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The empirical goal of this paper is to conduct an analysis of the geopolitical dimensions of the TurkStream pipeline, with special consideration given to its determinants as well as a diagnosis of the geopolitical implicationsof its geographical extent. To explore this problem, the following hypotheses are offered. First, the inauguration of the second branch of the TurkStream pipeline in the beginning of 2020 will strengthen the monopolistic positionof Russia as a supplier of natural gas to the countries of the European Union.This will increase the dependency of the EU on Russia and severely hamper itsability to formulate a unified, cohesive energy policy. Second, two factors that underlie the geopolitical importance of the TurkStream pipeline are Turkey's and Southern Europe's natural gas needs on the one hand and the political and economic interests of Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine on the other. Third, theTurkStream project should be seen as an instrument that serves to build a tactical partnership between Turkey and Russia – a partnership underpinned by the strategic interests of both countries in the Middle East. Fourth and finally, Russia's gradual withdrawal from directing its natural gas through Ukraine will generate serious economic problems and potential energy shortages in that country. In the long term, this pressure is geared toward forcing Ukraine to re-evaluate the pro-Western trajectory of its foreign policy.

In this analysis, the Turkish Stream pipeline project infrastructure will be presented.We will concentrate on the gas transportation route from Russia to the Turkish energy market and then to the Southern European states. The Russian Federation, as the main exporter of the energy resources in the global scale, is interested to restore its strategic position in its relations with Turkey and the Southern European states. Such policy is corresponding with Turkish aspirations, to be much more influential in the region. Therefore, the joint strategic energy project will combine the interests of Russia and Turkey and will be important for both countries in terms of strengthening their position not only in the energy market, but also in the geostrategic dimension. ; Przedmiotem analizy artykułu jest budowa Turkish Stream, gazociągu eksportowego z Rosji, który będzie docierał na rynek energetyczny Turcji, a następnie ma przekroczyć granicę tego państwa z Grecją i kierować się do Europy Południowej. Działania Federacji Rosyjskiej demonstrują chęć odzyskania strategicznej pozycji w relacjach z T urcją i państwami Europy Południowej kosztem Unii Europejskiej. Propozycje Rosji są zgodne z polityką Turcji, która dąży do wzmocnienia swojej roli w regionie. Wspólny strategiczny projekt energetyczny połączy znacząco interesy Rosji i Turcji pomimo wielu sprzeczności oraz zwiększy znaczenie tych państw nie tylko w wymiarze energetycznym, lecz także geostrategicznym.

Energy security policy is currently one of the most crucial areas of foreign policy. Infl uencing states through the price of energy resources and conditions of their supply is a common phenomenon nowadays. The purpose of this article is to show the policy methods to realize energy security pursued by the European Union and Russian Federation as well as to show their effectiveness. The analysis is based on the examples of Nabucco and South Stream pipelines. ; Polityka bezpieczeństwa energetycznego jest współcześnie jedną z kluczo wych dziedzin polityki zagranicznej państw. Zjawisko wywierania wpływu na podmioty międzynarodowe za pomocą cen surowców energetycznych oraz warunków ich dostaw występuje obecnie powszechnie. Celem pracy jest ukazanie sposobów realizacji energetycznej polityki bezpieczeństwa prowadzonej przez Unię Europejską oraz Federację Rosyjską (na przykładzie gazociągu Nabucco i Gazociągu Południowego) i ocena ich skuteczności.

