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Članak razmatra uspon, oblike i posledice protesta u nedemokratskim režimima, oslanjajući se na noviju literaturu iz uporedne analize političkih režima i društvenih pokreta. Oblik režima značajno oblikuje izglede za izbijanje protesta, kao i njegove oblike i posledice. Protesti često proizvode bitne promene u personalnom sastavu i politici vlasti, koje značajno utiču na strukturu i delovanje nedemokratskih režima, i ponekad vode promeni režima. Primeri su navedeni iz kasnog komunističkog autoritarizma u Poljskoj i Jugoslaviji, u kojima su dugotrajni protesti doprineli padu režima i države, i postkomunistički autoritarni režimi u Srbiji i Ukrajini koji su više puta uzdrmani a zatim i dokrajčeni "pritiskom odozdo". ; The paper explores the politics of protest in non-democratic regimes using insights from comparative regime analysis and social movement theory. A regime type strongly shapes factors that trigger popular mobilization, the repertories of collective action and their implications. Protest politics may produce a considerable political change, such as policy and personality change in the political establishment, as well as important shifts in the structure and operation of non-democratic regimes, even regime change. The paper provides evidence from the late communist authoritarian Poland and Yugoslavia, in which sustained protests contributed to the collapse of regime and state, and the post-communist competitive authoritarian Serbia and Ukraine, which experience repeated protest waves and were brought down by protest politics.

Са политичким преокретом 2000. године у Србији отпочео је истовемено и процес идеолошког преобликовања јавних простора. Међу најпроминентнијим видовима оваквог деловања је именовање или преименовање урбаног простора, првенствено улица и тргова, те бављење постојећим споменицима и меморијалима, као и градња и планирање нових. Овакви су случајеви посебно били уочљиви у Београду. Њима су се у неколико наврата супротставиле одређене политичке партије, те неполитичке групе које су организовале уличне акције 'против-именовања' београдских улица, те кампање против новопланираних јавних споменика. Односи моћи и идентитетске политике у овим случајевима биће коментарисани у овом раду. Пропратиће се праксе неколико уметничких и политичких скупина које су спровеле акције и перформансе незваничног преименовања улица, или су пак дискутовале и противиле се подизању новопредложених споменика. (Пре)именовањем одређених градских простора, хегемонске политичке коалиције покушавају да конституишу сигнификантна симболичка места, док, са друге стране, опозиционе противакције покушавају да преузму та иста места и да их реинтерпретирају. У овом ће се раду покушати да прикажу и анализирају поједине идеолошке политике и званични дискурси сећања, те поједине уметничке и политичке контраполитике и опозиционе праксе алтернативне комеморације ; With the onset of political overturn in Serbia in 2000, the process of the ideological reconfiguration of public places was simultaneously being put in motion. One of the most promi- nent means of this endeavor was naming and renaming of urban space, primarily of streets and squares, but also treatment of existing memorial sites and monuments and commissioning and erection of new ones. These undertakings were especially prominent in Serbia's capital Belgrade. Such processes were opposed several times by certain political parties and groups which organized street-actions of counter-naming of Belgrade's thoroughfares and campaigns against newly designated public monuments, and power-play and identity politics of such proceedings will be commented on here. This paper will discuss practices of several artistic and political groups which carried out unofficial street-renaming actions and performances, or discussed and opposed proposed new memorials. By (re)naming certain urban spaces, hegemonic political coalitions are trying to construct significant symbolic places, while oppositional counter-actions are seeking to overtake those same places and reinterpret them. This paper will attempt to sum up and inquire into the ideological politics of official memory discourses and artistic and political counter-politics and actions of opposition or alternative commemoration.

