Suchergebnisse

Contemporary Central Asia (CA / Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) is an internationally important region in economic and security sense. Its biggest problem is the lack of long-term political stability, which became the object of the thesis. Accordingly, the purpose of the thesis was to determine the basic reasons of instability in CA states, to disclose their detailed essence and offer an effective conception to maintain long-term stability in them. Stability was defined in dissertation as absence of revolution and objective/subjective socio-political and socio-economic base of discontent with the government of a single taken country, which is a premise and condition of the revolution in it. More favorable conditions for any revolution (classical or "colorful"), as it was stressed in the study, are supposed to form in the transitional societies with no deep historical tradition of statehood, as it is in case of CA states. Therefore, the conclusion was made that the successful state (as ethnic-civil entity and institutional system) "building" is a fundamental preventive condition of revolution (instability) and its premises there, applying principle of socio-political corporatism in organization of the system of governance in the framework of Central Asian presidential regimes. The core idea of the principle is a consensual politics of the ruling elite of the country, meeting not only individual needs, but also socio-economic needs of the society, what will keep the political system of CA states stable in the long run. External factor in case of stability in Central Asia is secondary, but presumed balance of power between Russia and China in the region is going to become its additional guarantee.

Contemporary Central Asia (CA / Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) is an internationally important region in economic and security sense. Its biggest problem is the lack of long-term political stability, which became the object of the thesis. Accordingly, the purpose of the thesis was to determine the basic reasons of instability in CA states, to disclose their detailed essence and offer an effective conception to maintain long-term stability in them. Stability was defined in dissertation as absence of revolution and objective/subjective socio-political and socio-economic base of discontent with the government of a single taken country, which is a premise and condition of the revolution in it. More favorable conditions for any revolution (classical or "colorful"), as it was stressed in the study, are supposed to form in the transitional societies with no deep historical tradition of statehood, as it is in case of CA states. Therefore, the conclusion was made that the successful state (as ethnic-civil entity and institutional system) "building" is a fundamental preventive condition of revolution (instability) and its premises there, applying principle of socio-political corporatism in organization of the system of governance in the framework of Central Asian presidential regimes. The core idea of the principle is a consensual politics of the ruling elite of the country, meeting not only individual needs, but also socio-economic needs of the society, what will keep the political system of CA states stable in the long run. External factor in case of stability in Central Asia is secondary, but presumed balance of power between Russia and China in the region is going to become its additional guarantee.

Contemporary Central Asia (CA / Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) is an internationally important region in economic and security sense. Its biggest problem is the lack of long-term political stability, which became the object of the thesis. Accordingly, the purpose of the thesis was to determine the basic reasons of instability in CA states, to disclose their detailed essence and offer an effective conception to maintain long-term stability in them. Stability was defined in dissertation as absence of revolution and objective/subjective socio-political and socio-economic base of discontent with the government of a single taken country, which is a premise and condition of the revolution in it. More favorable conditions for any revolution (classical or "colorful"), as it was stressed in the study, are supposed to form in the transitional societies with no deep historical tradition of statehood, as it is in case of CA states. Therefore, the conclusion was made that the successful state (as ethnic-civil entity and institutional system) "building" is a fundamental preventive condition of revolution (instability) and its premises there, applying principle of socio-political corporatism in organization of the system of governance in the framework of Central Asian presidential regimes. The core idea of the principle is a consensual politics of the ruling elite of the country, meeting not only individual needs, but also socio-economic needs of the society, what will keep the political system of CA states stable in the long run. External factor in case of stability in Central Asia is secondary, but presumed balance of power between Russia and China in the region is going to become its additional guarantee.

