This text deals with the teaching of philosophy, trying to highlight its value in secondary education, for the development of personal autonomy and the global formation of a democratic citizenship. The starting point is the experience of teaching philosophy to future secondary education philosophy teachers, based on a conception of philosophy formulated by the Italian philosopher G. Vattimo and linked to the so-called right to philosophy formulated by the French philosopher J. Derrida. From this point of view, the form and function of the teaching of philosophy in secondary education are examined. And, in conclusion, as measures to reinforce and improve the fulfillment of its aims, the recourse to the thematic heritage of the so-called history of philosophy in teaching and the use of objective tests in the evaluation are proposed.
This paper examines the relationship between poetry and philosophy in the sophists, asking what role earlier traditions of poetry and song played in their work. The sophists' influence on various genres of literature and philosophy is widely acknowledged, but, as this paper shows, the influence of earlier traditions of poetry and myth on their work was no less important. The paper demonstrates too how the sophists' engagement with the poetic tradition, like that of the Presocratics, was geared primarily to serve their philosophical or didactic goals, even if the aesthetic benefits of poetic language and style were also appreciated and exploited. Moreover, the sophists recognized poetry's important role in education, and their varied use of poetic language, style, and content in their own teaching was a continuation of this traditional aspect of poetry. In conclusion, the sophists' work on rhetorical, political, and ethical issues engaged with, and was enriched by, the shared poetic culture of their time.
This article adresses democracy problem, as it has been thought by a group of Chilean philosophers, in relation to military dictatorship, transition to democracy and post-authoritarian democracy's consolidation.We expone their critic to post-authoritarian democracy and its theoretical sustenance: the elitarian democratic theories and the consociative model. We also present the authors's democracy concept: this concept defends normative dimension of politics, the multidimensionality of democracy and participation. Finally, we reflect on authors contributions to think on an alternative democratic order. ; Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana publica bajo licencia Creative Commons Atribución-No Comercial-Compartir Igual 4.0 Internacional (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0). Más información en https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
In this article I focus on the concept of habit in Kant's philosophy. First of all, I concentrate on the criticisms he delineates against Gewohnheit in his epistemological and moral philosophy. In particular, habit is seen as absence of moral freedom. This conclusion is pretty different from Kant's position expressed in his Anthropology From the Pragmatic Point of View and in the last part of the Conflict of the Faculties. After a deep insight on the different terms referred to the conceptual field of habit, I focus on the relation between Gewohnheit and desire: in fact, Kant recognized that habit is not the mere repetition of an act, but more precisely it is the desire of repetition. That is why it is not strictly bonded to the deterministic world and it does not refer to machines: only the living beings may have habits. This way, it is possible to understand its role within the theme of health: in the reflections on dietetics, habit is particularly useful. The last part of the article is devoted to the new perspective on Kantian political philosophy opened by this positive view on this concept. ; En este artículo me centro en el concepto de hábito en la filosofía de Kant. En primer lugar, me enfoco en las críticas que él delinea contra Gewohnheit en su filosofía epistemológica y moral. En particular, el hábito es visto como ausencia de libertad moral. Esta conclusión es bastante diferente a la posición expresada por Kant en su Antropología en sentido pragmático y en la última parte de El conflicto de las facultades. Tras profundizar sobre los diferentes términos referidos al campo conceptual del hábito, me concentro en la relación entre Gewohnheit y deseo: de hecho, Kant reconoció que el hábito no es una mera repetición de un acto, sino, más precisamente, es el deseo de repetición. Es por esto que no está estrictamente ligado al mundo determinista y no se refiere a máquinas: solo los seres vivos podrían tener hábitos. De esta forma, es posible comprender su rol en el tema de la salud: en la reflexión sobre dietética, el hábito es particularmente útil. La última parte del artículo está consagrada a la nueva perspectiva en la filosofía política kantiana abierta por esta visión positiva de este concepto.
