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This is the first collection of essays to focus on feminist philosophy of mind. It brings the theoretical insights from feminist philosophy to issues in philosophy of mind and vice versa. Feminist Philosophy of Mind thus promises to challenge and inform dominant theories in both of its parent fields, thereby enlarging their rigor, scope, and implications. In addition to engaging analytic and feminist philosophical traditions, essays draw upon resources inphenomenology, cross-cultural philosophy, philosophy of race, disability studies, embodied cognition theory, neuroscience, and psychology.The book's methods center on the collective consideration of three questions: What is the mind? Whose mind is the model for the theory? To whom is mind attributed? Topics considered with this lens include mental content, artificial intelligence, the first-person perspective, personal identity, other minds, mental illness, perception, memory, attention, desire, trauma, agency, empathy, grief, love, gender, race, sexual orientation, materialism, panpsychism, enactivism,and others.Each of the book's twenty chapters are organized according to five core themes: Mind and Gender Self and Selves; Naturalism and Normativity; Body and Mind; and Memory and Emotion. The introduction traces the development of these themes with reference to the respective literatures in feminist philosophy and philosophy of mind. This context not only helps the reader see how the essays fit into existing disciplinary landscapes, but also facilitates their use in teaching.Feminist Philosophy of Mind is designed to be used as a core text for courses in contemporary disciplines, and as a supplemental text that facilitates the ready integration of diverse perspectives and women's voices

Larry M. Jorgensen provides a systematic reappraisal of Leibniz's philosophy of mind. He argues that Leibniz's theological commitments yielded a thoroughgoing naturalising methodology, according to which the properties of an object are explicable in terms of the object's nature, and that this led him to a fully natural theory of mind.

Jaegwon Kim relied principally on armchair methods in approaching problems in philosophy of mind. This paper is concerned with the nature of such methods and their prospects of success. Identifying the main armchair methods as introspection, modal reasoning involving conceivability tests, and conceptual analysis, the paper argues that insofar as the first two members of this trio aim to reveal the constitutive metaphysical natures of mental states, they are unable to reach their objective. In contrast, it defends conceptual analysis, arguing that Quine's attempt to discredit it fails. More specifically, it maintains that a certain form of conceptual role semantics is immune to Quine's strictures against meaning, and that this conception of meaning allows room for armchair discoveries about the meanings of our words (though it has no tendency to provide access to deep facts about the constitutive metaphysical natures of extralinguistic entities).

Contents/Table des matières -- G. Fløistad, Preface -- Personal identity and the concept of a person -- Recent work on the relation of mind and brain -- Philosophy of perception -- Spinoza's philosophy of mind -- Hegel's philosophy of mind -- Kierkegaard's philosophy of mind -- The significance of Freud for modern philosophy of mind -- Brentano's philosophy of mind -- Husserl's philosophy of mind -- Heidegger's philosophy of mind -- Wittgensttin's philosophy of mind -- Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of mind -- American pragmatism -- Pragmatism in Apel and Habermas -- Wilfrid Sellars' philosophy of mind -- Abbreviations used by some contributors -- Index of names -- Index of subjects.