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This research theorizes an ongoing, global, grand trend of geopolitical disintegration, in the Post-Cold War, and increasingly in post-1989 time. The proposed paradigm may be useful to analyze redistribution of internal power within every state, from developed old Western powers, to new developed powers as China and India, well beyond the dissolved former real-socialist countries and the so-called failing states. The focus is on not empirical description of each local request of more autonomy, self-government, or even independence, but on the reached limits of the centuries-long and planet-wide integration process, from which the modern states and contemporary world have arisen, and that has now left room to a time of disintegration. This insight draws on a wide range of positions and contributions from International Relations theorists, along with other political scientists and scholars of geopolitics, anthropologists and sociologists, political geographers and economists, historians of colonialism and nationalism, experts of secession, critics of globalization and postmodern intellectuals, federalists and anarchists. * The first of the three parts of this study, is dedicated to an historical insight about the geopolitical integration process that had westernized and globalized the entire world. War, the state and expansionism, were not an inevitable destiny. Instead, a very small group of modern states, in competition and imitation amongst themselves, started a particularly steady conquering march on the planet. Their power expanded in intensity and extension for centuries and, with and because of the Industrial Revolution, culminated in totalitarian states and in total wars. * * The second part treats the social and national movements that have led to the end, in 1989, of the bipolar paramountcy of the two industrial superpowers, United States and Soviet Union. Along with the dissolution of blocs and states, a steady decreasing of states wars, crimes and violences, is registered and explained in the study. A slippery use of the word and concept of nationalism, particularly in post-1989 geopolitical crises, is frontally attacked in this part, drawing from early works of Ernest Gellner and Tom Nairn. Under the umbrella term of nationalism, integrationist projects and their victims, colonizers and colonized, oppressors and resistants, are likely to be confused. An early intuition of Karl Deutsch about the social awareness and mobilization of people in post-totalitarian, post-industrial and post-colonial societies, is here crossed with the work about coercion, capital, inclusion and consent of Charles Tilly. Masses, once enslaved in industrialized obedience, have evolved in networks of active citizens – and netizens – able, in a less violent international system, to claim for more personal liberties but also, as communities, for social, economical, and geopolitical change. A theoretical conjecture is also presented in this second part: in the Post-Cold War, no old or new powers will be able to keep enough concentration of power, in order to compete for world domination. We have entered a permissive state of disintegration. Redistribution of power from center to peripheries, empowerment of federal units, multiplication of small states, may occur, from now on, because there is nobody and nothing capable of preventing it. From this geopolitical point of view, the 1989 is at the very beginning. While sharing certain premises of a well-known thoughtful article by Alexander Wendt, on the inevitability of a world state (2003), this work reaches a different conclusion. * * * In the third and last part, the scope and the nature of the break in the sameness of international life is explored, with normative purposes. History is not repeating, and integration prejudices along with integrationist projects should be overcome. Every state may substantially devolve powers to its internal authorities, or even breakup, and many new smaller states, or self-governing units within states, might come out. In this increasing number of polities, an overwhelming number of citizens may go well beyond electoral democracy and have direct access to power. They may coalesce around what Brian Ferguson defined an «identerest» complex: constructed identities and tangible interests, inextricably intertwined. Citizens and netizens demanding power on their own territories and disintegration of their states, are required to take care of citizenry's duties, not only citizenship's rights. A model of responsible, moderate, pragmatic, «princely citizenry», echoing Machiavelli and Gramsci, is here proposed. -|- Acquisitions of this study are bluntly offered as a contribution to political action in a time of geopolitical change, in which it would be important to rely on expertise, but also on compassion, and on a real interest in the historical and geographical, spiritual and material pathways that each local, concrete human community is pursuing. Western-led state-building hubris, for instance, should be put aside in Afghanistan and many other corners of the world, it is recommend by this study. In favor of bottom-up cantonization, for example, an ancient Swiss wisdom which would deserve more consideration in a changing world. While burdened by the contradictions of modernity and menaced by recurrent economical and ecological crises, local princely citizenries, demanding sovereignty in their place of dwelling, are probably the main and the best possible challengers to the status quo. Concentrating on their territory and population, they may change their everyday reality, overcoming political corruption, bureaucratic impotence, economical inequality, ecological destruction. It may reveal be easier to scale down, rather than tear down, the pyramids of oppression. Leopold Kohr, Ivan Illich and don Lorenzo Milani's prophecies of justice and peace in geopolitical smallness, may become inspiring visions, in a time of disintegration.