Contemporary Central Asia (CA / Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) is an internationally important region in economic and security sense. Its biggest problem is the lack of long-term political stability, which became the object of the thesis. Accordingly, the purpose of the thesis was to determine the basic reasons of instability in CA states, to disclose their detailed essence and offer an effective conception to maintain long-term stability in them. Stability was defined in dissertation as absence of revolution and objective/subjective socio-political and socio-economic base of discontent with the government of a single taken country, which is a premise and condition of the revolution in it. More favorable conditions for any revolution (classical or "colorful"), as it was stressed in the study, are supposed to form in the transitional societies with no deep historical tradition of statehood, as it is in case of CA states. Therefore, the conclusion was made that the successful state (as ethnic-civil entity and institutional system) "building" is a fundamental preventive condition of revolution (instability) and its premises there, applying principle of socio-political corporatism in organization of the system of governance in the framework of Central Asian presidential regimes. The core idea of the principle is a consensual politics of the ruling elite of the country, meeting not only individual needs, but also socio-economic needs of the society, what will keep the political system of CA states stable in the long run. External factor in case of stability in Central Asia is secondary, but presumed balance of power between Russia and China in the region is going to become its additional guarantee.

A stabilised tax system is a necessary element of an efficient legal system. Assurance of stability of the tax system is crucial for tax payers, who can plan their undertakings over a longer period of time, without being exposed to the danger of tax rate changes. The most visible symptom of tax law stability is the stability of tax rates. The guarantee of fixed tax rates is one of the most important incentives for investors, who take it under consideration when estimating the risk connected with starting a new enterprise in a given market. Establishment of a stabilised tax system turns out to be very difficult in practice. There are several factors, amongst which the most important are: political background; sovereignty of lawmakers, who can almost unlimitedly define the level of tax burden; changes taking place in former socialist countries in the late 1980's and early 1990's causing radical tax system reforms; and, at last, the process of accession to the European Community, which required harmonisation of state law systems with the European one. The above makes one ask the question whether it is possible to create a stabilised tax system with all those factors around and eventually how to outline the area of stability.

A stabilised tax system is a necessary element of an efficient legal system. Assurance of stability of the tax system is crucial for tax payers, who can plan their undertakings over a longer period of time, without being exposed to the danger of tax rate changes. The most visible symptom of tax law stability is the stability of tax rates. The guarantee of fixed tax rates is one of the most important incentives for investors, who take it under consideration when estimating the risk connected with starting a new enterprise in a given market. Establishment of a stabilised tax system turns out to be very difficult in practice. There are several factors, amongst which the most important are: political background; sovereignty of lawmakers, who can almost unlimitedly define the level of tax burden; changes taking place in former socialist countries in the late 1980's and early 1990's causing radical tax system reforms; and, at last, the process of accession to the European Community, which required harmonisation of state law systems with the European one. The above makes one ask the question whether it is possible to create a stabilised tax system with all those factors around and eventually how to outline the area of stability.

This article presents the results of qualitative comparative analysis of such causal factors of Lithuanian government's stability as decision-making model, role of political parties, government ideology and parliamentary majority. The basic source of the research was the interviews with ministers who have served in different cabinets. The cabinets led by Kazimiera Prunskienė, Gediminas Vagnorius, Adolfas Šleţevičius, Laurynas Mindaugas Stankevičius, Rolandas Paksas, Andrius Kubilius, Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas and Gediminas Kirkilas are analyzed in this article. The research showed that in most cases the governments, where decision-making model is monocratic and party influence in governmental decision-making process is weak; or those in which decision-making model is monocratic and which have support of the parliamentary majority, are stable. It was also revealed that a strong influence of ruling party (or parties) in the governmental decision-making process and the leftist ideology could lead to government stability. The governments might be classified into three homogeneous groups according to decision-making model, role of political parties in decisionmaking, ideology, size of parliamentary support and cabinet duration.

This article presents the results of qualitative comparative analysis of such causal factors of Lithuanian government's stability as decision-making model, role of political parties, government ideology and parliamentary majority. The basic source of the research was the interviews with ministers who have served in different cabinets. The cabinets led by Kazimiera Prunskienė, Gediminas Vagnorius, Adolfas Šleţevičius, Laurynas Mindaugas Stankevičius, Rolandas Paksas, Andrius Kubilius, Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas and Gediminas Kirkilas are analyzed in this article. The research showed that in most cases the governments, where decision-making model is monocratic and party influence in governmental decision-making process is weak; or those in which decision-making model is monocratic and which have support of the parliamentary majority, are stable. It was also revealed that a strong influence of ruling party (or parties) in the governmental decision-making process and the leftist ideology could lead to government stability. The governments might be classified into three homogeneous groups according to decision-making model, role of political parties in decisionmaking, ideology, size of parliamentary support and cabinet duration.

