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The author initiates the article with the theory that the concept of sovereignty significantly differs in the late Middle Ages & the early modern age. Bodin gave to the sovereign the competency to both legislate & command, thus creating a significant shift forward from the medieval monarchical competency. Although he connected the two competencies, he was still unable to make the sovereign master of law but only master of statutes, with some limitations. The modern age recognizes two types of sovereignty: sovereignty of the sovereign & sovereignty of the people. The first case deals with absolute monarchies, while the second is concerned with democracies. Today, only the latter case is politically relevant. The author differentiates between 'the people' as a group of autonomous individuals, & 'the people' as an organic entity. The first form of political unity comes from autonomous individuals, & sees in the government only limiting power, while the second sees the basis for political unity in the whole of the ethnic body, culture, language, religion, history, etc. The second form has its roots in the romanticism of the 19th century; since the fall of socialist systems, it is again dominant in political thought & practice. The author warns of the dangers of one-sided use of organic unity in the creation of political communities & considers a combination of national & individual elements (democratic & liberal) the only successful basis for sovereignty. Adapted from the source document.

The author distinguishes between the antiquity's & Middle Ages' teachings on natural law & justice as a virtue & the modern-age Hobbes' theory of the prerequisites of the legal system. Hobbes' theory identifies the prerequisites of the legal system & describes the institution of legal constraint which guarantees the rule of law. The author points to the central historical difference between these paradigms. Finally, the author traces the evolution of Hobbes' paradigm in Kant's philosophy of right. Adapted from the source document.

Ages ago, Plato understood justice as the purport & the essential purpose of the very existence of the state. Though Plato distinguishes between the political justice of the state & the personal justice of the individual soul, it was Aristotle who in his practical philosophy developed, apart from the general justice, an appropriate understanding of the special or particular justice & its significance for social progress. The first part of this paper deals with the different types of justice, & the second with civil society. In order to understand the contemporary theories of political justice & the roles of civil society in its realization, the author looks into the history of the European political thought & "civil society," since "civic" or "civil society" ("societas civilis"), was originally a political society. In modernity, Hegel began differentiating between the state as a political community & the "civil society" as a nonpolitical society; his intention was not to separate but to integrate them by means of the public scrutiny & the citizens' governance, Thus Hegel linked Locke's & Montesquieu's opposing definitions of the relationship between the civil society & the state. This is all the more important since Hegel's philosophy is often misinterpreted as the state totalitarianism since we overlook the dangers coming, especially today, both from the civil society reduced to economy & the absolute state, the dangers that Hegel, with his concept of customariness, detected & avoided. 11 References. Adapted from the source document.

Mixed government, which is commonly regarded as a distinctly medieval form of government, is relevant also to contemporary constitutional states. It is the best form of government, since the aristocratic element is a continuous source of virtue, especially of justice, & a check not only on the executive, as the monarchical element which is the seat of political power, & the legislature, as the democratic element which expresses the will of the majority, but also groups & institutions that have the might & will to impose themselves as oligarchies. Mixed government is also the form of government that is practiced by most developed contemporary constitutional states: US, UK, France, Switzerland, Germany, etc. European nobility is the original aristocratic institution, by virtue of the fact that it was a system for the transfer of both virtue & general conditions of life. Three institutions that emerged in the late Middle Ages assumed structures & functions of the nobility. The first is the clergy. When, as a result of the differentiation of feudal society ethical & intellectual virtues of the nobility could no longer maintain general conditions of life, the clergy, by virtue of their abstract knowledge that ranged from philosophy & theology to law & medicine, became a class of new experts in generalities & thereby a new aristocracy. The second modern aristocratic institution is the judiciary, which has a structure & function similar to earlier aristocracies. The task of judges is to establish the highest virtue of constitutionalism. It is justice by law, which regulates general conditions of life in the state & society. What qualifies judges for the task is expertise in the new generality. The expertise includes not only education & experience in law but also impeccable private life & demonstrated professional ethics. The third modern aristocratic institution is the profession, whose most important instance is the legal profession. It shares its structure & function partly with the judiciary & partly with other professions. It seems that modern professions are degenerating. In the key area of data processing, due to rapid changes of technology, professions as systems of the transfer of virtue do not even seem to be possible. Professional aristocracies are replaced increasingly by oligarchies of capitalists & technocrats. Adapted from the source document.