Poland's natural gas supplies dependence from the Russian Federation was negatively assessed by Polish political groups. Politicians from many parties raised validity of building a diversified import structure of this commodity, and an important concept, which was considered over the years, was energy cooperation with Norway. The aim of the article is therefore to analyze the political thought of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish People's Party parties in the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline. The main research paradigm used in the text was the analysis of testimonies and traces of political thought. Taking up the topic was important due to the lack of studies in which we can find the results of original studies on the position of political parties in the context of building this pipeline. ; Uzależnienie Polski od dostaw gazu ziemnego z Federacji Rosyjskiej było negatywnie oceniane przez polskie ugrupowania polityczne. Politycy wielu partii podnosili zasadność budowy zróżnicowanej struktury importu tego surowca, a ważną, rozważaną przez lata koncepcją energetyczną była współpraca z Norwegią. Celem artykułu jest analiza myśli politycznej Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej oraz Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego w odniesieniu do budowy gazociągu Baltic Pipe. Główny paradygmat badawczy, zastosowany w tekście, stanowi analiza świadectw i śladów myśli politycznej. Podjęcie badanego tematu było istotne z uwagi na brak opracowań, w których można znaleźć efekty autorskich studiów dotyczących stanowiska partii politycznych w kontekście budowy tego gazociągu.

The paper analyzes the impact of the Nord Stream pipeline construction on Polish-German relations from 2005 to 2009. The author notes that the difficulties in reaching a consensus were further increased by the different attitudes of both governments to this investment as well as to the cooperation with Russia. From the beginning, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was an advocate of the pipeline construction and a great promoter of German-Russian friendship, an attitude to a somewhat lesser degree also continued by his successor – Angela Merkel. Polish President Lech Kaczynski was consistently against the pipeline, supported by subsequent Prime Ministers of Poland. The Polish side was also against the tightened relations between Germany and the European Union and Russia that were supposed to ensure energy security. German visits and words of assurance, that were so numerous in the period 2004–2009, were intended to appease Warsaw but they did not mark a change of policy. Although the German government was trying to persuade Poland to support the project, Poland was consistent in its refusal to take part in it. Poland's persistent standpoint has not changed the German attitude in this matter, while the extremely different approaches of both governments have adversely affected Polish-German relations. It was only after the Polish side ceased its continuous criticism of the pipeline project in late 2008 that a clear détente was apparent. ; The paper analyzes the impact of the Nord Stream pipeline construction on Polish-German relations from 2005 to 2009. The author notes that the difficulties in reaching a consensus were further increased by the different attitudes of both governments to this investment as well as to the cooperation with Russia. From the beginning, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was an advocate of the pipeline construction and a great promoter of German-Russian friendship, an attitude to a somewhat lesser degree also continued by his successor – Angela Merkel. Polish President Lech Kaczynski was consistently against the pipeline, supported by subsequent Prime Ministers of Poland. The Polish side was also against the tightened relations between Germany and the European Union and Russia that were supposed to ensure energy security. German visits and words of assurance, that were so numerous in the period 2004–2009, were intended to appease Warsaw but they did not mark a change of policy. Although the German government was trying to persuade Poland to support the project, Poland was consistent in its refusal to take part in it. Poland's persistent standpoint has not changed the German attitude in this matter, while the extremely different approaches of both governments have adversely affected Polish-German relations. It was only after the Polish side ceased its continuous criticism of the pipeline project in late 2008 that a clear détente was apparent.

The paper analyzes the impact of the Nord Stream pipeline construction on Polish-German relations from 2005 to 2009. The author notes that the difficulties in reaching a consensus were further increased by the different attitudes of both Governments to this investment as well as to the cooperation with Russia. From the beginning, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was an advocate of the pipeline construction and a great promoter of German-Russian friendship, an attitude to a somewhat lesser degree also continued by his successor – Angela Merkel. Polish President Lech Kaczyński was consistently against the pipeline, supported by subsequent Prime Ministers of Poland. The Polish side was also against the tightened relations between Germany and the European Union and Russia that were supposed to ensure energy security. German visits and words of assurance, that were so numerous in the period 2004–2009, were intended to appease Warsaw but they did not mark a change of policy. Although the German government was trying to persuade Poland to support the project, Poland was consistent in its refusal to take part in it. Poland's persistent standpoint has not changed the German attitude in this matter, while the exteremely different approaches of both governments have adversely affected Polish-German relations. It was only after the Polish side ceased its continuous criticism of the pipeline project in late 2008 that a clear détente was apparent.

