People have a tendency to disregard information that contradicts their partisan or ideological identity. This inclination can become especially striking when citizens reject notions that scientists would consider "facts" in the light of overwhelming scientific evidence and consensus. The resulting polarization over science has reached alarming levels in recent years. This theoretical review conceptualizes political polarization over science and argues that it is driven by two interrelated processes. Through psychological science rejection, people can implicitly disregard scientific facts that are inconsistent with their political identity. Alternatively, citizens can engage in ideological science rejection by adhering to a political ideology that explicitly contests science. This contestation can in turn be subdivided into four levels of generalization: An ideology can dispute either specific scientific claims, distinct research fields, science in general, or the entire political system and elite. By proposing this interdisciplinary framework, this article aims to integrate insights from various disciplines.
In this paper we examine the link between ethnic and religious polariza- tion and conflict using interpersonal distances for ethnic and religious attitudes obtained from the World Values Survey. We use the Duclos et al (2004) polar- ization index. We measure conflict by means on an index of social unrest, as well as by the standard conflict onset or incidence based on a threshold number of deaths. Our results show that taking distances into account significantly improves the quality of the fit. Our measure of polarization outperforms the measure used by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and the fractionalization index. We also obtain that both ethnic and religious polarization are significant in explaining conflict. The results improve when we use an indicator of social unrest as the dependent variable. ; Financial support from the Axa Research Fund, the Government of Catalonia, and the CICYT project n. SEJ2006-00369. Financial support from the CICYT project n. SEJ2006-00369. ; Peer reviewed
Research has documented increasing partisan division and extremist positions that are more pronounced among political elites than among voters. Attention has now begun to focus on how polarization might be attenuated. We use a general model of opinion change to see if the self-reinforcing dynamics of influence and homophily may be characterized by tipping points that make reversibility problematic. The model applies to a legislative body or other small, densely connected organization, but does not assume country-specific institutional arrangements that would obscure the identification of fundamental regularities in the phase transitions. Agents in the model have initially random locations in a multidimensional issue space consisting of membership in one of two equal-sized parties and positions on 10 issues. Agents then update their issue positions by moving closer to nearby neighbors and farther from those with whom they disagree, depending on the agents' tolerance of disagreement and strength of party identification compared to their ideological commitment to the issues. We conducted computational experiments in which we manipulated agents' tolerance for disagreement and strength of party identification. Importantly, we also introduced exogenous shocks corresponding to events that create a shared interest against a common threat (e.g., a global pandemic). Phase diagrams of political polarization reveal difficult-to-predict transitions that can be irreversible due to asymmetric hysteresis trajectories. We conclude that future empirical research needs to pay much closer attention to the identification of tipping points and the effectiveness of possible countermeasures.
Recent decades have seen a rise in polarization in many countries, but the causes and mechanisms behind this rise are still heavily debated. Even though polarization is reliably connected to extreme affect and elevated social identity salience, these connections have been treated as ephemeral by most researchers. In this thesis, we identify affect and social identity as central drivers of political polarization. Our methodological approach is both theory-driven and data-driven. By combining theories from psychology and political science, we develop a theoretical perspective that links affect to cognitive processes and social identity, and, via interactions, relations and communication, to the emergence of polarization on the collective level. To test this theoretical framework, we apply state-of-the-art statistical, affect detection and natural language processing methods to large-scale datasets from various online media, political surveys, as well as a unique dataset covering 96 years of political interactions in the Swiss parliament. We also contribute to political science methodology by developing theoretically grounded measures of relational polarization. Our analyses reveal how affect influences cognitive processes in ways that, depending on the specific affective state, either lead to thorough evaluation and complex processing of political arguments, or to reliance on simple cognitive heuristics and group membership cues. In online discussion, the effect of affect is reinforced by affect sharing and the concomitant emergence of collective affect. In this way, online discussions can tilt into states dominated by extreme affective expressions, and characterized by repetitive and superficial argumentation, which in turn promotes the emergence of polarization. We also explore how properties of online media, such as character constraints, facilitate the sharing of affect, and thus might contribute to polarization. On the political macro-level, we can show how affect interacts with characteristics of the political situation to influence long-term trends in polarization. When power is monopolized and public resources are scarce, both extreme affect and polarization increase. Power sharing and economic prosperity, in contrast, lead to periods of political harmony. Finally, we demonstrate how, by implementing psychologically founded micro-mechanisms, the alignment and polarization of ideological positions can be reproduced with an agent based model. Again, affect is identified as the central driver of ideological alignment and polarization. In conclusion, through this thesis we contribute to polarization research in three ways: i) by advancing the conceptual understanding of polarization by merging theoretical perspectives from psychology and political science, ii) by expanding the methodological tool set of these disciplines, and iii) by compiling several unique large-scale datasets, which will be made available to the research community.
