Linking Ontology, Epistemology and Research Methodology
In: Science & Philosophy Volume 8(1), 2020, pp. 75-91
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In: Science & Philosophy Volume 8(1), 2020, pp. 75-91
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In: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (2020)
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In: Library Philosophy and Practice (e-journal), 4170, August 2020
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In: Forthcoming, Philosophy & Technology, DOI 10.1007/s13347-020-00416-5
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In: International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 2020
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In: Philosophy of Law and General Theory of Law (Forthcoming)
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In: Symposion: theoretical and applied inquiries in philosophy and social sciences, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 9-27
ISSN: 2392-6260
This paper confronts two questions: How is it possible to be free if causal determinism is true?; and relatedly, How then is the practice of holding persons responsible for their actions to be justified? On offer here is a compatibilist account of freedom, tying it to control; the relation – argued to be a necessary connection – is considered in some detail. Then the question of ability to 'do otherwise' is discussed, which has held a fascination for many in regard to free choice. Our ability to learn to choose rationally is key here, to becoming able to choose well and (hence) freely, freedom being understood realistically. A developed rationality is necessary for maximal free choice, and (as argued here) is also key to the justification of the practice of holding persons responsible for their actions – a practice which is both necessary (socially indispensable) and capable of being justified, on both moral and pragmatic grounds. There is nothing in determinism that threatens that justification, but rather enables it.
In: Symposion: theoretical and applied inquiries in philosophy and social sciences, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 319-319
ISSN: 2392-6260
In: Symposion: theoretical and applied inquiries in philosophy and social sciences, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 41-53
ISSN: 2392-6260
Through a detailed case study of investigations on beauty, I demonstrate that a thoughtful consideration of empirical evidence can lead to the disclosure of the fundamental assumptions entrenched in a philosophical discipline. I present a contrastive examination of two empirically oriented approaches to art and beauty, namely, the anthropology of art and the anthropology of aesthetics. To capture these two different ways of interpreting the available evidence, I draw upon a debate between Alfred Gell and Jeremy Coote on the understanding of beauty and art in the Dinka community. Following Gell, I reveal that the Western-centric predilection of Coote, who uses traditional aesthetic categories, leads to his failure to grasp the functional and causal roles of beauty in the social relations of the Dinka. In more general terms, my study reveals the inherent limitations of aesthetics as developed in the Western tradition and its Kantian legacy. Being steadily driven towards purely abstract and speculative concepts, such as 'work of art,' Western aesthetics has lost the ability to account for the causal role of beauty in social relations. By contrasting this approach with Gell's anthropological approach to art, I indicate those fundamental assumptions of aesthetics as a philosophical discipline that apparently confine it to a particular cultural context, compromising its ability to account for the universal human condition. As my study illustrates, this limitation could be overcome by a thoughtful and unprejudiced examination of empirical evidence.
In: Symposion: theoretical and applied inquiries in philosophy and social sciences, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 99-100
ISSN: 2392-6260
In: Symposion: theoretical and applied inquiries in philosophy and social sciences, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 315-318
ISSN: 2392-6260
In: Symposion: theoretical and applied inquiries in philosophy and social sciences, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 321-324
ISSN: 2392-6260
In: Symposion: theoretical and applied inquiries in philosophy and social sciences, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 103-106
ISSN: 2392-6260
In: Symposion: theoretical and applied inquiries in philosophy and social sciences, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 55-84
ISSN: 2392-6260
This paper begins with several opening passages from the most esoteric writings in Hinduism's vast, ancient religious-philosophical heritage, namely the Upanishads. The aim is to reveal certain essential connections between the primordial relation between self and sacrifice while exploring uncanny paradoxes of eternity and time, immortals and mortals and their secret linkages. The work is entirely philosophical in its intent and does not aspire to defend a faith-perspective. The horizon for this exposition follows the spirit of Ambedkar's critique of Brahmanic superiority inherent in this entire system of religious thought: we must expose what lies in the heart of modern Hinduism to reveal its inner-contradictory entanglements, which are not exactly innocuous. A phenomenological-deconstructive inspiration motivates our own critical theoretical-philosophical conceptualizations beyond Ambedkar's basic attestation to liberate India from Hinduism. The enterprise derives from a speculative appropriation and extension of the depths of (CC.) 'Religion,' the penultimate chapter of Hegel's indomitable Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). The aim of the paper is to advance new philosophical theses in an unrelenting metaphysical critique of Hinduism– beyond Ambedkar's writings–but also in a manner that is irreducible to the Western philosophical cosmos within which the nineteenth-century Hegel inhabited. The paper argues that the internal contradictions and aporias of mortality, immortality, self, bodyhood, time, and eternity in the Hindu Upanishads can be contrasted with Hegel's speculative Western-Christological propositions to expose a greater metaphysical complexity that escapes Eastern and Western religious and philosophical traditions alike. Therefore, the paper falls within the scope of comparative philosophies of religion.
In: Symposion: theoretical and applied inquiries in philosophy and social sciences, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 7-8
ISSN: 2392-6260
We intend to show that Aristotle's contention that future tense contingent statements are neither true nor false leads to inconsistency.