Suchergebnisse

The essay describes the evolution of the concept of political culture, from th concepts such as Comte's 'consensus', Durkheim's 'collective awareness', Weber's 'significance of individual actions', to Parson's 'action frame of reference', and Mead's 'national character'. The development began with Comte's search for differentia specifica of social sciences in relation to oth positive sciences and finished in 1963 with the introduction of the concept of political culture into political science by G. Mmond and S. Verba. Our analysis has shown that many definitions of political culture point out that i essence lies in people's beliefs since political culture is a set of beliefs regarding politics. As much as it may seem a paradox, it cannot be reduced to mere individual beliefs, but represents a system of inter-subjective opinions on various political objects. This explains the possible discrepancies between the political events and the political beliefs of the people, between their behaviour and political culture, and so on. Contrary to the belief of some authors, it has been shown how political culture may and should be taken as a common denominator for a variety of opinions on politics. Political attitudes, values, norms, public opinion and political ideologies are nothing but different manifestations of political culture. Thus, the concept of political culture includes diverse facets of the subjective attitude of people towards politics. This is the asset and not the downside of this concept, as some authors would have it. It is pointed out that the manifold manifestations of political culture do not carry the same 'weight' in explaining the political activism of people and the functioning of political systems. The relationship between these manifestations is extremely complex and a challenge for research. It is this very relationship that could explain the stable and less stable (i.e. stable and vacillating) reactions of people in their political activity. (SOI : PM: S. 128)

The analysis has shown that both approaches are legitimate and useful in understanding and maintaining democracy. Of course, the interactional approaches are more complex, as well as more important and more vital for understanding democracy. The analysis has shown how political culture (democratic legitimation or political trust, support for civil freedoms, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, etc.) often depend on the elements of the very political structure (party systems and coalition models, election patterns, patterns of democracy, positions in power structure, etc.). Political culture is autonomous in relation to political structure, but frequently its role greatly depends on the relations among political actors and the variables of the political culture itself. The analysis has also demonstrated how these investigations into the interaction (combined effects) between political culture and structure are extremely sophisticated and that in the future they are going to become the most fruitful part of political science, making possible not only a deeper understanding of the "dynamic regularities" in the functioning of democracy but also the attempts at its "innovative sustainment" and gradual development. (SOI : PM: S. 131) + The purpose of this essay is to prove the connection among political culture, political structure and democracy. All the arguments pointing to such a connection have been analysed within the framework of two fundamental approaches to the relationship between culture and structure i.e. within the framework of the classical approach to their correspondence (which claims - primarily in line with the functional theory of culture - that there is a functional concordance between culture and structure, that democracy is mirrored by the civic political culture, i.e. that "culture is a structure's way of life", that culture determines the structure) and the contemporary interactional approach (in which - primarily in line with the theory of culture "as meaning" or "social functioning" - complex relations among various cultural variables and structural variables are analysed as well as their combined effect on democracy as the consequence of these relations). The latter approach considers democracy not as a "fixed condition" but rather as a dynamic phenomenon or the end result of the combined interactional relationships between culture and structure

Defining the dimensions of political culture is a precondition in the elaboration of the theory of this phenomenon and for its systematic empirical study. It has been demonstrated that Almond-Verba's concept of the dimensions of political culture, in the form of a matrix of the three orientations (cognitive, affective, and evaluative) times four political objects ("system", "input-objects", "output-objects" and "I" as an object) is not plausible. If political culture is defined as a set of beliefs about polit (which it indeed is), then it is clear that each belief at the same time contains an intricate mix of knowledge, emotions, and evaluations. This makes it difficult to determine the dimensions according to the mentioned orientations. It seems this was sensed by Almond himself in one of his later works. Using his more recent concept, we define the dimensions of political culture according to the "objects" of politics and not vice versa, according to the orientations in relation to these "objects". Thus we have elaborated on the three fundamental dimensions according to the three fundamental objects of politics: the "system" as a universal object, the "process" as a dynamic object of politics, and the "conduct" as a manner of decision-making and the outcome of governing. It has been found that each of these basic dimensions of political culture has a series of subdimensions (a total of about twenty-five). Surely, this matrix may be added to or perhaps amended, but basically it is unassailable, since it represents a sort of a map of political culture. (SOI : PM: S. 137)

