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This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election. ; This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election.

This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election. ; This article analyses the Brexit debate within the UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on the debates that occurred between 2013 when David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up and the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly introduces the topic. Section two examines the rise of social hatred during the referendum campaign. It focuses on the history of British euro-scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and immigration, and the increasing use of threats and political violence. Section three examines the decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It explores the idea of "Project Fear", the anti-expert narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section four asks what this period tells us about UK democracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly government, the democratic status of the referendum, the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) optimism. The article concludes by considering possible ways forward for the UK government and polity following the decisive Conservative victory in the 2019 UK General Election.

Delegitimization of the political system could be a strong factor leading to disruptions of the social and political order, including political violence. In order to measure the potential of this phenomenon an original measurement tool was created. The tool is based on the concept of ideal types and empirical types introduced by Max Weber and Georg Jellinek. Quantitative empirical data was provided by the Polish General Election Study (2011). Using this data, analyses of intergroup differences of selected sociodemographic and psychographic variables were carried out. The following groups emerged from the analyses: legitimizing the political system, ambivalent towards the political system, delegitimizing the political system (completely or incompletely), and several groups of moderate potential to delegitimize (for instance people rejecting democracy, but expressing satisfaction with the institutional aspects of its functioning in political practice). The gathered results confirm a moderate but noticeable potential for delegitimization of the Polish democracy; several extracted social categories may be a potential threat to internal security.

Delegitimization of the political system could be a strong factor leading to disruptions of the social and political order, including political violence. In order to measure the potential of this phenomenon an original measurement tool was created. The tool is based on the concept of ideal types and empirical types introduced by Max Weber and Georg Jellinek. Quantitative empirical data was provided by the Polish General Election Study (2011). Using this data, analyses of intergroup differences of selected sociodemographic and psychographic variables were carried out. The following groups emerged from the analyses: legitimizing the political system, ambivalent towards the political system, delegitimizing the political system (completely or incompletely), and several groups of moderate potential to delegitimize (for instance people rejecting democracy, but expressing satisfaction with the institutional aspects of its functioning in political practice). The gathered results confirm a moderate but noticeable potential for delegitimization of the Polish democracy; several extracted social categories may be a potential threat to internal security.

Although trauma and public skepticism toward the military is still quite strong; though the sins of the military during the New Order freely beragai stripped naked in public space during the reform. In fact, military figures rose even more flying in many national level either party until the local level, both old and new parties. To face the new system of political contestation and the military is benefiting from a weakening factor of the consolidation of civilian political forces. Political parties and civic leaders increasingly anti Orba number berjibun be a dilemma. Elections are approaching need fresh energy to be the winner while they are still haunted by the various limitations of the cadre of crisis, financial crisis and the crisis of political networks. To rise, the former general has a genetic modalities required political parties and civic leaders that organizational discipline, a network of territorial and political violence. Political modalities of military culture is that interest civilian politicians because it can be replicated in consolidating the power of the party, although very risky memangun consolidation of democracy in Indonesia in the future. The choices here are to be assessed for reading the direction of the democratization of Indonesia.

The aim of this article is to present the course of the Velvet Revolution in Slovakia in the period from 17 to 29 November 1989 and to show the similarities and differences between the two movements: Civic Forum and Society Against Violence. The study is based on several assumptions. Unlike the Civic Forum in the Czech Republic, the Society Against Violence was a broad movement with a very decentralised structure, led by individuals who had no organisational experience. Secondly, the main goal of the Society Against Violence was to control power and thus it was more of a civic initiative than a political one. Thirdly, a number of differences between the Civic Forum and the Society Against Violence determined the fact that it was not possible to create a single Czechoslovak political elite. In the study, the comparative method was applied in order to indicate similarities and differences between the Civic Forum and the Society Against Violence. To analyse the political reality in Slovakia in November 1989, the decision analysis method was applied. The article uses archival materials, documents and scientific studies.