En este artículo me centro en el concepto de hábito en la filosofía de Kant. En primer lugar, me enfoco en las críticas que él delinea contra Gewohnheit en su filosofía epistemológica y moral. En particular, el hábito es visto como ausencia de libertad moral. Esta conclusión es bastante diferente a la posición expresada por Kant en su Antropología en sentido pragmático y en la última parte de El conflicto de las facultades. Tras profundizar sobre los diferentes términos referidos al campo conceptual del hábito, me concentro en la relación entre Gewohnheit y deseo: de hecho, Kant reconoció que el hábito no es una mera repetición de un acto, sino, más precisamente, es el deseo de repetición. Es por esto que no está estrictamente ligado al mundo determinista y no se refiere a máquinas: solo los seres vivos podrían tener hábitos. De esta forma, es posible comprender su rol en el tema de la salud: en la reflexión sobre dietética, el hábito es particularmente útil. La última parte del artículo está consagrada a la nueva perspectiva en la filosofía política kantiana abierta por esta visión positiva de este concepto. Palabras clave: Kant, hábitos, vida, filosofía política moderna, libertad. ABSTRACT In this article I focus on the concept of habit in Kant's philosophy. First of all, I concentrate on the criticisms he delineates against Gewohnheit in his epistemological and moral philosophy. In particular, habit is seen as absence of moral freedom. This conclusion is pretty different from Kant's position expressed in his Anthropology From the Pragmatic Point of View and in the last part of the Conflict of the Faculties. After a deep insight on the different terms referred to the conceptual field of habit, I focus on the relation between Gewohnheit and desire: in fact, Kant recognized that habit is not the mere repetition of an act, but more precisely it is the desire of repetition. That is why it is not strictly bonded to the deterministic world and it does not refer to machines: only the living beings may have habits. This way, it is possible to understand its role within the theme of health: in the reflections on dietetics, habit is particularly useful. The last part of the article is devoted to the new perspective on Kantian political philosophy opened by this positive view on this concept. Keywords: Kant, Habits, Life, Modern Political Philosophy, Freedom.
Hegel saw modern philosophy as internally divided between its metaphysics and epistemology, on the one hand, and its political philosophy, on the other. Descartes had developed a metaphysics of totality to ground the epistemological certainty of the cogito, treating true unity as a unity of opposites (a totality). But political philosophy, in its empiricist and formalist forms, relied on an impoverished conception of unity—treating it, respectively, as a mere aggregation of parts or as formal consistency. The Philosophy of Right thus attempted to rectify the deficiencies of political philosophy by grounding it on the Cartesian concept of totality. ; Hegel consideraba que la filosofía moderna estaba internamente dividida entre su metafísica y epistemología, por un lado, y su filosofía política, por otro. Descartes había desarrollado una metafísica de la totalidad para fundamentar la certeza epistemológica del cogito, tratando la unidad verdadera como una unidad de contrarios (una totalidad). Pero la filosofía política, en sus formas empirista y formalista, se basaba en una concepción empobrecida de la unidad, tratándola, respectivamente, como una mera agregación de partes o como una consistencia formal. La Filosofía del Derecho trató, pues, de subsanar las deficiencias de la filosofía política basándose en el concepto cartesiano de totalidad.
El objetivo de este artícues mostrar la relevancia que la filosofía de las ciencias sociales (FCS) tiene para la investigación que llevan a cabo las disciplinas sociales. Identifico qué obstáculos han impedido reconocer su importancia, al tiempo que sugiero algunas estrategias para revertirlos. Así, señalaré que, en el contexto local de las ciencias sociales, la comprensión parcial de los compromisos intelectuales de la filosofía de la ciencia (FC) ha constituido un primer obstáculo. Explicaré cómo puede corregirse esa visión parcial, señalando cuál es el valor de las preguntas de carácter filosófico y cómo complementan el trabajo epistemológico de las ciencias sociales. Un segundo obstáculo la condición de autosuficiencia que las propias ciencias sociales conciben con respecto a los debates epistemológicos de su trabajo. En la última parte expondré mediante tres ejemplos cómo la FCS hace aportaciones importantes sobre debates que son cruciales en las ciencias sociales contemporáneas: la causalidad social, el papel de la interpretación y la objetividad científica.
"This book is an enquiry into memory in the Western world. Specifically, memory is the framework of culture, because it links the present to the past--or tradition--and projects it into the future. For this reason, any work focusing on memory involves a double challenge: (1) to reveal the origin of concepts and (2) to glimpse the course of thoughts. This is the case of the present volume, in which the authors make several tastings of Europe's intellectual heritage, by taking into account both the Greek origin of this legacy and its relevance for understanding the European philosophical heritage. In particular, these papers focus on the Aristotelian tradition, the true keystone of Europe, and on other currents of thought that have also played an essential role in the intellectual evolution of the Old Continent. In the latter field, there are contributions, for instance, on philosophical-religious traditions such as Orphism or on certain fundamental aspects of Neoplatonism both in the Classical World and in Christian authors. The volume concludes with various works on the survival of these intellectual trends from the Renaissance to the present day. Consequently, this work offers the opportunity to delve deeper into some of the aspects that define Western civilisation, observed both from its origin and its evolution over the centuries. The volume contains papers in Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and English."--
War is an activity that transcends the military plane on which is normally articulated. It is an inherently political activity endowed with a logic of its own, a logic of transformation that is very different from any linear approach familiar from daily life. War is a social reality that needs to be studied scientifically. Ignorance about it, as with any disease, is not a good thing. ; La guerra es una actividad que escapa al plano militar por donde normalmente es vehiculada. Es una actividad inherentemente política y dotada de una lógica propia, una lógica de transformación bien distinta de la aproximación lineal con la que se manejan los asuntos cotidianos. La guerra es una realidad social que precisa ser estudiada científicamente; de la ignorancia, al igual que sucede en cualquier enfermedad, no se desprende nada bueno.
