Suchergebnisse

One of the brand new areas of historiography is analyzed. Availing of the research of historical conscience launched in Germany, the author explores the possibility of applying this new practice to the analysis of Lithuanians' historical conscience. The perspectives, theoretical-methodological objectives & tasks are analyzed. Special attention is drawn to the ideological aspect of a historical conscience & to the problem of "left" & "right" in the Lithuanians' mass conscience during the last decade. A relationship between the "left" & "right" identity & a specific version of the past being defended, an attempt by Lithuania's politicians to manipulate the historical perspectives, a tendency toward mythologization as evident in Lithuania's contemporary historical conscience is emphasized. Adapted from the source document.

Different shortcomings have been attributed to both legislators (the people & the parliament) in all countries & at all times. The key shortcoming of the people as a legislator is its unability to duly solve state-level issues: the totality of citizens can easily be misled, they lack knowledge or competence on specific issues, their decisions are based on stereotypes etc. Another limitation of people is related to the possibility that anonymity of its decisions can provoke cruelty & intolerance. Despite logical validity of the above-mentioned shortcomings their practical correctness is not proven. Falseness is also not proven as the only existing example of a frequent people's participation in legislation (Switzerland) among other things proving the falseness of the above-mentioned reproaches could hardly serve as a basis for generalization. To the disadvantage of people as a legislator, a procedural argument is presented: during a referendum it is not possible to adopt a maximum best & balanced law as in every case there is a choice "either... or." There is a vote en bloc & no editorial (even most rational) amendments are possible. Besides, the legislation that involves a referendum is related to huge costs. The people's participation in legislation is beneficial because it ensures a higher legitimacy of the decisions & brings people closer to the ruling elite (thus the gap between what citizens expect from the administration & what they receive from the administration is minimized), moreover, this guarantees every citizen's right to participate in tackling his/her affairs. There is one case where the laws adopted by the people have all the strengths of the laws adopted by the parliament & the people, & avoid almost all the failings. These are ratification referenda where the parliament-approved draft laws are adopted (or rejected). The people are only a nominal legislator in Lithuania. The recent practice proves that currently the requirements for holding a referendum make it impossible to pass laws in referenda. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the requirements for initiating a referendum are practically impossible to meet: so far nobody has managed to collect 300.000 signatures required to initiate a referendum, ie., 12 percent of the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania who have the right to vote. Consequently, the Seimas is de facto the only legislator in Lithuania. The Parliament as a lawmaker also has some weaknesses. First parliament members, unlike the people, are more prone to bribing or may be subject to some other personal impact. On the other hand, in contemporary electoral system, the parliamentarians who seek to stay in office pander both certain social or territorial groups of the electorate by adopting laws beneficial to them. The people as the whole is not the only popular actor in the legislative process. Individual citizens & their groups have certain powers as well. Yet they are not legislators as such, but rather merely participants of the legislative process. As compared to foreign practice, in Lithuania the conditions & procedure exercising citizens' legislative initiative (50.000 signatures required) are subject to relatively liberal regulation. Unlike in many countries of Europe, there are no direct restrictions on exercising this initiative. There are two indirect restrictions: 1) a draft law on the state budget of the Republic of Lithuania can only be prepared & submitted to the Seimas by the Government, 2) draft laws on ratification & denouncing international treaties are submitted by the President. In practice, however, citizens' legislative initiatives are related to politicians' rather than citizens' initiatives. Citizens' legislative initiative most often is used not to promote the idea of lawmaking but to use citizens' signatures for exerting political pressure on the Seimas ruling majority by opposition & communicating a certain message to the electorate. Out of seven initiatives, one brought some results. Exercising the right of petition at the Seimas is in fact an indirect legislative initiative. It diminishes the significance of the Constitutional right of 50.000 citizens' initiative. This right does not make any practical influence: so far only two laws have been passed on the basis of the problems addressed in petitions. Adapted from the source document.