Demokratski optimizam devedestih godina prošlog veka zamenjuje osobita forma javnog razočarenja u demokratiju. Kriza demokratije praćena institucionalnim deficitima, konfuzijom, niskim stepenom upravljačke sposobnosti da se rešavaju pitanja siromaštva, nezaposlenosti, imigracije, korupcije, simptomi su ovoga stanja. Globalni val populizma najizoštreniji je izraz ove političke patologije. Početak novoga veka rađa uzlet otvorenog neprijateljstva prema demokratiji. Deskriptivni pristupi oslonjeni na proceduralnu dimenziju režima moći ("hibridni režimi", "ograničena demokratija" "iliberalna demokratija", "kompetitivni autoritarizam" ) pokazuju se nedostatnim. U ovome radu autor se vraća klasičnom konceptu "despotizma" i pokazuje normative i teorisjke prednosti ovoga koncepta ("novi despotizam") u analizi novoga režima moći koji izrasta na pretpostvkama sve šireg nepoverenja u demokratske instituciije. ; The democratic optimism of the 1990s has been replaced by a particular form of public disillusionment with democracy. The crisis of democracy, accompanied by institutional deficits, confusion, low levels of management capacity to tackle poverty, unemployment, immigration, corruption, are symptoms of this condition. The global wave of populism is the sharpest expression of this political pathology. The beginning of the new century has given birth to an open hostility to democracy. Descriptive approaches based on the procedural dimension of the regime of power ("hybrid regimes", "limited democracy", "liberal democracy", "competitive authoritarianism") are proving insufficient to capture the new political system. In this paper, the author returns to the classical concept of "despotism" and shows the normative and theoretical advantages of this concept ("new despotism") in the analysis of a new regime of power that grows on the premise of growing distrust of democratic institutions.

The author explores how the internet and the new media are changing the way that we communicate, act and think, individually and collectively, through the example of the Occupy Wall Street Movement. The author claims that The Occupy Movement, as a post-narrative project conceived in a digital environment, is less of a political activity, and more a new way of behavior for its members and for the society at large. Its focus on consensus building and its modus operandi are reflecting the principles of the Internet, web-organization and cooperation. Therefore, its success is not about achieving any particular political aim, or winning an election, but about the general acceptance of these values and their becoming part of a wider political agenda. ; Autor istražuje kako internet i novi mediji menjaju način na koji komuniciramo, delujemo i mislimo, pojedinačno ali i kolektivno, na primeru pokreta "Okupirajmo Volstrit". Autor tvrdi da "Okupacija Volstrita", kao postnarativni pokret nastao u digitalnom okruženju, manje predstavlja političku aktivnost a više novi normativni način ponašanja za svoje članove, ali i čitavo društvo. Njegova usmerenost ka izgradnji konsenzusa, kao i sam modus funkcionisanja, odražavaju principe interneta, mrežne organizacije i kolaboracije. Zato je njegov uspeh manje povezan sa ostvarivanjem nekog pojedinačnog cilja ili osvajanja vlasti na izborima, a više sa razmerom u kojoj će ove rednosti biti opšteusvojene i postati deo ukupne političke agende.

Uporedo sа porаstom političkih tenzijа u globаlnim okvirimа usled аntаgonizmimа ekonomski i vojno nаjmoćnijih zemаljа, prve decenije nаkon Drugog svetskog rаtа donele su i intenzivirаnje konflikаtа unutаr аmeričkog društvа te njihovo problemаtizovаnje u jаvnom i političkom polju. Grаđаnsko nezаdovoljstvo nа tlu SAD-а imаlo je rаzličitа ishodištа kаo i rаzličite vidove kаnаlisаnjа kаdа je reč o metodаmа političkog i društvenog orgаnizovаnjа ugroženih ili obesprаvljenih društvenih grupа. Kаo jedаn od njegovih nаjupečаtljivijih oblikа ispoljаvаnjа bilo je političko, kulturno i društveno delаnje аfroаmeričke zаjednice nаročito tokom 60-ih godinа prošlog vekа, u "nаjborbenijoj" fаzi Pokretа zа grаđаnskа prаvа.2 U ovom periodu znаčаjаn deo аfroаmeričke populаcije počev od predstаvnikа njene političke i kulturne elite do аkterа iz nаjnižih slojevа bio je uključen u rаzličite vidove аktivnosti sа ciljem dezintegrаcije represivnih mehаnizаmа аmeričkog društvа, te otklаnjаnjа ključnih činilаcа političke, kulturne i ekonomske nejednаkosti njegovih pripаdnikа. ; Since the beginning of the 20th century African American intellectual and political elite strived to define the place of black minority in the American society by formulating its political, cultural and economic goals. During that time different concepts of African American culture as well as different cultural policies were promoted in the political, artistic and academic fields. In the 1960s distinct visions of the future of African American community in the American society were consolidated and mediated through the Civil Rights Movement and its multiple organizations that included both the activist from the lower social strata and intellectuals and artists. Among them were many male jazz musicinas as well as a few female jazz artists. Focusing on the artistic work of Nina Simone in the 1960s as a specific example of fusion of political and feministic activism, we will examine the ideological and aesthetical distinction of her position in the fields of politics, music and culture of that period. In that process we will analyze the artistic sublimation of Simone`s understanding of African American racial and feminist identity comparing her views with the predominant perspectives of the African American political, intellectual and artistic elite.