Artykuł zarysowuje kwestię bezpieczeństwa energetycznego Unii Europejskiej oraz państw członkowskich. Nakreślony w nim został przebieg prac w Komisji Europejskiej oraz w Parlamencie Europejskim nad dokumentami unijnymi "trzeciego pakietu energetycznego" oraz nad rozporządzeniem w sprawie środków zapewniających bezpieczeństwo dostaw gazu ziemnego. Zarysowana została również postawa RFN i RP wobec budowy Gazociągu Północnego, Południowego oraz Nabucco. Poruszone kwestie rozpatrzone zostały pod kątem ich wpływu na stosunki polsko- niemieckie, zarówno bilateralne, jak i na arenie europejskiej. ; This article outlines the issue of energy security of the European Union and its Member States. It outlines the course of work in the European Commission and the European Parliament on EU documents "third energy package" and the regulation concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply. It also outlines the German and Polish attitude to the construction of the pipelines like Nord Stream, South Stream and Nabucco. Issues raised were considered for their impact on the Polish-German relations, on the basis of bilateral and European level.

Artykuł stanowi analizę problemu budowanego przez spółkę Nord Stream gazociągu, pod kątem jego znaczenia dla Polski, UE oraz innych państw, szczególnie w kontekście bezpieczeństwa energetycznego regionu. W artykule zawarto argumenty za i przeciw zasadności budowy gazociągu po dnie Morza Bałtyckiego. W tym fragmencie autorzy szerzej odnieśli się do polityki prowadzonej przez przeciwników projektu forsowanego przez Gazprom oraz do argumentów wspierających potrzebę jego realizacji. Ogólna konkluzja analizy zasadności budowy Gazociągu Północnego wskazuje, że nie jest to tak unikalny projekt, jak mogłoby się wydawać. A ocena tego przedsięwzięcia zależy od interesów narodowych poszczególnych państw oraz podmiotów gospodarczych. W dalszej części tekstu autorzy odnieśli się do geopolitycznego znaczenia Gazociągu Północnego dla Polski, Niemiec i Rosji, a także do zagrożeń, jakie z tego mogą wynikać. Ponadto w artykule zawarto syntetyczne ujęcie sytuacji złóż gazu i projektów gazowych w Polsce. Na końcu tekstu umieszczono konkluzje i podsumowanie całej problematyki. W skrócie odniesiono się do najbardziej dyskutowanych kwestii zarówno w polityce energetycznej, jak i zagranicznej Polski. ; The article constitutes the problem analysis of the gas pipeline built by the Nord Stream company, i.e. its importance for Poland, the EU and other states, peculiarly in the context of the energy security of the region. This article includes pros and cons of the legitimacy of the construction of the gas pipeline on the Baltic seabed. In this fragment authors more widely referred to the politics pursued by opponents of the plan which was pushed through by the Gazprom, as well as to arguments supporting the need of this gas project. The general conclusion of analysis of the legitimacy of the North gas pipeline construction shows that it is not as unique project as it could seem. And the evaluation of this undertaking depends on national interests of different countries and business entities. In the more distant part of the text, the authors referred to the geopolitical importance of the North Stream gas pipeline for Poland, Germany and Russia and to threats which can result from it. In addition, the article contains a synthetic approach to the situation of gas and gas projects in Poland. At the end of the text there are conclusions and summary of the whole issue. In short, the text refers to the most debated issues in both energy policy and Polish foreign policy.

Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Norwegia jest jednym z największych eksporterów gazu ziemnego oraz ropy naftowej do państw unijnych. Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Norwegii oparte jest na elektrowniach wodnych, które prawie całkowicie pokrywają zapotrzebowanie na energię elektryczną państwa. Norwegia i Niemcy mają długą tradycję współpracy w sektorze energetycznym. Planowane połączenie systemów przesyłowych energii elektrycznej tych państw przyczyni się do zwiększenia bezpieczeństwa energetycznego Niemiec oraz wzmocni pozycję tego państwa na wspólnym rynku energii UE. Celem artykułu jest analiza znaczenia współpracy energetycznej pomiędzy Niemcami a Norwegią. ; Norway is one of the biggest natural gas and oil exporters to the European Union states. Norway's energy security is based on water power, which covers almost the whole demand for electricity of the state. Norway and Germany have a tradition in a long term cooperation in the energy sector. The prospective integration of the electricity systems of both countries will support the energy security of Germany and strengthen the position of this country on the EU internal energy market. The aim of this article is to analyse the significance of energy cooperation between Germany and Norway.

