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"Populism: An Introduction is the first introduction to the theme of populism. It will introduce the principal theories, definitions, models and contemporary debates. A number of global case studies will be used to illustrate the concept: Russian populism; Latin American populism; Italian populism. Populism will reflect on the sociology of democratic processes and investigate the evolution of political consensus in contemporary political systems. This book will appeal to academics and postgraduate students working in the field of sociology, political sociology and politics."--Provided by publisher.

Argues that the antimodernist impulse of populism, which has historically been denigrated in mainstream culture, assumes greater legitimacy under postmodern conditions in which the concept of progress has been discredited. Against interpretations of populism as inherently xenophobic, modern defenders of populism are described as seeking a postmodern model of communal life in which the organicity of communities assumes special importance. It is suggested that this populist vision is an effort to reconstruct the kind of individuality that disintegrated in the face of modern conditions of social life. John Dewey's pragmatic theory of experience is considered as the closest approximation to this postmodern populist ideal. Finally, the work of Carl Schmitt (1950) is employed as a starting point for a more explicitly political theory of postmodern populism. D. M. Smith

Populist political forces have played significant roles in Indian politics, and have varied in their vision of political community, in the social groups they targeted, in the policies they pursued, and in their impact on democracy. The Indian National Congress had populist aspects in the interwar period, and then again under Indira Gandhi's leadership from the late 1960s to the late 1970s. Movements and parties that represented particular language and caste groups also employed populist rhetoric and methods of mobilization, and pursued populist policies. The nature of the populist organizations influenced the effect of populism on democracy. While Indira Gandhi's populism weakened Indian democracy, leading to a period of authoritarian rule, the populism of many of India's language and caste parties strengthened democracy. Populism is likely to continue in Indian politics, and is particularly significant currently in the mobilization of the lower castes. Adapted from the source document.

Asserting that politics has the capacity to shift negative societal directions & revive democracy, it is contended that civic populism is required to merge everyday politics with electoral politics to foster that improvement. Civic populism calls for citizen participation & the blending of interest group bargaining with broader civic ideals, which requires work, a concept absent from theories of participatory democracy. Flaws in communitarian & liberal theories are laid out before presenting an alternative to underpin US civic life in civic populism. Civic populism embodies a conception of everyday politics, ie, the interaction of citizens with basically equal, horizontal relationships with each other across settings; this results in alliances of diverse citizen groups that organize based on a philosophical orientation to politics rooted in democratic & religious values. Attention turns to public work as a theme of civic populism. Public work is viewed as the sustained effort by a blend of citizens to create material or cultural goods of lasting civic value. It also sheds light on the democratic potential of knowledge power. It is concluded that civic populism stresses the productive & distributive aspects of politics as key resources for citizen empowerment. 37 References. J. Zendejas

Populists are making headway across Europe & from all points on the political spectrum. Their success is symptomatic of the weakness of European political parties & party systems. Some of these populists seek to reinvigorate European democracy & yet most -- with their xenophobic, anti-immigrant rhetoric -- seem intent on making matters worse. The challenge in Europe is to reconstitute national party systems as effective institutions for representing the popular interest. Such a challenge can be met only over the long term. For now, Europeans must deal with those populists who emerge at the national level. Some of these can be dealt with safely & others cannot. So far Europeans have succeeded in keeping the most unsavory populists from power. However, such success is not guaranteed. Indeed, failure to restrain European populism may be just a matter of time. Adapted from the source document.

Searches for a useful & accurate definition of Islamic movements in the Middle East. The often-used term "theocratic populism" is incorrect, as it incorporates concepts used to the explain events in other parts of the world. Similarly rejected are the ideas of Michel Foucault, who observed the 1979 Iranian Revolution first hand. He argued that it was neither antimodern nor populist, but rather, the injection of the spiritual into political life. In his romanticizing of the revolution, however, he downplayed repressive aspects of it & failed to understand the authoritarian cult of the personality. The ideas of Jurgen Habermas can also be used to understand the defense of the life world in the Middle East against further enroachments by the world system. It is argued here, however, that a historical understanding of the development of the Iranian state, Islam, foreign intervention, & nationalism must be pursued. The analysis emphasizes the need to retrieve the strain of participatory democracy in Iran from the demagogic populism of the power elite in order to check the rise of religious fascism, which threatens a more liberal path for the Middle East. J. Cowie

This essay offers an explanation for the rise of contemporary "mediatized populisms." Disaggregating the idea of a singular media logic of populist politics, we examine the institutional and political-economic dynamics of mediatization and the variegated structures of mediated political fields in which contemporary populist political formations are embedded. Moving away from broad "global populism" approaches as well as case studies from Europe and the Americas that have thus far dominated discussions of populism, we make the case for empirically grounded comparative studies of populism from the particular standpoint of regional contexts across Asia that offer theoretical insights often missed in prevailing "technology-first" and election-focused approaches. We then outline three distinctive features of media-politics relations (and their transformations) that have enabled the contemporary rise of mediatized populism across the Inter-Asian region.

International audience ; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

International audience ; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

International audience ; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

In this paper, I want to introduce a(n digital) ethnographic approach to populism that understands populism as a (digitally) mediatized chronotopic communicative and discursive relation. Populism, I argue, is not only constructed in a (mediatized) communicative relation between journalists, politicians and academics, but also in the relation to citizens, activists and computational agency. Attention to all these actors, and the media they use, is of crucial importance if we want to understand populism. Digital media are not just new media that populists use, their algorithms and affordances reshape their populism. In times of digitalization, we cannot understand populism by only looking at 'the input', the frame that actors prepare for uptake, it is about the uptake as well. More concretely, I will argue that digital media have given birth to a new form of populism: algorithmic populism. Understanding and focusing on populism as a 'communicative relation' between all these human and non-human actors allows use to analyze 'populism' more precisely.