Through a reinterpretation of the concept of intercampo considering digital transformation, the contribution highlights the presence of opportunities, in this changing period, in particular with respect to political education. In modern society, increasingly neural and interactive, the school struggles to consider the active role of digital technology. In digital prospective, the pandemic situation has increased the difficulties, putting forward the actions to the reflections. The school today needs a digital citizenship education set in the concreteness of humanity and attention to the public good, capable of giving life to social processes of fraternity and justice for all that define a modern political charity (Enciclica Fratelli Tutti, 2020). The aim for the pedagogy is to inhabit the gap, directing the education of digital citizen considering at the same time the relational dynamics in the classroom and the value of online experiences, according to a principle of recognition and constructive interchange. ; Il contributo, attraverso una rilettura del concetto di intercampo alla luce della digital transformation, sottolinea le opportunità insite nello spazio di cambiamento in corso, in particolare rispetto all'educazione alla politica. Nella società moderna, sempre più neurale e interattiva, la scuola sembra faticare nel considerare il ruolo attivo delle tecnologie e l'emergenza pandemica ha reso questo ancor più difficile, anticipando forzatamente le azioni alle riflessioni. La scuola necessita oggi di un'educazione alla cittadinanza digitale incastonata nella concretezza di un vissuto di umanità e attenzione al bene comune, capace di dare vita a processi sociali di fraternità e giustizia che definiscono una moderna carità politica (Enciclica Fratelli Tutti, 2020). La pedagogia ha il compito di abitare l'intercampo, orientando la formazione del cittadino digitale considerando simultaneamente le dinamiche relazionali in aula e la valenza delle esperienze di vita online, secondo un principio di riconoscimento ...

The Italian political unification is a process starting in 1861. The next ten years, until the freeing of Rome, are a period of strong changes because the the new nation starts by heavier backwardness conditions compared to other European nations.The basic conditionings that bound the new nation are summarized in some causes: an underdeveloped economic system where there are areas of industrial development; a significant shortage of mineral and energy resources; and an urban structure that is still that of the sixteenth century, the last brightness period of the Italian cities. The same internal communication system is composed of a basic road network which is still one of Roman origin and of isolated sections of rail network, with few links among the pre-unity nations.Particular attention should be paid on the impact of the economic processes on the cities: they have a strong impact on European cities since the early nineteenth century, but their impact on Italian cities (beginning from the main northern cities, Milan and Turin) is more limited, if compared with the transformations concerning other continental cities.The unification starting from 1861 imposes additional critical elements, because the Italian urban structure is not ready to the event, particularly for the choice of the capital city. A city that can rightfully define itself as capital exists, and it is Turin; but it is peripheral to the rest of the Italian territory. Furthermore there is an in pectore capital city, Rome, that is the symbolic centre of the Italian history. But the city has to wait another ten years to join to the rest of Italy. The solution is to temporarily move the capitol to Florence, even if nobody explicitly says it to Florentines! The step from Turin to Florence, and from Florence to Rome sets in motion a complex organizational mechanism and a significant money's amount, invested in the effort to bring the two cities to the new role.Before Florence, then Rome (two cities that represent a fundamental part of artistic and cultural national heritage) see the opportunity to modernize their urban structure. Urban plans are also formed for this purpose, although the instruments are deficient in relation to their technical capacity and the public administrations have low authority in the driving of the transformations. Instead, private investors and national and international banks will have open hand, facilitated from the new liberal State that will not hinder the freedom of action of private capitals.The paper want to identify the major changes occurred in the three capital cities (Turin, Florence, and Rome) investigating the urban processes and the main events in the period from 1861 to 1900. The unification acts on the three cities in different ways. In 1861 they are very different from each other, with a single similar factor, the number of inhabitants (about 150,000 each). The process of building of the new nation acts on the cities changing even more their characters and extending their differences. ; La costruzione dello stato unitario, avvenuta nell'arco di un decennio (1861-1871) portò alla necessità di spostare la capitale del Regno in un percorso di avvicinamento a Roma. Da Torino la capitale fu prima spostata a Firenze (1865), poi nel suo luogo naturale, Roma (1871). Gli spostamenti non comportarono solo conseguenze di ordine politico. Esse portarono anche alla necessità di intervenire sulla struttura urbana delle città per renderle capaci di accogliere la nuova funzione. Sia Torino che Firenze che, in misura maggiore, Roma, subirono rilevanti trasformazioni urbane, nel solco dei processi trasformativi che interessarono le città Ottocentesche d'Europa.Obiettivo dell'articolo è:- analizzare i caratteri urbanistici delle città al 1861;- individuare le trasformazioni riconducibili al loro status di capitale;- definire gli impatti di tali azioni fino ai giorni nostri- individuare gli influssi causati dall'evoluzione delle infrastrutture di trasporto sulla struttura urbana.