The author analyses the relationship between the constitutional law and the political reality. Using the historical material of the German constitutional legal practice to analyze this relationship, the author concludes that a good constitution can function solely in the setting of a good political culture of state's citizens. Citizenry of a certain political culture always goes hand in hand with a good constitution. (SOI : PM: S. 148)

The author points up the proverbial complexity of Yugoslavia and the inadequacy of its political structure, officially made up of six republics, five peoples, four languages, three religions, two alphabets, and one party. That is why the subjective orientations of its many peoples went counter to its existence, leading to its disintegration following the first multiparty elections. Serbs and Montenegrins were its partisans and due to a lack of democratic political culture they launched the war for the preservation of Yugoslavia. The properties of the political culture of the peoples living on its territory had acted as trip-wires for that war, defined its form, course and intensity. Due to their national identification with Yugoslavia and insufficient democratic political culture, Serbs and Montenegrins started the war for the territories of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aggressors belong to the Eastern civilisational sphere, speak the Serbian language, write in the Cyrillic alphabet. are culturally tribally oriented, want to live in Yugoslavia and Greater Serbia which would be socialist, and are adherents of repressive types of political culture. The victims belong to the Western civilisational sphere, they are Catholics and Moslems, speak Croatian, write in the Latin alphabet, are culturally communally oriented, and favour the participatory political culture. During the Serbian and Monetenegrian aggression, two civil wars erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (1) between the Muslims and the Croats and (2) between the Muslims. The participants of this war all swear their allegiance to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but differ in their visions of its political structure. The Moslems wish a unitarian state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croats want it to be a federal state, while the Serbs are against any separate state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (SOI: PM: S. 242)

The author presents the thesis about the difference between the cultural/historical and the political identity by distinguishing the cultural/historical majorities and minorities from the political winners and losers. He points to the democratic paradox according to which states are not ruled by the losers' political majorities but by the winners' political minorities. According to the author, in multi-ethnic societies it is necessary to equally develop the popular and the political culture - that is the culture and political tolerance. (SOI : PM: S. 56)

The author has tried to prove that interethnic relations in democracy cannot be handled solely by means of legal, economic and institutional means; political culture, i.e. civic democratic political culture can have a significant role. The analysis has shown that there is room for the build-up of a trans-national democratic citizenry, free from all ascriptive criteria and identities such as religion, ethnicity, etc. It has also revealed how classic liberalism neglects various identities (ethnic, national etc.) while communitarian liberalism overlooks the excluding force of various identities. It has also demonstrated that there are several concepts of civic identities (liberal, communitarian and social/group) and that each of these concepts can exert profound influence on the relationship between citizens and their political community. And finally, the relation between patriotism and inter-ethnic relations in democracy are reviewed. Patriotism, in the circumstances of growing social pluralisation, and despite a plethora of political integrations, can play a prominent role in bridging the political and cultural atomisations and conflicts in society. It can undertake this role only if constituted in th civic and not the crude (fixed) ethnic sense - though the national defines the limits and the meaning of this constitution - provided it evolves into the loyalty to one's homeland and going hand in hand with the development of democracy and human rights. In short, the purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that it is necessary to expand democratic political culture which might aid in resolving intricate and sensitive relations among various ethnic and cultural communities. Patriotism can assume a decisive role in this. It lays down the limits and legitimacy to each meaningful political discourse and to each genuine political subject. (SOI : PM: S. 49)

