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We Need a Pollution Tax!
In: Bulletin of the atomic scientists, Band 26, Heft 4, S. 3-5
ISSN: 1938-3282
Pollution Taxes for Monopolistically Competitive Firms
In: Frontiers of theoretical economics, Band 5, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1704
This paper examines ways of taxing monopolistically competitive firms that pollute the environment. There are two sources of welfare loss: production externalities and product selection bias associated with fixed costs. We argue that the optimal firm specific tax is always, strictly speaking, less than the Pigouvian tax and that furthermore, under some circumstances, both Pigouvian and optimal taxes leave the monopolistically competitive industry with too few firms. Under either regime, however, the tax targets the right firms.
Environmental capital flight and pollution tax
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 5, Heft 3, S. 273-286
ISSN: 1573-1502
Pollution Taxes, Subsidies, and Rent Seeking
In: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Band 26, Heft 2, S. 355
Pollution Taxes and Optimal Spatial Location
In: Economica, Band 49, Heft 195, S. 297
Negative Pollution Taxes for Controlling Wind Erosion
In: Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 306-318
ISSN: 2040-5804
AbstractThis article explores the use of a negative pollution tax to control erosion in semiarid agriculture. This tax operates on the setting of either one or two threshold levels. With two threshold levels, T‐max identifies the maximum acceptable limit of pollution and T‐min identifies the desirable or target level. Above T‐max, fines or penalties are imposed; below T‐min, the farm, county, or state is paid for their superior achievement. Although from a theoretical perspective the negative pollution tax has several attractive features, from an operational and political point of view many obstacles to its implementation must be surmounted.
Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 229-251
ISSN: 1573-1502
How Pollution Taxes May Increase Pollution and Reduce Net Revenues
In: Public choice, Band 107, Heft 1-2, S. 65-85
ISSN: 0048-5829
This paper develops a positive theory of pollution taxation by a federal authority when pollution abatement subsidies are used by local governments. Environmental & industry lobby groups influence governments with campaign contributions. First, pollution may increase in the pollution tax because the abatement subsidy increases (decreases) with the tax, & pollution increases (decreases) in the abatement subsidy. This occurs because the lobbying incentives change at a pollution tax reform. Second, pollution taxes may reduce net revenues because subsidy expenditures rise. Third, pollution may increase simultaneously as net revenues fall. Finally, the welfare effect of a pollution tax may be negative. 1 Appendix, 59 References. Adapted from the source document.
Should Pollution Taxes be Targeted at Income Redistribution?
This paper analyses optimal corrective taxation and optimal income redistribution. Under general utility functions, the Pigouvian pollution tax is higher if pollution damages disproportionally hurt the poor due to equity weighting of pollution damages. Moreover, optimal pollution taxes should be set below the Pigouvian tax if the poor spend a disproportionate fraction of their income on polluting goods. However, if preferences for commodities are of the Gorman (1961) polar form, optimal pollution taxes should follow the first-best rule for the Pigouvian corrective tax even if the government wants to redistribute income and the poor spend a disproportional part of their income on polluting goods. The often-used quasi-linear, CES and Stone-Geary utility functions all belong to the Gorman polar class. If preferences are Gorman polar, and if pollution taxes are not optimized, Pareto-improving green tax reforms exist that move the pollution tax closer to the Pigouvian tax. Simulations demonstrate that optimal corrective taxes should be Pigouvian if the demand for polluting goods is derived from a LES demand system, but deviate from the Pigouvian taxes if demand for polluting goods demand is derived from a PIGLOG demand system.
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Should Pollution Taxes Be Targeted At Income Redistribution?
This paper analyses optimal corrective taxation and optimal income redistribution. Under general utility functions, the Pigouvian pollution tax is higher if pollution damages disproportionally hurt the poor due to equity weighting of pollution damages. Moreover, optimal pollution taxes should be set below the Pigouvian tax if the poor spend a disproportionate fraction of their income on polluting goods. However, if preferences for commodities are of the Gorman (1961) polar form, optimal pollution taxes should follow the first-best rule for the Pigouvian corrective tax even if the government wants to redistribute income and the poor spend a disproportional part of their income on polluting goods. The often-used quasi-linear, CES and Stone-Geary utility functions all belong to the Gorman polar class. If preferences are Gorman polar, and if pollution taxes are not optimized, Pareto-improving green tax reforms exist that move the pollution tax closer to the Pigouvian tax. Simulations demonstrate that optimal corrective taxes should be Pigouvian if the demand for polluting goods is derived from a LES demand system, but deviate from the Pigouvian taxes if demand for polluting goods demand is derived from a PIGLOG demand system.
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The Welfare Consequences of Pollution-Tax Harmonization
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 56, Heft 2, S. 227-238
ISSN: 1573-1502
Should pollution taxes be targeted at income redistribution?
In: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f4e70a94-4b70-49c0-9559-5b6e1c223c41
This paper analyses optimal corrective taxation and optimal income redistribution. Under general utility functions, the Pigouvian pollution tax is higher if pollution damages disproportionally hurt the poor due to equity weighting of pollution damages. Moreover, optimal pollution taxes should be set below the Pigouvian tax if the poor spend a disproportionate fraction of their income on polluting goods. However, if preferences for commodities are of the Gorman (1961) polar form, optimal pollution taxes should follow the first-best rule for the Pigouvian corrective tax even if the government wants to redistribute income and the poor spend a disproportional part of their income on polluting goods. The often-used quasi-linear, CES and Stone-Geary utility functions all belong to the Gorman polar class. If preferences are Gorman polar, and if pollution taxes are not optimized, Pareto-improving green tax reforms exist that move the pollution tax closer to the Pigouvian tax. Simulations demonstrate that optimal corrective taxes should be Pigouvian if the demand for polluting goods is derived from a LES demand system, but deviate from the Pigouvian taxes if demand for polluting goods demand is derived from a PIGLOG demand system.
BASE
Should pollution taxes be targeted at income redistribution?
In: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:4e7c606d-1300-4fb4-bb18-a02eae964bbe
This paper analyses optimal corrective taxation and optimal income redistribution. The Pigouvian pollution tax is higher if pollution damages disproportionally hurt the poor due to equity weighting of pollution damages. Moreover, optimal pollution taxes should be set below the Pigouvian tax if the poor spend a disproportionate fraction of their income on polluting goods if preferences for commodities are not of the Gorman (1961) polar form. However, optimal pollution taxes should follow the first-best rule for the Pigouvian corrective tax if preferences for commodities are of the Gorman polar form even if the government wants to redistribute income and the poor spend a disproportional part of their income on polluting goods. The often-used quasi-linear, CES and Stone-Geary utility functions all belong to the Gorman polar class. If pollution taxes are not optimized, Pareto-improving green tax reforms exist that move the pollution tax closer to the Pigouvian tax if preferences are Gorman polar. Simulations demonstrate that optimal corrective taxes should be Pigouvian if the demand for polluting goods is derived from a LES demand system, but optimal corrective taxes deviate from the Pigouvian taxes if demand for polluting goods demand is derived from a PIGLOG demand system.
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From regressive pollution taxes to progressive environmental tax reforms
In: European economic review: EER, Band 69, S. 126-142
ISSN: 1873-572X