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J. K. De Vree's "A Theory of Human Behaviour and of the Political Process" (see SA 26:2/78J2195) is criticized. The behavior model offered is faulted on the grounds that it is inconsistent & that it is difficult if not impossible to interpret. That the model is inconsistent is easy to see, thanks to its formal presentation. This criticism might not be very serious, due to the fact that it may be remedied through some small adjustments. The author's own interpretation of his model is not congruent with it. In particular, formulae containing variables that range over both cardinal & ordinal numbers seem impossible to interpret. It is concluded that the problems noted are due to too high a level of generality being sought. In Een reactie op De Vree's 'A Theory of Human Behaviour and of the Political Process' (A Reaction to De Vree's 'A Theory of Human Behavior and of the Political Process'), G. P. de Bruin argues that De Vree's theory is empty of empirical significance, & the theory's weakness can be traced to its mathematical axiomatic foundation. It is argued that the set theoretical concepts of ordinal & cardinal numbers have been misinterpreted, & that the whole problem of measurement in social sciences is merely 'axiomatized away'. In Een ordinale algebra en empirische theorie: een antwoord op Kritiek (An Ordinal Algebra and Empirical Theory: An Answer to Criticism), J. K. De Vree concedes that the theory is so far empty, & that the nature of its relationship to empirical data remains an unsolved problem. This is the case with all general theories & does not constitute a valid objection. It is further argued that the proposed axiomatization is nothing more than a systematization of the system of numbers & relations used in actual empirical research, & that far from axiomatizing away the measurement problem, a systematic account is given of the number system without which measurement would not be possible. A. Orianne.

State formation is defined as the growth of power resources of the state apparatus, the growth of state autonomy, & the growth of societal regulations, sanctioned by state power resources. The relationship between state formation & economic development is investigated, using the method of historical case study. It is hypothesized that growing state regulation is to be expected in periods of acute labor shortage & economic growth. It is found that "houses of correction" were founded in times of overwhelming labor surplus & mass unemployment. The reasons for the foundations of these institutions, however, are not seen as economic, but social: they were a means to fight the social & political consequences of mass unemployment, eg, poverty, crime, & political rebellion. It is concluded that state formation can be found in times of economic prosperity as well as in times of depression, when the depression has severe political or social consequences. It is the result of social & political conflicts possibly due to economic development. Modified HA.

Explanation is given to the dismal predictions of the Club of Rome studies concerning long-run consequences of economic growth & population increases, & why they are not translated into policy changes affecting those variables. The domestic function of economic growth, providing bargaining space for the solution of political conflicts, & the propensity of policy makers to give priority to short-run problems affecting their own position inhibit these policy changes. Focus is on the theory of W. Harich, (KOMMUNISMUS OHNE WACHSTUM? BABEUF UND DER CLUB OF ROME [Communism without Growth? Babeuf and the Club of Rome], Rheinbeck: Rowohlt, 1975) a philosopher from the German Democratic Republic who argued for rigid centralization of political & economic power at the global level. Although Harich did not include concepts such as `liberty', `democracy', & `constitution' in his theory, this can be compared to some of the political reactions to the challenge in Western Europe. Proposals made by Tinbergen & the Mansholt plan however are found to be more promising. 3 Figures. Modified HA.

The question is examined of what personal income distribution will be brought about by the institutions of a political democracy, assuming these institutions have the power to determine this. It has been assumed that an egalitarian income distribution would result. The ideas of Hans van den Doel (Democracy and Welfare Economics, Cambridge, 1979) offer an alternative model. The majority of individuals would not seek radical leveling down of incomes for several reasons: concern for economic growth & employment, & the hope of the poor to become rich. Also, if a majority sought radical leveling down, & the measures were not rigorously enforced, a Prisoner's Dilemma would result for each individual; but if they were rigorously enforced, a situation of collective intransitivity would emerge, making the decision subject to cycling. Resolution of this problem would likely leave median income voters in a strong position that they could use to benefit themselves at the expense of the poor. These findings are consistent with the finding of R. W. Jackman (Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis, New York, 1975) that political equality does not play an important role in increasing equality of material rewards. 4 Tables, 5 Figures. Modified HA.