The current trends in media industry (in the text referred to as concentration trend, diversification, globalization, & deregulation) bring up the question of the scope of classical liberal theory when faced with the challenges of new communication technologies. The convergence of the market & the capital, the interests from the point of view of ownership & the commercialization of mass media make up the contextual framework of the debate about certain limitations of the principles of classical liberal theory concerning freedom of the press & media in general. 1 Table, 10 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author emphasizes the necessity of linking thought & action in order to avoid the dangers of calamitous abstractions of sheer philosophy & sheer politics. Only a tension between philosophy & politics can be fruitful both for philosophy & politics. Jaspers's political writings, the author thinks, are not an appendage of philosophy but its component part. Philosophy is political in itself because it exists & functions solely in freedom. Nevertheless, Jaspers is not an acolyte of Plato's thesis about rulers-philosophers but of Kant's demand that philosophers have the right to speak in public. A man as a man is not only a political but also a philosophical being whose freedom depends on the encounter of philosophy & politics. This does not mean to neglect the fact that philosophers & politicians are faced with a different set of tasks. Adapted from the source document.

The author analyzes the concept of neoclassicism in contemporary political philosophy. The study begins with a description of contemporary neoclassical developments & continues with a precise delineation of Plato's & Aristotle's philosophy of politics. In the end, the author concludes that the antiquity-inspired philosophy of politics today has the corrective function to steer liberal society towards community. Adapted from the source document.

In the wake of the 'Kant revival,' which has spawned a plethora of works on his philosophy by its contemporary interpreters & advocates such as Herbert Schnadelbach, Hans Lenk, Konrad Cramer, Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, Volker Gerhardt, Karl-Otto Apel, Otfried Hoffe & others (whose studies were published this year under the title of Kant in der Diskussion der Moderne), the author tries to prove, by means of an analysis of Kant's treatise Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fur die Praxis, that not only did Kant in his later works draft & expound the program of a practical philosophy of morality & right, politics, & history, but also that in the last three chapters of this work, this philosophy evolves into a modern liberal theory of morality, state law, & international or "international civil" law built around the central principle of Kant's practical philosophy: "Was aus Vernunftgrunden fur die Theorie gilt, das gilt auch fur die Praxis.". Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the meaning of law in Kant's practical philosophy for the constitution of a political community. First, he defines the specific character of modern knowledge by referring to Heidegger & Fink & how this knowledge is reflected in Kant's philosophy of morality & law. Then he goes on to define the external legislation & list its applications. After the author has defined Kant's concept of law, he shows how freedom & its security -- not happiness, well-being, or interest -- are central to Kant's political philosophy. Freedom becomes the foundation of all activities & laws, & freedom can only be based on law & not morality. Thus, individual freedom is possible solely within a law-abiding community. Adapted from the source document.

Hannah Arendt pondered the meaning of the concept of the faculty of judgment from the philosophical angle in relation to a concrete historical phenomenon, the epoch she characterized as the "bankruptcy of human sanity," ie, the epoch of national socialism. That bankruptcy was primarily manifested as a failure of the so-called faculty of judgment, in an age that was witnessing some radical changes in the historical & social conditions of the totality of the practice of life. That is why Arendt is searching for a way out in the so-called reflective faculty of judgments, an alternative for the deficiencies & difficulties of the determining faculty of judgment that it manifests at the time of sweeping crises. In Kant, Hannah Arendt finds the elements of political philosophy that could explain the problematics of the political. However, she does not find these elements in his political philosophy, as might be expected, but in his philosophy of the faculty of judgment. 28 References. Adapted from the source document.

Hannah Arendt pondered the meaning of the concept of the faculty of judgment from the philosophical angle in relation to a concrete historical phenomenon, the epoch she characterized as the "bankruptcy of human sanity," ie, the epoch of national socialism. That bankruptcy was primarily manifested as a failure of the so-called faculty of judgment, in an age that was witnessing some radical changes in the historical & social conditions of the totality of the practice of life. That is why Arendt is searching for a way out in the so-called reflective faculty of judgments, an alternative for the deficiencies & difficulties of the determining faculty of judgment that it manifests at the time of sweeping crises. In Kant, Hannah Arendt finds the elements of political philosophy that could explain the problematics of the political. However, she does not find these elements in his political philosophy, as might be expected, but in his philosophy of the faculty of judgment. 28 References. Adapted from the source document.

