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This volume contends that Evidential Pluralism—an account of the epistemology of causation, which maintains that in order to establish a causal claim one needs to establish the existence of a correlation and the existence of a mechanism—can be fruitfully applied to the social sciences. Through case studies in sociology, economics, political science and law, it advances new philosophical foundations for causal enquiry in the social sciences. The book provides an account of how to establish and evaluate causal claims and it offers a new way of thinking about evidence-based policy, basic social science research and mixed methods research. As such, it will appeal to scholars with interests in social science research and methodology, the philosophy of science and evidence-based policy.

There are five levels in social inquiry: ontology; epistemology; approaches; methodology; and methods, which we see as means of gathering information. There is no determinate relationship such that one school will consistently choose the same options all the way down. We can cross between what are often seen as competing world views at various of these levels. Natural sciences have not arrived at a unified field theory and there is no reason why social sciences have to do so. Adapted from the source document.

This article takes it for granted that science is intrinsically social and that competition is part and parcel of science. Four kinds of competition are distinguished and related to four kinds of rationalities: technological, normal scientific, political, and philosophical. It is argued that science as a whole is rational when there is interaction between the different (sub-) rationalities. Science needs not only different disciplines, but a methodological division of labor.

There are five levels in social inquiry: ontology; epistemology; approaches; methodology; and methods, which we see as means of gathering information. There is no determinate relationship such that one school will consistently choose the same options all the way down. We can cross between what are often seen as competing world views at various of these levels. Natural sciences have not arrived at a unified field theory and there is no reason why social sciences have to do so.

RésuméL'universel comme horizon d'attente des savoirs issus de divers champs épistémologiques autorise le comparatisme, pratiqué comme dialogue, à condition de partir du pluralisme. Il se démarque du relativisme par le postulat de conversation ; le tiers, un horizon idéel, en étant le médiateur. S'appuyant sur l'expérience de ses recherches sur mémoires et histoire des sociétés urbaines d'Afrique centrale, l'auteur souligne l'irréductibilité de la tension entre le savoir scolastique et les savoirs pratiques soumis à l'urgence de l'action. En fait partie la tension entre l'objectivation, qu'opère le premier, et l'exigence éthique de respect pour les acteurs. Le présent, au sens de l'actuel, constitue le lieu où ces tensions travaillent. Le pluralisme épistémologique postule l'analyse de ce travail dans le respect de l'autonomie de chaque savoir. À l'instar du présent, un point de vue sur le temps, le particulier est un point de vue sur l'universel.

Pluralism is the concept that there is no single methodology that is always the correct one for discovering scientific truths, so multiple approaches and methodologies are required for a complete scientific understanding of a subject. Heterodoxy refers to those approaches to a subject that are outside of the generally accepted mainstream. While pluralism and heterodoxy are not necessarily inconsistent, heterodox economists tend to follow one particular methodology or school of thought rather than taking an eclectic approach to economic understanding, and heterodox economists often criticize approaches other than their own. Thus, in most cases, heterodox economists, by defending their own schools of thought and critiquing other approaches, are not pluralistic. The paper advocates a pluralistic approach to the social sciences over the more narrow approaches typically promoted by heterodox schools of thought.

This article argues that it is possible to bring the social sciences into evolutionary focus without being committed to a thesis the author calls ontological reductionism, which is a widespread predilection for lower-level explanations. After showing why we should reject ontological reductionism, the author argues that there is a way to construe cultural evolution that does justice to the autonomy of social science explanations. This paves the way for a liberal approach to explanation the author calls explanatory pluralism, which allows for the possibility of explaining cultural phenomena in terms of different evolutionary processes.