The purpose of this research was to examine the causes and consequences that meta-perceptions of polarization in the United States entails. The survey used in this study assessed respondents demographic and political information prior to questions regarding polarization. This study found that the polarization in the United States results from a multitude of variables, including: the intrusion of partisan cues into everyday life, social sorting, polarization's implicit effect, and differences in moral concern. Moreover, polarization encompasses and variety of ramifications that include disease, amplified interparty animosity, biased policy evaluation, reduced governmental efficiency, intraparty polarization, tribalism, and the quest to achieve political victory rather than achieving the "greater good." In further discussion, it was determined that polarization poses two main outcomes for the United States: a perpetual cycle in which polarization continues to increase over time, or a future in which polarization has already reached its apex and, thus, will deescalate over time. In light of these findings, it is prudent for Americans to refrain from impulsivity to preclude the onset of polarization and its accompanying repercussions.
The network of international environmental agreements (IEAs) has been characterized as a complex adaptive system (CAS) in which the uncoordinated responses of nation states to changes in the conditions addressed by particular agreements may generate seemingly coordinated patterns of behavior at the level of the system. Unfortunately, since the rules governing national responses are ill understood, it is not currently possible to implement a CAS approach. Polarization of both political parties and the electorate has been implicated in a secular decline in national commitment to some IEAs, but the causal mechanisms are not clear. In this paper, we explore the impact of polarization on the rules underpinning national responses. We identify the degree to which responsibility for national decisions is shared across political parties and calculate the electoral cost of party positions as national obligations under an agreement change. We find that polarization typically affects the degree but not the direction of national responses. Whether national commitment to IEAs strengthens or weakens as national obligations increase depends more on the change in national obligations than on polarization per se. Where the rules governing national responses are conditioned by the current political environment, so are the dynamic consequences both for the agreement itself and for the network to which it belongs. Any CAS analysis requires an understanding of such conditioning effects on the rules governing national responses.
We adapt an axiomatically derived measure of polarization due to Esteban and Ray (1994) to measure polarization of political preferences. Previous work used different measures such as variance, kurtosis, Cronbach's alpha, median distance to median and the mean distance between groups. Yet, none of these measures are theoretically connected to a notion of polarization. Although the initiation of the current one is in the lieu of income inequality measurement, it is conceptually suitable for preferential polarization as well. This paper offers a methodology for that purpose. The second contribution of the paper is that we use the Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling to correct for differential-item functioning in estimating ideal points of the individuals. We use the American National Election Survey Data for years between 1984-2008 to implement the theory offered in the paper. Our findings suggest that there is not a statistically significant increasing trend in polarization in this time period in many issue dimensions but there is an upward trend in the latent ideology dimension which is significant during the 1990s.
We adapt an axiomatically derived measure of polarization due to Esteban and Ray (1994) to measure polarization of political preferences. Previous work used different measures such as variance, kurtosis, Cronbach's alpha, median distance to median and the mean distance between groups. Yet, none of these measures are theoretically connected to a notion of polarization. Although the initiation of the current one is in the lieu of income inequality measurement, it is conceptually suitable for preferential polarization as well. This paper offers a methodology for that purpose. The second contribution of the paper is that we use the Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling to correct for differential-item functioning in estimating ideal points of the individuals. We use the American National Election Survey Data for years between 1984-2008 to implement the theory offered in the paper. Our findings suggest that there is not a statistically significant increasing trend in polarization in this time period in many issue dimensions but there is an upward trend in the latent ideology dimension which is significant during the 1990s.