This article presents the results of qualitative comparative analysis of such causal factors of Lithuanian government's stability as decision-making model, role of political parties, government ideology and parliamentary majority. The basic source of the research was the interviews with ministers who have served in different cabinets. The cabinets led by Kazimiera Prunskienė, Gediminas Vagnorius, Adolfas Šleţevičius, Laurynas Mindaugas Stankevičius, Rolandas Paksas, Andrius Kubilius, Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas and Gediminas Kirkilas are analyzed in this article. The research showed that in most cases the governments, where decision-making model is monocratic and party influence in governmental decision-making process is weak; or those in which decision-making model is monocratic and which have support of the parliamentary majority, are stable. It was also revealed that a strong influence of ruling party (or parties) in the governmental decision-making process and the leftist ideology could lead to government stability. The governments might be classified into three homogeneous groups according to decision-making model, role of political parties in decisionmaking, ideology, size of parliamentary support and cabinet duration.

This article presents the results of qualitative comparative analysis of such causal factors of Lithuanian government's stability as decision-making model, role of political parties, government ideology and parliamentary majority. The basic source of the research was the interviews with ministers who have served in different cabinets. The cabinets led by Kazimiera Prunskienė, Gediminas Vagnorius, Adolfas Šleţevičius, Laurynas Mindaugas Stankevičius, Rolandas Paksas, Andrius Kubilius, Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas and Gediminas Kirkilas are analyzed in this article. The research showed that in most cases the governments, where decision-making model is monocratic and party influence in governmental decision-making process is weak; or those in which decision-making model is monocratic and which have support of the parliamentary majority, are stable. It was also revealed that a strong influence of ruling party (or parties) in the governmental decision-making process and the leftist ideology could lead to government stability. The governments might be classified into three homogeneous groups according to decision-making model, role of political parties in decisionmaking, ideology, size of parliamentary support and cabinet duration.

The doctoral dissertation analyses the recent overhaul of the EU banking policy framework in 2012–2016 with the aim of answering two interrelated questions. First, why did the euro area member states decide to surrender national control over their banking systems by creating a banking union despite the fact that similar proposals had been constantly rejected in the past? Second, what accounts for the content of the established banking union? The research argues that the European sovereign debt crisis and, more specifically, its Spanish episode in the first half of 2012 were a necessary but insufficient condition for the European leaders' historic decision. Building on a deterministic interpretation of punctuated equilibrium theory, the author explains the creation of the banking union by three intervening factors: interdependence of the euro area member states that led to changes in the EU banking policy image held by the governments of the largest euro area states, and the politicisation of the related banking policy-making venue. Having showed that the content of the final agreements corresponded to the identified 'preventive' banking union type, the author argues that it can be best explained by the interaction of preference intensity of member states and political legitimacy of their national positions. Accordingly, the research explains the content of the banking union by the exposure of German banks' to the most stressed Southern euro area member states at the start of negotiations and the German government's 'rhetorical entrapment' at later stages. It is also argued that the entire EU bargaining process was facilitated by 'constructive ambiguity' related to the finality of the banking union.

The doctoral dissertation analyses the recent overhaul of the EU banking policy framework in 2012–2016 with the aim of answering two interrelated questions. First, why did the euro area member states decide to surrender national control over their banking systems by creating a banking union despite the fact that similar proposals had been constantly rejected in the past? Second, what accounts for the content of the established banking union? The research argues that the European sovereign debt crisis and, more specifically, its Spanish episode in the first half of 2012 were a necessary but insufficient condition for the European leaders' historic decision. Building on a deterministic interpretation of punctuated equilibrium theory, the author explains the creation of the banking union by three intervening factors: interdependence of the euro area member states that led to changes in the EU banking policy image held by the governments of the largest euro area states, and the politicisation of the related banking policy-making venue. Having showed that the content of the final agreements corresponded to the identified 'preventive' banking union type, the author argues that it can be best explained by the interaction of preference intensity of member states and political legitimacy of their national positions. Accordingly, the research explains the content of the banking union by the exposure of German banks' to the most stressed Southern euro area member states at the start of negotiations and the German government's 'rhetorical entrapment' at later stages. It is also argued that the entire EU bargaining process was facilitated by 'constructive ambiguity' related to the finality of the banking union.