Dоktоrskа disеrtаciја prаti rаzvој kоncеpаtа pоlitičkе lеvicе, pоlitičkе dеsnicе i pоlitičkоg cеntrа, оd njihоvоg nаstаnkа svе dо dаnаšnjih dаnа. Krоz gеnеrаlnо rаzmаtrаnjе оvih kоncеpаtа dоktоrskа disеrtаciја nudi i niz mini-biоgrаfskih pоrtrеtа znаčајnih tеоrеtičаrа i držаvnikа, kојi su оbеlеžili pоmеnutе pојmоvе u еvrоpskој pоlitičkој i intеlеktuаlnој istоriјi. Аutоr disеrtаciје, pоrеd disciplinоvаnоg iznоšеnjа nаučnih činjеnicа, nа litеrаlаn nаčin prеzеntuје intеrеsаntnu gеnеrаlnu fаbulu u kојој sе kао glаvni аktеri pојаvlјuјu vоdеćе ličnоsti mоdеrnе еvrоpskе istоriје. Disеrtаciја prikаzuје kаkо ćе, nеkаdа јеdinstvеni pоlitički prоstоri lеvicе i dеsnicе, u pоstmоdеrnоm vrеmеnu biti pоdеlјеni grаđаnskim i аntigrаđаnskim shvаtаnjеm pоlitikе, dоk ćе pоdеlа nа lеvicu i dеsnicu u njihоvim klаsičnim оblicimа biti јоš sаmо sеkundаrnа. Dоktоrskа disеrtаciја pоkаzuје dа nаs tо dоvоdi u јеdnu nоvu tеоriјsku i prаktičnu situаciјu, tе аutоr disеrtаciје u zаklјučnim nаpоmеnаmа rаdа zаklјučuје dа ćе zа stаbilnоst, dеlоtvоrnоst i lеgitimnоst pоlitičkih instituciја nа pоčеtku 21. vеkа biti pоtrеbnа јеdnа nоvа pоstidеоlоškа pоlitikа i pоstidеоlоškа pоlitičkа sоciоlоgiја. ; Doctoral dissertation follows the development of the concepts of the Political Left, the Political Right and the Political Center from the time of their creation to the present day. Through a general discussion of these concepts dissertation offers a series of mini - biographical portraits of important scholars and statesmen, who epitomized these concepts in European political and intellectual history. Author of dissertation, together with disciplined presentation of scientific facts, offers the interesting general story in which as the main actors appear leading figures of modern European history. The dissertation shows how, in the past a unique political space of the Left and the Right, in the postmodern period will be divided by civil and anti-civic understanding of politics, while the division between the Left and the Right in their classical forms remains only secondary. Doctoral dissertation finally demonstrates that previous happenings brings us into a new theoretical and practical situation, and the author of the thesis in the concluding remarks of work concludes that for stability, effectiveness and legitimacy of political institutions at the beginning of the 21st century we need a new post-ideological politics and post-ideological political sociology.

