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If a country has no developed political party system, it is not really a democracy. And the development of political parties in Russia has a long way to go. The only branch of government in which parties play an influential role is in the State Duma (the lower house of parliament) -- not in the Federation Council (the upper house) or the executive branch. Addressing the question of why parties have developed so little elsewhere, it is argued that they are weak because the most powerful politicians choose to make them so. This institutional arrangement suits their purposes to control what happens in government from the top. Tracing the origins of this situation reveals that they lie in Russian history & culture, predating the Soviet period. Another impediment to party development is the scale of socioeconomic change in Russia. Socioeconomic cleavages were important to party development in Western Europe, with liberal & conservative parties representing different sectors of the population. However, there is reason for optimism for the future. While Putin enjoys solid support from the people, other major political actors do not; if Putin should cease to identify with Unified Russia, the majority party's future is uncertain. Also, a 2002 law passed by both houses & the president requires regional parliaments to be proportional in terms of political party representation. This will lead to party development at the regional level, which conceivably could spread upward. Tables. J. Stanton

After tracing the origins of political parties in post-Soviet Estonia, parties are classified on the basis of "dispute measurements" -- from areas in which they fundamentally agree to those on which they widely diverge -- using a left-center-right continuum. It is shown that two key areas constitute the major source of interparty differences: socioeconomic & cultural-ethnic; ideological differences between parties are also noted. Data are presented on the performance of the major parties since independent Estonia held its first Riigikogu (parliamentary) elections in 1992, comparing results with those of the 1995 & 1999 elections; changes in the size & number of parties, the rise & fall of coalitions, & characteristics of party supporters are analyzed. The fundamentals of the Party Law adopted in 1994 are outlined & the structure of the party system is described, concluding that it lags far behind that of more developed democracies; electoral participation also remains quite low. 14 Tables, 2 Figures. K. Hyatt Stewart

"Reprinted from The American political science review, vol. 13, no. 2, May, 1919." ; Cover-title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

First edition, July, 1945. ; For further reading: p. 32. ; Mode of access: Internet.

One of the tales told about American political parties is that Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, desiring to create an institution uniting sup-porters of their beliefs about the means and ends of government, set off from their Virginia plantations on what was described to inquisitive journalists as an expedition to gather botanical specimens. Instead of collecting specimens, however, they are alleged to have created the original specimen of the modern political party.

The implementation of regional autonomy through Acts Number 23/2014 on Regional Government formulates the authority that can be maintained by local governments. One of the authorities' is the political autonomy. The efforts to implement the political autonomy can be done through the institutionalization of local political parties. However, according to Indonesian Law, the institutionalization of local political parties is not regulated in the provisions of acts related to political parties. The legislation that regulates local political parties can be found only in Acts Number 11/2006 on Aceh Government and Acts Number 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province. Therefore, this paper analyzes the theoretical, juridical and sociological reasons underpinned the idea of local political parties' institutionalization. This research is a normative legal research which uses legal matter and acts to analyse the problems. This research finds strategies that is relevant to make local political parties institutionalized. There are five reasons to deliver local political parties in Indonesia based from this research. First, the theoretical foundation describes Indonesia as a country with federalism autonomy. Second, the constitutional juridical basis consists of two principles of the Constitution, namely the principle of the autonomy of the unitary state and the principle of equality and freedom of every citizen in governing. Third, The platform of sociological based on the fact that the choice of pluralistic Indonesian society is still diverse in many elections. Fourth, the historical background in the form of historical experience that in 1955 General Election and Local Election, there were several local political parties. Fifth, the comparative study in United Kingdom as a unitary state and Malaysia as a Federal State, which both have local political parties. The concept of local political parties that are relevant to be applied in Indonesia in the constitutional juridical perspective related to the decentralization of political parties can be built through four strategies. First, the local political party whose presence was based on pluralist paradigm which provides the idea that in a pluralistic society should be built a decentralized party system in order to sustain the plurality of society. Second, the local political party which drafted is a separate legal entity which is dichotomous from the national political parties as a legal entity. Third, local political party's participation in elections only to the General Election and Local Elections for Legislative Elections candidates, the Provincial Representatives, Regency / City. Fourth, the formation mechanism, supervision and dissolution of local political parties are designed similar to national political process for parties as applicable today.

This paper assesses the relationship between the nature of political parties and varieties of democracy. It is argued that the changing role of parties can be attributed to an ideational transformation by which parties have gradually come to be seen as necessary and desirable institutions for democracy, and that this has contributed to a changing conception of parties from voluntary private associations towards the political party as a 'public utility', i.e. the party as an essential public good for democracy. Recent cases of democratization, where parties were attributed a markedly privileged position within the democratic institutional framework, provide the most unequivocal testimony of such a conception of the relationship between parties and democracy. At the same time, however, fundamental disagreements persist about the meaning of democracy and the actual role of political parties within it. Regrettably, however, the literatures on parties and democratic theory have developed to a large degree in mutual isolation. This paper provides a preliminary attempt to move beyond the consensus which exists on the surface that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties by considering varieties of party and different conceptions of democracy.

In this chapter of Life after Reform: When Bipartisan Campaign Reform Meets Politics, the authors reject the assumption that national political parties are strong in the US due to soft money, & argue that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) will create broader competition by changing spending & fundraising strategies at the national level of political parties. The changes in use of resources of soft & hard money are contextualized in the light of the new limits & the new incentives to garner hard money donations. The changes in hard money requirements under BCRA as related to party choice of coordinated or independent spending with their chosen candidate is discussed in the case of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). Findings indicate an increased use of political party consultants as a campaign expenditure. In conclusion, the authors predict significant change in the way federal campaigns are financed by a shifting of money away from national party committees to state & local parties, PACs & NGO's. 1 Table, 2 Figures. J. Harwell

A concluding chapter considers evolutionary, generational, & genetic interpretations of trends revealed in the essays regarding the role & importance of parties in democracies. The functions of parties can be categorized as either "representative" (interest articulation, aggregation, & policy formulation), or "institutional," (leader recruitment & government organization). There has been a shift in the balance of party functions from the combined representative & procedural roles that were typical of mass parties, to more exclusively procedural functions. This historic shift can be seen as a strategy of adaptation rather than an indication of decline. Three challenges facing contemporary parties are pointed out: (1) Political parties need to be capable of producing a relatively coherent internal hierarchy that can be "exported" in order to integrate different institutional arenas. (2) Parties must secure their institutional integrity by recovering their autonomy & coherence. (3) Parties have to regain their legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry by conforming to legal/moral standards; relating to popular concerns; & emphasizing the authority of party politicians as opposed to technical experts. J. Lindroth

We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties.

We argue that anticorruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anticorruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anticorruption laws also bind political parties.

Arguing that a complete understanding of the functioning of modern liberal democracies entails analysis of the challenges facing political parties, key findings from empirical political science are reviewed & directions for future theory & research are outlined. Focus is on recent changes within & between Western European polities -- particularly those related to European integration -- & the challenges these pose for political party functioning as purposive organizations, including shifts in political values, national political cultures, socioeconomic transformations, the structures of political communication, & political issues & policy agendas. The mobilization & linkage functions of political parties in relation to the wider society are explored, along with parties' internal structure, organization, & behavior. Figures. K. Hyatt Stewart

"Paper prepared for the project "The Role of Political Parties in the Return to Democracy in the Southern Cone," sponsored by the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the World Peace Foundation." ; Bibliography: p. [29]-[31] ; Mode of access: Internet.