The doctoral dissertation analyses the recent overhaul of the EU banking policy framework in 2012–2016 with the aim of answering two interrelated questions. First, why did the euro area member states decide to surrender national control over their banking systems by creating a banking union despite the fact that similar proposals had been constantly rejected in the past? Second, what accounts for the content of the established banking union? The research argues that the European sovereign debt crisis and, more specifically, its Spanish episode in the first half of 2012 were a necessary but insufficient condition for the European leaders' historic decision. Building on a deterministic interpretation of punctuated equilibrium theory, the author explains the creation of the banking union by three intervening factors: interdependence of the euro area member states that led to changes in the EU banking policy image held by the governments of the largest euro area states, and the politicisation of the related banking policy-making venue. Having showed that the content of the final agreements corresponded to the identified 'preventive' banking union type, the author argues that it can be best explained by the interaction of preference intensity of member states and political legitimacy of their national positions. Accordingly, the research explains the content of the banking union by the exposure of German banks' to the most stressed Southern euro area member states at the start of negotiations and the German government's 'rhetorical entrapment' at later stages. It is also argued that the entire EU bargaining process was facilitated by 'constructive ambiguity' related to the finality of the banking union.

The doctoral dissertation analyses the recent overhaul of the EU banking policy framework in 2012–2016 with the aim of answering two interrelated questions. First, why did the euro area member states decide to surrender national control over their banking systems by creating a banking union despite the fact that similar proposals had been constantly rejected in the past? Second, what accounts for the content of the established banking union? The research argues that the European sovereign debt crisis and, more specifically, its Spanish episode in the first half of 2012 were a necessary but insufficient condition for the European leaders' historic decision. Building on a deterministic interpretation of punctuated equilibrium theory, the author explains the creation of the banking union by three intervening factors: interdependence of the euro area member states that led to changes in the EU banking policy image held by the governments of the largest euro area states, and the politicisation of the related banking policy-making venue. Having showed that the content of the final agreements corresponded to the identified 'preventive' banking union type, the author argues that it can be best explained by the interaction of preference intensity of member states and political legitimacy of their national positions. Accordingly, the research explains the content of the banking union by the exposure of German banks' to the most stressed Southern euro area member states at the start of negotiations and the German government's 'rhetorical entrapment' at later stages. It is also argued that the entire EU bargaining process was facilitated by 'constructive ambiguity' related to the finality of the banking union.

The doctoral dissertation analyses the recent overhaul of the EU banking policy framework in 2012–2016 with the aim of answering two interrelated questions. First, why did the euro area member states decide to surrender national control over their banking systems by creating a banking union despite the fact that similar proposals had been constantly rejected in the past? Second, what accounts for the content of the established banking union? The research argues that the European sovereign debt crisis and, more specifically, its Spanish episode in the first half of 2012 were a necessary but insufficient condition for the European leaders' historic decision. Building on a deterministic interpretation of punctuated equilibrium theory, the author explains the creation of the banking union by three intervening factors: interdependence of the euro area member states that led to changes in the EU banking policy image held by the governments of the largest euro area states, and the politicisation of the related banking policy-making venue. Having showed that the content of the final agreements corresponded to the identified 'preventive' banking union type, the author argues that it can be best explained by the interaction of preference intensity of member states and political legitimacy of their national positions. Accordingly, the research explains the content of the banking union by the exposure of German banks' to the most stressed Southern euro area member states at the start of negotiations and the German government's 'rhetorical entrapment' at later stages. It is also argued that the entire EU bargaining process was facilitated by 'constructive ambiguity' related to the finality of the banking union.