Nowadays, energy security is a growing concern in state foreignpolicy. Interdependency in the energy field is a very important dimensionof contemporary relations between states and transnational corporations.Energy security is becoming a key issue for the European Union (EU). TheUnion is one of the world's fastest-growing energy markets and the biggestimporter of energy resources. For the foreseeable future, Europe's energydependence will probably increase. Facing a shortage of energy, Europe isdependent on imports and the EU member states need to diversify their energysupplies. The Caspian region contains some of the largest undevelopedoil and gas reserves in the world. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, thenewly independent Caspian states became open to foreign investment. Thegrowing energy needs have given the EU a strong interest in developing tieswith energy-producing states in the Caspian region to build the necessarypipeline infrastructure. In this analysis, the pipeline infrastructure that exists orwill be built in the near future will be presented. The analysis will concentrateon routes transporting gas from the Caspian region and the most importantproblems and solutions in designing the midstream energy system in the region.The key aim of the article is to analyse the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC)infrastructure project, which will inevitably contribute to the EU's energy securityinterest.

Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Artykuł przedstawia problem "wspólnej" polityki energetycznej Unii Europejskiej w kontekście tendencji dezintegracyjnych i renacjonalizacji, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem tzw. Brexit'u i jego implikacji dla uwspólontowienia polityki energetycznej UE, działań, które podważają zasady i reguły "wspólnej" polityki energetycznej UE na przykładzie decyzji Komisji Europejskiej z 28 października 2016 r., w sprawie zwiększenia wykorzystywanej przez Gazprom przepustowości gazociągu OPAL (lądowej odnogi Nord Stream) oraz problemu intensyfikowania współpracy w energetycznej Niemiec z Rosją, na przykładzie projektu Nord Stream 2. W artykule przedstawiono również zasadnicze etapy procesu uwspólnotowienia polityki energetycznej UE. ; The article presents an issue of "common" energy policy of the European Union in the context of desintegration tendencies and renationalizationn with particular attention to so-called Brexit and its implications for commonalization of the EU energy policy. The article discusses the actions that undermine principles and rules of the EU's "common" energy policy taking as an example the decision of the European Commission from October 28th, 2016 regarding the increase of transportation capacity of the OPAL gas pipeline (land off shoot of Nord Stream) used by Gazprom as well as the problem of intensification of energy cooperation between Germany and Russia in case of Nord Stream 2 project. The basic phases of the commonalization of the EU's energy policy were presented in the paper too.

Extraction and import – structure of covering the oil demand in Poland during 1990–2017.A b s t r a c t.Fromthe beginning of the 20th century until the interwar period, Poland was at the forefront of crude oil producers in theworld, and then in Europe. Poland, as a result of war damage, and first of all territorial changes that occurred after World War II, lost significant resources of this raw material. At the same time, the development of oil demand, related to the economic recovery of the country, contributed to the need to develop imports, which during 1990–2017 increased from 13.0 million tons to over 24.0 million tons of crude oil. Poland, due to the technical configuration of domestic refineries, as well as the availability of the "Przyjaźń" pipeline, imports crude oil mainly from Russia. However, Polish refineries have the opportunity to develop alternative sources of supply through the availability of Naftoport in Gdañsk. Thus, the progressive diversification of supplies, causes a decline in the share of Russian oil (from 95% during 2001–2005 to 74% in 2017), for the benefit of raw material from the Middle East, but also North America or other European countries. The extraction of crude oil from domestic deposits increased in the analyzed period from 0.15 million tons to 0.94 million tons in 2017, but in recent years it covers only 3–4% of domestic demand.