Suchergebnisse

Adapted from the source document.

Adapted from the source document.

The paper disputes the thesis of Jokubaitis's article "Politics Without Values," that purely political understanding of things is impossible for there are no purely political values. Therefore no decision could be based on purely political values. Razma argues that values as well as politics are not things but phenomena, which together make up a system where the former make its elements & the latter constitute the process. For analytical purposes the system can be dissembled into component parts, but the conclusions of analysis must refer to the systematic nature of the relationship between the parts. The politics as an axiological process is impossible without values, & any value can only gain acknowledgement through the process of politics. Therefore, the politics is always axiological, & common values of any society are always political. Adapted from the source document.

The so-called political values are only representations of values from other areas. We got used to the idea that if there is politics, there also have to be unique values belonging to this realm. However, the biggest paradox is that politics does not have its own values. There is no pure political judgment. When we make judgments about political matters we enter into discussions about values which are clearly not political. The roots of political judgments always can be traced to matters that are not political. All political values can be reduced to issues which exist beyond politics. They represent moral, religious, economic & cultural convictions of citizens. The meaning of politics always remains outside its reach. Behind so-called "political values" we always find reference to other values. Adapted from the source document.

One of the brand new areas of historiography is analyzed. Availing of the research of historical conscience launched in Germany, the author explores the possibility of applying this new practice to the analysis of Lithuanians' historical conscience. The perspectives, theoretical-methodological objectives & tasks are analyzed. Special attention is drawn to the ideological aspect of a historical conscience & to the problem of "left" & "right" in the Lithuanians' mass conscience during the last decade. A relationship between the "left" & "right" identity & a specific version of the past being defended, an attempt by Lithuania's politicians to manipulate the historical perspectives, a tendency toward mythologization as evident in Lithuania's contemporary historical conscience is emphasized. Adapted from the source document.

Straipsnyje siekiama isanalizuoti Lenkijos parlamentiniu politiniu partiju programas, kuriose isskiriamas uzsienio politikos vektorius regioninio bendradarbiavimo kontekste. Pagrindinis demesys analizeje skiriamas politinems partijoms ir jas vienijanciai ideologijai analizuoti, apibreziant siu subjektu vaidmeni bendrame Lenkijos uzsienio politikos formavimo procese. Tekste pateikiamos prioritetines uzsienio politikos sritys, kurias isskiria parlamentines Lenkijos partijos. Analize atliekama nagrinejant 2011 metais suformuluotas parlamentiniu politiniu partiju - Pilieciu platformos, Teises ir teisingumo, Demokratines kaires aljanso, Lenkijos valstieciu sajungos - programas. Straipsnyje nera analizuojamas Palikotos judejimo (lenk. Ruch Palikota, RP) atvejis, nes sios partijos programoje nera isskiriamas uzsienio politikos vektorius. Tekste siekiama isanalizuoti pagrindinius Lenkijos uzsienio politikos prioritetus, ju vieta formuojant ir vykdant politika, ir daugiausia demesio skiriama siu prioritetu apraiskoms parlamentiniu politiniu partiju programose. Analizuojant Lenkijos regioninio ir strateginio bendradarbiavimo sritis, pateikiamas partiju programose isskiriamas bendradarbiavimas Europos Sajungos regione, transatlantiniai rysiai su JAV ir NATO bei santykiai su gretimomis valstybemis. Straipsnyje siekiama ivertinti, ar politiniu partiju programose iskelti uzsienio politikos vektoriai atspindi oficialia valstybes uzsienio politikos koncepcija This article analyses programs of Poland Parliamentary political parties, which exclude vectors of foreign politics in the context of regional collaboration. The most important concept in this article is the analysis of political parties and their ideologies which show their importance in forming foreign politics in Poland. Priority areas of foreign politics in Poland are presented in the text. Analysis was conducted using analysing programs (2011) of Parliamentary parties such as Civic Platform, Law and Justice, Democratic Left Alliance and Polish People Party. The case of Palikot's movement is absent in the article due to the fact that the vector of foreign politics is not excluded in its program. The main priorities of Poland's foreign politics, its position in forming and performing the politics are analysed in the text. The focus of it is on how these priorities are presented in the programs of Parliamentary parties. Adapted from the source document.

