Suchergebnisse

Jednym z fundamentalnych przedmiotów badań nauki o polityce pozostaje niezmiennie język polityki (w swoich licznych odmianach i formach). Analiza naukowa tego przedmiotu badań przysparza jednak politologii nadal szereg problemów, wynikających z nieprzystawalności metod językoznawstwa do funkcji i zadań współczesnej nauki o polityce. Pojawia się więc potrzeba wypracowania politologicznej metody analizy tekstu, która to metoda pozwoliłaby – za pomocą języka – odkryć i wyeksponować założenia kształtujące orientacje i postawy podmiotów politycznych, czyli treści tworzące ogólną przestrzeń polityczną. Propozycją odpowiedzi na to zapotrzebowanie jest prezentowana w artykule metoda, wyróżniająca trzy podstawowe poziomy analizy: konwencjonalną warstwę tekstu, opisową oraz presupozycjalną. Na przykładzie analizy inauguracyjnych orędzi polskich prezydentów, ukazano specyfikę poszczególnych wymiarów: determinant sytuacyjny (na pierwszym poziomie), kreację treści korzystnych wizerunkowo (na poziomie deskryptywnym), wreszcie – najistotniejszy dla politologa – mechanizm odkrywania założeń ukrytych na poziomie presupozycjalnym. ; The language of politics (in its numerous variations and forms) continues to be one of the fundamental objects of political science research. The academic analysis of this object of research, however, continues to generate considerable difficulties for political science as a result of the incompatibility of language studies methodology with the function and tasks of modern political science. Therefore, there emerges a need to develop a method of text analysis for political science that will allow us to use language to discover and present the assumptions that shape the attitudes and ideologies of political entities, or in other words – the content of general political environment. This paper responds to this need by presenting a method that distinguishes three basic levels of analysis: a conventional layer of text, a descriptive one and a presuppositional one. Analyzing the inaugural addresses given by Polish presidents the specificity of their individual dimensions is presented: the situational determinant (level one), the creation of content to boost image (on a descriptive level), and – most importantly to the political scientist – a mechanism revealing the assumptions concealed at the presuppositional level.

Category of enemy presented in the program documents of the communist parties, was an inherent feature of the communist way of thinking, then reflected in the political system of the People's Poland. Political regimes modeled on the Soviet Union needed enemies. Mobilization, which in the first phase of development of the state served reconstruction of the country, and then defend the status quo, required activation against all kinds of enemies. It was evident the need for the existence of the enemy, which was permanent. Changed only the image of the enemy. Enemies were sought inside and outside the communist movement. Communist world was composed mainly of enemies. The enemy was necessary, even mythical. Fight against real or mythical enemies allowed to pursue various goals: differentiate society, to explain various failures, eliminate inconvenient persons, to justify the existence of the security services and the need to strengthen it, to build a party of a new type. The communist movement had created two categories of enemies. The first included the kind of traditional, "class" enemies of the communist movement, "acquired" along with the state in 1944, and treated as a real enemies, which were various types of: 1) social groups as a "capitalist elements" – traders, farmers; 2) political and military organizations and institutions; 3) ideologies and doctrines competitive with Marxism. The U.S. and English imperialism was the constant enemy which was located outside of the state. The second category consisted of enemies which were created in Polish People's Republic – "objective" and "potential" enemies. ; Kategoria wroga, obecna w dokumentach programowych partii komunistycznych, była immanentną cechą komunistycznego stylu myślenia, odzwierciedloną następnie w systemie politycznym Polski Ludowej. Reżimy polityczne wzorowane na reżimie radzieckim, w swej istocie mobilizacyjne, potrzebowały wrogów. Mobilizacja, która w pierwszej fazie rozwoju państwa służyła przebudowie kraju, a następnie obronie status quo, wymagała aktywizacji przeciwko różnego rodzaju wrogom. Widoczne było zapotrzebowanie na istnienie wroga, który był stały, a zmieniał się jedynie jego obraz. Wroga poszukiwano wewnątrz i na zewnątrz ruchu. Świat komunistyczny złożony był przede wszystkim z wrogów. Wróg był niezbędny, nawet mityczny. Walka z rzeczywistymi bądź mitycznymi wrogami pozwalała realizować różne cele: różnicować społeczeństwo, tłumaczyć niepowodzenia, eliminować osoby niewygodne dla aktualnie rządzących, uzasadniać istnienie służby bezpieczeństwa i potrzebę jej wzmocnienia, budować partię nowego typu. Ruch komunistyczny wykreował dwie kategorie wrogów. Do pierwszej zaliczyć należy niejako tradycyjnych, "klasowych" wrogów ruchu komunistycznego, "przejętych" wraz z państwem w 1944 roku, a traktowanych jako wrogów realnych, czyli różnego rodzaju: 1) grupy społeczne w postaci tzw. elementów kapitalistycznych – przedsiębiorców, chłopów, 2) organizacje i instytucje polityczne oraz wojskowe; 3) konkurencyjne wobec marksizmu ideologie i doktryny. Stałym wrogiem ulokowanym poza państwem był amerykański i angielski imperializm. Drugą kategorią byli wrogowie wykreowani w PRL, tzw. wrogowie obiektywni i potencjalni.

