This paper aims to explore the dynamics of competition in the Asia Pacific region. The analysis in this article used a qualitative approach based on secondary data. The data collected from the official reports and other relevant sources. The findings showed that there is instability in intrastate politics, it does not have much effect on regional political constellations. Geopolitical and geo-economic shifts in the region are ongoing so it is natural that there is a process of adaptation that creates a bit of friction with domestic politics. Economy and military serve as a power base for superpowers to be able to spread its influence in a minor power state. However, the power of the superpower is not always constant. The tide of the presence of force can affect the political constellation of the region and lead to changes in hegemony.
Henry Siegman asks whether the next US President can rescue a two-state solution to the Israel–Palestine conflict; Lakhdar Brahimi discusses Iran – war or peace in the Middle East?; Eric Rouleau assesses the Iranian nuclear threat; Walid Khadduri looks at concerns over the future of Iraq and regional implications.
This paper tries to examine in detail political stability in the European Union's (EU) countries during the period 2002-12. Firstly, it examines the causality relationship between political stability and economic growth, which is an issue that has puzzled scholars for decades. Using the Granger causality test the empirical findings suggest that in the case of the EU's countries, causality is one directional, moving from political stability to economic growth. Secondly, it examines the factors that affect political stability. Using the fixed effects panel data model, we may suggest that the long term recession, the increased unemployment ratios and the high levels of inflation significantly threaten political stability. However, there are other factors that are not exclusively due to economics, such as transparency, public health care, education etc., which may significantly reduce the previously mentioned consequences. Finally, this study suggests some reforms of the EU's regulation according to the migration policy that may smooth social and humanitarian disparities.
Political stability and security have become important factors of sustainable economic progress for the developingcountries, especially states with the experience of war and instability. Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) as a semi-autonomousregion tried to improve the level of political stability and security status, to gain more foreign direct investment (FDI)and economic growth. Consequently, KRI has become the safest region in Iraq and enjoyed political stability and safety.Therefore, during the last decade, KRI has occurred as a new destination of FDI in the Middle East and has receivednotable progress in most of the economic sectors. The aim of this study is to evaluate the role of political stability andsecurity status on the FDI attractions and their consequences on economic development. However, it will investigatethe factors that make the KRI safer than the rest of Iraq.
This research paper explores the evolution of the Senegalese government immediately after independence and the various factors contributing to its remarkable stability. It begins with a brief look at Senegal's history, both pre-colonial and colonial. The research then discusses the foundations of the Senegalese government structure and party system from just before independence to 1978. The highlighted elements of the story are the role of political parties and single-party dominance, Senghor's platform based on African socialism and négritude, and the formation and failure of the Mali Federation. This work also features party building, social groups that influence politics, the urban-rural cleavage, and some constitutional development. The focus of the research is on Léopold Sédar Senghor, the key figure in the stable governmental establishment in Senegal. It explores his relations with other key figures including Lamine Guèye, the facilitator of socialism's rise in Senegal and a major party leader, and Mamadou Dia, once a friend of Senghor's and his Prime Minister, who attempted a nonviolent coup; he was foiled and jailed in 1962. The various clans of Senegal (based on heredity) and the Islamic Brotherhoods, powerful religious organizations that have much sway over their members' political attitudes, also play an important role. This paper concludes with an exploration of Senghor's dynamic leadership as a foundation for political stability in Senegal, focusing on two major events: the disintegration of the extremely short-lived Mali Federation and the resulting independence of Senegal, and Dia's attempted coup and resulting arrest. The constitution was amended after Dia's jailing in 1962 to remove the post of prime minister, leaving the president as the sole head of government, and increasing Senghor's power and influence. The remainder of the research after the failed coup consists of exploring the ways in which Senghor made his party completely dominant and his role and contributions as president.
We study the association between resource rents and political stability, highlighting the importance of the distribution of political power as a mediating factor. We present a simple theoretical model showing that increased rents are likely to be positively associated with the stability of a powerful incumbent while destabilizing a less powerful incumbent. Our empirical analysis confirms this prediction: Using panel data for more than 120 countries from 1984-2009, our results show that rents can promote political stability, but only when the political power is sufficiently concentrated. Indeed, if the incumbent is sufficiently weak, rents fuel instability. Our main results hold when we control for the effects of income, quality of institutions, time varying common shocks, country fixed effects and various additional covariates.
A highly successful investment- and export-led growth strategy has positioned China as the second largest economy and as the largest exporter in the world. Households' consumption has played a minor role in its growth strategy, which is reflected in its unique and very high saving rates. In this paper we argue that the low weight of consumption in total expenditure is the result of the pervasiveness of the state in the economy, which aimed at impairing the growth of middle classes and,therefore, at preserving political stability. Nonetheless, an increase in purchasing power and the cultural individualisation of vast portions of the population is leading to an increase in popular mobilisation and social unrest. This indicates that, contrary to common pessimist analyses, prospects for democratization are perhaps stronger than usually presumed. ; COMPETE; QREN; UE; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia ...
We study the association between resource rents and political stability, highlighting the importance of the distribution of political power as a mediating factor. We present a simple theoretical model showing that increased rents are likely to be positively associated with the stability of a powerful incumbent while destabilizing a less powerful incumbent. Our empirical analysis confirms this prediction: Using panel data for more than 120 countries from 1984-2009, our results show that rents can promote political stability, but only when the political power is sufficiently concentrated. Indeed, if the incumbent is sufficiently weak, rents fuel instability. Our main results hold when we control for time varying common shocks, country fixed effects and various additional covariates.