Muslims have known & used the term 'da'wa' throughout the history of Islam. The concept, or rather concepts, of da'wa has been elaborated upon since the early centuries of Islam. Muslims have applied the term to various specific activities of theirs. The broadly known explanation in Europe & North America for da'wa is that it constitutes activities, which in the Christian context fall under the term 'missions' or 'missionary activities.' Recently, however, there has been much discussion whether da'wa at all can be rendered as 'missionary activity,' for it is argued by some Muslims as well as non-Muslim scholars that da'wa distinctly differs from what in the Christian tradition 'missions' have encompassed. From the available historical evidence, it appears that after Muhammad's death Muslims did not immediately embark upon da'wa activities -- during & after the rapid conquests of the Byzantinian & Persian lands, they little if at all ventured to preach to local non-Muslims about the virtues of Islam. Da'wa in the sense of inviting non-Muslims to embrace Islam was not yet on conquering Muslims' agenda. The first waves of conversions to Islam from among the indigenous populations of the conquered lands took place with virtually no Muslim missionary activities in the background. But the concept of da'wa was not lost even on the early Muslims. They were very much aware of it & indeed capitalized on its exploitation. Yet, this first was done on the intra-community level, among the Muslims themselves. The term da'wa came into wider usage almost a hundred years after Muhammad's death, in the wake of the 'Abbasid propaganda against the then ruling Ummayad clan in the 720's. However, the 'Abbasid da'wa ceased as soon as the 'Abbasids were in power -- the fact that attests to its political nature. Da'wa as a truly missionary activity, albeit still within the Muslim Umma, appeared in the form of the Isma'ili da'wa of the 9th through 13th centuries. Isma'ilis, in many ways, can be seen as the pioneers of the organized Muslim missionary activities: their highly institutionalized & sophisticated da'wa structure has hardly been repeated until today. Moreover, for the Isma'ilis, da'wa was a state priority. The Isma'ili da'wa encompassed extra- & intra-ummaic forms & blended both theology & politics. The focal point of this article is the inter-relatedness of da'wa & politics on both theoretical & practical levels. On the one hand, the Quran nowhere directly implies da'wa to be a political activity. On the other hand, Muslims made it a part of their political theory (through relating da'wa to jihad) & life (using the concept of da'wa in their political agendas). Taken in general, the intertwining of da'wa & politics, then, has been a feature throughout the Muslim history, though practical implications of this have been different in different ages. [Abstract shortened by ProQuest.]. Adapted from the source document.

