Suchergebnisse

A test of two competing theories of status polarization of social welfare attitudes: (1) a social-psychological approach that sees status polarization as a function of identification with social groups; & (2) an economic theory that sees policy preferences as a function of the individual's expected utility from various policies. Center for Political Studies (U of Michigan, Ann Arbor) data from the years 1956-1984 reveal that the utility maximizing hypothesis has much more explanatory power for the middle & late 1970s. SC identification, on the other hand, rivals utility maximization as an expression of policy preferences during the years 1956-1964 & shows a slight resurgence in 1982 & 1984. These results suggest little prospect for a revival of the New Deal party coalitions, barring strong political leadership that defines issues in class terms & polarizes the electorate. 5 Tables, 43 References. Modified HA

This book provides a concise and engaging analysis of the particularly unusual 2020 election year in the USA. The political science perspective illuminates societal tensions in the context of the Corona pandemic and elaborates election-deciding discourses. Larger socio-political trends such as ideological polarisation are addressed as well as the different campaign strategies of the two parties. In addition, the book offers insights into the election results of this landmark presidential election for American society and for the development of its democracy. The final evaluation of the resulting implications for transatlantic relations rounds off the book. The authors Dr. Christiane Lemke is Professor of Political Science at Leibniz Universität Hannover, specialising in international relations and US politics. Jakob Wiedekind is a research assistant and doctoral student in the "International Relations" department at the Institute of Political Science at Leibniz Universität Hannover.

The objective of this article is to explain populist attitudes that are prevailing in a number of European democracies. Populist attitudes usually lead to social protests and populist votes. We capture the populist wave by relying on values that are traditionally viewed as populist—such as distrust of institutions and neighbors, rejection of migrations, and strong preferences for law and order—rather than on voting behavior. Our study covers the period 2004–2018 and 25 European countries for which we match aggregated indicators of populist values and social polarization based on ESS and SILC survey micro-data. We show that social polarization varies dramatically across European regions, but at the same time, some convergence is observed. Our estimations confirm, in most cases, a positive and statistically significant relation between social polarization and populist attitudes. (JEL codes: D63 and I30)

The COVID-19 pandemic has created communication challenges exacerbated by the circulation of misinformation and the politicization of science. The case of hydroxychloroquine is an illustrative example, with the drug being aggressively promoted as a cure even while emerging evidence demonstrated the contrary. This research analyzed how hydroxychloroquine discussions took place on Twitter from 21 to 28 April 2020, a key period in developments around the drug. We collected, in real time, tweets with "hydroxychloroquine" over this period, which resulted in a dataset of nearly one million tweets from over 350,000 Twitter accounts. Our content analysis provides specific details of how hydroxychloroquine was promoted and critiqued, and which accounts were tweeting. Findings showed a highly polarized environment with active bots and conspiracy propagators, where political perspectives dominated the Twittersphere in the place of science-focused discussions.

While scholars and pundits alike have expressed concern regarding increasing social polarization based on partisan identity, there has been little analysis of how social polarization impacts voting. In this paper, we incorporate social identity into a principal-agent model of political representation and characterize the influence of social polarization on partisan voting. We show that social identity has an indirect effect on voting through voters' beliefs regarding the ex post decision of political representatives on top of a direct effect through an expressive channel. We conduct a laboratory experiment designed to identify the relative effect of the two channels. We find that social polarization causes partisan voting, and that up to fifty-five percent of partisan voting is due to the indirect effect of social identity.

This chapter explores the implications of growing economic and social inequality in California for the state's social contract, as well as the role of government and other institutions in addressing the new polarization. Data from the ILE's 2001-02 California Workforce Survey reveal that a majority of Californians are seriously concerned about the widening economic divide and support public policy measures that would help to narrow it. Respondents with lower incomes and less education are especially supportive of a strong government role in this area, as are noncitizens, Latinos, and African Americans. Because of the concentration of low-wage workers, immigrants, and Latinos in the southern part of the state, attitudes there belie the conservative stereotype of Southern California, traditionally juxtaposed to the relatively liberal attitudes assumed to be typical of the Bay Area. The survey results suggest that today, southern Californians are in fact more supportive of a strong government role than are people in the rest of the state. Southern Californians are also more pro-union than their counterparts elsewhere in the state. Another important topic in the chapter is public policy in regard to the problem of combining work and family responsibilities, with a large majority of survey respondents reporting that they favor compensating workers for family leave, and making child care and elder care more affordable.

An unprecedented president -- From umbrella parties to polarized parties in American politics -- Trumping the Republicans and berning the Democrats -- The presidential election of 2016 in historical perspective -- The irony of polarization: parliamentary parties without parliamentary government -- The Trump era and beyond : postindustrial democracy in America -- Conclusion

People have a tendency to disregard information that contradicts their partisan or ideological identity. This inclination can become especially striking when citizens reject notions that scientists would consider "facts" in the light of overwhelming scientific evidence and consensus. The resulting polarization over science has reached alarming levels in recent years. This theoretical review conceptualizes political polarization over science and argues that it is driven by two interrelated processes. Through psychological science rejection, people can implicitly disregard scientific facts that are inconsistent with their political identity. Alternatively, citizens can engage in ideological science rejection by adhering to a political ideology that explicitly contests science. This contestation can in turn be subdivided into four levels of generalization: An ideology can dispute either specific scientific claims, distinct research fields, science in general, or the entire political system and elite. By proposing this interdisciplinary framework, this article aims to integrate insights from various disciplines.