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This dissertation examines the polarizing effects of electoral competition in Kenya's multiethnic democracy. I argue that polarization results from a combination of the messages parties use to demonize opponents and the tendency by voters to accept more readily messages from co -ethnic leaders. The argument starts with an investigation of campaign targeting decisions. I show, contrary to much of the existing ethnic politics literature, that in Kenya the competition for swing groups (ethnic communities that do not have a co-ethnic leader in the presidential race) is at the heart of electoral contests. The need to attract support across group lines drives message development, leading parties to craft appeals that communicate their inclusive intentions while relying on negative ethnic messages to vilify opponents as ethnic chauvinists. I argue that because of the strong association between ethnicity and trust, voters in the ethnic communities associated with the leading parties internalize messages offered by distinct sets of political elites during campaigns. The result is that negative ethnic appeals exacerbate divisions across communities during the race. To develop and test these claims, I draw on a wide range of empirical evidence collected from Kenya's four multiparty races since the reintroduction of competitive presidential elections in 1991

The objective of this paper is to explain populist attitudes that are prevailing in a number of European democracies. Populist attitudes usually lead to social protests and populist votes. We capture the populist wave by relying on values that are traditionally viewed as populist—such as distrust of institutions and neighbors, rejection of migrations and strong preferences for law and order—rather than on voting behavior. Our study covers the period 2004 to 2018 and 25 European countries for which we match aggregated indicators of populist values and social polarization based on ESS and SILC survey micro-data. We show that social polarization varies dramatically across European regions, but at the same time some convergence is observed. Our estimations confirm, in most cases, a positive and statistically significant relation between social polarization and populist attitudes. ; Peer reviewed

Abstract
Media coverage of affective polarization—partisans disliking and distrusting out-partisans while liking and trusting in-partisans—is abundant, both creating and reflecting a belief among the public that partisans are more affectively polarized than they are. These trends suggest that affective polarization among partisans could be viewed as socially desirable, which may then shape partisans' expressed attitudes and behavior. To examine this, I run four original surveys and study two broad research questions: (1) Does this social desirability exist?; and (2) Can it influence partisans' expressed affective polarization? I find that affective polarization among partisans is indeed socially desirable and that, largely motivated by self-presentation desires, this social desirability can shape partisans' expressed affective polarization. However, my results also suggest that affective polarization responses are rather ingrained in partisans, and that while partisans are aware of this social desirability and its effect on their behavior, small changes in survey context do not necessarily produce large changes in affective polarization responses. Overall, the results offer necessary nuance to our understanding of affective polarization, implying that social desirability—which can be shifted by contexts—can alter how affectively polarized people act.

Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy, whereas others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic contexts and consistent with Bayesian rationality.

ABSTRACTRecent analyses of American politics often invoke the term "culture war" depicting sharp and increasing divisions within the American polity. Most of this research defines culture in terms of values and beliefs about social issues and defines polarization in terms of partisan and issue divisions. I evaluate the claim of worsening "culture wars" by using a conceptualization of political culture that focuses on social groups and measuring polarization as both social group members' attitudes toward their own social in-groups and out-groups, and the effects of group attitudes on partisanship. Analyzing inter-group attitudes from 1964 to 2012 for social group cleavages defined by race, class, age, sex, and religion shows that polarization in attitudes toward social groups is minimal and generally stable, and most group members feel positively toward out-groups. Partisan and issue polarization seen in prior research do not extend to deep or increasing inter-group hostility that could reinforce issue-based and partisan polarization.

The objective of this paper is to explain populist attitudes that are prevailing in a number of European democraties. Populist attitudes expectedly lead to social protests and populist votes. We capture the populist wave by relying not on voting behavior but rather on values that are traditionally viewed as populist values, such as distrust of institutions and neighbors, rejection of migrations and strong preferences for law and order. Our study covers the period 2004 to 2018 and 25 European countries for which we match aggregated indicators of populist values and social polarization computed from ESS and SILC survey micro-data, respectively. We find that social polarization, along with other factors, can explain populist attitudes. We also observe that both populist attitudes and polarization vary across countries much more than over time, with the exception of authoritarian values which appear positively correlated with social polarization, particularly among baby-boomers and younger cohorts.

The objective of this paper is to explain populist attitudes that are prevailing in a number of European democraties. Populist attitudes expectedly lead to social protests and populist votes. We capture the populist wave by relying not on voting behavior but rather on values that are traditionally viewed as populist values, such as distrust of institutions and neighbors, rejection of migrations and strong preferences for law and order. Our study covers the period 2004 to 2018 and 25 European countries for which we match aggregated indicators of populist values and social polarization computed from ESS and SILC survey micro-data, respectively. We find that social polarization, along with other factors, can explain populist attitudes. We also observe that both populist attitudes and polarization vary across countries much more than over time, with the exception of authoritarian values which appear positively correlated with social polarization, particularly among baby-boomers and younger cohorts.

The objective of this article is to explain populist attitudes that are prevailing in a number of European democracies. Populist attitudes usually lead to social protests and populist votes. We capture the populist wave by relying on values that are traditionally viewed as populist—such as distrust of institutions and neighbors, rejection of migrations, and strong preferences for law and order—rather than on voting behavior. Our study covers the period 2004–2018 and 25 European countries for which we match aggregated indicators of populist values and social polarization based on ESS and SILC survey micro-data. We show that social polarization varies dramatically across European regions, but at the same time, some convergence is observed. Our estimations confirm, in most cases, a positive and statistically significant relation between social polarization and populist attitudes.