The Italian political unification is a process starting in 1861. The next ten years, until the freeing of Rome, are a period of strong changes because the the new nation starts by heavier backwardness conditions compared to other European nations.The basic conditionings that bound the new nation are summarized in some causes: an underdeveloped economic system where there are areas of industrial development; a significant shortage of mineral and energy resources; and an urban structure that is still that of the sixteenth century, the last brightness period of the Italian cities. The same internal communication system is composed of a basic road network which is still one of Roman origin and of isolated sections of rail network, with few links among the pre-unity nations.Particular attention should be paid on the impact of the economic processes on the cities: they have a strong impact on European cities since the early nineteenth century, but their impact on Italian cities (beginning from the main northern cities, Milan and Turin) is more limited, if compared with the transformations concerning other continental cities.The unification starting from 1861 imposes additional critical elements, because the Italian urban structure is not ready to the event, particularly for the choice of the capital city. A city that can rightfully define itself as capital exists, and it is Turin; but it is peripheral to the rest of the Italian territory. Furthermore there is an in pectore capital city, Rome, that is the symbolic centre of the Italian history. But the city has to wait another ten years to join to the rest of Italy. The solution is to temporarily move the capitol to Florence, even if nobody explicitly says it to Florentines! The step from Turin to Florence, and from Florence to Rome sets in motion a complex organizational mechanism and a significant money's amount, invested in the effort to bring the two cities to the new role.Before Florence, then Rome (two cities that represent a fundamental part of artistic and cultural national heritage) see the opportunity to modernize their urban structure. Urban plans are also formed for this purpose, although the instruments are deficient in relation to their technical capacity and the public administrations have low authority in the driving of the transformations. Instead, private investors and national and international banks will have open hand, facilitated from the new liberal State that will not hinder the freedom of action of private capitals.The paper want to identify the major changes occurred in the three capital cities (Turin, Florence, and Rome) investigating the urban processes and the main events in the period from 1861 to 1900. The unification acts on the three cities in different ways. In 1861 they are very different from each other, with a single similar factor, the number of inhabitants (about 150,000 each). The process of building of the new nation acts on the cities changing even more their characters and extending their differences. ; La costruzione dello stato unitario, avvenuta nell'arco di un decennio (1861-1871) portò alla necessità di spostare la capitale del Regno in un percorso di avvicinamento a Roma. Da Torino la capitale fu prima spostata a Firenze (1865), poi nel suo luogo naturale, Roma (1871). Gli spostamenti non comportarono solo conseguenze di ordine politico. Esse portarono anche alla necessità di intervenire sulla struttura urbana delle città per renderle capaci di accogliere la nuova funzione. Sia Torino che Firenze che, in misura maggiore, Roma, subirono rilevanti trasformazioni urbane, nel solco dei processi trasformativi che interessarono le città Ottocentesche d'Europa.Obiettivo dell'articolo è:- analizzare i caratteri urbanistici delle città al 1861;- individuare le trasformazioni riconducibili al loro status di capitale;- definire gli impatti di tali azioni fino ai giorni nostri- individuare gli influssi causati dall'evoluzione delle infrastrutture di trasporto sulla struttura urbana.

The paper analyzes the evolution of public opinion attitudes on transatlantic issues in United States & the European countries. The paper distinguishes two main periods in Transatlantic Relations & examines the evolution of foreign policy attitudes in these two periods. A first period, during the Cold War, was characterized by a foreign policy consensus on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, this consensus was based on the combination of Atlanticism & Europeanism. With different emphasis in the different countries the Atlantic & European choice were seen as crucial to insure the domestic political stability & the foreign policy security. While in Europe the Cold War consensus was first based on a Center-Right coalition & later on extended to the Left, as a consequence of the post-Stalinism & the increasing institutionalization of European integration. In the United States it combined the Liberal & Conservative wings. This consensus broke down as a consequence of the Vietnam war & the detente crisis in the '70s. In Europe, the main consequence was the fracturing of the Left-Right consensus on foreign policy. This double cleavage has been brought forth during the Post-Cold War period & it has manifested itself in its starker way after the 9/11 events & a more unilateralist American foreign policy. The author discusses the different structure of public opinion in Europe ad the United States might have played in the tense relationships between Europe & US during the Iraq war. 4 Tables, 39 References. Adapted from the source document.

In this paper, Vaccaro deals with the notion of post-truth, comparing its utilization by the President Trump staff with the classical relation between truth and politics in Arendt and in the Ferraris criticism of postmodernity.

In this article, the author means to connect the anarchist thought to post-structuralism, deconstructionism, critical theory, french theory, and so on. These strategies of thinking are labelled post-anarchism or neo-anarchism, all tending towards a libertarian affirmation of anti-authoritarian, not-hierarchical and differential equalitarian practices of anarchism.

"Europe's boundaries have mainly been shaped by cultural, religious, and political conceptions rather than by geography. In this context, this volume outlines the transformation of Europe's boundaries from the fall of the ancient world to the age of decolonization and explores, among other aspects, the confrontation of Christian Europe with Islam and the changing role of the Mediterranean from 'mare nostrum' to a frontier between nations"--

The Nordic Region offers innovative interpretative approaches and models to overcome the "dilemma between security and prosperity". In this region, integration and fragmentation have been well-balanced and grounded on diversity. The first aim of this article is to explain the reasons for peace in Nordic Europe, a task sometimes more difficult than explaining wars. Historical cases of pacific resolution of disputes and the possible reasons for those policies are considered. Finally, the theoretical foundations of these approaches and how they influenced the political institutions are also analyzed.