The transformation of the political system in Poland after the negotiations of the'Round Table' resulted in an increased interest in modern history, accompanied by a desire to reckon with the past, in particular with the period of communist rule after 1944. Since the 1990s, government authorities and political parties have made a natural move to legitimize the democratic political system in the area of social memory and historical policy. This process has been initiated by constitutional changes, coupled with a truly spontaneous social movement to change national symbols, names of streets and squares, patrons of schools and universities, institutions and manufacturing plants rooted in the overthrown system of communist Poland. The humanities, in particular historiography, have taken steps to reassess attitudes to Polish and global history. The issues of social memory, national identity and historical policy have been reflected in the ideologies and platforms of various political parties. The issue of social (national) memory has become entangled in political disputes and a struggle for 'control of the past', of interpretations of history, the value of patriotism and, by extension, of the electorate, has been waged mainly by the Law and Justice (PiS), Civic Platform (PO), and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) parties. This paper analyzes and describes the most influential political movements in Poland in the early 21st century as regards their attitude to collective memory and the concept of historical policy. These attitudes are presented in terms of the conservative, liberal, critical and totalitarian 'models of historical policy'. The study implies that the conservative and liberal models predominate, clearly influenced by the ideology of Christian democracy and national tendencies. The attitude of conservative parties in particular is characterized by disrespect for academic findings and interpretations of history, a frequently ad hoc approach to facts and assessments of the past, which follows from a desire to find the in-depth historical legitimization of the status of a given party in society and to dominate the electorate. ; The transformation of the political system in Poland after the negotiations of the'Round Table' resulted in an increased interest in modern history, accompanied by a desire to reckon with the past, in particular with the period of communist rule after 1944. Since the 1990s, government authorities and political parties have made a natural move to legitimize the democratic political system in the area of social memory and historical policy. This process has been initiated by constitutional changes, coupled with a truly spontaneous social movement to change national symbols, names of streets and squares, patrons of schools and universities, institutions and manufacturing plants rooted in the overthrown system of communist Poland. The humanities, in particular historiography, have taken steps to reassess attitudes to Polish and global history. The issues of social memory, national identity and historical policy have been reflected in the ideologies and platforms of various political parties. The issue of social (national) memory has become entangled in political disputes and a struggle for 'control of the past', of interpretations of history, the value of patriotism and, by extension, of the electorate, has been waged mainly by the Law and Justice (PiS), Civic Platform (PO), and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) parties. This paper analyzes and describes the most influential political movements in Poland in the early 21st century as regards their attitude to collective memory and the concept of historical policy. These attitudes are presented in terms of the conservative, liberal, critical and totalitarian 'models of historical policy'. The study implies that the conservative and liberal models predominate, clearly influenced by the ideology of Christian democracy and national tendencies. The attitude of conservative parties in particular is characterized by disrespect for academic findings and interpretations of history, a frequently ad hoc approach to facts and assessments of the past, which follows from a desire to find the in-depth historical legitimization of the status of a given party in society and to dominate the electorate.