Social media sites are often blamed for exacerbating political polarization by creating "echo chambers" that prevent people from being exposed to information that contradicts their preexisting beliefs. We conducted a field experiment that offered a large group of Democrats and Republicans financial compensation to follow bots that retweeted messages by elected officials and opinion leaders with opposing political views. Republican participants expressed substantially more conservative views after following a liberal Twitter bot, whereas Democrats' attitudes became slightly more liberal after following a conservative Twitter bot—although this effect was not statistically significant. Despite several limitations, this study has important implications for the emerging field of computational social science and ongoing efforts to reduce political polarization online.
Abstract. Polarization is a new phenomenon that threatens the cohesion and social development of our society. The raise of social media is known to have contributed significantly to the emergence of this phenomenon as it can be noticed from the multiplication of far right and racist online communities as well as the ill-structured political discourse. This can be noticed from scrutinizing recent US or EU elections. Automatic identification of polarization from social media plays a key role in devising appropriate defence strategy to tackle the issue and avoid escalation. This thesis implements several methods to identify polarization from Twitter data issued from Trump-Clinton US election campaign using metrics like Belief Polarization Index (BPI) and Sentiment Analysis. Furtherly, semantic role labelling and argument mining were applied to derive structure of arguments of polarized discourse. Especially, we constructed thirteen topics of interests that were used as potential candidates for polarized discourse. For each topic, the cosine distance of the frequency of the topic overtime between the two candidates was used to indicate the polarization (called as Belief Polarization Index). The statistics inference of sentiment scores was implemented to convey either a positive or negative polarity, which are then further examined using argument structure. All the proposed approaches provide attempts to measure the polarization between two individuals from different perspectives, which may give some hints or references for future research.Tiivistelmä. Polarisaatio on uusi ilmiö, joka uhkaa yhteiskuntamme yhteenkuuluvuutta ja sosiaalista kehitystä. Sosiaalisen median nousun tiedetään vaikuttaneen merkittävästi tämän ilmiön syntymiseen, koska se voidaan havaita äärioikeistolaisten ja rasististen verkkoyhteisöjen lisääntymisestä sekä huonosti jäsennellystä poliittisesta keskustelusta. Tämä voidaan havaita tarkastelemalla äskettäisiä Yhdysvaltojen tai EU: n vaaleja. Polarisaation automaattisella tunnistamisella sosiaalisesta mediasta on keskeinen rooli sopivan puolustusstrategian suunnittelussa ongelman ratkaisemiseksi ja eskalaation välttämiseksi. Tässä opinnäytetyössä toteutetaan useita menetelmiä polarisaation tunnistamiseksi Yhdysvaltain Trump-Clintonin vaalikampanjan Twitter-tiedoista käyttämällä mittareita, kuten vakaumuspolarisaatio indeksi (BPI) ja mielipiteiden analyysi. Lisäksi semanttisen roolin merkintöjä ja argumenttien louhintaa sovellettiin polarisoidun diskurssin argumenttien rakenteen johtamiseen. Erityisesti rakensimme kolmetoista aihepiiriä, joita käytettiin potentiaalisina ehdokkaina polarisoituneeseen keskusteluun. Kunkin aiheen kohdalla kahden ehdokkaan aiheiden ylityötiheyden kosinietäisyyttä käytettiin osoittamaan polarisaatiota (kutsutaan nimellä Belief Polarization Index). Tunnelmapisteiden tilastollinen päättely toteutettiin joko positiivisen tai negatiivisen napaisuuden välittämiseksi, joita sitten tutkitaan edelleen argumenttirakennetta käyttäen. Kaikki ehdotetut lähestymistavat tarjoavat yrityksiä mitata kahden ihmisen välistä polarisaatiota eri näkökulmista, mikä saattaa antaa vihjeitä tai viitteitä tulevaa tutkimusta varten.
