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This book develops a general explanation for party polarization in America from both historical and contemporary perspectives. Prior polarization studies focused exclusively on the modern era, but this work traces party polarization from the constitutional convention of 1787 to the present. Using such a broad historical perspective shows that what was unusual in American history was the period of low polarization from the Great Depression through 1980, rather than the period of high polarization of the modern era. Polarization is the norm of the American system, not the exception, and is likely to persist in the future. More theoretically, party polarization in America has been due to class-based conflict and rent-seeking by the patrician and plebian classes in various historical eras, rather than conflict over cultural values. As in earlier historical eras, modern party polarization has largely been elite-driven, with party entrepreneurs cunningly and strategically using polarization to their advantage.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 The Philosophy of Polarization Phenomena -- 2 The Psychology of Group Polarization -- 3 The Epistemology of Group Polarization -- 4 Four Models of Group Polarization -- 5 The Reductive Virtue/Vice Model -- 6 The Collective Heuristic/Bias Model -- 7 The Reductive Heuristic/Bias Model -- 8 The Collective Virtue/Vice Model -- 9 Mitigating the Epistemic Pitfalls of Group Polarization -- Conclusion: Future Directions -- References -- Index.

Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; List of figures; List of tables; List of contributors; Preface; Introduction and overview: polarization explained and applied; Part I Polarized mass publics and electoral politics; 1 Concerted action in complex environments: a comparison of industrial restructuring in mid-sized city-regions in Canada and the United States; 2 Lines in the sand: how Americans' polarization results in unwillingness to accept compromise policy outcomes.

American political observers express increasing concern about affective polarization, i.e., partisans' resentment toward political opponents. We advance debates about America's partisan divisions by comparing affective polarization in the US over the past 25 years with affective polarization in 19 other western publics. We conclude that American affective polarization is not extreme in comparative perspective, although Americans' dislike of partisan opponents has increased more rapidly since the mid-1990s than in most other Western publics. We then show that affective polarization is more intense when unemployment and inequality are high; when political elites clash over cultural issues such as immigration and national identity; and in countries with majoritarian electoral institutions. Our findings situate American partisan resentment and hostility in comparative perspective, and illuminate correlates of affective polarization that are difficult to detect when examining the American case in isolation.

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- FIGURES -- TABLES -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- A NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION -- 1 Introduction -- 2 A Theory of Polarization in Authoritarian Regimes -- 3 The Historical Origins of Authoritarian Repression -- 4 Targeted and Widespread Repression in Authoritarian Regimes -- 5 Repression and Polarization in Tunisia, 1987–2010 -- 6 Repression and Polarization in Egypt, 1981–2011 -- 7 Identity and Polarization in the Lab -- 8 Polarization during Democratic Transitions -- 9 Conclusion -- APPENDIX -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX -- A NOTE ON THE TYPE

Renowned political scientist Alan I. Abramowitz presents a groundbreaking argument that the most important divide in American politics is not between left and right but rather between citizens who are politically engaged and those who are not. It is the engaged members of the public, he argues, who most closely reflect the ideals of democratic citizenship-but this is also the group that is most polarized. Polarization at the highest levels of government, therefore, is not a sign of elites' disconnection from the public but rather of their responsiveness to the more politically engaged parts of it. Though polarization is often assumed to be detrimental to democracy, Abramowitz concludes that by presenting voters with clear choices, polarization can serve to increase the public's interest and participation in politics and strengthen electoral accountability

The Fair Process Effect aims to shed light on why there are so many instances of distrust, polarization, and conspiracy thinking in our world and what we can do about this. The book focuses on the fair process effect as a mechanism that may help to start overcoming these important issues of societal discontent. This is a positive effect that people exhibit when they have been treated in genuinely fair and just ways by fellow human beings and societal authorities. Current insights presented in the book aid the understanding of why people may experience discontent, distrust, and disillusionment. Furthermore, these insights can be used to start countering exaggerated levels of distrust, heightened polarization, and unfounded conspiracy thinking. To this end, Van den Bos develops a coherent and modern account of the fair process effect, targeted at understanding and managing these pertinent issues.

"The book brings together an international team of experts, enabling a broad, multidisciplinary approach that examines hate speech, dislike, polarization, and enclave deliberation as cross axes that influence offline and digital conversations. The diverse case studies herein offer insights into international news media, television drama and social media in a range of contexts, suggesting an academic frame of reference for examining this emerging phenomenon within the field of communication studies. Offering thoughtful and much-needed analysis, this collection will be of great interest to scholars and students working in communication studies, media studies, journalism, sociology, political science, political communication, and cultural industries"--

ch 1. Introduction / by Immanuel Wallerstein -- ch. 2. Ecology and the geography of capitalism / by Ana Esther Cecena -- ch. 3. Economic inequality, stratification, and mobility / by Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz and Timothy Patrick Moran -- ch. 4. Cities / by Peter J. Taylor, Michael Hoyler, and Dennis Smith -- ch. 5. Peasantries / by Eric Vanhaute, Hanne Cottyn, and Yang Wang -- ch. 6. Large enterprises and corporate power / by Jorge Fonseca -- ch. 7. Intellectual property / by Ravi Sundaram -- ch. 8. The States / by Atilio A. Borom and Paloma Nottebohm -- ch. 9. Citizenship / by Oleksandr Fisun and Volodymyr Golovko -- ch. 10. Women's spaces and a patriarchal system / by Linda Christiansen-Ruffman -- ch. 11. Deviance / by Ari Sitas. [et al.] -- ch. 12. Conclusion / by Immanuel Wallerstein.