The transformation of the political system in Poland after the negotiations of the 'Round Table' resulted in an increased interest in modern history, accompanied by a desire to reckon with the past, in particular with the period of communist rule after 1944. Since the 1990s, government authorities and political parties have made a natural move to legitimize the democratic political system in the area of social memory and historical policy. This process has been initiated by constitutional changes, coupled with a truly spontaneous social movement to change national symbols, names of streets and squares, patrons of schools and universities, institutions and manufacturing plants rooted in the overthrown system of communist Poland. The humanities, in particular historiography, have taken steps to reassess attitudes to Polish and global history. The issues of social memory, national identity and historical policy have been reflected in the ideologies and platforms of various political parties. The issue of social (national) memory has become entangled in political disputes and a struggle for 'control of the past', of interpretations of history, the value of patriotism and, by extension, of the electorate, has been waged mainly by the Law and Justice (PiS), Civic Platform (PO), and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) parties. This paper analyzes and describes the most influential political movements in Poland in the early 21st century as regards their attitude to collective memory and the concept of historical policy. These attitudes are presented in terms of the conservative, liberal, critical and totalitarian 'models of historical policy'. The study implies that the conservative and liberal models predominate, clearly influenced by the ideology of Christian democracy and national tendencies. The attitude of conservative parties in particular is characterized by disrespect for academic findings and inter- pretations of history, a frequently ad hoc approach to facts and assessments of the past, which follows from a desire to find the in-depth historical legitimization of the status of a given party in society and to dominate the electorate.

The word "Holocaust" functions as a keyword in reading of the contemporary history in the Web services (which contain video files). Very often this word is used in the context of some historical truth which concerns the second world war. There are mainly some newsreels or audiovisual documents which confirm the atrocities of the war. The forms of the provocation are rather rarely. In this perspective the authors want to notice some peculiar problems or phenomenona. Sometimes the word "Holocaust" is used by some communities to support their ideologies (for example in the political background) – and in this context the interpretation of this word exceeds the ethical taboo. ; Truth, provocation, propaganda. Images of the Holocaust in the Web services The word "Holocaust" functions as a keyword in reading of the contemporary history in the Web services (which contain video files). Very often this word is used in the context of some historical truth which concerns the second world war. There are mainly some newsreels or audiovisual documents which confirm the atrocities of the war. The forms of the provocation are rather rarely. In this perspective the authors want to notice some peculiar problems or phenomenona. Sometimes the word "Holocaust" is used by somecommunities to support their ideologies (for example in the political background) – and in this context the interpretation of this word exceeds the ethical taboo.

The Turkish history huge efforts aimed at modernization and determination to equal Western European countries in the fi eld of respecting human rights. The secularisation process carried out during the Mustafa Kemal Pasha resulted in Turkey being the only Muslim country, were the principle of separation of religion from the state is obligatory (at least formally). The last military coup (in 1980), activities of non-governmental organizations and the infl uence of the European Union in relation to the accession process resulted in gradual improvement of the situation of women in Turkey. The European Union indirectly supported opposition feminist's movement which emerged in new political situation. Nevertheless, gender segregation is still visible on the streets of Istanbul and in the workplaces - women are employed in places less exposed to social contacts, they are paid lower pay, and they often work in the informal sector without a benefi t of social security. Finally, it is worth to point out some similarities between Poland and Turkey. At the beginning of XX century agriculture and monotheistic religion dominated in both countries. Both countries, albeit for different reasons, reclaimed independence after World War I. In both countries strong leaders took over, reforming and modernizing the country. Both leaders, Józef Piłsudski and Mustafa Kemal sympathised with the postulates of female organizations in respect to voting rights and access to education35. For many years, in both countries the dominant role model for women was a mother (also mother of the nation) or a virgin. However, following different ideologies, equality of women in employment was promoted. In Poland and in Turkey gender inequality in marriage has never been opposed, while the phenomenon of domestic violence was concealed. Moreover, in the eighties and nineties of the XX century, both countries: Turkey and Poland underwent liberalizing political changes. Women have become their benefi - ciaries, but they also have been their motive power. ...