For over a century, rumours have been spread from Croatia about Serbia's intention to create a Greater Serbia and its aspirations to greater Serbian hegemony. This has been a constant refrain in all anti-Serbian speeches delivered both before the Yugoslav and international public. On the one hand, the Serbs and Serbia were presented as aggressors with great territorial appetites, whereas on the other, the aim was to conceal one's own aggression and territorial pretensions to the ethnic, state and historical territories that belonged to others. Though such tactics is a well-known and long-lasting feature of Croatian politics, it has not been given an appropriate place and explanation in Serbian and foreign historiography. Croatia inherited such political approach from Austria-Hungary which demonised and satanised the Serbian intentions aimed at liberation and unification all the more so as its appetites towards the territories in the Balkans increased and as it more strongly expounded the German Drang nach Osten policy. According to such tactical approach, everything that was Serbian was proclaimed greater Serbian in order to nip in the bud and thwart Serbian interests which conflicted with the AustroHungarian ones. Following in the wake of Austro-Hungarian policy, in which they participated and often played the leading role, in all historical periods – from the 1848 revolution to this day the Croats have been denouncing Serbian often labelling it as greater Serbian. By reviling Serbhood and greater Serbhood, in which they saw the main rival to Croatdom and greater Croatdom, Croatian politicians did not only dream about a Greater Croatia, but also worked on building it, with determination and consistency, faithful to the principle that such end justifies all means, including even the genocidal annihilation of the Serbs. The Croatian aspirations to territorial enlargement have a rather long history. Although small in numbers and in a small territory, the Croats have fostered great imperial ambitions. This may be well illustrated with the various names such as: "Alpine or mountainous Croats" (Slovenes), "Orthodox Croats" (Serbs), "indisputable Croats" or the "flower of the Croatian nation" (Muslims), "Turkish Croatia", "Red Croatia", "White Croatia" or "Carpathian Croatia", which were the territories of Bosnia, Montenegro, Dalmatia and Slovenia. These names have been carefully cherished and for centuries instilled in the consciousness of a Croat with the aim to develop the awareness of Croatia's greatness and the numerical strength of the Croats. With the present two studies, I wish to demonstrate and prove when, how, on what foundations and with what objectives the Croats have endeavoured, from the 1848/49 revolution until the present time, to get hold of some parts or the entire territories of Vojvodina and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As precious data on this topic are scattered in different places, it is hard to gain insight into the entirety of this national, state-legal and geopolitical issue. With this in mind, I have elaborated in these papers, in a chronological sequence, on all important Croatian territorial claims on Vojvodina and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I have thus practically uncovered the decades-long greater Croatian politics and have provided concrete answers to the Croatian attacks at Serbia and the Serbs in regard to the so-called greater Serbian politics. I would also like to inform readers that this book is the second, supplemented and expanded edition of the book first published in 2012 in small print run (500 copies) and sold out a long time ago. Belgrade, 20 July 2016 Vasilije Đ. Krestić ; Посебна издања / Српска академија наука и уметности ; књ. 685. Председништво ; књ. 6

The term politics, from its origin until nowadays, has been closely related to coercion and effects of coercion. The first rulers were finding support in a belief in the divine nature of power, but since, in time, this belief faded, the solution was found in physical superiority of rulers. The development of politics as an activity by which a community can be governed instrumentally, conditioned its closer linkage to force. Politics was sometimes identified with force, and sometimes politics was using force as an instrument for taming the bullying by others. Undoubtedly, the man is a rational and instinctive being. Monopolization of bullying within political activity made it possible to place the force, depending on the circumstances, into the service of one or the other attribute of human nature. Integration processes in political, economic, military and other areas, significantly contributed to changing the role of a national state in its formerly inviolable spheres, even in those elements that are considered classic attributes of the state as an institution (sovereignty, independence, monetary policy, defense, state power legitimacy, etc). Does this power, which is 'taken away' from the national state, go away, through integrative processes with other international subjects, to some distant power and alienated centers, or does it, on the contrary, enter the corpus of political activity that strengthens its overall position? Without immersing into more profound analysis about what is closer to the truth, it is a fact that through integrative processes a number of 'state' activities is transferred to joint institutions. In the spirit of this paper, the most important institutions are those which decide about organization, preparing, functioning, and using of the state (interstate) power. Strategic solutions concerning these matters, are a part of domestic and intergovernmental policy. They are products of a great number of internal and external factors, starting from economic and institutional, to social and cultural-traditional, and to international.

