This article reviews the issue of negativity in election campaigns in academic literature, & presents some data from Lithuanian Presidential campaign (1997 & 2002) analysis. The article aims to ascertain how often various types of negativity are used in the Lithuanian presidential campaigns as well as to deliberate about their potential effect on election results. Comparison of the data of two Lithuanian Presidential campaigns' newspapers' analyses indicates the possibility of growing importance of negativity in election campaigns. As analysis shows, there is no agreement among the scholars about the effect of different types of negativity. It is evident that more detail studies of negativity of election campaigns in Lithuania are needed. Adapted from the source document.
Lithuania's referendum on the accession into the European Union was part of the so-called "domino strategy" of the fourth wave of EU enlargement, which aimed to influence the mindset of the inhabitants of the less euro-enthusiastic member states by placing the pressure of the anticipated high positive result from the more enthusiastic member states (Lithuania among them) on them. Typical trend of elites' manipulations can be observed in Lithuania, i.e. changing of the legal basis on the referendum prior to the EU accession referendum in order to facilitate positive outcome. These facilitating rules had been introduced step by step, bringing any discussions on these matters in a parliament during election campaigns of 2000 & 2002 to an end in order to escape escalation of the pro versus the anti-European cleavages within political system. Thus, a double hurdle (both turn-out & voting YES of 50 per cent of all eligible voters) existing since 1989 in referendum legislation was lowered introducing triple hurdle (turnout of 50 per cent & voting YES one third of all eligible voters but more than 50 per cent of participants) in 2002. Then, in 2003 it was facilitated once again introducing new double hurdle (turn-out 50 per cent of all eligible voters & voting YES by 50 per cent of participants). Further attempts to facilitate positive result were limited by two factors: first, a specific factor, an almost parallel initiative of referendum on the constitutional amendments (so-called "Uspaskikh referendum"), is to be taken into consideration. In addition, a general requirement that the citizens themselves decide on the issue of Lithuania's EU integration in a decisive & binding manner, i.e. a referendum, typical for other CEE countries as well as, was also important here. Finally, other settings laying ground for a positive result, though facilitated twice, were further reinforced by a two-day voting procedure. Together with an unexpected apathy of Hungarian voters in their referendum, these risky rules became a reason for dramatization & anxiety expecting proclaiming referendum as invalid due to insufficient voter turnout. An official information campaign of the Government on the EU accession started in 2000. Gradually it turned into a one-sided agitation campaign, let alone before the referendum date. Positive involvement of the institutions possessing high public confidence such as te mass media & Catholic Church, a well-established consensus of the major political parties on the EU accession, weak organization of the euro-skeptical movement all led to an absence of any substantial political competition. Finally, the advertising as such started dominating the campaign. Features of propaganda, sometimes coming very close to a violation of laws banning advertising during the voting days, could be observed here too. Different points of view should be endorsed in order to interpret the high positive result of the referendum in a sufficient manner. As regards the history of Lithuania's political system, it was the fourth successful referendum since the 90s. What was typical for all of them was that the citizens & the elites held a common position on the issue. Seen within the context of the latest internal political developments in Lithuania, it could be nevertheless equated to an exception first of all in view of electorate's positive motivation, less apathy & the lack of tangible protest features. Referendum proceeding & its results -- maximal active support for the YES statement among all countries of fourth wave of EU enlargement -- give a fresh & useful data for testing "elite-centric," "rational choice," "ideological-cultural" theories of euro-integration. 6 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.
The paper discusses women's images & women related themes as they were presented in the Lithuanian national mass-media in the EP elections (May-June, 2004). Monitoring of the two largest Lithuanian dailies demonstrated that the EP elections had a second-rate status, which was enhanced by the first-round of the nation-wide Presidential elections, taking place on the very same day (May 14, 2004). Newspapers provided superficial references to women & did not produce any articulated discourse about women's representation in the EP. The result -- the Lithuanian delegation to the EP has 5 women among its 13 members -- is to be attributed to national political culture, appearance of the new populist party & individual candidates' electoral strategies, but not to women-friendly public discourse & political communication. Adapted from the source document.