An unambiguous assessment of the results of changes in the post-communist political regime of Ukraine is hardly possible. The political system of this country has experienced both periods of democratic expectations & democratic setbacks during the last fifteen years. For example, in 1990-1994, before the first competitive parliamentary elections, there was a clear fragmentation among the old (communist) political elite in Ukraine; the country's first democratic constitution was adopted in 1996. However, after Leonid Kuchma was elected President in 1994, authoritarian tendencies gradually recrudesced, "oligarchic" clans took hold of the country's political system, & the elections were increasingly blatantly manipulated & rigged to the advantage of the ruling elite. This cycle of political development recurred ten years later. Manipulations of the results of the 2004 presidential election raised a massive protest among the inhabitants of Ukraine, which was symbolically dubbed the "Orange Revolution." A new influx of democratic expectations forced the ruling elite to concede to re-running the second round of Ukraine's presidential election, which was won by the opposition. However, the political crisis which struck the new government in September 2005 & the mutual accusations of corruption raised by the former "revolutionary" comrades-in-arms -- President Viktor Yushchenko & former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko -- raised new questions regarding the vitality of the democratic processes in Ukraine. The main question examined in this article is therefore whether the vacillation of Ukraine's political regime is not a regular, permanent condition. Having two main aims -- (1) to construct a theory of Ukraine's post-soviet political transformation, & (2) to disclose the possibilities of democracy consolidation in this country -- the article starts with making some "corrections" to the transitologist approach to regime change. Firstly, it is argued that political transformation theories should have a shared concept of democracy, irrespective of the number or type of the stages of democratization distinguished. The experience of post-communist countries shows that formal procedural democratic criteria are insufficient in order to characterize a political system as democratic. Secondly, traditional theories of regime change focus mostly on the analysis of the behavior of the main political actors (the political elite) & their decisions (agreements). The structural conditions (eg., the characteristics of socio-economic development) should be also included into theoretical thinking about regime change. Thirdly, the analysis of elites & their agreements is sufficiently developed to explain how & when the transition to democracy occurs. However, the democratic consolidation stage has remained somewhat mystified by 'transitologists.' The article argues that an assumption should probably be made that the behavior of political elite factions competing in the political system is always rational & self-interested, ie., democracy (or any other form of political regime) becomes "the only game in town" only if & when it is mostly advantageous for the political elite functioning in that system. Taking into account the above mentioned "corrections" to the transitologist approach, in the article, there is produced a model for analyzing post-soviet regime transformations. The model consists of three main explanatory variables: (1) the structure of political elite, (2) the 'rules of game' prevalent in the system, & (3) the strategies of political elite aiming at gaining business and/or mass support. Consequently, various interrelations of these variables may produce four possible ideal-type outcomes of regime change -- (1) democracy, (2) 'democracy with adjectives,' (3) zero-sum game (a very unstable option when political regime may be temporarily democratic but is at a huge risk of downfall), (4) authoritarianism. In post-soviet countries, it is not enough to examine the structure of political elite & the institutions in order to predict the consolidation of one or another form of political regime. 'Building politicians' "alliances" with business & (or) mobilizing mass support may negate any such predictions & produce additional (regressive, in terms of democratization) impulses to further regime change. The very possibilities of the political elite to form "alliances" with business & (or) to mobilize the masses are mostly determined by the structural characteristics of the country. Thus, the analysis of the latter may not also be omitted in examining post-soviet transitions. Political regime in Ukraine, which beginning of 1990s started evolving as a probable liberal democracy or at least 'democracy with adjectives,' after 1998 Verkhovna Rada elections moved to the situation of the zero-sum game. Such transition was conditioned by two factors. First, the changes within political elite structure -- the communist camp, which occupied an important, although not the most important place in the pluralist political elite structure in 1994-1998, became an anti-systemic political force after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. For these reasons, only two opposing elite factions (oligarchs-"centrists" vs. national democrats) remained in the political system of Ukraine after the 1998 elections, the ideological confrontation of which was constantly increasing & became particularly acute at the outset of the "Orange Revolution" in 2004. Second, the fact that the business class in Ukraine was forming with the "assistance" of politicians allowed the political elite to build an alliance with business community already in 1994-1996 & maintain these tight clientelist relations even after the privatization period was over. When at the end of 2004 the national democrats gathered mass support & became virtually equal or even more influential than the so-called "centrists," who traditionally draw support from business structures, the zero-sum game in Ukraine became especially acute. Such it remains by now, even after the Orange revolution is over. In more than ten years of independence the business community of Ukraine has consolidated its positions in the Verkhovna Rada & accumulated control over almost all national TV channels & other media outlets, as well as separate industrial regions. Therefore even anti-oligarchically disposed government cannot ignore this power. The ruling elite that cares about its survival & political success is forced to co-ordinate its decisions with the interests of various business clans. On the other hand, since Ukraine's business class consists of several competing clans, any government decisions that seek to limit the political influence of business groups immediately affect the interests of competing business clans. The government cannot remain neutral in principal. Any attempts of the supposed "deoligarchisation" will only result in provoking sharper disagreements between business groups because the curtailment of the positions of one clan will open new prospects for the strengthening of the influence of its competitors. It may be argued that for these reasons there will always be at least one (and, most likely, the strongest one) oligarchic political camp supported by an "alliance" with business. In other words, Ukraine's political regime does not have any chance to be consolidated in the liberal democracy perspective. Another structural characteristic of Ukraine is the politically unorganized working class. At least several competing political forces claim to represent the workers' interests -- the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, & the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. The internal competition among the left-wing forces encourages at least one of them (the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist Party) to take a radical, anti-systemic position in order that potential supporters may distinguish it from other leftist parties. Therefore, it is likely that the political system of Ukraine will preserve a left-wing segment that will not wield much power but will propagate an anti-systemic ideology without "communicating" with other political forces. Due to its anti-systemic nature it will not be able to participate in the government of the state & the votes of the left-wing voters (comprising the basis for mass support) will probably be collected by the national democrats. This circumstance enables predicting that the zero-sum game will remain very intensive in Ukraine in the future as well. Thus, the permanent instability of the state & both -- democracy & authoritarianism -- in Ukraine (a zero-sum game) may actually be considered to be its consolidated political regime form. Adapted from the source document.

