, the concept and the speculative sentence can be used to create sophisticated theories of language acquisition, universal grammar and linguistic practice. Hegel's defence of a scientific philosophy that is necessary and universal seems to eliminate the need for a philosophical linguistics. Since

Russell and the linguistic philosophy -- I. The quest for logical form -- Reference and meaning -- Two senses of "logical form" -- Logical form, propositional constituents, and reconstructionism -- The "logically perfect" language -- The theory of acquaintance -- Proper names -- The "minimum vocabulary" -- Summary and conclusion -- II. The uses of reconstructionism -- The theory of descriptions -- The analysis of class-symbols -- The logical construction of physical objects -- Conclusion -- III. Critique of Russell's philosophy of language -- The theory of acquaintance -- The doctrine of logical form -- Philosophical analysis as elucidation of ontological structure -- Selected Bibliography.

Habermas does not rule out the possibility of violence in language. In fact his account explicitly licenses a broad conception of violence as 'systematically distorted communication'. Yet he does rule out the possibility that language simultaneously imposes as it discloses. That is, his argument precludes the possibility of recognizing that there is an antinomy at the heart of language and philosophical reason. This occlusion of the simultaneously world-disclosing and world-imposing character of language feeds and sustains Habermas's legal and political arguments, where he states that in order to achieve consensus rational deliberation must eliminate force. In this paper, I claim that this argument operates through a manoeuvre that leaves Habermas's position curiously blind to its own predicament. To explain why, I turn to Kant's treatment of the problem of evil in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Here, as in the Western philosophical tradition more generally, evil has no separate existence: it is folded back into Kant's philosophical scheme. Arendt notes that as soon as Kant identifies the problem of evil he rationalizes it into comprehensible motives. I will show how, through a move that is structurally similar to Kant's rationalization of evil, Habermas rationalizes and attempts to eliminate violence from his consideration of law and language. In Habermas's work, law and language appear as ciphers for reason. The case to be made here is that Habermas's inability to recognize the paradoxical character of language and reason makes his work blind to the violence in which it is unavoidably implicated.

2: The Problem of Sentential Unity -- 2.1 The Asymmetry Thesis -- 2.2 The Related Designation Theory -- 2.3 The Two Views Compared -- 3: The Sense-Reference Distinction -- 3.1 The Sense-Reference Distinction -- 3.2 The Sense-Reference Distinction In Pr?bh?kara -- 3.3 The Sense-Reference Distinction In Buddhist Philosophy Of Language -- 3.4 Related Designation And apoha Semantics -- 4: Talk About the Non-Existent -- 4.1 Are Absences Perceived Or Inferred? -- 4.2 Conceptual Constructions -- 4.3 Affirmation, Denial, And Reference -- 4.4 Talking About The Non-Existent -- 4.5 Objections And Replies -- 4.6 The Alternatives -- References.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Series Editor's Foreword -- 0 Introduction -- 0.1 Expressive and representational semantics -- 0.2 The received view -- 0.3 Themes -- 1 Intuitionistic Formalism -- 1.1 What was Intuitionistic Formalism? -- 1.1.1 A puzzle about concepts and definitions -- 1.1.2 Tarski, Le´sniewski and Intuitionistic Formalism -- 1.1.3 Formalism -- 1.2 Le´sniewski -- 1.2.1 Le´sniewski's early work -- 1.2.2 Le´sniewski's later work -- 1.3 Kotarbi ´ nski -- 1.4 Tarski in context -- 1.4.1 The axiomatic method -- 1.4.2 Monism vs tolerance -- 1.4.3 Five doctrines -- 1.4.4 Tarski's project -- 2 Tarski as Intuitionistic Formalist -- 2.1 The early metamathematical works -- 2.1.1 Axiomatizing consequence -- 2.1.2 Relativization to a deductive science -- 2.2 Explicit definition -- 2.2.1 Defining definition -- 2.2.2 Two conceptions of definition -- 2.2.3 Padoa's method -- 2.3 Categoricity and completeness of terms -- 2.3.1 Provable monotransformability -- 2.3.2 Absolute monotransformability -- 2.4 Theory and concept -- 3 Semantics -- 3.1 Philosophical resistance -- 3.1.1 The quantifier -- 3.1.2 Paradox -- 3.2 Mathematical acceptance -- 3.3 Intuitionistic Formalism in "On Definable Sets" -- 3.3.1 The intuitive notion of definability -- 3.3.2 Defining definable sets vs defining "Defines" -- 4 Truth -- 4.1 Convention T -- 4.1.1 Terminological notes -- 4.1.2 Truth in the Lvov-Warsaw school -- 4.1.3 Semantic concepts in a mathematical theory -- 4.1.4 T-sentences -- 4.2 Tarski's definitions -- 4.2.1 Truth for the language of the calculus of classes -- 4.2.2 Higher order and polyadicity -- 4.2.3 Domain relativization and consequence -- 4.3 Evaluating Tarski's account -- 4.3.1 Familiar questions -- 4.3.2 Tarskian definitions and Tarski's "theory" -- 4.3.3 Reduction and physicalism -- 4.3.4 Correspondence and deflationism.

This article outlines the philosophy of language of the vitalist philosopher Ludwig Klages, as it can be found in his late work Language as the Source of Psychology ( Die Sprache als Quell der Seelenkunde). First published in 1948, this treatise is full of examples of how everyday usage of words should give us pause for thought – underlining the link between philosophy and life that is inherent to the project of vitalism or Lebensphilosophie. In line with the remit for submissions to this issue of the Journal of European Studies intended to mark 50 years since its inception, the article reflects the interest of its contributor (translation studies and the history of ideas), forms part of a larger project to retrieve the thought of a largely forgotten thinker, and showcases a work that occupies a key position in the history of twentieth-century thought and has been seminal to the contributor's own development. For ultimately Klages's philosophy of language illustrates the truth of Goethe's maxim, 'the point of life is life itself'.

Ernst Tugendhat's major work, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie (1976), was translated into English in 1982. Although trained in Heideggerian phenomenological and hermeneutical thinking, Tugendhat increasingly came to believe that the most appropriate approach to philosophy was an analytical one. This influential work grew from that conviction and brought new perspectives to some of the central and abiding questions of metaphysics and the philosophy of language. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Hans-Johann Glock, illuminating its enduring importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this impressive work has been revived for a new generation of readers