Suchergebnisse

This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences. ; This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences.

This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences.

This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences.

This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences.

To explain the political clout of different social groups, traditional accounts typically focus on the group's size, resources, or commonality and intensity of its members' interests. We contend that a group's penumbra—the set of individuals who are personally familiar with people in that group—is another important explanatory factor that merits systematic analysis. To this end, we designed a panel study that allows us to learn about the characteristics of the penumbras of politically relevant groups such as gay people, the unemployed, or recent immigrants. Our study reveals major and systematic differences in the penumbras of various social groups, even ones of similar size. Moreover, we find evidence that entering a group's penumbra is associated with a change in attitude on group-related policy questions. Taken together, our findings suggest that penumbras are pertinent for understanding variation in the political standing of different groups in society.

This paper examines the influences of religious and political attitudes on attitudes towards women in power. Specifically, I measure the ideology and general favorability of Conservative Christians (Seventhday Adventists) towards various political candidates and ideological positions. This question is worth analyzing, considering relatively recent events regarding the role of women in politics and corresponding discussion in religious circles on the role of women in church leadership. A survey method was used to test whether there is a relationship between attitudes towards women in power in politics (female political candidates) and women in power in religion (women's ordination), as well as to measure additional variables that might predict any relationship. 351 subjects in three separate groups indicated attitudes towards ten religious and ten political statements using a 5-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The results were analyzed using a Pearson's correlation coefficient, while also running the non-parametric Kendall's tau-b because of possible violations of parametric assumptions. The hypothesis that a strong positive relationship exists between attitudes towards religious women & political women in power was supported by a statistically significant positive correlation at the level of more general attitudes between women's ordination and female political candidates, but not when specific candidates were considered. Finally, favorability towards women in power and more "liberal" ideology were positively correlated to some degree, which suggests changing attitudes towards women in power have an ideological basis that may be consistent with trends within Conservative Protestant circles.

We investigate the effects of the rise of the Internet as an additional mass medium on news consumption patterns and political attitudes. We use Swedish survey data from 2002 to 2007, the period during which online news media emerged. We find that broadband access is associated with online media consumption which, to some extent, crowds out offline consumption. Furthermore, these altered news consumption patterns have no or small effects on political attitudes.

We investigate the effects of the rise of the Internet as an additional mass medium on news consumption patterns and political attitudes. We use Swedish survey data from 2002 to 2007, the period during which online news media emerged. We find that broadband access is associated with online media consumption which, to some extent, crowds out offline consumption. Furthermore, these altered news consumption patterns have no or small effects on political attitudes.

We investigate the effects of the rise of the Internet as an additional mass medium on news consumption patterns and political attitudes. We use Swedish survey data from 2002 to 2007, the period during which online news media emerged. We find that broadband access is associated with online media consumption which, to some extent, crowds out offline consumption. Furthermore, these altered news consumption patterns have no or small effects on political attitudes.

Extreme polarization can undermine democracy by making compromise impossible and transforming politics into a zero-sum game. "Ideological polarization"—the extent to which political views are widely dispersed—is already strong among elites, but less so among the general public [N. McCarty, Polarization: What Everyone Needs to Know, 2019, pp. 50–68]. Strong mutual distrust and hostility between Democrats and Republicans in the United States, combined with the elites' already strong ideological polarization, could lead to increasing ideological polarization among the public. The paper addresses two questions: 1) Is there a level of ideological polarization above which polarization feeds upon itself to become a runaway process? 2) If so, what policy interventions could prevent such dangerous positive feedback loops? To explore these questions, we present an agent-based model of ideological polarization that differentiates between the tendency for two actors to interact ("exposure") and how they respond when interactions occur, positing that interaction between similar actors reduces their difference, while interaction between dissimilar actors increases their difference. Our analysis explores the effects on polarization of different levels of tolerance to other views, responsiveness to other views, exposure to dissimilar actors, multiple ideological dimensions, economic self-interest, and external shocks. The results suggest strategies for preventing, or at least slowing, the development of extreme polarization.

This article deals with the problem of studying the political attitudes of convicts in modern Russia, especially their formation in the private social space. The article identifies and describes the attitudes of convicts in particular in relation to political institutions, political power and political regimes.

This paper examines the political views and ideology of the 1996 cohort. We constructed a survey from an early 2005 voter registration roll, and details of the survey are available from the author upon request. In the survey we asked Chinese Americans for information about their political ideology and partisan affiliation, and also asked for opinions on a range of public policy issues, many of them specifically related to the Chinese-American community or to public policies dealing with ethnicity and immigration (for example, ethnic preferences in education). We also asked about the nature and sources of political engagement: why the respondents chose to vote and where and from whom they got their political information. We found that Chinese Americans in the Bay Area, like Chinese Americans nationwide, are not ideologically monolithic. They are neither liberal nor conservative, and while many are members of political parties, few report strong feelings of partisan allegiance. The respondents are united, however, in their views on a range of ethnic issues—although, interestingly, they are divided over affirmative action. Overall, we find that the respondents share many of the same concerns as American at large, but that they are more aware of policy issues that deal specifically with Chinese Americans.

Political behavior can be defined as the actions and activities that an individual makes as an autonomous choice and the decisions he or she makes to influence political decision makers or those in their possession. There are many social factors that affect the political attitude and behavior of the individual in this frame. Education, gender, occupation, family, etc. Some of them. The "family", one of these factors, is the most important institution in which all social and political processes are inherited since the birth of the individual. A lot of research reveals that the family of an individual adopts and maintains political attitude.In the light of these explanations, the main purpose of this study is to show the effect of "family" on the individual's political attitude and behavior. The study was carried out according to the literature review and it was examined from the findings of the studies related to the subject that the effect of the family in the voting preference of the individual is in the direction of the effect. In this context, a comparative analysis was made with other factors considered to be influential in political attitudes and behaviors.

Current research has suggested that facial expressions may not only be the result of emotional experiences, but they may also play a role in shaping emotion itself. This idea, known as the Facial Feedback Hypothesis, has been supported in a number of various areas of psychology. The weak version of the hypothesis tested in this study suggests that facial feedback may intensify or inhibit an underlying emotion already present. One area of psychology untouched by the facial feedback hypothesis appears to be political evaluations. We hypothesized that activation of the zygomatic major muscle in the face (normally present when expressing happiness) when evaluating moderate political statements would correlate with higher levels of support and be viewed as more partisan congruent to a person's political identity. Similarly, we hypothesized that activating the anguli oris muscle in the face (usually present when expressing anger) when evaluating bi-partisan statements would correlate with higher levels of disagreement and be viewed as less congruent to a participant's partisan identity when judging these statements. Results indicated that opposite to our predictions, moderate statements are evaluated more favorably and more congruently to political identity in the frowning condition compared to the smiling condition, relative to pretests. Implications are discussed.

Abstract: This paper applies multivariate analysis to 1978 survey data to examine the attitude structure of the Northern Ireland electorate and its effect on partisanship. Four political attitudes are extracted: two communal attitudes, strongly related to religious affiliation, and two non-communal attitudes, unrelated to religious affiliation. All four attitudes are found to be weakly embedded in the social structure. When used to predict partisan loyalties, the four political attitudes have a consistent, if limited, significance. In addition, analysis shows that individuals who support the Alliance Party are more likely to reject the dominant attitudes and loyalties of their co-religionists.