Dansk Folkeparti har i større udstrækning end andre partier anvendt pressemeddelelser som led i deres kommunikation. Samtidig har deres pressemeddelelser været af en anden karakter end de øvrige partiers. Med udgangspunkt i George Lakoffs teori om moralpolitik og med anvendelse af en Toulmin-inspireret argumentationsanalyse analyseres partiets pressemeddelelser fra en tilfældigt valgt måned i 2010. Analysen viser, at pressemeddelelserne udtrykker meget tydelige positioner med baggrund i moralske standpunkter. Politiske modsætninger behandles som moralske, men der er ikke tale om, at man på populistisk vis vender kappen efter vinden. Tværtimod er der tale om et særdeles homogent syn på politik som moral. På den baggrund diskuteres Lees-Marshments skelnen mellem markeds-, salgs- og produktorienterede partier, og konklusionen er, at man kan se Dansk Folkeparti som et salgsorienteret parti, som anvender pressemeddelelserne som et (billigt) middel for at nå ud til vælgerne. ; Dansk Folkeparti (the Danish People's Party) uses press releases to a much larger extent than any other Danish party. But they also use them in a different way. Through an analysis of press releases from a randomly chosen month in 2010, this article discusses the party's use of press releases not only as a source of information about the party's political initiatives but as a way of doing what George Lakoff has called Moral Politics. The use of press releases is then discussed in relation to the distinction presented by Lees-Marshement between product oriented, sales oriented and market oriented parties. The conclusion is that Dansk Folkeparti use the press releases as a part of their political marketing, but that the party due to its moral politics has to be classified as a sales oriented party.
In: Christiansen , F J & Klemmensen , R 2015 , Danish Experiences with Coalition Governments and Coalition Governance . i H L Madsen (red.) , Coalition Building : Finding Solutions Together . Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy - DIPD , København , s. 26-43 .
In this chapter we outline the Danish and Scandinavian experiences with coalition governments and coalition governance. We do so by first briefly describing the historical path that has led to the political system we see working today in these countries. Then we tell about the political culture and institutional factors that lead to coalition governments. In the third section, we look at the nature of political agreements. We discuss the preconditions for coalition governments or coalition governance and its pros and cons. We focus on the trade-offs between including different interests into legislative coalitions and the possible lack of clarity of responsibility or of party identity that this inclusion entails. ; In this chapter we outline the Danish and Scandinavian experiences with coalition governments and coalition governance. We do so by first briefly describing the historical path that has led to the political system we see working today in these countries. Then we tell about the political culture and institutional factors that lead to coalition governments. In the third section, we look at the nature of political agreements. We discuss the preconditions for coalition governments or coalition governance and its pros and cons. We focus on the trade-offs between including different interests into legislative coalitions and the possible lack of clarity of responsibility or of party identity that this inclusion entails.
In: Mandrup , T 2009 , ' South Africa and the SADC Stand-by Force ' , Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies , bind 37 , nr. 2 , s. 1-24 .
The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.