The paper is an attempt to analyze the marketing activities of selected candidates running for office in the local authorities of the Opolskie Region in 2010. A large proportion of these candidates implemented the Machiavellian principle that the end justifies the means, and they tried to win power, almost trampling over corpses, using all available methods to succeed. Niccolò Machiavelli, the author of The Prince, argued five centuries earlier that the good of state justifies ruses, cruelty and violence. The present face of political Machiavellianism is different, as many people value power itself rather than the good of the state or region. As a result, voters observe a political farce under the official name of an election campaign. The local government campaign in the Opolskie Region in 2010 reminded a political circus with a number of pseudo-events keenly reported by the media, instead of real content that could give potential voters an idea of what the candidates had to offer. Some tried to win voters feeding them with sweets, others cleared snow from pavements in the middle of winter, yet others paid those who promised to vote for them. The latter are probably still suffering from post-election hiccups, as they will have to explain this electoral corruption in court. ; The paper is an attempt to analyze the marketing activities of selected candidates running for office in the local authorities of the Opolskie Region in 2010. A large proportion of these candidates implemented the Machiavellian principle that the end justifies the means, and they tried to win power, almost trampling over corpses, using all available methods to succeed. Niccolò Machiavelli, the author of The Prince, argued five centuries earlier that the good of state justifies ruses, cruelty and violence. The present face of political Machiavellianism is different, as many people value power itself rather than the good of the state or region. As a result, voters observe a political farce under the official name of an election campaign. The local government campaign in the Opolskie Region in 2010 reminded a political circus with a number of pseudo-events keenly reported by the media, instead of real content that could give potential voters an idea of what the candidates had to offer. Some tried to win voters feeding them with sweets, others cleared snow from pavements in the middle of winter, yet others paid those who promised to vote for them. The latter are probably still suffering from post-election hiccups, as they will have to explain this electoral corruption in court.

Following the case of the disappearance of the 43 Ayotzinapa students, the Pandora's Box was opened: pits filled with bodies, corruption, impunity and institutional weakness of a state where politicians, police and authorities at all three government levels have been infiltrated by the organized crime. In Mexico, corruption and drug trafficking are common and the economic reforms are not enough if they do not go together with an effective program of combating corruption and the society is not the main beneficiary of the reforms.This article will explain the background of the Ayotzinapa case, the characteristics of the Mexican political system that allow cases like Ayotzinapa, the consequences of the fight against organized crime launched by ex-President Felipe Calderon, the behavior of a sleeping civil society tired of the reduced economic results and where the state does not have the monopoly of the authority and does not guarantee security.

Following the case of the disappearance of the 43 Ayotzinapa students, the Pandora's Box was opened: pits filled with bodies, corruption, impunity and institutional weakness of a state where politicians, police and authorities at all three government levels have been infiltrated by the organized crime. In Mexico, corruption and drug trafficking are common and the economic reforms are not enough if they do not go together with an effective program of combating corruption and the society is not the main beneficiary of the reforms.This article will explain the background of the Ayotzinapa case, the characteristics of the Mexican political system that allow cases like Ayotzinapa, the consequences of the fight against organized crime launched by ex-President Felipe Calderon, the behavior of a sleeping civil society tired of the reduced economic results and where the state does not have the monopoly of the authority and does not guarantee security.

The paper is an attempt to analyze the marketing activities of selected candidates running for office in the local authorities of the Opolskie Region in 2010. A large proportion of these candidates implemented the Machiavellian principle that the end justifies the means, and they tried to win power, almost trampling over corpses, using all available methods to succeed. Niccol ò Machiavelli, the author of The Prince argued five centuries earlier that the good of state justifies ruses, cruelty and violence. The present face of political Machiavellianism is different, as many people value power itself rather than the good of the state or region. As a result, voters observe a political farce under the official name of an election campaign. The local government campaign in the Opolskie Region in 2010 reminded a political circus with a number of pseudo-events keenly reported by the media, instead of real content that could give potential voters an idea of what the candidates had to offer. Some tried to win voters feeding them with sweets, others cleared snow from pavements in the middle of winter, yet others paid those who promised to vote for them. The latter are probably still suffering from post-election hiccups, as they will have to explain this electoral corruption in court.

This paper aims to discuss the extent to which the influence of the military in the political system in Myanmar related to cases of prosecution of ethnic Rohingya in 2017. Myanmar's government through the military is considered to use violence and discrimination against Rohingya ethnic groups resulting in thousands of casualties and the ethnic Rohingya fled to neighboring countries. This research was conducted to assess the role of the military in the Myanmar government system because under the 2008 Constitution, the military had a seat of 25 percent in the Myanmar parliament and had a number of authorities in the political system. This can be considered as a trigger for the military's aggressiveness towards Rohingya because of military representatives who have existence in the Myanmar parliament. The author uses concordance theory and the concept of new professionalism of internal security and national development in analyzing related phenomena. The results of this study indicate the existence of military influence in the Myanmar government because under the constitution, the military controls three strategic departments, namely Defense, Internal Affairs and Border. The military also holds full control of the armed forces, police and security forces, thus demonstrating the military role in Myanmar's policies regarding prosecution of the ethnic minority Rohingya.