It is widely assumed that effective functioning of democratic institutions depends on the political support & civic engagement of the public. Public support for authorities is especially important during the reform period in new democracies. Evidence from different Central & Eastern European countries including Lithuania demonstrates critically low level of political support, e.g. satisfaction with regime performance & trust in political institutions as well as comparatively low level of political engagement. However, systematic & comprehensive account of these trends & their implications for political stability & democratic performance in new democracies is lacking. Here, the results of qualitative research of political attitudes & political behavior in the Lithuanian countryside are presented, drawing on 30 in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens in Alarita & Naujasodis (district of Moletai) in July 2003. The aim of the research is to explore the dominating patterns of political support & political engagement of Lithuanian citizens. The political support was analyzed by using the theoretical framework of David Easton & Pippa Norris. Easton in his classic model distinguished among different objects of support, including support for the community, the regime & the authorities. Moreover, he made a distinction between the specific support, a quid pro quo for the fulfillment of demands, & diffuse support, unconditional attachment to political objects & a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will. This conceptual framework was recently revisited by Norris, who expanded the classification into a five-fold framework distinguishing between political support for the community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, & political actors. Political engagement is defined here to include psychological as well as actual political involvement. In more concrete terms, it comprises the following dimensions: 1) interest in politics; 2) voting & propensity to vote in elections or referenda; 3) engagement in community politics; 4) partisanship, including both the party membership & party identification; 5) participation or propensity to engage in unconventional political activity. The analysis resulted in classification of ten types of political outlook: 'prosoviet radical', 'soviet system builder', 'moderate critic', 'rural wisdom optimist', 'apathetic youth', 'rational youth', 'disappointed activist', 'civic optimist', 'right1st democrat' & 'rightist radical'. These types can be expected to represent the dominant patterns of political attitudes & political behavior in rural Lithuania. The investigation reveals that political support for democracy is highly dependent on the attitudes towards the soviet past. Moreover, it is indirectly linked with the age & former social status of the respondent. The data shows that supporters of democratic regime are usually right-oriented or young persons. Surprisingly, the satisfaction with current regime performance is not linked with the support for current authorities. Finally, the results suggest that most disappointed persons are more skeptical toward conventional forms of political engagement & are likely to support unconventional political activities. The actual political behavior, however, is not dependent on the level of political support. 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.

The goal of paper is to put into focus and explain essential features of the political development in Lithuania during second post-communist decade by means of its comparison with the analogous processes in other Baltic States (Latvia and Estonia) and in those Central European countries with political systems which resemble most closely Lithuanian case (Poland and Hungary). In all these countries, second post-communist decade witnessed the rise of the new successful populist parties. The author argues that this populist rise is the proper context for the understanding of Rolandas Paksas' impeachment in Lithuania in 2003-2004. His Order and Justice party has to be classified together with the brothers Kaczynski's Law and Justice party and its even more radical allies in Poland, Viktor Orban's Fidesz and Gabor Vona's Jobbik in Hungary, Juhan Part's Res Publica in Estonia and Einars Repse's New Era in Latvia. While the rise of right-wing populism did not change the political system in the former bureaucratic authoritarian countries Estonia and Latvia, in Hungary and Poland the outcome was the breakup of the implicit ex-communist and anti-communist elite pact which was the foundation of the political stability in these former countries of national communism. Lithuania is unique in that the ex-communist and anti- communist elite pact was not abolished, but preserved and consolidated due to the collaboration of all, by this time, "established" and Left-of-centre populist parties during the impeachment proceedings. Adapted from the source document.

