Suchergebnisse

This contribution offers a reminder of the state of political forces in France and the course of the health crisis, which initially took place in a context of strong political tensions, particularly as a result of the controversial pension reform decided by Macron. The COVID crisis allowed populist parties to develop 'naming' and 'blaming' strategies, initially mobilized in different proportions, to attack the President of the Republic Macron. The analysis shows that the decision to introduce a lockdown led the two leaders of the parties described as populist to harden their criticism to similar proportions but also to 'claim' rapid responses to the crisis. These speeches are also part of the medical polemics that will have been omnipresent throughout the pandemic. Finally, we observe that these strategies have not been beneficial to the populist parties, since during the municipal elections the two parties did not manage to take advantage on this health and political sequence.

The Hungarian railway network with the latest and most advanced in the XIX–XX. at the turn of the century. The railway network plays a crucial role not only within the country's borders, but the whole of Europe. The nationalities wanted to create their own state in the Austro - Hungarian monarchy. The Entente validate their own political and economic interests of the Páruzsi peace talks, was used for the national aspirations. The world changes strengthened the political aspirations of the Entente. The strategic interests also justify their decisions. Soviet Russia and the European labor movement organization of great danger to the Entente countries. Politicians of the Entente countries have developed the boundaries of the Central European countries, on the basis of these two reasons. They split up the single railway network in small units. Austria wants now to standardize the components, according to their own interests. Hungary can not promote their own interests in the field of European rail services.

It was only recently, in the early 2000's, that the national councils were formed as institutions of policy making. The present paper concerns the second election of the national councils, which was held in the traditional way and not by means of electors. In 2010, the primary issue was whether and to what extent the institution is considered legitimate by majority of the Hungarians in Serbia. However, mitigating the collective social inequities of Hungarians in Serbia/Voivodina was not empha-sized. This inequity is partly due to the political deep structure of the representational form of rule. In other words, the dispute on the working of the MNT paralleled the current challenges of the Hungarian party-political system in Voivodina. The actual possibilities of minority policy making or the sensibly discussable circumstances of a given policy area were not really included. The discourse belonged to the dimension of politics rather than that of policies. Even the most skilled intellectuals were unaware of the ways how interests can be institutionalized through policy making. The debate addressed the elections of the MNT and not its procedures of functioning/competence/decision. The 2010 election facilitated the progress in the legality and legitimacy of the body but it also pointed out that, due to the short-term and tactical workings of daily political struggles, the political possibilities and articulations of minority interests will continue to be kept in the background.

The representative of the Hungarian peace delegation took over the final regulations of the peace conference that closed the I. World War, in the beginning of May 1920. The peace treaty dislocated Hungary and with the disannexed territories millions of Hungarians were forced to live in the neighbouring countries. The Hungarian government could react for this dramatic and significant event in two ways: on one hand accept and undersign, on the other side refuse its signatory. After a long debate, the government and the assembly –notwithstanding the public"s dismissal –were under the necessity of the pressure of the victorious powers, and made up their mind of signature. This study leads on this decisionmaking progress, on the strength of the elaboration and analysis of the reports of the government meetings in May 1920. The first part of the study shows debates in the meetings of the cabinet council and the political circumstances of the decision. The second part, in turn, shows the dramatic progress of the decisionmaking, as a result of which they pointed the representatives, whose task was the signature on the 4th June 1920 in the Castle of Grand Trianon. As a part of this, the study examines the personal decisions, the possible signatories, the ones who previously undertook the task. The study furnishes an answer for the controversial question, that why Dr. Ágost Benárd, welfare and labour minister and Alfréd Drasche-Lázár, extraordinary delegate were chosen by the government for the signature.

This study is a continuation of the previously published paper in the Central European Publications No. 35, which presented the political controversies about the codifing of the Trianon Peace Treaty and that massive pressure exerted on Hungary by the great powers for the purpose of making it. The antecedents of the ratification process and the entry into force of the peace treaty were the result of more than one year's process. The study describes the period from 4th June 1920, the signing of the peace treaty, till 26th October 1920, the referral of the peace treaty to the National Assembly. The paper presents in details the content of the ratification bill and its justification. It analyzes the content of the letter in which the Hungarian party informed the ambassadors' commission on the submission of the bill. At the same time, asking the great powers to call on the governments of neighboring countries to respect the minority rights of millions of Hungarians, who were attached to them as a result of the peace treaty. The study describes the French Prime Minister's response to the Hungarian letter, and follows up with the further developments of the ratification of the Trianon Peace Treaty, presents the leading political opinions and the decisions of the National Assembly that determined the Hungarian political life and affected the public's everydays, until the beginning of the ratification debate of the National Assembly, from 13rd November 1920.