Badając, jak wzajemne postrzeganie Europy Środkowej i Rosji zmieniało się na tle złożonych relacji między Wschodem a Zachodem, artykuł czerpie z elementów teorii komunikacji i studiów międzykulturowych (C. Gullién, H. Dyserinck, D. H. Pageaux, D. Ďurišin, etc.) znanych jako imagologia. Jako obszar geograficzny kulturowych przecięć, gdzie weszły ze sobą w kontakt niesłowiański Zachód i słowiański Wschód, Europa Środkowa zawsze wyróżniała sięzmienną pozycją przejściowych centrów i peryferii ze specyficzną mieszanką grup etnicznych, kultur, religii i ideologii. Fakt, że leży ona pomiędzy dwoma tak potężnymi narodami, jak Niemcy i Rosja, wywarł fundamentalny wpływ nie tylko na polityczną, ale i estetyczną komunikację pomiędzy narodami słowiańskimi i Zachodem, który często ujmowany był za pomocą mitów, tzn. fikcjonalnych i subiektywnych obrazów służących do interpretowania rzeczywistości. Wzajemne schodzenie się i rozchodzenie Rosji i Zachodu wynikało z różnic religijnych i "rozdarcia" narodów słowiańskich (przede wszystkim Słowian zachodnich), którzy oprócz trzymania się zachodniej religii i reguł politycznych, pielęgnowali niechęć w stosunku do plemiennej wspólnoty z Rosją. Najsilniejsze więzy z Rosją demonstrowały więc małe narody słowiańskie, żyjące w imperium habsburskim, podczas gdy rosyjskie interesy w Europie skierowane były raczej na Niemcy, Francję lub Anglię, a obszar środkowoeuropejski uznano za strefęprzejściową, traktowaną przez carską Rosję lub Związek Radziecki jako siłę polityczną do prowadzenia własnej polityki względem Zachodu. W przeciwieństwie do tego stanowiska, narody środkowoeuropejskie, nie wyłączając z nich Czechów, nawiązywały relacje z Rosją jako inspirującym liderem i symbolem słowiańskiej niezależności, szczególnie w czasach kłopotów, zagrożenia narodowego i politycznej niestabilności. Ich oczekiwania opierały się na powszechnym przekonaniu, że "nieeuropejska" Rosja i jej inność zdemokratyzuje się poprzez podążanie drogąlokalnej tradycji i popieranie czeskich interesów w geopolitycznej konfrontacji z niesłowiańskim Zachodem. Jak się wydaje, relacja pomiędzy Europą Środkową i Rosją pozostanie centrum permanentnej refleksji metakrytycznej nawet na początku XXI wieku i pozostaje mieć nadzieję, że będzie to model harmonijnej współegzystencji, wzajemnego zrozumienia i szacunku. ; While examining mutual perception of Central Europe and Russia as it has changed against the background of the complex East-West relation, the paper employs the motives of the theory of communication and intercultural studies (C. Guillén, H. Dyserinck, D. H. Pageaux, D. Ďurišin, etc.) known as imagology. As a cultural crossroads and geographicalarea where the non-Slavonic West and the Slavonic East come into contact, Central Europe has always featured a changeable position of transitional centres and peripheries with the specific mingling of ethnics, cultures, religions and ideologies. The fact that it is situated between two powerful nations, such as Germany and Russia, has fundamentally influenced not only political but also aesthetical communication between the Slavonic peoples and the West, which has often been maintained through myths, i.e. fictional and subjective images to interpret the reality. The mutual converging or diverging of Russia and the West has resulted from the religious oscillation and "splitting" of Slavonic peoples (namely the West Slavs) who, despite adhering to Western religion and policies, have fostered awareness of tribal affinity with Russia. The strongest ties with Russia were thus maintained by small Slavonic nations living in the Hapsburg Empire, whereas the Russian interest in Europe was rather aimed at Germany, France or England, andCentral European area was deemed to be a zone of transition employed by Tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union as political powers to pursue their goals in the West. In contrast to it, Central European nations, the Czechs not excluding, forged ties with Russia as the inspiring leader and symbol of Slavonic independence, the more so in times of troubles, national danger and political instability. Their expectations were based on the common belief that "non-European" Russia and its otherness would become democratised through following the local tradition and supporting Czech interests in the geopolitical confrontation with the non-Slavonic West. As it seems, the relation between Central Europe and Russia will remain the focus of permanent metacritical discourse even in the early 21st century and one can only cherish hope that it will be a model of harmonious coexistence, mutual understanding and respect.