The May 9th issue was the main question on the Lithuanian foreign policy agenda in the first half-year 2005. The question was a trivial one: should the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus attend the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in Moscow. However the question became a source of public discussions among politicians, businessmen, historians & political commentators. One point was common -- the issue was very delicate & needed unusual measures to find the right solution. The President agreed that he should be aware of the painful historic experience of Lithuanian nation & take the issue to the public discussions before the final decision is made. Therefore, the task of this research is to look at the May 9th issue from different theoretical perspectives: from constructivist approach (Ole Waever's theory of securitization) & from positivistic approach to security issues. The first question of exploration -- is the May 9th issue a security issue? From securitization perspective the question should be formulated like this: was the May 9th issue a securitizated threat? From positivistic perspective the question sounds so: could the discussions around the May 9th issue & the decision of the Lithuanian President cause damage to Lithuanian national security? The research has concluded that the May 9th issue was successfully securitizated, because three criteria of securitization were fulfilled: a) usual political procedures were changed with reference to the possible threat rising from the President's decision; b) objects to be secured were indicated; c) securitizing actors were identified. From positivistic perspectives the real threat of the May 9th problem could be estimated as minimal (or hypothetical) & even communication processes (proposing the hypothesis that communication security sector has an effect on threats dynamics) did not changed threats characteristics significantly. Adapted from the source document.

Lietuvos viesojoje erdveje gajus isitikinimas, kad Lietuvos rinkejo santykis su politiniais atstovais yra suasmenintas, neretai besiremiantis subjektyviomis ir iracionaliomis simpatijomis ar antipatijomis konkretiems politiniams lyderiams. Kiek pagristas toks pesimizmas? Straipsnio tikslas - issiaiskinti, kokio rysio esama tarp politiniu lyderiu asmenybes portretu suvokimo salies visuomeneje ir rinkeju vertybiniu orientaciju, kurios traktuojamos kaip vienas personalizacijos sklaida Lietuvos politikoje ribojanciu veiksniu. Pasitelkus 2012 m. rudens Lietuvos gyventoju viesosios nuomones apklausu duomenis, nagrinejama, kaip politiniu lyderiu paveikslai varijuoja priklausomai nuo rinkejo ideologinio identifikavimosi, (anti)sovietiskumo, tautinio konservatizmo ir postmaterializmo nuostatu. Nors daugelis asmenybes bruozu yra objektyvus ir ilgalaikiai asmens psichologines sandaros elementai, Lietuvos visuomeneje rimtai nesutariama, koks 'is tiesu' yra gerai zinomas salies politikas, ir nuomoniu issiskyrimui reiksminga itaka daro politiniu paziuru bei vertybiniu nuostatu skirtumai. Rinkejo identifikavimasis kaires-desines skaleje ir (anti)sovietiskumo nuostatos svarbios vertinant tris is penkiu tirtu Lietuvos politiniu lyderiu asmenybes dimensiju - sutaikomuma, samoninguma ir atviruma patirciai. Tautinio konservatizmo nuostatos padeda paaiskinti pirmu dvieju dimensiju suvokima visuomeneje. Gauti rezultatai taip pat skatina tolesniuose tyrimuose aiskintis rinkejo vertybiniu nuostatu poveikio politiniu lyderiu 'moraliniu bruozu' ir temperamento suvokimui skirtumus Lithuanian public debates share a strong conviction that the relationship between a Lithuanian voter and his/her political representatives rests on personalisation, often nurtured by voter's subjective and irrational feelings of love or hate in regard to particular political leaders. Is such kind of pessimism well-grounded? The article aims to explore the relationship between perceptions of well-known political leaders' personality portraits among Lithuanian population and voter's normative orientations on the individual level, holding voter's normative orientations an important factor, limiting the proliferation of personalisation of politics. Based on the empirical data of public surveys, conducted in autumn 2012, the study explores how perceptions of political leaders' personalities vary according to voter's ideological self-identification, the level of adherence to soviet values, national conservatism and post-materialism. Even though personality traits are objective and stable elements of individual's psychological constitution, a serious disagreement regarding the personality portraits of analysed political leaders is revealed in the Lithuanian society, and the perceptions diverge according to individual's political views and normative attitudes. Voter's left-right self-identification and (anti)soviet attitudes predict the perception of three personality dimensions of Big Five - Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and Openness to experience - for analysed leaders, and national conservatism - perceptions of the abovementioned first two dimensions. The results of the study ask for further analysis of a different level of impact that voter's normative attitudes may bear on popular perception of political leaders' 'moral traits' and temperamental features. Adapted from the source document.

