Suchergebnisse

The political-strategic approach is one of the most employed frameworks within the methodologically heterogeneous subfield of populism studies. In the last two decades, it has contributed to the analysis of populism both in Latin America and the United States and, more recently, in Western and Eastern Europe. That being said, a close inspection of its axioms and its conceptualization of the phenomenon shows that it is built on ill-conceived premises. This article intends to be a comprehensive critique of the approach that can contribute to the methodological progress of the field. It criticizes the three main dysfunctions of the approach: selective rationalism, leader-centrism, and normative bias.

The aim of this paper is to conduct a literature review of the existing nexus between conspiracy theories and populist politics. Most of the literature considering the political nature of conspiracy theories has focused mainly on individual action and electoral choices, hence setting aside the agency of political leaders that deliberately resort to these tales to mobilise supporters. On the contrary, conspiracy theories are increasingly moving away from extremist politics to enter the institutional political arena and become part and parcel of the political narratives and strategies of institutional figures. Against this backdrop, the present work offers a new approach to investigate the connection between populist conspiracy theories and conspiracist populism and attempts to explain how conspiracist populism works and what its potential impact on contemporary democracies is. The analysis of the literature offers some theoretical insights to explore the specific case of the presidency of Kais Saied in Tunisia, which has been labelled as a form of constitutional populism integrating conspiracy theories. The inquiry on the Tunisian case demonstrates that conspiracy theories can represent both tactics and framings for populists in power, and, if democratic checks and balances are weak enough, they can lead to the erosion of democracy itself.

Abstract
This review article provides a comprehensive overview of the relationship between the COVID-19 pandemic and populism. We analyse the demand and supply sides of the populist phenomenon during the pandemic. On the demand side, we focus on the interplay between populist attitudes and COVID-19 restrictions by assessing the role of conspiracy theories, social media and alternative news media. On the supply side, we identify similarities and differences in the responses of populist actors globally. Hence, we focus on the main ideational varieties of the contemporary populist phenomenon (right-wing, left-wing and valence populism) while also distinguishing between populists in government and opposition. The analysis reveals that complexity is the defining feature of both the demand and supply sides of populism in times of pandemic.

Abstract
Populism on the far left and the far right is reshaping the contemporary city and the urban condition. In this special short-form section, we put forward populism, art and the city as a linked theoretical and methodological framework through the UC Berkeley Global Urban Humanities Initiative. Our conversations brought together new research in urban studies, art, architecture, public policy, and performance studies into what many people described as a decidedly populist age. Following a short introduction, we share a collection of four papers from such conversations that offer 'focus sites' from San Francisco to Palm Springs, Hong Kong to Mexico City, with a diverse set of theoretical proposals that branch from our discussions and shared readings in art, populism, and the city.

AbstractCoxey's March was a multidimensional spectacle reflecting the disparate social and intellectual strands that comprised an energetic late 19th‐century producer's movement. This well‐staged, though seemingly spontaneous, march was emblematic of a brand of grassroots populism that united producers from farm fields to factory floors. Their cause was propelled by an eclectic array of reformers whose distinct ideas to change the economic landscape were united only in their common vision of a more cooperative, rather than corporate, vision of the future. Coxey shared in that vision with his bold public works plan. In choosing a direct form of democratic expression, and then adorning it with religious and utopian symbols, his march to Washington reflected the essence of a progressive populism churning throughout the Gilded Age.

AbstractThis special issue aims to understand the rise of right‐wing populism in the European countryside, as well as the forms of resistance and the alternatives being built against it. In this short introduction, we briefly present the main objectives and conceptual position of the special issue and introduce its articles. Each article is discussed here based on its contribution to one of the following themes: (1) analysis of the existing socio‐economic system and power relations that gave rise to right‐wing populism in rural Europe; (2) critical examination of the major assumptions about rural support for populist movements; (3) problematic overlap between politics and rhetoric of right‐wing populist parties and left‐wing (green) parties and agrarian movements; (4) agrarian populism and food sovereignty movement as progressive alternatives to right‐wing politics in the European countryside.

What is the relationship between right-wing populism and contemporary fascism? How has fascism changed since the 1920s? And how do the answers to these questions concern a global shift that can be called the Great Unsettling—including a postmodern fracturing of prior modern 'certainties' about the nature of subjectivity, political practice and meaning, deconstructing the consequences of 'truth'? This essay seeks to respond to these questions by first going back to foundational issues of defnition and elaborating the meaning of populism and fascism in relation to their structural 'moving parts'. Using this alternative scaffolding, the essay argues that right-wing populism and an orientation to postmodern fascism represented by Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro have converged. The context of this convergence is a globalizing shift that now challenges democratic politics.

This chapter introduces a rhetorical-performative analysis as a tool for exploring urban symbolic landscape and populism and hence deals with relationality and materiality from the postfoundational perspective. It connects the articulation theory of cultural theorists Stuart Hall or political theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and spatial analysis of cultural geographer Doreen Massey to the study of populism. The case of Hungary shows how political frontiers have been articulated in the public space, contestable interpretations of the past are deliberately used and key symbolic urban landscapes transformed radically to articulate a political 'us'—and 'them.' In the 2010s, in the Hungarian capital Budapest, the top-down process transforming urban space faced bottom-up movements which reproduce the populist logic of articulation. ; Peer reviewed

Uno de los rasgos más destacados del populismo es su empleo de las emociones. Sin embargo, los análisis de la dimensión emocional del populismo suelen adolecer de cierta superficialidad. Este trabajo persigue, justamente, arrojar luz sobre las bases afectivas del populismo. A tal fin, presenta un análisis de los distintos aspectos de la afectividad populista, a partir de los hallazgos resultantes del giro afectivo experimentado por las ciencias sociales. Asimismo, se ocupa de los notables efectos que sobre la sentimentalidad populista tiene la reconfiguración digital del espacio público. ; One of the most prominent features of populism is its emotionality. Yet studies on the emotional dimension of populism tend to be rather superficial. Precisely, this article attempts to shed some light on the affective foundations of populism, taking advantage of the findings resulting from the affective turn that has taken place on the social sciences in the last years. In this connection, it also deals with the digital transformation of the public space and its effects on the populist sentimentality. ; Universidad Pablo de Olavide

AbstractEconomic and health crises have profound political consequences for public support for social policy, historically setting in motion a massive expansion of governmental programs. Is demand for social protection likely to increase among citizens exposed to risk in an era in which populist messages are prominent? We show that this depends critically on the precise targets that populists evoke as enemies of the people. We distinguish between two types of political rhetoric deployed by populist politicians in their claims to represent the authentic people—one opposing the authority of domestic elites, including technocrats, and one attacking foreigners. We examine the extent to which each rhetorical strategy reduces or enhances popular demand for social policies by randomly exposing Americans to these frames as part of a public opinion survey conducted during the Covid-19 pandemic. Our results show that the two messages have different consequences for support for redistribution among respondents exposed to risk: populist anti-foreign rhetoric that blames foreign countries for the onset of the pandemic increases demand for expansion of social protection compared to populist anti-elite rhetoric.