The author defines the state of law as a typical product of German political culture which corresponds to, but also differs from, both the experience of the English rule of law and that of the French l'Etat-Nation. The author pays particular attention to the issue of the legitimacy of the state of law. He focuses on two different approaches to this issue in the works of Volker Gerhardt and Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförd. Following a critical analysis of their fundamental assumptions the author goes on to divulge the thesis on the necessity of a balance between rights and power in the functioning of modern political systems. (SOI : PM: S. 13)

Häberle claims constitutional law is a comparative experiential science closely linked with political science with which it shares the research subject. The constitutional state has been going through a permanent process of changes; the central question is who is the prime mover of constitutional changes: constitutional/legal institutions, constitutional/lega science and political science or public opinion and political culture of citizens? By analysing the recent history of the changes of the German constitutions he suggests that all these factors contribute to constitutional changes. Nevertheless, as an expert for law and political science, who considers himself as belonging to the wider European scientific community, Häberle thinks that the decisive influences in constitutional changes stem from legal and political sciences and concludes: Sine qua (scientia) mortalium vita non regitur liberaliter. (Without science, mortals do not command their life freely). (SOI : PM: S. 186)

The Ministry of Science of the Republic of Croatia decided on a new "Rule book of definition of scientific areas". By the "Book", politology is a scientific field in the area of social sciences. The field is divided in three branches: 1. politology, 2. theory and history of politics, 3. political philosophy. The author of this article shows by documents how the "political science" is quite differently structured by IPSA and APSA, and describes 120 years of dominantly American development of "political science" and of professions of political scientists which brought out a recent new world standard with around 100 subdisciplines and areas of expertise which are structured in 8 fundamental disciplines: 1. political institutions, 2. political behaviour, 3. comparative politics, 4. internationa relations, 5. political theory, 6. public policy and public administration/management, 7. political economy, 8. political methodology. The author points out that a voluntaristic intervention in the definition of scientific areas could mean an attack on development of science, research organisation, renewal of teaching staff on University, and on academic education of political scientists, as well as on internationally comparable competence of Croatian experts, and Croatian democratic political thought and political culture in general. (SOI : PM: S. 240)

The authors analyse the constitutional position of the Polish parliament after the democratic revolution of 1989 as well as its internal political dynamics. The parliament has two houses, endowed with different constitutional competences: Sejm (lower House) and Senate (upper House). The 460 members of the Sejm were elected in three electoral cycles (1989, 1991, and 1993) by means of majority and a proportional electoral system with various prohibitive clauses, while the 100 senators were elected by the majority electoral system. The changes in the electoral rules resulted in the altered parliamentary "contractual" Sejm. The seats (in accordance with a political agreement) were divided between the ruling communist bloc and the oppositional "Solidarity", the first freely elected Sejm had an extremely fragmented party structure with 28 parties, while the second Sejm is moderately pluralist, with two parties of the government coalition and four opposition parties. The most remarkable feature of the Polish political culture is an increasing professionalization of the parliament members as well as a growing political apathy of general public and a meagre turnout at the polls. (SOI : PM: S. 120)

In this work, the author analyses three basic requisites for the establishment of a comprehensive information system in Croatia: contemporary worldview, the latest state-of-the-art technology of the electronic media and the new rhetoric of tele-dialogue/polilogue. The author claims that, regarding the implementation of the latest technology, Croatia is on a par with the world (since we have links with the satellite and optical system and the number of the INTERNET subscribers is growing). However, the situation with the growth of political culture is not so rosy, since the media are still far from a constructive polilogue and mostly stoop to the ad hominem rhetoric. The bleakest situation is in the unpreparedness of journalists and citizens for active, participatory communication in powerful polilogist electronic media. + That is why the author advocates a speedier progress in all subsystems, since only through the synergetic linking of the new communicational technology with the new rhetoric of the polilogue, as well as with the responsibility of all the participants in public communication, a comprehensive Croatian information system may be developed. (SOI : PM: S. 215)