Straipsnio tikslas yra isnagrineti Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorijos fragmentacija rinkimu kampanijos metu ir nustatyti, kurie kanalai labiausiai gali susieti auditorija tarpusavyje. Straipsnyje apzvelgiama fragmentacijos reiksme demokratijai ir jos tyrimuose vartojamos savokos, pristatomi empirinio tyrimo poziuriai, besiremiantys auditorijos sutapimo analize. Remiantis reprezentatyvios apklausos duomenimis ir pristatytais poziuriais, analizuo-jama Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorijos fragmentacija. Kadangi nustatytas gana didelis skirtingu kanalu susiklojimas, straipsnyje daroma isvada, kad Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorija kol kas nera labai fragmentiska. Taciau palyginimas su ankstesniu metu duomenimis rodo tam tikrus fragmentacijos didejimo polinkius. Labiausiai Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorija susiejantis kanalas yra televizija, taciau vis didesne svarba igyja ir populiarus interneto portalai The aim of the article is to analyse the extent of media audience fragmentation in Lithuania during the 2012 Parliament election campaign and to define which media channels are best able to unify the audience. The article reviews the significance of fragmentation in terms of democracy and concepts used in its analysis, and presents approaches for its empirical study, based on audience duplication. On the basis of this approach and data from a representative survey, the fragmentation of Lithuanian media audience is analysed. Since the analysis shows a considerable overlap of audience of different media outlets, the main conclusion is made that the Lithuanian media audience is not (yet) fragmented. The media that unites the biggest share of the audience is television, although popular internet portals are also becoming very important. Adapted from the source document.
The concept of deterrence is widely used in social sciences. In general literature this means prevention of someone's actions by threatening to impose sanctions. In the area of strategy, deterrence means preventing states to act in a way that is not acceptable to others. According to deterrence theory, wars or aggressions to be prevented by threatening a potential aggressor with retaliation destructive & credible enough to outweigh any benefit the potential aggressor could expect to gain. The concept of deterrence came to prominence with the appearance of nuclear weapons, precisely because they made it possible for a state under attack to do great harm to the attacker even without really defending itself. This requirement becomes difficult to fulfill when we consider non-nuclear powers. They do not enjoy military capabilities to strike their enemies in retaliation without carrying defense. Nuclear have-not may only threaten her adversaries with a high level of resistance. This articles addresses deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers that do not possess retaliatory capabilities but only are capable to threaten their adversaries with a level of destruction higher than the value of objectives sought. The logic of deterrence strategy formulates two main requirements for it to be effective. First is a sufficient capability to carry out the defense actions. The second is ability to impress enemy leaders of their intentions without provoking a preventive or pre-emptive strike out of fear. Effective deterrence strategies of small non-nuclear powers suffer from serious weaknesses that are embedded into the logic of this strategy. First of all, successful deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers requires more than ability to impose costs using conventional means. An adversary must be sufficiently convinced that the state will use its defensive capabilities. The greater a state's defensive capability, the less its adversary can hurt it, & the more likely it may use its punitive capabilities on its adversary. Secondly, intelligence communities long have known, policy makers have a way of resisting unwelcome information & advice. Often, national intelligence communities are entirely as culturally blind, not to mention ignorant in other ways, as are their political & military masters. Risk of a mistake when attacking a nonnuclear country is smaller then attacking a nuclear one. When employed by alliances, such as NATO, conventional deterrence also must face a number of additional problems. It requires a large & credible power projection capability because of the simple facts of geography. To operate large expeditionary forces requires an overseas base network & a forcible entry capability. Effective defense demands a large standing force structure, & technological superiority, to assure the success of conventional campaigns. Such complex, capable, & large forces prove to be very costly. Small non-nuclear powers may enhance deterrence using different strategies. Most importantly by making it plain through prior security agreements that aggressors will be severely for punished by the international community, whether or not their invasions are successful. The punishments could be military (including counter-value attacks or asymmetrical threats), political (pariah-state status), & economic (isolation), but they should be certain & tough, even if not perfectly enforced. For example, the European Union may seriously punish aggression from the East using economical measures such as sanctions, boycotts, exclusion from "clubs," etc. Conventional capabilities of small non-nuclear powers is also benefiting from significant improvements in the technology of conventional weapons, notably in accuracy, stealth, intelligence, & information support. Nor does the current theory of conventional deterrence require that conventional weapons be as powerful, destructive, or fearful as nuclear weapons. Growing military strength & asymmetrical capabilities significantly contributes to the psychological credibility of deterrence. Adapted from the source document.
