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This article analyzes policing political protest in post-independent Lithuania. It argues that since the early 2000s, policing of political protest as an issue has increased in importance as Lithuania has experienced political mobilization and radicalization among groups disadvantaged by post-socialist reforms. It is suggested that police responses reveal precursor tendencies towards growing authoritarianism which has become more visible in the most recent period. In 2008, the onset of deep economic crisis across the region has generated rising social unrest (including outbreaks of street riot) as a result of government adoption of severe austerity measures. The article examines the growing centralization and militarization of policing and the increasing criminalization of public protest, as well as the restriction and litigation of organized dissent by authorities. At the same time, it also points to the internal contradictions of austerity programs which lack popular legitimacy both at the level of the state and society, including more vocal and militant labor unions; increasing challenges to the drift towards a new authoritarianism by the courts; and, paradoxically, the emergence of growing labor unrest within police force itself, with the potential to undermine authoritarian tendencies in policing 'from within.' The wider implications of (re)turn to post-communist authoritarianism to public order policing are discussed.

This article analyzes policing political protest in post-independent Lithuania. It argues that since the early 2000s, policing of political protest as an issue has increased in importance as Lithuania has experienced political mobilization and radicalization among groups disadvantaged by post-communist reforms. It is suggested that police responses reveal precursor tendencies towards growing authoritarianism which has become more visible in the most recent period. In 2008, the onset of deep economic crisis across the region has generated rising social unrest (including outbreaks of street riot) as a result of government adoption of severe austerity measures. The article examines the growing centralization and militarization of policing and the increasing criminalization of public protest, as well as the restriction and litigation of organized dissent by authorities. At the same time, it also points to the internal contradictions of austerity programs which lack popular legitimacy both at the level of the state and society, including more vocal and militant labor unions; increasing challenges by the courts to the drift towards a new authoritarianism; and, paradoxically, the emergence of growing labor unrest within police force itself, with the potential to undermine authoritarian tendencies in policing 'from within.' The wider implications of (re)turn to post-communist authoritarianism in public order policing are discussed.

AbstractThe links between protests and state responses have taken on increased visibility in light of the Arab Spring movements. But we still have unanswered questions about the relationship between protest behaviors and responses by the state. We frame this in terms of concession and disruption costs. Costs are typically defined as government behaviors that impede dissidents' capacity for collective action. We change this causal arrow and hypothesize how dissidents can generate costs that structure the government's response to a protest. By disaggregating costs along dimensions of concession and disruption we extend our understanding of protest behaviors and the conditions under which they are more (or less) effective. Utilizing a new cross-national protest-event data set, we test our theoretical expectations against protests from 1990 to 2014 and find that when protesters generate high concession costs, the state responds in a coercive manner. Conversely, high disruption costs encourage the state to accommodate demands. Our research provides substantial insights and inferences about the dynamics of government response to protest.

After delineating differences between individual (social) & collective identities, ways that the two intersect in social movement participation via the process of group identification are examined, focusing on political protest movements. Conceptual discussion is borne out by empirical data collected over three interviews, 1993-1995, with 168 Dutch farmers who organized in protest against national & European Union agricultural policy. Some cognitive, behavioral, & sociodemographic determinants of group identification are identified & the relationship between group identification & preparation for/participation in protest activities is described. 5 Tables, 35 References. K. Hyatt Stewart

How do economic grievances affect citizens' inclination to protest? Given rising levels of inequality and widespread economic hardship in the aftermath of the Great Recession, this question is crucial for political science: if adverse economic conditions depress citizens' engagement, as many contributions have argued, then the economic crisis may well feed into a crisis of democracy. However, the existing research on the link between economic grievances and political participation remains empirically inconclusive. It is argued in this article that this is due to two distinct shortcomings, which are effectively addressed by combining the strengths of political economy and social movement theories. Based on ESS and EU‐SILC data from 2006–2012, as well as newly collected data on political protest in 28 European countries, a novel, more fine‐grained conceptualisation of objective economic grievances considerably improves our understanding of the direct link between economic grievances and protest behaviour. While structural economic disadvantage (i.e., the level of grievances) unambiguously de‐mobilises individuals, the deterioration of economic prospects (i.e., a change in grievances) instead increases political activity. Revealing these two countervailing effects provides an important clarification that helps reconcile many seemingly conflicting findings in the existing literature. Second, the article shows that the level of political mobilisation substantially moderates this direct link between individual hardship and political activity. In a strongly mobilised environment, even structural economic disadvantage is no longer an impediment to political participation. There is a strong political message in this interacting factor: if the presence of organised and visible political action is a decisive signal for citizens that conditions the micro‐level link between economic grievances and protest, then democracy itself – that is, organised collective action – can help sustain political equality and prevent the vicious circle of democratic erosion.