According to the author, the difference between Hegel & Kant regarding the definition of the idea of perpetual peace is indicative of their radically different concepts of philosophy. The first philosophy strives, through the sober acceptance of what really is, to point out where improvements are needed. The second talks about the reconciliation of reason & reality & is consequently frequently dubbed despondent. Nevertheless, according to the author, this difference between Hegel & Kant (which in certain postulates looks incompatible) is less principle-based than is usually thought, since Kant's moral & philosophical requirements regarding politics are meaningful only if there is an underlying confidence as to the historical efficacy of the reason. Adapted from the source document.

This article attempts to show the beginnings of Croatian political science. The author considers the 16th-century practical philosophy & political work of Croatian political historians Ivan Polikarp Severitan, Franjo Petric, & Nikola Vitov Gucetic. In spite of the fact that Croatian political philosophy is considerably more diverse in this century, these authors were chosen because their work is representative of the whole, & is quite significant in the development of political science. All wrote about politics & discussed political themes -- especially the creation & function of the political community, government, & authority -- within the parameters long since established by Aristotle. Except for their nationality & ties to the region, the three authors were concerned with actual problems of their era, & were included in political discussions, ie, the identification of sovereignty & postulates upon which political communities are formed. They reaffirmed Greek principles of creation of the state on the basis of unity of ethics, policy, & other attributes. Through these authors, active in different times of the 16th century, we can see a progression in political philosophy -- from a close tie to scholastics to politics as a practical art that adapts to opportunities & conditions. Adapted from the source document.

The author's starting point is the principle of contemporary phenomenology: we are able to comprehend & adequately evaluate our own & new regimes in general, only if familiar with their predecessors & their traditions in their otherness. Naturally, in this paper the otherness is neither the essential natural world nor its cosmological structuredness as a universe, but a historical & political world as well as the possibilities of its alterations & transformations. Despite the changes it has gone through in the course of history, it has retained its cultural-historical continuity & its "fundamental features" in the form of a certain, in Husserl's words, "contingent a priori," that precedes certain cultural & historical experiences, but not "the entire experience," as Waldenfels points out. In order to adequately grasp these complex problems of cultural & political world, the author refers to Aristotle who, when asked in the second volume of his Politics about the best state, uses the then known forms of the state to show "what is right & useful in them" & what is not, & also that it is possible not only to transcend the existing forms but to elaborate them & search for "something new." Contrary to the modern reduction of the concept of the state to "the organization of government," Aristotle defines the state by means of three prerequisites: the land, the people, & the government & "always by one of these three components, while the other two are somehow implied." Thus, in all its various forms, the state always includes all these three components: the land as territory, the people as identity & the sum of its citizens, & sovereign government as state authority of the people. Regarding the opportunities for political activity in the contemporary global world, the author opts for a certain practical philosophy that, despite the universal crisis of today's society shows that the practice of good life is still possible & that not everybody has given up on it. This also means that in reflecting upon & in accomplishing the good life it is possible to build upon Aristotle's practical philosophy. Besides the phenomenological & practical philosophy, the final part of the paper looks into the political philosophy of American communitarians & shows that communitarian universalism & historicism are complementary to the European phenomenological & hermeneutical philosophy & productively assist it in developing a new historical thinking as practical knowledge that is applicable to our contemporary situation & that, historically, & in a variety of spheres & at different levels enables us to act ethically/politically in today's global world. 12 References. Adapted from the source document.

Kant's philosophy in its entirety outgrew its Humeist heritage of rational empiricism, ie, relativism. This relativism is particularly unwelcome in the realm of morality -- hence his philosophy of a priori concepts. Since law, as the minimum of morality, would be invalidated by the political (value) relativism, Kant has no politics apart from law -- specifically civil, Roman law -- which he declares natural (& absolutely rational). Roman private legal principles are the axiomatic foundations on which a structure of deductional theorems of political reasoning is erected. Ubi ius ibi remedium is the central principle, which serves to deny & circumvent rights -- including the right to revolt -- that would make up a set of political supra "rights." In the age of enlightened absolutism -- a schematic derivative of the philosophy of rationalism -- government ceased to be diffuse. Its bearers became too unequivocal, & the whole system turned into a highly visible & assailable target. For Kant (as well as for Hobbes), anarchy is the worst form of tyranny. While Montesquieu & Rousseau sought refuge from tyranny in the diffusion of power, & Raynal & Mably claimed that the right to resist oppression is not only the ultimate remedium but a civil duty, Kant (long before the French revolution & Burke) considers as nonpermissible not only the right to resist oppression but also that against revolutions instigated by legitimate sovereigns. Adapted from the source document.