Dans quelle mesure l'évolution des articles publiés depuis 1979 dans Travailet Emploi dessine-t-elle une histoire cohérente ? Pour essayer de répondre àcette question, nous proposons une analyse des articles parus dans la revueau cours de ces quatre décennies à partir de leurs titres et mots-clés. Pourrendre compte et éclairer cette histoire, trois types d'arguments sont mobilisés. Travail et Emploi étant initialement une revue de nature administrative,publiée par le ministère du Travail, l'évolution de ses articles est en partieliée aux soubresauts de l'actualité législative, des politiques publiques et de laproduction statistique. Elle peut par ailleurs pour partie tenir aux transformations du regard porté par les sciences sociales sur le travail et l'emploi à partirdu moment où Travail et Emploi devient une revue résolument académique.Enfin, ces évolutions rendent également, et assez naturellement, compte destransformations réelles et profondes du travail et de l'emploi sur le terrain,dans la vie des travailleurs et des entreprises.
Dans quelle mesure l'évolution des articles publiés depuis 1979 dans Travailet Emploi dessine-t-elle une histoire cohérente ? Pour essayer de répondre àcette question, nous proposons une analyse des articles parus dans la revueau cours de ces quatre décennies à partir de leurs titres et mots-clés. Pourrendre compte et éclairer cette histoire, trois types d'arguments sont mobilisés. Travail et Emploi étant initialement une revue de nature administrative,publiée par le ministère du Travail, l'évolution de ses articles est en partieliée aux soubresauts de l'actualité législative, des politiques publiques et de laproduction statistique. Elle peut par ailleurs pour partie tenir aux transformations du regard porté par les sciences sociales sur le travail et l'emploi à partirdu moment où Travail et Emploi devient une revue résolument académique.Enfin, ces évolutions rendent également, et assez naturellement, compte destransformations réelles et profondes du travail et de l'emploi sur le terrain,dans la vie des travailleurs et des entreprises.
Recently, researchers and reporters have made a wide range of claims about the distribution, nature, and societal impact of political polarization. Here I offer reasons to believe that even when they are correct and prima facie merely descriptive, many of these claims have the highly negative side effect of increasing political polarization. This is because of the interplay of two factors that have so far been neglected in the work on political polarization, namely that (1) people tend to conform to descriptive norms (i.e., norms capturing [perceptions of] what others commonly do, think, or feel), and that (2) claims about political polarization often convey such norms. Many of these claims thus incline people to behave, cognize, and be affectively disposed in ways that contribute to social division. But there is a silver lining. People's tendency to conform to descriptive norms also provides the basis for developing new, experimentally testable strategies for counteracting political polarization. I outline three.
Recently, researchers and reporters have made a wide range of claims about the distribution, nature, and societal impact of political polarization. Here I offer reasons to believe that even when they are correct and prima facie merely descriptive, many of these claims have the highly negative side effect of increasing political polarization. This is because of the interplay of two factors that have so far been neglected in the work on political polarization, namely that (1) people tend to conform to descriptive norms (i.e., norms capturing [perceptions of] what others commonly do, think, or feel), and that (2) claims about political polarization often convey such norms. Many of these claims thus incline people to behave, cognize, and be affectively disposed in ways that contribute to social division. But there is a silver lining. People's tendency to conform to descriptive norms also provides the basis for developing new, experimentally testable strategies for counteracting political polarization. I outline three. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion
Extreme polarization can undermine democracy by making compromise impossible and transforming politics into a zero-sum game. "Ideological polarization"—the extent to which political views are widely dispersed—is already strong among elites, but less so among the general public [N. McCarty, Polarization: What Everyone Needs to Know, 2019, pp. 50–68]. Strong mutual distrust and hostility between Democrats and Republicans in the United States, combined with the elites' already strong ideological polarization, could lead to increasing ideological polarization among the public. The paper addresses two questions: 1) Is there a level of ideological polarization above which polarization feeds upon itself to become a runaway process? 2) If so, what policy interventions could prevent such dangerous positive feedback loops? To explore these questions, we present an agent-based model of ideological polarization that differentiates between the tendency for two actors to interact ("exposure") and how they respond when interactions occur, positing that interaction between similar actors reduces their difference, while interaction between dissimilar actors increases their difference. Our analysis explores the effects on polarization of different levels of tolerance to other views, responsiveness to other views, exposure to dissimilar actors, multiple ideological dimensions, economic self-interest, and external shocks. The results suggest strategies for preventing, or at least slowing, the development of extreme polarization.