"Compared to neighboring Saudi Arabia, there is very little press coverage on Oman. And unlike the many stories about how bad things are in the kingdom, the little reporting done on the sultanate is generally positive. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from Oman's glowing press coverage that all is well there. Oman, in fact, is experiencing some very difficult problems that are likely to get worse in coming years."(.)
Though not its main focus, Goldstone's Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (1991) threw considerable new light on 19th century Europe's revolutions and near-revolutions. While Goldstone stresses the role of an expanding and industrializing economy in absorbing 19th century England's demographic shocks, we accept this analysis but argue alongside it for similar attention to the vector of emigration, settler-colonialism, and imperial state expansion into which at least some of the exhaust fumes of the population explosion were vented. Furthermore, it is important to note the crucial role of a highly interventionist state and 'big' government in the background to these dynamics—a far cry from the light-touch, laissez-faire qualities with which the 19th century British state is often associated. To make our case, this article takes advantage of secondary literature and raw data not available prior to the publication of Goldstone's book. Of crucial importance here is our unique dataset of fatality-inducing political violence events in Britain and Ireland from 1785 to 1900. This is the first research paper to utilise this dataset. We draw upon this in the following section, which seeks to establish what the real level of political instability was in 19th century Britain—thus cross-referencing Goldstone's account with more recent data—before moving on in the following section to a more detailed overview of the socio-economic conditions underlying events at the political level. This is followed by our account of the emigration-settler-colonialism-imperial state expansion vector and the interventionist state policy behind it, which we argue was crucial to making 19th century Britain relatively 'revolution-proof'—alongside the expanding economic opportunities rightly highlighted by Goldstone. Lastly come our brief concluding remarks, which lay out the implications, as we see them, of this article's findings for research on revolutions, political violence and instability, demographic-structural theory, state-building, migration, and imperialism-colonialism.
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the impact of Political stability on foreign direct investment (FDI) revenues in Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) countries. To do so, we have concentrated on a sample of 16 countries for which the necessary data were available for the period 2002-2009. We have used a panel data regression analysis. Our empirical results indicate that Population, openness and gross domestic product (GDP) have positive impact on FDI, whereas Political Stability has a detrimental effect on FDI in OIC countries.
One of the important conditions for ensuring ethnic stability in Central Asia, which is undergoing complex socio-political processes, is the development of the security strategy of the region. The ethno-political stability in the socio-political life of the republics depends not on the processes, but on the general social, economic and political conditions of the entire region, the purely ethnocultural foundations of which are inherent in the framework of one country or in the border regions. Therefore, the situation that has arisen from the point of view of security, in the correct understanding of the moss of geopolitical competition that is happening around the region, as well as in the ethno-cultural relations between the republics, requires the conduct of a harmonized policy, in fact, the problems on a purely ethnographic basis among the indigenous people residing in, it depends on the solution of the nodes in the social economic and political relations between the republics. During the first session of the Second Call of the Oliy Majlis, President I.Karimov touched upon the priority strategic tasks in the field of security and stressed that the issue of ensuring the security of not only itself, but also of the entire region is being raised before Uzbekistan to the level of strategic goals. In this, the principle of non-fragmentation (integrity) of security is put forward, ensuring the bitterness of a reslublic, it was meant to go to the general security of the region. After all, the fact that geopolitical interests are re-forming in the world, and exactly the Central Asian region the conflict of these interests, as a potential territory. For example, Central Asia is an important region from the geostrategic point of view, where the interests of major countries clash with Russia in the north, the Caucasus and Europe in the West, Afghanistan in the south, Pakistan and India in the East, China and Asian countries in the East. Over the next decade, the geopolitical situation in this region has been seriously ...
In this article we develop a dynamic model where an endogenous evolution of trust impacts a politician's choice for bribe-taking and tax re-distribution. The politician obtains utility from net income that comes from his wage income, tax embezzlements and bribe-taking, and he also has incentives for tax re-distribution. The higher the tax embezzlements and the more bribes the politician takes the lower his citizens' trust and the less likely will he be re-elected. We support the evolution of trust with an econometric investigation. We analyze the necessary and su cient conditions, and nd that withholding taxes and taking bribes may be complements or substitutes for a politician, depending on the politician's incentives for tax re-distribution. Without these incentives, tax embezzlement and bribe taking are necessarily substitutes. With su ciently strong incentives, we nd re-distribution and bribe-taking may become complements. Complements implies that the politician, at least partly, increases bribe-taking because this allows him to increase re-distribution, which aids his additional motives for tax re-distribution. Based on comparative statics at steady state we also nd that the higher the politician's wage the lower the bribe-taking and the higher the trust; stronger social capital leads to less bribe-taking and higher levels of trust; improvements in electoral accountability induce a decrease in bribing while trust increases.
In this article we develop a dynamic model where an endogenous evolution of trust impacts a politician's choice for bribe-taking and tax re-distribution. The politician obtains utility from net income that comes from his wage income, tax embezzlements and bribe-taking, and he also has incentives for tax re-distribution. The higher the tax embezzlements and the more bribes the politician takes the lower his citizens' trust and the less likely will he be re-elected. We support the evolution of trust with an econometric investigation. We analyze the necessary and su cient conditions, and nd that withholding taxes and taking bribes may be complements or substitutes for a politician, depending on the politician's incentives for tax re-distribution. Without these incentives, tax embezzlement and bribe taking are necessarily substitutes. With su ciently strong incentives, we nd re-distribution and bribe-taking may become complements. Complements implies that the politician, at least partly, increases bribe-taking because this allows him to increase re-distribution, which aids his additional motives for tax re-distribution. Based on comparative statics at steady state we also nd that the higher the politician's wage the lower the bribe-taking and the higher the trust; stronger social capital leads to less bribe-taking and higher levels of trust; improvements in electoral accountability induce a decrease in bribing while trust increases.