En este ensayo se establece una vinculación entre la actual situación venezolana y el así denominado postmodernismo, que, según sus voceros, por una parte, ha derrumbado o aniquilado a la fi losofía moderna, esto es, la de Kant y Hegel, que desarrollaron lo contenido en la Ilustración, y por otra parte, todo su fundamento, la razón, habría también concluido su hegemonía. ¿Habría que entender entonces que lo desarrollado por las fi losofías modernas carece de vigencia? ¿La libertad humana, y los mecanismos para protegerla y desarrollarla en lo social y lo político carecen de todo valor? ¿Los derechos universales del hombre y del ciudadano, la separación de los poderes públicos, el derecho de propiedad, son sólo monstruos productos del sueño de la razón? ; This essay provides a link between the current situation in Venezuela and the so-called postmodernism. According to their spokesmen, on the one hand, this later has demolished or destroyed the modern philosophy -namely, philosophy of Kant and Hegel, who developed the Enlightenment's contentand on the other hand, it has made the reason ends its hegemony. Should we understand then the proposal of modern philosophy with no effect? Does have human freedom no value, neither the procedures to safeguard it and develop it socially and politically? Are just the universal rights of man and citizen, the separation of public powers and the property rights the monsters produced by the dream of reason? (Traducción de Gladys Portuondo). ; 193-202 ; eduardovasquez@cantv.net ; semestral
The text is divided in two phases. In the first phase, consisting of three parts, the main concepts of Kant's Doctrine of Right are considered in a comprehensive approach related to: the issue of the relations between natural right and positive right, problem closely connected to that of the relations between natural state and civil state, private right and public right; to the doctrine of property and its connection with political right. on treating the right in its several types, we intend to appoint the practical reasoning as a background of the Doctrine. In the second phase, concerning its last section, the consideration on the presence of the practical reasoning into the right is placed before some specificities of Kant's phylosophy of history, with the intent of establishing the possible relation between Rechtslehre and that philosophy.
Quiero ante todo expresar la profunda satisfacción que este Doctorado Honoris Causa me produce, pues constituye para mí un motivo de orgullo recibir esta distinción tan relevante por parte de la decana, en antigüedad y prestigio, de todas las universidades hispanoamericanas, esta hermosa y casi legendaria Universidad de San Marcos que en el día de hoy me acoge como formando parte de su comunidad universitaria. Esta distinción de la que me siento tan honrado, ha permitido que por vez primera pudiera conocer este querido país, que desde mi infancia y mi juventud había deseado visitar, ya que me unen a él vínculos personales y hasta familiares. Como he podido relatarlo en un libro reciente de memorias y confesiones que se titula El árbol de la vida, en el que hablo de mis primeros treinta y tres años, y que concluye con la fecha del cambio de régimen en España y del inicio de la transición democrática, toda mi infancia estuvo tutelada y guiada por una abuela materna, Ana Puig-Mir de Sagnier, que había nacido en Guayaquil, donde vivió hasta casi los veinte años; mujer muy culta, amante de todas las artes. Mi abuela siempre consideraba que Lima era su ciudad predilecta; la había conocido en su infancia, y volvió a visitarla siempre que pudo. Era una mujer ecuatoriana enamorada de Lima y de Perú. Y ciertamente me comunicó a mí esos sentimientos, que sin embargo, por diferentes infortunios, me impidieron visitar este querido país en diferentes ocasiones. ; First, I would like to express my deep satisfaction with this Honorary Doctorate, as it is a source of pride for me to receive such a relevant distinction from the dean, in terms of seniority and prestige, of all the Spanish-American universities, this beautiful and almost legendary University of San Marcos, which today welcomes me as part of its university community. This distinction, of which I feel so honoured, has allowed me to get to know this beloved country for the first time, which I had wanted to visit since my childhood and youth, since I have personal and even family ties to it. As I have been able to relate in a recent book of memoirs and confessions entitled El árbol de la vida (The Tree of Life), in which I talk about my first thirty-three years, and which concludes with the date of the change of regime in Spain and the beginning of the democratic transition, my entire childhood was tutored and guided by a maternal grandmother, Ana Puig-Mir de Sagnier, who was born in Guayaquil, where she lived until she was almost twenty; a very cultured woman, a lover of all the arts. My grandmother always considered Lima to be her favourite city; she had known it in her childhood, and she returned to visit it whenever she could. She was an Ecuadorian woman in love with Lima and Peru. And she certainly communicated those feelings to me, which however, through different misfortunes, prevented me from visiting this beloved country on different occasions.