The fundamental principles of the EU LEADER Programme are common in every member states. However the Programme was fit to the national legislative framework, institutional culture and social features, thus it was implemented with significant differences in the different EU countries/regions. Our study examines the LEADER implementation in one of the Spanish autonomous regions, Andalusia, which has many parallels with Hungarian rurality in terms of political culture, rural economy and society. The Andalusian implementation of the LEADER Programme is especially advanced on various ways. Resulting from the genuine decentralisation of the programme, local action groups enjoy a great degree of independence. They act as paying agencies, make independent and fast decisions and provide tailored assistance for their local clients. The Andalusian implementation of LEADER clearly proves that it can be successful, even in less advanced socio-cultural circumstances. Many elements of this system could be usefully applied in Hungary too, given that we find a way to embed a similar approach to rural development in various levels of our institutional system. We recommend our study to all those who aim for a better rural development system for Hungary in 2014-20.

This study is a continuation of the previously published paper in the Central European Publications No. 35, and No. 43. The study is a continuation of the previously published paper in the Central European Publications No. 35, which presented the political controversies about the codifing of the Trianon Peace Treaty and that massive pressure exerted on Hungary by the great powers for the purpose of making it. The antecedents of the ratification process and the entry into force of the Peace Treaty were the result of more than one year's process. The first study describes the period from 4th June 1920, the signing of the peace treaty, till 26th October 1920, the referral of the peace treaty to the National Assembly. The second study detailed the content of the ratification bill and its justification. Described further developments regarding the ratification of the Trianon Peace Treaty, opinions of leading Hungarian politicians and the decisions of the National Assembly Committee, which determined Hungarian political life and influenced the daily life of the public until the commencement of the National Assembly ratification debate. This study continues the previous one and presents the details of the ratification debate, on 13 November 1920. Details the pre-debate press news, the expectations of the public, statements by the chairmen of the National Assembly Committees. Than it describes and analyzes the detailed discussion, the arguments of the opposing politicians who did not support ratification. These speeches point to the fatal flaws of the peace treaty, the measures that have befallen the Hungarians for a century in its brutality.

In his study the author deals with the question of the corporative organization of the young Slovenian state. In the first part of his writing the author presents the theory and development of corporative ideas after WWII. He sums up the main theories of Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, the two main thinkers of modern corporatism and shows how these theories influenced the development of societal/liberal corporatism. The author introduces the concept of concertation, the new decision-making process of the modern corporative state and differentiates it from the classic pressure politics of liberalism. After the theoretical background in the second part of his study the author gives an introspection into the forms of Slovenian corporative cooperation. First of all, he describes the main organizations of the tripartite political processes: the employers' chambers and associations (e.g. Gospodarska zbornica Slovenije, Trgovinska zbornica Slovenije, Združenje delodajalcev Slovenije) and the employees' unions (e.g. Zveza svobodnih sindikatov Slovenije, Konfedearcija sindikatov Slovenije Pergam, Konfederacija sindikatov 90 Slovenije). At the end of his work he shows the function of the classical corporative forums in Slovenia: the Economic and Social Council (Ekonomsko-socialni svet Slovenije, ESSS) and the National Council (Državni Svet). The author's conclusions are unambiguous: after the successful achievement of independence and freedom, Slovenia managed to create one of the most effective organizational models of modern (societal/liberal) corporatism and uses the process of concertation fruitful for his economic stability and social welfare.

Mátyás Rákosi, first secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party, was forced to resign by soviet Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan on 18th July, 1956. He was followed by Ernő Gerő, who was also a hated man, responsible for all economic decisions in earlier years and taking part in a leadership which had committed serious crimes. He remained in power for three months only, until the October 1956 Revolution. Although Gerő announced political reforms, historians regard it only as a tactical step. This study suggests that these reforms, named "clear sheet", or "tabula rasa" policy, were in fact serious steps toward a "socialist democracy". What is more, these steps were not only announced but many of them was also taken. However, three months were not enough for Gerő to introduce all changes, because he was also engaged in neutralizing the activity of the party opposition lead by Imre Nagy's group. The study analyzes these reforms (e.g. increasing the role of the National Assembly, restoring the "socialist legality", decentralization, improving the living standards of the society, broadening the freedom of speech, giving greater support to the intellectuals etc.). To sum up, it can be stated that these reforms have a lot in common with the reforms of Imre Nagy in 1953. Surprisingly, it seems that the so-called "soft dictatorship" would have started much earlier, already in 1956, instead of 1963. The later reforms of János Kádár, introduced gradually in the 1960s (and sometimes only in the 1980s) probably originated also from this period of time, the Summer of'56. This study has much more questions than answers, its aim is to generate a new debate on Gerő's first secretariat hoping that a better understanding of this period can be reached. The most important questions are the following: why did the Revolution exacdy break out; how would it be possible to avoid it and, most interestingly, what would have happened if the Revolution did not break out at all?