Employees shall not use District funds, services, supplies or equipment to urge the passage or defeat of any ballot measure or candidate, including but not limited to, any candidate for election to the governing Board. This policy prohibits political activity during an employee’s working hours, but shall not be construed to prohibit an employee from urging the support or defeat of a ballot measure or candidate during non-working time. Nothing in this policy shall prevent: a. The dissemination of information concerning school tax and/or bond elections by the administrative staff insofar as authorized by the Education Code. b. The discussion and study of politics and political issues, when such discussion and study is appropriate to instruction and learning. c. The conducting of student and employee elections, and campaigning connected therewith.

Employees shall not use District funds, services, supplies or equipment to urge the passage or defeat of any ballot measure or candidate, including but not limited to, any candidate for election to the governing Board. This policy prohibits political activity during an employee’s working hours, but shall not be construed to prohibit an employee from urging the support or defeat of a ballot measure or candidate during non-working time. Nothing in this policy shall prevent: a. The dissemination of information concerning school tax and/or bond elections by the administrative staff insofar as authorized by the Education Code. b. The discussion and study of politics and political issues, when such discussion and study is appropriate to classroom studies, such as history, current events, and political science. c. The conducting of student and employee elections, and campaigning connected therewith.

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In this study, we focus on existing research of corporate political activity (CPA) in management and organization science. We systematically explore the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the research field by utilizing bibliometric analysis. The results identify several gaps in the extant research on CPA, implying that the field is incomplete and inadequate. Hence, we argue that the field needs an application of a wider array of theories and methodological approaches in order to increase and complement the prevailing knowledge. This study is an example of how meta-analytical research can assist research problematization and theory building in organization studies. Key words: bibliometric analysis, theory building, corporate political activity

The aim of this paper is to make a modest contribution toward improved understanding of how the political process actually operates in America. It reports the results of some research on individual citizen participation in political activity and describes a tool that may be used for classifying individuals in terms of the amount of political activity in which they engage. Finally it outlines some differences that are observed when attitudes with respect to some public personalities and issues held by the politically active portion of the citizenry are compared with attitudes of the politically inert.The research study from which the data reported here are derived is one of a long series carried out over the past five years for the Public Relations Department of the Standard Oil Company (N. J.). The primary purpose of these studies has been to find out how the company stands with the American public —to learn what virtues people credit to it and what sins they think it is committing. Research on such topics inevitably involves the question of who among the vast body of American citizens are most articulate in their feelings about big corporations and most concerned to defend or attack them. Since similar questions arise whenever the citizen's role with respect to any public issue comes up, the tools developed for corporation public relations may have much wider applicability and usefulness.

This paper investigates possible effects of political activity on pharmaceutical prices, with a particular focus on the health care reform period. It evaluates the extent to which pharmaceutical companies slowed the rates at which they increased prices in an attempt to preempt government intervention. To do so, we characterize companies based on their vulnerability to future price regulation. We then consider patterns in price movements across companies. The results suggest that companies whose drugs had longer patent lives and who had recently increased contributions to their corporate Political Action Committees (PACs) slowed price increases during 1992 and 1994 more than their competitors. It is difficult to distinguish pricing differences across companies in 1993, perhaps because most companies had pledged to keep price increases below the rate of inflation. sellison@mit.edu, wolfram@haas.berkeley.edu. We are grateful to Shigeo Hirano, Nada Mora, Jie Shen, and Jeff Wilder for excellent research assistance. The first author acknowledges financial support from Eli Lilly through their grant to the NBER, the Hoover Institution, and the MIT Dean's Fund, and the second from the NSF (Grant SBR-9810402). Matthew Barmack, Ernie Berndt, David Cutler, Glenn Ellison, Zvi Griliches, Wally Mullin, Steve Puller and Mike Whinston provided valuable comments and suggestions. 1 1.