The article discusses factors, determining loyalty of the European Parliament members, which is marginalized in most of researches on the European Parliament. The initial assumption holds that as given the rates of loyalty to the national states are high it is groundless to assess it as a neutral variable. Loyalty of the European Parliament members to national states can significantly contribute to the studies of European Parliament's internal relations and power contribution. The first section of this article presents and analyses main insights of the influence of national parties and political groups on the voting behavior of the European Parliament members, justifying objective reasons which caused marginalization of importance of the European Parliament members' loyalty to national states. It should be noted that the European Parliament members, like most of other politicians, have fixed set of objectives forming their choices. Goals of re-election, positions and policy (leading to power gains/losses) are leading. In the hands of national parties and political groups these goals become instruments of pressure and enforcement, determining behavior of the European Parliament members. National parties controlling the access of candidates to the electoral lists and defining their position on those lists gain extreme importance in the competition for loyalty. Since political groups of the European Parliament have dominant political force for the second objective of the parliament members each of them have an interest in maintaining balance between loyalty to the national party and particular political group. Loyalty to national states loses its importance as it has minimal influence on the success of achieving objectives of the parliament members. The second section is devoted to the research of links between voting of European Parliament members and their national states, more specifically -- to the analysis of European Parliament members' loyalty to their national states. Lithuania is chosen as a case study. The fact that loyalty to the national states during 2004-2009 and 2009-2014 terms of the European Parliament is over 85 % indicates that this variable should not be seen as accidental or insignificant. It is argued that loyalty to the national state mainly reflects voting unity of national delegation. The rest of this section analyzes factors which can explain why, despite the fact that national delegation is very diverse in the context of left-right ideological divide, rates of loyalty to the national states, demonstrated by the national delegations, remain very high. The article concludes stating that loyalty of European Parliament members to their national states is a valuable source of data for the analysis of the party behavior in the European Parliament as well as outside it and should not be overlooked. Adapted from the source document.

Public space is realized as social & communicative arena, civic forum. The whole of individuals becomes a market of information consumers where arguments are presented & public opinion is formed. Conception of public space is related to alternation of state organization & communication models. While a modern state is being created, press forms a bourgeois public space. Radio & television invoked public discussions in the last century. Conception of public radio & television formed in Europe prolonged the tradition of public service. Community delegates to the state certain regulation functions which secure the right of a citizen to receive information & to participate in formation of public opinion. The monopoly of radio & television broadcast granted to democratic state has to guarantee pluralism & word freedom. Goals of public broadcaster are to expand civic society, stimulate activities of non-commercial & non-political groups, nourish national values. Main principles of an audiovisual public service are accessibility, pluralism, universality, independence. Citizens control (public services) & finance (subscription fee) public broadcasters. An antimonopolic wave formed in the eighth decade of previous century forced to liberalize the sector of European audiovisual communication. A new political consensus was achieved: only competition can secure pluralism. Traditional conception of public space varies. Market of audiovisual mass communication growing rapidly formed public space being regulated & activated in a special way. Efforts of generated communication (public relations) & competitive media invoke an opposite effect -- decreasing interest in public life. According to the opinion of radical democratic theory conception of public space formed by liberal democracy fell into desuetude, because community was split to heterogenous groups which don't have the vision of the common goal. Information community evolves in the direction of demassification & diversification; it will be supplied with products of media according to individual demand. The model of vertical communication dominating in public space is replaced by horizontal interactive communication. In such a way models of popular & qualitative communication become equally important. However the idea of public audiovisual service becomes more & more popular. It is believed that only it can guarantee functioning of democracy not allowing forming community of two speeds where not all of them will have an access to information resources. Adapted from the source document.