NATO's political and - above all - military participation in secession-motivated conflicts in former Yugoslavia (1990-1995), will be remembered as a clear example of demonstration of power, intentions and (in)capability of the Victor in a decades-long global "cold war" between the "freedom-loving" West and "totalitarian East". Regardless of the expectations of liberal theoreticians and the majority of public opinion, it was soon revealed that the victory was no "triumph of freedom" and even less "the end of history". On the contrary, as historically typical, it was only an unstable resultant of relations between major actors in the modern global theater, who strive to legitimize their need for domination with varying success and vocabulary. Hence the lessons to be learned from the final act of destruction of Yugoslavia (several months of NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999) have the expected tone of banality: absolute might strives for absolute power (which remains unattainable in principle); "the mighty oppress" is true always and in any place (but with a time limit); and, finally, what everyone knows but does not (or is unable or refuses) to say aloud: the only true alternative to military threat and/or aggression of a single political actor is an equally valid (military) threat/aggression by another one. We are tempted to conclude that, despite the ideological ardor of NGO activists, the political correctness of theoreticians and the rhetorical figures of speech of politicians, the "banalities" remain valid as the only certainties, i.e., regularities in the unpredictable currents of relations between states.

In this article Dr Pribicevic analyses the impact of Kosovo crises on Serbian EU integrations and shaping of political scene of Serbia. Dr Pribicevic pointed out how crises started in spring 2011 when idea of split of Kosovo appeared again in Serbia and then continued with the clashes between KFOR and Serbs from north of Kosovo in order to get the control of administrative crossing Jarinje and Brnjak. During the summer 2011 German chancellor Merkel visited Serbia and asked government in Belgrade to normalize its relations with Kosovo and dissolve "parallel institutions" of Serbs in the north of Kosovo. Following this visit Serbian government continue its negotiations with Pristina and find out solutions for administrative crossings. On the other side, Belgrade and Pristina didn't find solution for the problem of presentation of Kosovo on the regional gatherings after what European council, under the German influence, decided to postpone the decision to give Serbia the status of candidate for the EU. Therefore, Serbia remains without EU candidaturein December 2011 in spite of the fact that government in Belgrade handedover general Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic to Hague Tribunal as well as conducted a number of successful reforms which got very high marks from EU commission. In this article Dr Pribicevic is trying to answer several questions. Why Washington and Berlin imposed such a strong pressure on Serbia in this moment? Is split of Kosovo possible solution? Could Serbian government continue with current politics of EU and Kosovo or it should take one of these politics as a priority? How Kosovo crises influenced Serbian political scene? At the end, Kosovo crises opened the crucial question: could Serbia enter EU without "recognition of territorial integrity of Kosovo"as described by German foreign minister Westervele. Having in mind forthcoming elections in spring time 2012 author thinks that ruling Democratic Party as well as leading opposition party Sebian Progresive Party will continue with current politics "both EU and Kosovo". Such politics will be in accordance with the public mood in Serbia which shows that support for EU integrations is declining with the growing pressure of US and Germany on Serbian Kosovo's politics. On the other side, Serbian politics "both EU and Kosovo" is not sustainable on the long run and Serbia has to face difficult decisions in future. Also, according to the author opinion Kosovo crises showed weakness of Serbian international position. It is without important allies among key Western powers which has dominant influence in this part of Europe. Serbia has support of Russia but key influence on Kosovo has US, GB, France and Germany. These powers connected Serbia's further progress towards EU with normalization its relations with Kosovo, knowing in advance that the time when Serbia is seeking for the EU candidature is the best time to ask Belgrade to make concessions in its Kosovo's politics. Western powers do not expect Serbia to recognize Kosovo but they expect Serbia to accept " territorial integrity of Kosovo", including its north part. Why Kosovo become so important for leading Western powers? Author thinks that several reasons influenced such tough behavior of Western power towards Serbia. First, after helping them to create an independent state, US perceived Albanians as the most reliable ally in this part of Europe. Second, Germany and other big powers in Europe wants to prevent creation of new frozen conflict in Europe similar to Cyprus one, Third, all big Western powers has reserves towards Serbian foreign policy and its orientation on EU but as well as on Russia, nonalignment world, China which quite often is described in the West as sitting on the two chairs, Last but not the least, Germany as well as France is not very eager of politics of enlargement of EU in the eve of forthcoming elections in these countries scheduled for 2012 and 2013. Therefore its hesitation in this moment towards further enlargement with US pro Albanian politics creates tough dillemas for Serbian politics in foreseeable future.