The paper deals with the specific features of the construction of an international identity by the EU & Lithuania. We do this by comparing the narrative of "Normative Power Europe" to that of "Lithuania, the regional center." The term "Normative Power Europe," though in use for some two years, still has no clear-cut place in the studies of European integration. So in the paper we first try to explicate its content by drawing a contrast with the more familiar concept of "civil power." We show that the term is an attempt at a new conceptualization of a problem that has been on the agenda of constructivist international relations studies for some time already, namely, that of the power of ideas in international politics. "Normative Power Europe" is defined as a discursive practice, as a narrative shaping the EU as a unique political institution which, by realizing itself via free exchange of ideas & opinions, is capable of changing the "normalcy" perception in international relations. In the EU political discourse the identity of EU as a normative power is constructed via the contrast of EU/USA politics, with America conceived as Europe's "Other." Next, in analyzing Lithuania's foreign politics in the context of the EU New Neighborhood Policy, we draw the parallels in the narratives made use of in constructing the identities of EU & Lithuania. A brief examination of the narrative "Lithuania, the regional center" shows its similarity to the narrative of "Normative Power Europe." First, the "Normative Power Europe" & the "Lithuania, the regional center" are both discursive constructions of their international identity. Second, both narratives are promoting a normative model, based on similar values & principles. Third, in both narratives regionalization is held a major instrument in spreading the values conducive to the creation of a common identity. Finally, both narratives perceive the common regional identity as a major security guarantee. The conclusion is that the narrative of "Lithuania, the regional center" is merely a nationalist replica of the "Normative Power Europe," with some peculiarities to be explained by differences in historical context & Lithuania's specifics in domestic politics. These are mainly due to Lithuania's attempt at reconciling her nation state identity & the ambitions of an active actor of the EU Common Foreign & Security Policy. Adapted from the source document.

One of the biggest critiques for the constructivism in international relations discipline is the accusations of abstractiveness and having little substantive to say when talking about world politics. The article asserts that constructivism is not the typical theory of international relations or foreign policy analysis. Constructivism in the discipline is what every constructivist researcher makes of it, using a few fundamental statements about the analysis of social reality. In order to show how the constructivist international relations researchers apply the fundamental principles of the constructivist analysis of social reality to form their models of analysis, firstly, the article explains the metatheoretical assumptions of constructivism and the main problems that emerge trying to apply them in empirical research. Secondly, analysing three fundamental statements of metatheoretical constructivism (on intersubjective construction of meanings, relationship of ideas and materiality, and mutual constitutive relation of structure and agency) it is demonstrated how they are transformed and applied in more particular theoretical and empirical works of international politics. In the end several recommendation are provided on the main principles of constructivist research in international relations. Adapted from the source document.