Suchergebnisse

Is a nation ever justified in attacking before it has been attacked? If so, under precisely what conditions? Does the possibility of terrorists with weapons of mass destruction force us to change our traditional views about what counts as defense? This book provides the most comprehensive assessment to date of the justifiability of preemptive or preventive military action. Its engaging debate, accompanied by an analytic Introduction, focuses probing criticism of the most persuasive proponents of preemptive attack or preventive war, who then respond to these challenges and modify or extend their justifications ... (Quelle: Text Verlagseinband / Verlag)

Is a nation ever justified in attacking before it has been attacked? If so, under precisely what conditions? This volume of new, specially commissioned chapters provides the most definitive assessment to date of the justifiability of preemptive or preventive military action

'Point of Attack' argues that the time has come to replace the international rules of war. Current law permits nations to resort to force only in self-defence or under UN authority, which perversely allows mass civilian killings, civil wars, weapons proliferation, and terrorism to run rampant. A new approach should allow the great powers to intervene when a war would benefit global welfare more than the costs.

Circumstances surrounding ten conflicts, 1899-1987. The decision to go to war; the conflicts; consequences; whether the initiating party had actually been placed in a preemptive situation; whether the attack succeeded; how the other party could have reduced the motivation to attack.

"Might U.S. officials be surprised by an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities? This study examines some key historical precedents, considering four key cases in which Israeli prime ministers chose preemptive or preventive military strikes and had to decide whether to notify or consult with the United States: the Suez crisis of 1956, the Six-Day War of 1967, the 1981 strike on Iraq's nuclear reactor, and the 2007 bombing of the mysterious Syrian nuclear facility known as al-Kibar. The Eisenhower and Reagan administrations were indeed surprised by Israel's actions in 1956 and 1981, but U.S.-Israel relations were put under far less strain by the bilateral discussions that preceded Israeli military action in 1967 and 2007. With the widening and deepening of the U.S.-Israel special relationship over the decades, Israeli prime ministers will have to think very carefully before choosing confrontation over consultation with the United States."--Back cover

Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to anticipate the coming of war. Emphasing the psychological aspect of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties and mistakes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgemental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints.