Migracijski val od 2014. do 2016. u kojem je velik broj djece i majki iz država Sjevernog trokuta na putu prema krajnjem odredištu SAD-u bio u tranzitu Meksikom okarakteriziran je krizom. Kriza je podrazumijevala postojanje prijetnje koja opravdava provođenje izvanrednih mjera. Teza rada je da pod utjecajem SAD-a Meksiko migrante u tranzitu smatra prijetnjom sigurnosti građanima Meksika, a ne ugroženim pripadnicima istoga kulturnoga kruga koje treba zaštititi. Stoga se prema njima ne odnosi u skladu s ciljem ljudske sigurnosti, već primjenjuje silu. Rad predstavlja studiju slučaja. U prvom odjeljku dani su prikaz vrsta migracija i poimanje migracija u kontekstu ljudske i građanske sigurnosti, dok su u drugom analizirani potisni i privlačni faktori migracija iz država Sjevernog trokuta. U trećem odjeljku prikazana je politika tranzitne države Meksika prema ilegalnim migrantima. U radu je izložen sud o migracijskoj politici Meksika prema migrantima u tranzitu. Zaključeno je da je iz perspektive ljudske sigurnosti politika bila »loša« jer je bila diskriminirajuća i u neskladu s kulturno-političkim kontekstom te moralnim i zakonskim normama. No gledano iz perspektive nacionalne sigurnosti politika je bila »dobra« jer je bila ostvariva, postigla je rezultate uz prihvatljiv trošak ljudi i sredstva i njome su obranjeni državni interesi Meksika – dobri odnosi sa SAD-om. ; This article will attempt to answer two questions; first, in what way did the Government of Mexico attempt to resolve the influx of a large number of migrants, children and family members, from the Northern Triangle countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras) who were transiting Mexico on their way to the United States in the 2014–2016 period? Second, why have migrants continued to arrive even after the adoption of the Mexican Programa Frontera Sur (PFS) of 2014, which was supposed to resolve the migration crisis and put an end to arrests and deportation? At the same time, the article will try to assess, according to Haines (2013), whether the Mexican post-2014 migration policy has been "good" (in line with the political and cultural context, achievable and effective with acceptable costs of staff and resources), or "bad" (discriminatory and incompatible with existing moral and legal norms). The thesis of the article is that under the influence of the United States, Mexico is treating migrants in transit as a security threat, rather than as members of the same cultural circle who require protection. So, instead of helping them, Mexico uses coercion to suppress them. While traditional threats are endangering the survival of the state, new threats to the state are also endangering individuals. The article consists of an introduction, three sections and a conclusion. The first section will provide an explanation of the relationship between migration and security (traditional national security and human security). The second section analyses the pull-and-push factors of migration from the Northern Triangle countries. This is followed by Mexico's transit policy towards illegal migrants, which is discussed in the third section. Case study research was used as a methodological strategy. The migration wave in the 2014–2016 period, consisting of many children and mothers from the Northern Triangle states transiting through Mexico on their way to the United States, was characterised as a crisis. A crisis implies the existence of a threat justifying the imposition of extraordinary measures. The issue of migrants in transit through Mexico was no novelty. Since the late 1980s, under the pressure of the United States, Mexico has been deporting migrants in transit back to their countries of origin. As Mexico has increasingly associated with the United States, there has emerged a growing need for greater compliance with "American requirements" and for the understanding of "American fears" of illegal migrants. After 11 September 2001, the fear became almost paranoid. Mexican presidents Fox, Calderon, and Nieto brought about and implemented a restrictive migration policy in line with the US policy, according to which migrants posed a threat to national security. Although repeatedly emphasising its intention to protect the migrants in transit, Mexico militarised and securitised its migration policy. This was particularly apparent after the 2014 Frontera Sur programme, which applied the same methods – arrest, deportation and denial of asylum – to the vulnerable population of women and children who largely satisfied the criteria for refugee status recognition. The PFS emphasised the intent to protect migrants, to better manage border crossings and to create security and prosperity zones in the south of the country. However, after two years of the programme's implementation it can be concluded that none of the objectives above have been achieved. Indeed, migrants in transit are additionally exposed to strife, suffering, and violations of their fundamental human rights, both by criminal organisations and the forces of law and order. Therefore, their transit has become much more uncertain than it was before. At the same time, human rights are violated by the state of Mexico itself, which denies migrants the right to asylum or recognition of humanitarian visas. The border in the south of the country has not become more secure. That PFS complies with US interests is apparent from the fact that the United States is its main source of funding, since it has managed to link the combat against drugs and migrants in transit via the Merida Initiative. The question is why have migrants continued to arrive despite everything mentioned above? It was their hope that somehow, they would reach the USA or, in the worst case, remain in Mexico. The most elementary human right, the right to life, is endangered in the countries of the Northern Triangle. In addition to personal insecurity, there are other human security threats in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador forcing the citizens to flee and emigrate from political, economic, environmental, and health and food insecurity. With everything being said, it is not easy to evaluate the Mexican migration policy. From a perspective of human security, it was "bad" because it was discriminatory and incompatible with the cultural and political context, as well as with moral and legal norms. Evaluated from a national security perspective, it was "good" because it was achievable, it has yielded results with an acceptable cost of staff and resources and has achieved state interests – good relations with the United States. At the same time, it is one of the tools Mexico can use in the future if Trump should decide against Mexican interests (significant taxing of Mexican products or deporting the many Mexican citizens illegally residing in the United States). Since Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador belong to the same cultural (historical, religious and linguistic circle), it was presumed that Mexico would pursue a policy that favours migrants and their protection; however, that did not happen. The authors agree with Kimball (2007: 140) that in the long run, Mexico will not be able to simultaneously advocate and implement both the pro- and anti-immigrant policy. The problem of the migrant wave, mostly consisting of mothers and children from the Northern Triangle countries, who were in transit through Mexico during 2014–2016, was attempted to be resolved via securitisation rather than care about their security. Castles de Haas and Miller (2014: 5) state that in the case of Mexico, there is a proliferation of migration transition, since it is turning from an emigration into an immigration country. To be more specific, with Trump coming to power, Mexico is increasingly not just a transit country, but also an ultimate destination country. Trump's immigration policy regarding immigrants from Central America suffers from deep historical amnesia related to the role of the USA in the Central American conflict of the 1980s, which has significantly destabilised the region. Moreover, Trump denounces and demonises as dangerous criminals the families, women and children, who have fled from violence contributed to by the USA (Portillo Villeda and Miklos, 2017: 53–54). This is one of the reasons the number of arrested migrants from Central America on the southern border of the United States has significantly decreased, but the number of asylum seekers in Mexico has increased threefold. There is a hope that new Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador would perceive vulnerable Northern Triangle migrants more as a threat to human rather than national security.
Stjecanjem povlastica slobodnoga i kraljevskoga grada započelo je novo razdoblje osječke povijesti. Promjene su se ponajviše ticale funkcioniranja gradske uprave u novim pravnim i društvenim okolnostima. Dosadašnja rijetka istraživanja onovremene osječke upravne povijesti u pravilu su se zadržavala na ustrojstvu i nadležnostima tamošnje gradske općine. U ovom radu autori su se bavili pitanjem sastava i značajki prve uprave slobodnoga i kraljevskoga grada Osijeka, koja je s radom počela u kolovozu 1809. godine. Na temelju gradiva osječkoga poglavarstva autori daju povijesni i pravni kontekst izboru i imenovanju članova uprave te analizu njihovih sociodemografskih karakteristika zabilježenih primarno u evidencijama građana. ; When the city of Osijek received the charter of privileges and became a free and royal city in 1809, a new stage in its historical and legal development began. Although the citizens' request for the charter from the Emperor Francis I was probably mainly motivated by the presumed prospects of the economic development, as it arrived rather late, i.e. some four decades before the feudalism was abolished in the Habsburg lands, its effects were mostly of legal and administrational nature. This is probably why the few works that cover the topic of Osijek's municipal history in the first half of the 19th century mainly deal with issues such as legal status of the Free and Royal City of Osijek and its citizens, the organisation of the local authority, etc. Although these historical aspects are indeed crucial to understanding the role of the local authority in the broad system of public (state) administration, as well as in the community, there are others that could complement our knowledge in that respect, such as the influence of different political, ideological, demographic and cultural factors. Among them are sociodemographic characteristics of the members of the city government. Besides an overview of the historical events prior to the election and appointment of the first government of the Free and Royal City of Osijek, the legal context and its organisation, as well as the very process of election, the authors analyse the sociodemographic characteristics of its highest-ranking members. The analysis included 57 officials and administration officers, i.e. 7 members of the City Council (Magistrate), 40 members of the Elected Commune (Assembly) with its President, and 9 other heads and deputies of the most important offices and services. Characteristics recorded in the registries of Osijek's citizens that were in focus of the research were the nobility status, religion, profession and place of origin. Combining the results and the official criteria for the election of the local authority officials and officers, the authors suggest that the leading criteria were the education and former work experience in the public administration. This is, of course, related to the social standing of the individuals, because the elites traditionally had better education and better overall access to public positions. Consequently, the majority of nobles and intellectual workers among the citizens were elected or appointed to a position in the local authority. Two most represented groups (equal in numbers) were merchants and craftsmen, but if we look at the overall population of people with citizen status, there were three times more craftsmen than merchants, which means that the latter were, relatively speaking, more represented in the local administration, as their social status was generally better. The only two religious groups that could apply for Osijek's citizenship were members of the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox communities. The latter, as a minority, was a slightly underrepresented, but within the limits of the obligatory one quarter of the representatives in the Elected Commune. The place of origin had little or no influence on the election and appointment of members of the local authority, but it clearly portrays the City of Osijek as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural community in which the citizens that came from other parts of the Habsburg Monarchy or even outside of it were well integrated.
Demokracije su u opasnosti da će ih zadaviti populistički demagozi, koji se postavljaju kao jedini i istinski vođe "naroda", i koji zanemarujući ustavnu "strukturu slobode", parlamentarnu supremaciju, kontrolu sudova i, nadasve, ustavna ograničenja dovode u izravnu vezu s odlučivanjem biračkog tijela. Referendumi se sve više koriste za donošenje određenih odluka koje ne mogu proći u parlamentu. Tvrdi se da ne smije postojati nikakva prepreka vlasti naroda. Ovaj je fenomen najpoznatiji liberalni časopis The Economist obilježio novom riječju referendumanijom u kojoj se referendum izravno povezuje s manijom. U okolnostima kada televizija i Internet pokazuje svu bijedu brojnih skupština i to ne samo u novim već i u zrelim demokracijama taj je fenomen dobio punu simpatiju šire javnosti. Nakon što je u Velikoj Britaniji toj matici svih parlamenata referendum o Brexitu iskorišten kao instrument političke borbe što je dovelo do tekućeg "pretapanja" visoko cijenjenog britanskog političkog sistema izgleda da se ispunilo najgore moguće proročanstvo o napredovanju populističkih snaga u velikom broju europskih država. Republika Hrvatska je već dugo izložena takvim ugrozama od strane političkih grupa koje se ekstremno protive politici Vlade, počam od katoličkih konzervativaca a odnedavno i sindikalista. Zahvaljujući neadekvatnoj regulaciji refrerenduma o građanskim inicijativama gdje se ne govori o nikakvom kvorumu već se odluka donosi većinom onih koji glasuju mogućnosti manipulacije su ogromne. U postojećim okolnostima trajne konfuzije, brojni političari koji su već izjavili svoju namjeru da će ukoliko budu izabrani za Predsjednika Republike takav referendum koristiti radi uklanjanja svih kontrola i provjera koje postoje između šefa države i "naroda". Imajući u vidu krizu demokracije i smatrajući takve prijetnje sasvim ozbiljnim autor naglašava potrebu da se jednim međustranačkim dogovorom stvore uvjeti kojima bi se referendum uz odgovarajuću regulaciju uklopio u deemokreatski sistem ustavne demokracije. ; Democracies are at risk to be strangled by the populist demagogues, posturing as the only and true leaders of 'the people', while disregarding constitutional "structure of liberty", meaning that, the parliamentary supremacy, judicial review and, above all, the constitutional limits to the very direct decision making by the voters' constituencies. Referenda are being used ever more, often to push certain decision, which could not pass the parliament. The claim is that there must not be any limits to the power of the people. That phenomenon the most esteemed liberal magazine "The Economist" nicknamed coining the word "referendumania", apparently combining 'a mania' with 'referenda'. It has been received with a lot of sympathy by the general public, in circumstances when the television and the Internet shows all the misery of the numerous assemblies, not only in a new but also in the mature democracies. After the referendum on the Brexit has been used as an instrument of the political struggle in the mother of parliaments, Great Britain, which lead to the ongoing "melting down" of the highly valued British political system, it seems that the worst of prophecies are realized by advancing populist forces in a number of Euroepan states. Republic of Croatia has been for a long time exposed to such treats, by the political groups extremely opposed to governmental policies, first by the Catholic conservatives and most recently by the trade unionists. Due to the very inadequate regulation of the referenda on civil initiatives, whereas the decision is to be made by a majority of those who vote, without any quorum being provided, the posibilites of manipulation are enormous. In the lasting confusion, a number of politicians has already proclaimed their intention, if elected the president of the Republic, to use such a referendum in order to remove all the checks and balances between the chief of state and "the people". Taking such treats very seriously in the existing crisis of democracy, the author emphasizes hi plead for an interparty agreement which would enable the referendum to be properly regulated and thus incorporated into the system of a democratic constitutional democracy.
30. ožujka 2021. godine u 83. godini života napustio nas je akademik, prof. emeritus Fakulteta šumarstva i drvne tehnologije Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, doktor honoris causa Mendelovog poljoprivrednoga i šumarskog Sveučilišta u Brnu (Češka) i Tehničkoga sveučilišta u Zvolenu (Slovačka), član predsjedništva HAZU, jedan od osnivača i prvi predsjednik Akademije šumarskih znanosti u Zagrebu, član kluba dekana Zagrebačkog sveučilišta i dugogodišnji predsjednik Hrvatskog šumarskog društva Slavko Matić. Ovdje nećemo iznositi njegovu znanstvenu ostavštinu o kojoj govori dovoljno njegova bibliografija, dostupna na WEB stranicama HŠD-a, kao i brojna priznanja koja je primio u bogatoj karijeri šumarskog pedagoga i znanstvenika. Iako je uže područje znanstvenoga rada Slavka Matića, unutar znanstvenoga područja biotehničkih znanosti, uzgajanje šuma, on je svojim širokim poljem aktivnosti obilježio cijelo jedno razdoblje šumarske povijesti konca 20. i početka 21. stoljeća. Ljubav prema šumama i šumarstvu usmjerila je njegov životni put te je često isticao da šumarstvo nije samo struka, već i način života. Uporno je zagovarao i promicao jedinstvo šumarske politike, znanosti, obrazovanja i struke. Njegove riječi izgovorene na 107. godišnjoj skupštini HŠD-a u Županji misao su vodilja i njegovo poimanje šumarske struke. "Ponosni smo na svoju dugu tradiciju obilježenu ponajprije brigom za šume i šumarstvo Hrvatske, u želji da svi oni koji aktivno rade u toj struci daju najviše u prilog poboljšanja kvalitete i vječnosti šuma. Isto tako, uvijek smo vjerovali, a i danas, da će nam se uloženi trud i ljubav prema šumi višestruko i trajno vratiti, ne u enormnim i za pristojan život nepotrebnim materijalnim dobrima, nego u zadovoljstvu i saznanju da pripadamo struci gdje je rad, ljubav i poštenje temeljna odrednica i zakon. Bez tih odrednica ne bi bilo moguće uzgojiti i danas održati šume, koje su po svojoj strukturi i vrijednosti najljepše i najvrjednije u Europi. Bez takvog uvjerenja ne bi bilo moguće šume uzgajati i održavati u stanju da daju materijalna i općekorisna dobra, dobra namijenjena svakom čovjeku ove zemlje".Bio je u pravom smislu zaštitnik šuma i šumarske struke. Sjetimo se njegovih reakcija kada je znao "zagrmiti" ukoliko se nešto unutar struke nije odvijalo u skladu s njezinim pravilima bez obzira da li se to odnosilo na izdvajanja šuma i šumskog zemljišta za potrebe građevinske infrastrukture ili za poljoprivrednu proizvodnju, ili kod primjene građevinskih zahvata (Kanal Dunav-Sava, Projekt Zagreb na Savi, Hidrocentrale na Dravi, šuma Kalje) s negativnim posljedicama na šumski ekosustav. U svojim istupima često je bio protiv politike pasivne zaštite šuma provođene od strane Zavoda za zaštitu okoliša i prirode pri današnjem Ministarstvu gospodarstva i održivog razvoja, naglašavajući sječu kao sredstvo njege šuma.Kada bi se poduzimali zahvati u šumama koji nisu bili u skladu s načelima Zagrebačke škole uzgajanja šuma, kojoj je bio jedan od utemeljitelja, šumari su znali da je tu profesor Matić, koji će reagirati i adekvatno odgovoriti.Otvoreno je istupao protiv plaćanja vodne naknade za površine šuma i šumskog zemljišta koje istovremeno jedine omogućuju prirodni vodni režim i čistu vodu. Uvijek je naglašavao važnost općekorisnih funkcija šuma, dok je drvo smatrao kao nusproizvod gospodarenja šumama.Prostore Hrvatskoga šumarskoga društva smatrao je svojim drugim domom gdje je često raspravljao o šumama i šumarstvu. Iskazivao je nezadovoljstvo aktualnom politikom prema šumarstvu, koja je posebice nakon brisanja imena šumarstva iz naziva resornog ministarstva, sustavno zanemarivala interese šumarske struke. Žalostilo ga je ponašanje brojnih naših kolega, koji su pod uticanjem politike pretpostavili konformizam trenutnih rukovodećih funkcija osnovnim šumarskim postulatima koje su učili na Fakultetu,. Odlaskom profesora Matića završilo je jedno razdoblje koje će nama suvremenicima ostati u sjećanju kao nezaboravno iskustvo, plemenitog, šumarskog načina života i zajedništva, a koje je rezultiralo njegovanim i očuvanim šumama. Hoće li novi trendovi koji su sve izraženiji u današnjem šumarstvu, a prema kojima su šumarski stručnjaci sve manje povezani sa šumom, ali i međusobno, uspjeti odgovoriti na nove izazove, posebice u okolnostima sve izraženijih klimatskih promjena, tek je za vidjeti.Uredništvo ; Slavko Matić, Academy member, Professor Emeritus of the Faculty of Forestry and Wood Technology of the University of Zagreb, Doctor Honoris Causa of the Mendel University of Agriculture and Forestry in Brno (Czech Republic) and the Technical University in Zvolen (Slovakia), member of the presidency of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, one of the founders and the first president of the Academy of Forestry Sciences in Zagreb, member of the Deans' Club of the University of Zagreb and long-standing president of the Croatian Forestry Association, passed away on March 30th, 2021, at age 83.We are not going to discuss his scientific achievements here. His bibliography, available from the web site of the Croatian Forestry Association, fully testifies to his immense scientific legacy, as do numerous awards and recognitions which he received during his rich career of forestry pedagogue and scientist. Although Slavko Matić's scientific work focused more specifically on silviculture within the scientific area of biotechnical sciences, his broad spectrum of activities left an indelible mark on the whole era of forestry history at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century.His life path was determined by his love for forests and forestry. He would often say that forestry was not only a profession but also a way of life. He staunchly advocated and promoted the unity of forestry policy, science, education and profession.His words, spoken at the 107th annual assembly of the Croatian Academy of Sciences in Županja illustrate his mission and his understanding of the forestry profession. "We are proud of our long tradition marked above all by the utmost care for forests and forestry of Croatia. We would like all those who are actively involved in this profession to do their best in order to improve the quality and eternity of forests. We have always believed and we still believe that all our efforts and love invested in the forest will be paid back manifoldly and permanently, but not in enormous and unnecessary material goods, but in the satisfaction and knowledge that we belong to a profession in which work, love and honesty are the basic principles and laws. Without these principles it would not be possible to raise and maintain forests today, whose structure and worth rank them among the most beautiful and valuable in Europe. These beliefs allow us to cultivate and preserve forests in the state in which they provide both market and non-market goods, goods dedicated to every person in this country".He was the protector of forests and the forestry profession in every sense of the word. We still remember vividly how our professor would "storm and thunder" if something was not done according to the rules of the forestry profession. It might have been a number of things, such as the conversion of forests and forestland for the needs of building infrastructure or for agricultural production, when construction interventions would be undertaken in the affected zone with negative impacts on the forest ecosystem (the Danube-Sava Canal, the Zagreb Project on the River Sava, hydropower stations on the River Drava, the Kalje forest). He also frequently spoke against the policy of passive forest protection promoted by the Croatian Ministry of Environmental Protection, stressing felling as a means of tending forests. When interventions were made in forests which went against the principles of the Zagreb School of Silviculture, of which he was one of the founders, foresters knew with certainty that it was Professor Matić who would react and respond adequately. He openly opposed the payment of the water fee for forests and forestland, while at the same time they are the only ones that ensure a natural water regime and provide clear water. He always highlighted the importance of non-market forest functions and viewed timber as a side product of forest management.He considered the Croatian Forestry Association as his second home. Here, we would often discuss in detail issues related to forests and forestry.He expressed dissatisfaction with the current policy towards forestry, which systematically neglected the interests of the forestry profession, particularly after the word forestry was omitted from the name of the corresponding ministry. He was also saddened by the fact that a number of our colleagues who, under the influence of politics, put the conformism of current managerial functions above the forestry postulates we were taught at the faculty.The demise of Professor Matić ends a period which we, his contemporaries, will always look upon as an unforgettable experience of living a noble foresters' life in togetherness, the result of which are well-tended and preserved forests. Will the new trends increasingly visible in present day forestry, in which foresters have less and less contact with forest and with their colleagues, be able to respond to all the challenges, particularly in conditions of growing climate changes, remains to be seen.&Editorial Board
Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.
Namjera ovoga priloga je prikazati kako i zašto su tekle promjene u vlastima Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH) u Banja Luci tijekom 1941. i 1942., a dijelom i 1943. godine. Time mislim na različite osobe koje su kao dužnosnici NDH u Banja Luci obnašale vlast. Na promjene kod tih dužnosnika utjecao je odnos vlasti NDH, odnosno ustaškog pokreta prema bosanskohercegovačkim muslimanima, koje su oni smatrali sastavnim dijelom hrvatske nacije. Također je na te promjene utjecala i politika NDH prema srpskom stanovništvu, odnosno državni teror koji je NDH, nakon proglašenja, pokrenula prema njemu, a zatim ustanak tog stanovništva protiv NDH, što je njezine vlasti prisiljavalo na promjene prethodnih postupaka. ; The article presents the personal changes within the authorities of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) in the town of Banja Luka in north-western Bosnia. After the Axis attack on Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941 and the proclamation of NDH ruled by Ustasha movement, whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina was incorporated into its territory. Banja Luka was an important centre in north-western Bosnia. The majority of population in that part of Bosnia was made up of Orthodox Serbs, while the rest were Catholic Croats and Moslems. Immediately after the establishment of NDH authority in Banja Luka the main role was played by Viktor Gutić, a pre-war lawyer. Gutić became the head of the ruling Ustasha movement in Banja Luka and north-western Bosnia, but he was also the head of the civilian administration. New Ustasha regime immediately began with policies directed against the Serbs, ranging from abolishment of their national and religious identity to forced resettlements of certain parts of Serbs to Serbia. The new regime also committed mass killings of parts of Serb population. As a strongman in Banja Luka, Gutić distinguished himself in implementation of such policies. But in July of 1941 mass uprising of Serbs broke out in north-western Bosnia and it soon brought NDH authorities in a difficult situation. The uprising would gradually develop into two mutually opposed movements, the Partisans led by Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the royalist Chetnik movement. With the challenge put by mass uprising of Serbs, NDH authorities gradually realized that the arbitrary violence against Serbs, that went even beyond the official anti-Serb measures, backfired. Therefore, NDH introduced certain measures aimed at de-escalation of violence and peaceful efforts to dissuade Serbs from rebellion. This was best seen in the activities of the Committee for the examination and establishment of public safety and order that was established in Banja Luka in late 1941. The committee was headed by Croatian air-force colonel Ivan Mrak and its duty, among others, was to investigate and punish those who committed atrocities against the Serb population, while simultaneously calling Serbs who have rebelled to return to their homes, guaranteeing them safety. In August of 1941 Viktor Gutić was recalled from his duty in Banja Luka. He formally became a high official in the Ministry of internal affairs, but in fact he was stripped of real authority and removed from Banja Luka. Position of Moslem community in Banja Luka and north-western Bosnia was also of great importance. According to the Ustasha ideology, Moslems of Bosnia-Herzegovina were integral and equal part of the Croatian nation. Therefore, for Ante Pavelić, as head of NDH and Ustasha movement, it was of crucial importance to gain the support of the Moslems. Before the proclamation of NDH the Ustasha movement had a certain number of Moslem supporters. But after Ustasha came to power, Pavelić realized that he needs the support of those Moslem politicians who headed former Yugoslav Moslem Organization, the strongest political party of the Moslem community in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the period of Kingdom of Yugoslavia. For these reasons Džafer Kulenović, distinguished representative of the Yugoslav Moslem Organization, became the vice-president of Government of NDH. Contrary to such general policy, Viktor Gutić, while he was in power in Banja Luka, led sectarian policies that caused the discontent of the Moslem community. But Moslem representatives from Banja Luka, counting on Moslem members of the NDH government, could influence the decision making in Zagreb and were able to counter Gutić's policies. Although Gutić was removed from Banja Luka he still had supporters there, among others in the hierarchy of the Catholic church. Therefore, conflict between Gutić's group and the Moslems continued. Ultimately in summer of 1942. Ante Pavelić appointed Dragan Hadrović as a head of Great County of Sana-Luka in Banja Luka. Hadrović was a Catholic, but with the obvious support of Pavelić and Moslem members of NDH government he began leading a pro-Moslem policy, entering into a conflict with Gutić and his supporters. In a wider sense Hadrović was leading a policy of moderation, opposed to the various excesses of certain other institutions of NDH and representatives of the Ustasha movement. With such policies Hadrović soon gathered enemies within the NDH structures and was also in conflict with the Catholic bishop in Banja Luka, Jozo Garić. Finally, in July of 1943 Hadrović was assassinated by a bomb planted in a postal parcel. It was never officially established who assassinated him, but all sources suggest that the bomb was planted by certain elements within the Ustasha movement who opposed Hadrović's policies. The article follows these events through all important changes and developments within the NDH administration in Banja Luka. Ultimately it can be concluded that NDH regime itself was heterogeneous, with various splits within its ranks. These splits occurred between Catholic and Moslems as well as between those who, according to the changing circumstances, opted and called for more moderate policies, while other remained sectarian and prone to uncompromising and/or violent solutions.
Na osnovu analize izvornih arhivskih dokumenata i propisa objavljenih u službenim listovima, opisuje se djelokrug, ustroj i sastav Prezidijuma Sabora NRH. Njegovi temelji postavljeni su u radu Zemaljskog antifašističkog vijeća narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske (ZAVNOH), odnosno njegova Predsjedništva, koje je kao uže tijelo plenuma osnovano 9. svibnja 1944. godine. Na Četvrtom zasjedanju održanom 24. i 25. srpnja 1945. u Zagrebu, ZAVNOH je promijenio naziv u Narodni sabor Hrvatske, a njegovo Predsjedništvo od tada djeluje kao Predsjedništvo Narodnog sabora Hrvatske. U razdoblju 1945.–1953. njegovo djelovanje može se podijeliti u četiri mandatna razdoblja: Predsjedništvo Narodnog sabora Hrvatske/Prezidijum Sabora NRH (25. srpnja 1945.–30. studenoga 1946.), Prezidijum Ustavotvornog sabora NRH (30. studenoga 1946.–20. siječnja 1947.), Prezidijum Sabora NRH prvoga saziva (20. siječnja 1947.–4. prosinca 1950.) i Prezidijum Sabora NRH drugoga saziva (4. prosinca 1950.–6. veljače 1953.). U prvom dijelu rada opisuje se osnivanje i prestanak rada Prezidijuma Sabora, u drugom njegov djelokrug, a u trećem ustroj i sastav po mandatnim razdobljima. Njegov ustroj i djelokrug uspoređeni su s ustrojem i djelokrugom Prezidijuma Narodne skupštine FNRJ i prezidijuma drugih jugoslavenskih republika. Rezultati istraživanja prezentirani su kombinacijom tematskog i kronološkog pristupa, a dijelom su sistematizirani u obliku tabelarnih prikaza. ; This paper describes the scope, structure and the composition of the Presidium of Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia (PRC) which was active as a political governmental body in Croatia from 1945 to 1953. According to the Yugoslav constitutional system of government, the same political body existed on the federal level as the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY), as well as in every republic-member of the Yugoslav federation and the scope, organization and composition of the Presidium of Parliament are compared with the scope, organization and composition of those bodies. The foundations of the activities of the Presidium of Parliament, as well as other central governmental institutions in Croatia (namely, Parliament, Government, and Supreme Court) were laid in the work of the State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia (ZAVNOH) i.e. its Presidency, since until the end of the war they together performed the legislative, executive and judiciary government. During the 4th session that took place in Zagreb from 24 to 25 July 1945 ZAVNOH changed is title to the People's Parliament of Croatia and since then its Presidency worked as the Presidency of the People's Parliament of Croatia. In the period from 1945 to 1953 its activity can be divided into four mandate periods: the Presidency of the People's Parliament of Croatia/the Presidium of the Parliament of the PRC (25 July 1945–30 November 1946), the Presidium of the Constituent Parliament of the PRC (30 November 1946–20 January 1947), the Presidium of the 1st Session of the Parliament of the PRC (20 January 1947–4 December 1950) and the Presidium of the 2nd Session of the Parliament of the PRC (4 December 1950–6 February 1953). Its existence in the system of governmental power is the result of taking over the Soviet constitutional solutions about organizing the state and governmental institutions in the 1946 constitution of the FPRY and through it also in the constitutions of each federal unit. It was the main legislative body in the period until the constituting of the Constituent Parliament of the PRC, since the Parliament of the PRC only had a single short five-day session in late August 1946. This is confirmed by the information about 29 laws passed by the Presidium of Parliament in the period from 8 September 1945 to 20 November 1946. Besides legislative, it also performed other functions from the jurisdiction then belonging to the Parliament. The constitution of the PRC from 1946 bestowed upon it performing tasks that are usually given to the president of the state (representing in the country the people's and state sovereignty of the PRC, calling the general elections, granting pardons, awarding medals and recognitions), as well as other executive tasks partly closely linked to the legislative activities. The special function pertained to supervising the people's committees. The important difference in the scope in relation to the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the FPRY was that it did not have the authority in the area of foreign affairs. Even though the constitution of the PRC from January 1947 lists it together with the Parliament in the chapter on the highest bodies of the governmental power in Croatia, the sources and constitutional-legal texts of the time, in accordance with the principle of unity of power, define it as a body which "stems from the Parliament" and is subordinated to it. Also, despite being formally constitutionally defined as one of the highest bodies of governmental power in Croatia, in reality it was the Party's transmission, since the actual power and monopoly in decisionmaking was in the hands of the bodies of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia/the League of Communists of Yugoslavia i.e. the Communist Party of Croatia/the League of Communists of Croatia. It was a collegiate body comprised of members of the Parliament. The decision of its composition was formally passed by the Parliament, but based on the conclusions reached during sessions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia. It was elected for the same term as the Parliament, but it continued to perform its duties after the dissolution of the Parliament, until the election of the new Presidium of Parliament. From 1945 to 1953 the total of 45 MPs were included in its activities. 13 of them were members during all four mandate terms, 11 during two and 14 during only one. The structure and the way of work were determined by the Rulebook dated from 7 August 1947. They were the exact copy of the structure and the way of work of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the FPRY, with differences deriving from different jurisdictions (federal, republic) of these two bodies.
RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVAViše puta pisali smo o tome kako smo očekivali da će ova Vlada ponajprije vratiti šumarstvo u naziv resornog ministarstva, a potom i promijeniti odnos prema šumi i šumarskoj struci. To se na žalost nije dogodilo, tako da je šumarski resor u Ministarstvu na razini dijelova poljoprivrede, primjerice povrtlarstva, iako se radi o resursu koji pokriva gotovo polovicu kopnene površine Republike Hrvatske. O tome da je šuma najsloženiji ekosustav na svijetu, koji samim time zahtijeva visoku stručnost gospodarenja njime pa je i u Ustavu naznačeno da je šuma uz tlo i vode resurs od posebnog interesa za Republiku Hrvatsku, u uređenom gospodarstvu ne bi trebalo to opetovano govoriti. Ne inzistiramo na tome da resorni ministar mora biti istaknuti šumarski stručnjak, ali to onda mora biti državni tajnik ili pomoćnik ministra zadužen za šumarstvo. Ministar pak treba koristiti svaku priliku da se informira o struci, sastavnici njegovog resora, a najlakše će to učiniti nazočnošću barem na nekoliko stručnih skupova na kojima se znanstveno-stručno raspravlja o stanju i problemima u struci – njegovom resoru. Nažalost, smijenjeni resorni ministar nije nazočio niti jednom takvom skupu, pa niti onome u organizaciji Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti, što ocjenjujemo i podcjenjivanjem struke, ali i ove znanstvene institucije. Vidljivi trag u šumarstvu ostavio je jedino osnivanjem "svoje" Uprave šuma, smanjujući površine susjednih Uprava. Trenutno naš resor vodi drvni tehnolog, što je nelogično, a s čime se očito šumarska struka prešutno slaže, što je pak sramotno. Tko nam uopće vodi i kakvu šumarsku politiku i imamo li dobru strategiju da je provodimo? Kome je zapravo podređena šumarska politika? Opći je dojam da je vode drvoprerađivači i to nažalost oni primarne prerade drva, naravno po netržišnim uvjetima i zanemarujući načela potrajnog gospodarenja. U svome obraćanju nazočnima na znanstveno-stručnom skupu održanom u povodu Dana hrvatskoga šumarstva, predsjednik Hrvatskoga šumarskog društva Oliver Vlainić, naznačio je sadašnje probleme šumarstva i stavove struke. Nemamo ništa tome za dodati, nego upućujemo čitatelje da u prošlom dvobroju časopisa pročitaju prikaz sa spomenutoga skupa. Dakle, struka opominje i ukazuje na alarmantno stanje u šumarstvu, kojega resorno ministarstvo očito ne prepoznaje.Za saniranje stanja nakon ledoloma i vjetroloma u Gorskom kotaru i situacije s katastrofalnim sušenjem jasena te nadolazećega problema s hrastom, našom najvrjednijom vrstom drveća, bit će potrebna znatna financijska sredstva. Gdje ih pronaći ako smo novim Zakonom o šumama znatno smanjili priliv financijskih sredstava od naknade za općekorisne funkcije šuma (OKFŠ), a drvne sortimente prodajemo i dalje po netržišnim uvjetima? Nismo trebali dugo čekati da nova ministrica Odlukom o smanjenju naknada za šume i šumska zemljišta, pokaže kako će se odnositi prema šumi i šumarstvu. Vrijednost bodova je smanjena za 30 do 90 %, ovisno o uzgojnom obliku šume. To će, kaže ona, ubrzati investicijske projekte, jer su navodno mnoge investicije u kojima je bilo potrebno izdvojiti šumu ili šumsko zemljište iz šumsko-gospodarskih planova, bile dovedene u pitanje zbog previsoke naknade za lokalnu i regionalnu samoupravu. Naravno, "nisu ludi" platiti privatnicima, koji imaju na stotine tisuća hektara zapuštenog i zaraslog zemljišta, kada je državno (čitaj općenarodno) gotovo besplatno. Uostalom, za njih primjerice: šikara, šibljak, makija, garig i nije "neka šuma". A najnovije je najava novoga smanjenja naknade za općekorisne funkcije šuma "povećanjem granice ukupnog godišnjeg prihoda i primitka s 3.000.000,00 kn na 7.500.000,00 kn " što je obrazloženo opterećenjem, kako na poduzetnike, tako i na administrativnu obradu". Ionako smanjenim sredstvima OKFŠ-a, koja se danas većinom koriste za razminiranje i vatrogasnu zajednicu, za "zelene" radove u šumi na oko milijun hektara krša, preostaje jako malo novaca. Što reći na sve to?Idemo malo pričati o klimatskim promjenama, kisiku, ugljičnom dioksidu, eroziji, pitkoj vodi, rekreaciji i općenito zaštiti okoliša, gdje je šuma jedan od najznačajnijih i najsloženijih ekosustava, o kojoj i bez stručnog obrazovanja, nažalost svi sve znaju, jer jako vole šumu.Često spominjemo načelo potrajnosti i osiguranje višenamjenske uloge šume, što je moto poslovanja u šumarstvu, ali za to je ponajprije potrebno promijeniti mišljenje da šumu možemo samo koristiti, a ne ulagati u nju, odnosno vratiti joj dio benefita kako bi bila vječna.Uredništvo ; EDITORIALWe have written on several occasions about how we expected the present Government to bring the word forestry back into the name of the line ministry and to change its attitude towards forests and the forestry profession. Regrettably, this has not happened, with the final result of the forestry sector within the Ministry being at the level of parts of agriculture, vegetable growing for example, although forests cover almost half of the land area of the Republic of Croatia. Needless to say, the forest is the most complex ecosystem in the world, whose management requires supreme expertise. The Constitution itself states that, along with soil and water, the forest is a resource of particular interest for the Republic of Croatia. We do not insist that the sector minister should be a renowned forestry expert, but the state secretary or assistant minister in charge of forestry should definitely be one. The Minister should take every opportunity to get to know the profession which is a constituent part of his Ministry. The best way to do it is to attend at least several professional symposia in which the status and problems of the profession are discussed on a scientific-professional basis. We regret to say that the deposed department minister did not attend one single gathering, not even the one organized by the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts. This we regard as both the belittling of the profession and of the mentioned scientific institution. The only visible trace that he left in forestry was the establishment of "his" Forestry Administration at the expense of reducing the area of the adjacent Administrations. At present, the forestry department is headed by a wood technologist, which is illogical, but even worse, the forestry profession seems to approve of this. Who runs the forestry policy and do we have a good strategy for running it? Who is the forestry policy subjugated to? There is a general impression that the forestry policy is led by wood processors, and what is tragic, by wood processors in primary wood processing, who are guided by non-market conditions and who disregard the principles of sustainable management. At the scientific-professional gathering held to mark the Days of Croatian Forestry, Oliver Vlainić, President of the Croatian Forestry Association, mentioned current problems in forestry and attitudes of the profession. We have nothing more to add to this but to ask the readers to read the reviews of the gathering in the past double issue of the journal. Clearly, the profession repeatedly warns of the alarming conditions in forestry which the competent ministry obviously does not recognize. Considerable financial means will be required to repair the damage caused by ice and wind storms in Gorski Kotar and to remedy the situation with disastrous ash dieback and the oncoming problems with oak, the most valuable tree species in Croatia. Where to find these means if, according to the new Forest Act, the financial means from non-market forest functions fees have been significantly reduced while wood assortments continue to be sold at non-market conditions? We did not have to wait long to see how the new lady minister will treat forests and forestry by her Decision to lower the fees for forests and forest land. The value of the points was reduced by 30 to 90%, depending on the silvicultural form of the forest. To quote her words, this will accelerate investment projects, because, allegedly, many investments in which it was necessary to exclude forests or forest land from forest management plans, were called into question due to excessive fees for local or regional self-managing units. Of course, they are "not crazy" to pay to private owners, who have hundreds of thousands of hectares of abandoned and overgrown land, when the state (read: public) land is almost free of charge. For them a scrub, a thicket, maquis, and garrigue is not much of a forest anyway. The latest is the announcement of a new reduction in the non-market forest function fee by "increasing the level of total annual income from 3 000 000.00 kuna to 7 500 000.00 kuna, which was explained by a burden, both on the entrepreneurs and the administrative processing". Due to reduced means from non-market forest functions, which are currently mainly used for demining and for the fire fighter service, very little is left for "green" operations on about one million hectares of karst. What is there left to say?Let us talk a little bit about climate change, oxygen, carbon dioxide, erosion, potable water, recreation and environment protection in general, where the forest is one of the most important and most complex ecosystems, and about which everybody, although lacking professional education, knows everything because they all love forests.We often mention the principle of sustainability and the insurance of the multipurpose role of a forest, which is the motto of business-making in forestry. However, the first step is to change the general belief that the forest can be used without investing into it or without returning to it a part of the benefits. Only if we do so will forests remain an eternal asset.Editorial Board
RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVAUZ 20-tu OBLJETNICU DANA HRVATSKOGA ŠUMARSTVANa 101. Godišnjoj skupštini Hrvatskoga šumarskoga društva, održanoj 9. svibnja 1997. god. (188 sudionika) u Zaključcima pod red. br. 15 Skupština "proglašava 20. lipnja za Dan hrvatskoga šumarstva, koji će se od 1998. godine u organizaciji HŠD-a obilježavati svake godine". Naime, toga je datuma na 96. Redovitoj skupštini 20. lipnja 1991.g. jednoglasnom odlukom promijenjen naziv udruge iz Saveza društava inženjera i tehničara šumarstva i drvne industrije Hrvatske u Hrvatsko šumarsko društvo. Tako je od 1998.g. Dan hrvatskoga šumarstva redovito obilježavan. Uz redovita izvješća o radu i financijskom poslovanju udruge, u nastavku je uvijek slijedila aktualna stručna tema. Stručna tema ove Skupštine bila je "Hrvatsko šumarstvo danas i sutra". Uvod u raspravu dali su tadašnji predsjednik HŠD-a prof. dr. sc. Slavko Matić i direktor "Hrvatskih šuma" p.o. Zagreb Anđelko Serdarušić, dipl. ing. šum. Kao temu za razmišljanje, navest ćemo samo dio iz tih uvoda i rasprave objedinjenih u 15 zaključaka.Prof. Matić ponajprije naglašava kako je HŠD najmjerodavnija stručna organizacija koja mora raspravljati o stanju u hrvatskome šumarstvu, posebno onda kada su svakim danom problemi sve brojniji i uočljiviji. No, nitko ne očekuje njihovo rješenje preko noći. Najvažniji problemi su: zapošljavanje diplomiranih inženjera i općenito smanjenje broja zaposlenih u šumarstvu; nepotrebno izdvajanje velikih površina šuma u nacionalne parkove i parkove prirode i davanje na upravljanje raznoraznim upravnim odborima gdje gotovo i nema šumara; podređeni odnos prema struci gdje Hrvatske ceste, vodoprivreda i elektroprivreda, protivno Zakonu o šumama, ulaze u šume bez naknade; drvni sortimenti se raspoređuju po komisijama, uz niske cijene a svi se zaklinjemo u slobodno tržište; u šumu nam ulaze needucirani i slabo opremljeni poduzetnici s nekvalificiranom radnom snagom; poseban trud treba ulagati u afirmaciju struke utemeljene ponajprije na profesionalnoj etici; trebamo se riješiti onih "zalutalih" u šumarsku struku, kojima je cilj samo laka zarada.Direktor Serdarušić nakon uvoda daje desetak prijedloga za zaključke; uputiti zahtjev Hrvatskoj radioteleviziji za termin redovitog priloga o hrvatskom šumarstvu; da predstavnici HŠD-a, Šumarskog fakulteta, Šumarskog instituta i Hrvatskih šuma p.o. izrade suvremeni Zakon o šumama i Dugoročni program šumarstva i upute ga Ministarstvu uz zahtjev za ukidanje tzv. "liste finalista", reprogramiranja dugova, dodjela dionica, odgoda plaćanja itd.; usklađivanje odnosa šumarstva i drugih djelatnosti; da se osigura više financijskih sredstava za gospodarenje privatnim šumama i sanaciju ratnih šteta, te da na prostornom uređenju i djelatnostima zaštite prirode, neizostavno sudjeluju i šumarski stručnjaci.Tomislav Starčević naglašava kako je vrijeme da se analizira da li smo i koliko, dosljedno provodili temeljne koncepcijske pretpostavke za razvoj hrvatskoga šumarstva, gdje u provedbi tih opredjeljenja još nema jasne šumarske politike; Šumariji kao temeljnoj organizacijskoj jedinici ne daje se dovoljno važnosti i ovlaštenja, iz čega proizlazi gubitak motiva; kod uzgojnih radova vidljivo opada kvaliteta; doradom planova gospodarenja povećava se sortimentna struktura planova sječa, pa nemamo definirane planske veličine; naposljetku ovu Skupštinu smatra poticajnom za temeljiti razvoj šumarstva.Prof. Joso Vukelić smatra da Vlada RH nema koncepciju razvoja šumarstva i javnog poduzeća, ne uvažava stručna mišljenja, postavlja nekompetentan Upravni odbor; resorno Ministarstvo je neadekvatno organizirano i šumarstvo i lovstvo bi trebalo izdvojiti u posebnu Državnu upravu, kao što su to vode. Posebno ističe nezadovoljstvo društveno-moralnim položajem šumarske struke.Prvi resorni ministar Ivan Tarnaj ističe kako nijedna organizacija nije konačna, pa tako ni šumarska; ova dosadašnja, obrazlažući je detaljno, smatra da je bila dobra, jer trebalo je u teškim uvjetima preživjeti, no nakon 7 godina možda je vrijeme za novu.Prof. Branimir Prpić iskazuje nezadovoljstvo podređenošću šumarstva u Strategiji prostornog uređenja RH i smanjenjem opsega šumarskih djelatnosti, posebice u prostornom planiranju i zaštiti prirode i okoliša, gdje šumarske poslove preuzimaju nestručni kadrovi.Prošlo je 20 godina pa imajući pred sobom ovaj skraćeni prikaz navedene stručne teme (detaljno u Šumarskom listu br. 5-6/1997., str. 323-332), pokušajmo odgovoriti barem na dva pitanja: što se to do danas promijenilo i da li je "svatko od nas korigiranjem svoga rada dao najbolji doprinos poboljšanju stanja u šumarstvu", što je tada sugerirao prof. Matić u uvodnom izlaganju? Uredništvo ; EDITORIALOn the 20th Anniversary of the Day of Croatian ForestryAt the 101st Annual Assembly of the Croatian Forestry Association held on 9th May 1997, (188 participants), June 20th was proclaimed the Day of Croatian Forestry, which will be celebrated annually by the Croatian Forestry Association starting from 1998 (Conclusions, item 15). At the 96th regular meeting held on 20th June 1991, the name of the association was unanimously changed from the Association of Engineers and Technicians of Forestry and Wood Industry of Croatia into the Croatian Forestry Association. The Day of Croatian Forestry has been marked interminably since 1998. Regular reports on the activities and financial affairs of the Association have always been accompanied by discussions on current specialist topics. The specialist topic of the said Assembly was "the Croatian forestry today and tomorrow". An introduction to the discussion was given by Professor Slavko Matić, PhD, the then president of the Croatian Forestry Association, and Anđelko Serdarušić, BSc in forestry, director of the company "Croatian Forests". To provide food for thought, we shall mention only some parts of these introductions and discussions summarized in 15 conclusions.First and foremost, Professor Matić stresses that the CFA is the most competent professional organisation to discuss the condition of Croatian forestry, particularly in view of a growing number of acute problems. However, nobody expects overnight solutions. The most important problems include the employment of graduate engineers and the declining number of those employed in forestry in general; unnecessary conversions of large forest areas into national parks and nature parks and their management by managing boards consisting of anybody but foresters; a subordinate attitude towards the profession, reflected in the fact that the Croatian Roads, Water Management and Electrical Utility Company, contrary to the Forest Law, enter forests without any monetary compensation; wood assortments are distributed per commissions at low prices despite the fact that we all staunchly support the free market economy; forests are treated by uneducated and poorly equipped entrepreneurs with unqualified labour force; particular effort should be invested in the promotion of the profession that is based primarily on professional ethics; those who have "wandered" into the forestry profession by accident with the only goal of making easy money should be removed from forestry.Director Serdarušić followed his introduction with some ten proposals for the conclusions. These include the following: a request should be submitted to the Croatian Radio Television to allocate a fixed term for programmes on Croatian forestry; representatives of the CFA, the Faculty of Forestry, the Forest Research Institute and Croatian Forests Ltd should draw up a modern Forest Law and a Long-Term Forestry Programme and submit it to the Ministry. The Programme should be accompanied by a demand to abolish so-called "finalist lists", re-programme debts, allocate shares, postpone payments, etc; the relationship between forestry and other fields should be coordinated; more financial means should be ensured for the management of private forests and the recovery of war damage; and forestry experts should invariably be included into spatial management and nature conservation activities.Tomislav Starčević stresses the need to analyse whether the basic conceptual prerequisites for the development of Croatian forestry have been implemented and to what extent, considering that the application of these prerequisites is not guided by a clear forestry policy; the forest office, as the basic organisational unit, is not given sufficient importance and competences, hence the loss of motives; the quality of silvicultural treatments is visibly declining; by adding to management plans the assortment structure of cutting plans is increased, resulting in changes in the planned amounts; and finally, he considers this Assembly an incentive for the overall development of forestry.Professor Joso Vukelić points out that the Croatian Government does not have a clear concept of the development of forestry and public enterprises, does not accept professional opinions, and appoints incompetent management boards; the Ministry is inadequately organized; while forestry and hunting management should be placed under a separate State administration, similar to water management. He particularly expresses dissatisfaction with the socio-moral position of the forestry profession.The first forestry minister Ivan Tarnaj states that no organisation is final, and consequently the forestry organisation is not final either; he maintains that the current organisation is good in view of the fact that it was difficult to survive in hard conditions, but after seven years it is perhaps time to launch a new organisation.Professor Branimir Prpić expressed dissatisfaction with the subordinate position of forestry in the Croatian Strategy of Spatial Planning and with a reduced volume of forest activities, particularly in spatial planning and nature conservation and environment protection, where forestry activities are performed by inexpert personnel.Twenty years have passed: looking at this brief review of the topic (find a more detailed analysis in Forestry Journal No. 5-6/1997, pp 323-332), let us try and answer at least two questions: what has changed since and have we all "by improving our work, given the best contribution to the condition in forestry", as Professor Matić suggested in his introductory discussion. Editorial Board
U Vijestima iz sektora, u svom napisu gosp. Borislav Škegro pod naslovom "Može li državni holding biti učinkovit? Bude li se vodio logikom profita, bit će dividenda!" za primjer navodi poslovanje (odnos) šumarstva i drvoprerađivačke industrije. Kaže kako drvoprerađivačka industrija bilježi sjajne rezultate u proizvodnji, izvozu i zapošljavanju, ali ne zadovoljava potražnju, jer je ograničavajući čimbenik nedostatak drvne sirovine (nema dovoljno drva kaže on). To smatra apsurdnim, "jer u šumama danas postoji višak drva – kod hrasta npr. i do 1/3 ukupne mase". Te povećane količine drvoprerađivačka industrija bi u kešu platila, zaposlila nove ljude, izvezla, naplatila i platila povećane poreze, "ali to nikako ne ide – nitko ne traži dividendu", kaže on. Poruka je očito novom ministru "da za početak upiše dodatnih 200 mil. kuna dividende kao prihod proračuna", pa će biti "drva k'o u priči, a dividenda i poreza k'o drva".Obrazlažući uvodno način poslovanja holdinga navodi kako se mjeri samo prinos na uloženi kapital i nema drugih ni trećih "socijalno osjetljivih, generalno razvojnih društvenih kriterija . dividenda postaje značajni neporezni dio prihoda državnog proračuna .nema opravdanja za zadržavanje radnih mjesta i socijalnim, lokalnim i političkim kriterijima". Tu imamo navode i nekih drvoprerađivača da bi trebalo zabraniti izvoz trupaca, te da potrošimo 200 mil. dolara na uvoz namještaja od hrvatskih trupaca koje smo jeftino izvezli – na taj način rasipamo nacionalno bogatstvo.Što se tiče šumarstva, na tragu potpuno laičkog razmišljanja gosp. Škegre da se može sjeći koliko kome treba, a ne prema Gospodarskoj osnovi, slično razmišljanje dijeli i predsjednik Udruge poslodavaca, a ono se ponajprije odnosi na cijenu drvne sirovine – kada bi ona bila niža (a sada je najniža u EU), onda bi hrvatska drvoprerađivačka industrija bila konkurentna. Prvome možemo odgovoriti da su etatne mogućnosti ograničene i da se u duhu načela potrajnog gospodarenja u šumarstvu sječe nešto ispod godišnjeg prirasta drvne mase, a ne koliko prekapacitirana pilanska prerada traži, pa nema govora o tome da će biti drva k'o u priči, a onda i dividenda. Njih može biti samo ako se naša drvoprerađivačka industrija posveti smanjenju ostalih 80 % troškova proizvodnje, a ne da stalno plače nad previsokim troškovima drvne sirovine, koji u strukturi troškova čine maksimalno 16-20 %. Osim toga, mora se držati načela da najkvalitetniju sirovinu maksimalno finalizira u proizvod s najvećom dodanom vrijednosti. Na to je, sigurni smo, jedino može prisiliti tržišna cijena drvnih sortimenata. Isto tako potrebno je okrenuti se najnovijim tehnologijama i ulaganju u znanje na svim razinama. Slažemo se da treba zabraniti izvoz trupaca, jer smo u dosadašnjim tekstovima u ovoj rubrici između ostalog naveli da 8 m3 izveženih trupaca znači da izvozimo jedno radno mjesto. No, koliko je nama poznato, osim nekih mekih listača i proizvoda neinteresantnih za naše drvoprerađivače, Hrvatske šume d.o.o. ne izvoze trupce, ali znamo da to čine neki drvoprerađivači, tako da dio ugovorenih količina po netržišnoj cijeni upravo radi izvoza "kamufliraju" u razne oblike minimalne pilanske prerade (prizme, fličevi, grede, četvrtače i sl.). Glede uvoza namještaja mišljenja smo da bi svatko rađe kupio domaći ako je jefiniji i barem jednako kvalitetan kao uvozni – zašto on to nije neka odgovore drvoprerađivači koji imaju domaću sirovinu po netržišnim cijenama i tako reći na svom lageru gotovo bez troškova transporta. Upravo o rasipanju nacionalnog bogatstva pisali smo u više navrata, ponajprije govoreći o šumarstvu kao specifičnoj gospodarskoj grani, a ne onoj kako je vidi gosp. Škegro i privatnici drvoprerađivači. Osim toga, očito se uzaludno trudimo upozoriti da šuma ima osim sirovinske uloge i onu ekološku, socijalnu i ekofiziološku, koje su višestruko vrjednije od sirovinske, pa je gospodarenje šumom upravo suprotno od prethodno proklamiranog "holdinškog pristupa". Svakako, kada to nismo napravili do sada, a o tome smo pisali u Šumarskome listu br. 11-12/2014., vrijeme je da se konačno zacrta konzistentna šumarska politika, kojoj treba pridodati i drvoprerađivačku industriju koja će se novo-sačinjenim strategijama provoditi. Time ćemo izbjeći nakaradna "mlečanska" razmišljanja o šumi i ukloniti netržišini odnos šumarstva i drvoprerađivačke industrije te odrediti ispravan status šumarstva u hrvatskome gospodarstvu. Uredništvo ; In his article entitled "Can a state holding company be efficient? If governed by the logic of profit, there will be dividends!", Mr Borislav Škegro illustrates his standpoint with the example of the forestry and wood processing industry business (relationship). According to him, the wood processing industry records outstanding results in the production, export and employment, but cannot satisfy the demand because it is faced with the limiting factor of the lack of raw wood material (there is not enough wood, says he). He thinks this is absurd, because "there is a surplus of wood in the forests today – up to one third of the total mass of oak, for example." The wood processing industry would pay for these excess quantities in cash, it would employ new labour force, it would export, earn and pay increased taxes, but "it just does not work – nobody wants dividends", says he. Evidently, a message for the new minister is to "for a start, add the additional 200 million kuna of dividends to the budget income"; by doing so, there will be "wood in excess, and dividends and taxes in abundance". When he expostulates on the manner of how a holding company conducts business, he says that only income from the invested capital is measured and that there are no second or third "socially sensitive, generally developmental social criteria . a dividend becomes an important part of the tax-exempt income of the government budget . there is no justification for preserving working places and for the social, local and political criteria". There are also opinions of some wood processing companies which require a ban on the export of logs. They point out that we spend 200 million dollars on the import of furniture made of Croatian logs that were exported cheaply – which is a way of squandering our national wealth. With regard to forestry, the uninformed musings of Mr Škegro, according to which one can fell as much timber as he or she needs, and not according to management plans, are complemented by similar thoughts of the president of the Employers' Association, which concern primarily the price of raw wood: if it were lower (although currently it is the lowest in Europe), then the Croatian wood processing industry would be more competitive. The first gentleman should be informed that the capacities of the annual cut are limited and that in the spirit of the principle of sustainable management, forestry follows the principle of cutting slightly below the annual wood mass increment and not according to the demands of the over-capacitated sawmill processing. Therefore, it is out of the question that there will be wood in excess and dividends in abundance. There can be dividends only if the Croatian wood processing industry applies itself to cutting down on the 80% of production costs, rather than constantly lamenting on the excessively high price of raw wood material, which accounts for a maximum of 16–20% in the cost structure. In addition, it should do its utmost to use the best quality raw material in the final product with the highest added value. We are sure that the wood processing industry can be forced to do the aforesaid only by market prices of wood assortments. Another step to take is to turn to cutting edge technologies and investment into knowledge on all levels. We agree that log export should be banned, because we have already pointed out in previous texts that 8 m3 of exported logs equals one exported work place. However, as far as we know, apart from some soft broadleaves and products which the Croatian wood processors are not interested in, the company Hrvatske Šume Ltd does not export logs, unlike some wood processors. This means that for the sake of export, they "camouflage" a part of the quantities contracted at a non-market price into different forms of minimal sawmill products (Count, Flitch, Square and similar). As for imported furniture, we are confident that people would rather buy a home-made piece of furniture on condition that it is cheaper but of equal quality as the imported one. Why it is not cheaper and of good quality rests on our wood processors, who have home raw material available at non-market prices and at almost no transport costs. Our articles have repeatedly pointed at squandering the national wealth when writing about forestry as a specific economic branch, but not as an economic branch viewed by Mr Škegro and some private wood processors. Obviously, in vain have we tried to explain that apart from its raw material role, the forest also has other roles, such as the ecological, social and eco-physiological roles, which are several times more valuable than the raw material role. Consequently, managing a forest is in stark contrast with the proclaimed "holding approach". It is high time we finally formulated a consistent forestry policy (we wrote about this in Forestry Journal 11-12/2014), adding to this the wood processing industry, which should implement the newly-formulated strategies. By doing so we will put a stop to absurd irrational contemplations on forests, do away with non-market relationships between forestry and wood processing industry, and define an adequate status of forestry within Croatian economy. Editorial Board
Pri analizi dvaju suprotstavljenih narativa povezanih s temom uspostave vojske Europske unije (EU) u europskom medijskom i političkom prostoru u ovome radu upotrebljava se teorija sekrutizacije te se temeljem analize diskursa i javnog mnijenja dokazuje da suprotstavljeni narativi ispunjavaju uvjete da ih prema definiciji Kopenhagenske škole svedemo pod pojam sekuritizacije. Prema autorima Kopenhagenske škole, sekuritizacija je govorni čin kojim provoditelj sekuritizacije do tada nepolitizirani odnosno politizirani predmet debate prikazuje kao egzistencijalnu prijetnju prema referentnom objektu koja zahtijeva hitne mjere. Prvi narativ koji rad analizira je neizvjesna sigurnosna situacija u Europi i oko nje koja bi mogla prerasti u egzistencijalnu prijetnju društvu Europske unije i europskom identitetu zbog nepostojanja vojske Unije. Drugi, tome oprečni narativ pak interpretira uspostavu vojske Europske unije kao egzistencijalnu prijetnju NATO savezu i suverenitetu država članica Unije. Rad postavlja pitanje je li sekuritizacija upotrebljiva poluga u nastojanju provođenja odnosno blokiranja čvršće intergracije EU na području obrane. Analizom diskursa glavnih aktera, provoditelja sekuritizacije i sigurnosnih strategija EU, Velike Britanije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država te analizom prihvaćanja narativa od strane publike, rad zaključuje da su ti oba narativa činovi sekuritizacije. Prvi narativ, sekuritiziran od strane europskih federalista na čelu s predsjednikom Europske komisije Jean-Claudeom Junckerom, kao referentne objekte koji se pod hitno moraju zaštiti postavlja društvo EU i europski identitet. Egzistencijalna prijetnja referentnim objektima dolazi od ruske politike, ali i neizvjesne sigurnosne situacije u neposrednom susjedstvu EU-a. Ovaj narativ kao rješenje nameće uspostavu vojske EU-a. Drugi narativ, sekuritiziran od strane euroskeptika, NATO saveza te političkih elita Velike Britanije, SAD-a i Rusije, kao referentne objekte koji se pod hitno moraju zaštititi postavlja suverenitet država članica EU i opstanak NATO saveza koji se nalaze u egzistencijalnoj prijetnji od strane uspostave vojske Europske unije, čija bi uspostava oduzela nacionalne vojske tj. suverenitet država članica u području obrane, a postojanje NATO saveza učinilo izlišnim ; The thesis proves that around the establishment of the European Union army, we can infer two opposing narratives in European Union's media and political space and that both meet the conditions to be called a securitization. The first narrative (positive securitization) that the thesis analyses argues that the precarious the security situation in and around Europe could become an existential threat to the society of European Union (EU) and European identity because of the paucity of the EU army. The second narrative (negative securitization) that the thesis analyses interprets the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the sovereignty of EU member states. Securitization is defined through the Theory of Securitisation by the scientists belonging to Copenhagen School (Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde) as a speech act by which an actor (securitizing actor) presents a specific issue, until then only politicised in the political or public space, as an existential threat to the referent object that requires extraordinary measures. For a speech act to be an act of securitization and not just an attempt of securitisation, public (or a target group) needs to accept the speech as such. Thus, the Theory of Securitization affirms that the chosen narratives are acts of securitizations through discourse analysis and public opinion analysis. Elements of securitization are before mentioned securitization actor, referent object and public, as well as functional actors, which indirectly affect security decisions by lobbing or directing the securitization actors, and context, as a speech act cannot be an independent factor in the securitization process but is dependent on historical, political, societal, economic, geographic, and other variables. The principal difference between Theory of Securitisation and the mainstream security theories: Traditional Security Studies (TSS) and Critical Security Studies (CSS), is that Theory of Securitization is not concerned if the issue that a speech act wants to present as a security issue, really is a security issue, but how a speech act presents the issue as a security issue. Unlike the Theory of Securitisation, TSS is a realistic security theory that examines is the issue a real security threat while CSS is a constructive security theory that examines the reality of security threat. Both, TSS and CSS, analyze already present security threat, while Theory of Securitisation analyses the creation of the security threat. Positive securitisation, the precarious security situation in and around Europe that could become an existential threat to the society of the EU because of the paucity of the EU army, is securitised by European federalists headed by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and HR/VP Federica Mogherini. Referent objects that are in urgent need of protection are the EU society and the European identity (values and principles) that are in the existential threat of Russia and uncertain security situation in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU. As a solution for the existential threat, securitising actors impose the establishment of the EU army. Functional actors of positive securitisation are stakeholders in the European defence industry who have a purely economic reason for the backing of positive securitisation, and European elite which advocates the federalisation of the European Union. The prime public, core target group, for the positive securitisation should be the Heads of 28 EU member states who make decisions concerning Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP). As the decisions concerning CSDP must be unanimous, and some member states, mostly United Kingdom (UK), steadily use the instrument of veto to block further development of the CSDP, the thesis assumes that the securitising actors of positive securitisation decided to expand the target group for their securitisation onto European Union society as a whole. Reasons behind the expansion of the target public, which thus makes the whole society of the European Union a the public is a pressure onto the Heads of EU member states since the citizens of the EU have a very favourable opinion about the further development of the CSDP and mostly positive opinion regarding the establishment of the EU army. Negative securitisation, which interprets the establishment of the EU army as an existential a threat to the NATO and the sovereignty of EU member states, is a complex form of securitisation. Instead of one securitising actor or one group of securitising actors with the same motive (European federalist with Juncker as champion in positive securitisation), negative securitisation is securitised by several securitising actors without the leading champion with sometimes the same and sometimes different motives: Eurosceptics, NATO, decision-makers in the United Kingdom, the United States (US) and Russia. Furthermore, negative securitisation accumulates the referent objects that are in urgent need of protection: the sovereignty of the EU member states and the survival of the NATO alliance. The only element of the negative securitisation that is unambiguous is the existential threat from the establishment of the EU army whose establishment would take away the national armies, i.e. the sovereignty of the EU member states and made the NATO alliance vulnerable. Hence, for the sake of simplicity of understanding the elements of negative securitisation and their synergy, the thesis uses the Classical Security Complex Theory (CSCT) for the proper consideration of the patterns of the security connections. Using discourse analysis of the speech acts and official documents the thesis shows how the decision-makers in the US (regardless of their political affiliation) securitise the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to NATO and future of Atlantic security cooperation. Same is evident with the NATO as a securitising actor. The decision-makers in the UK (mostly conservatives) securitise the establishment of the EU army and further development of CSDP as an existential threat to the national sovereignty of EU member states. Russia too securitises the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to the national sovereignty of EU member states but does the deed backstage financially supporting nationalist and Eurosceptic EU parties and via cyber-attacks and disinformation campaign. Functional actors of negative securitisation are stakeholders in the non-EU defence industry and other industries which prosper due to unstable global security situation, private military organisations, non-independent think thanks, etc. The public for the negative securitisation is the Eurosceptic part of the EU society, but the core target group are the citizens of the UK. Securitising actors of the negative securitisation narrowed the public of their securitisation for the same reason why the securitising actors of the positive securitisation broaden theirs – decisions concerning CSDP must be unanimous. Consequently, the securitising actors of the negative securitisation to be successful in their securitisation need to persuade only citizens of the UK that their narrative is correct. As already mentioned, the Theory of Securitisation analyses the creation of the security threat, so very important for the understanding of the results of discourse analysis is the context behind the construction of the securitisation. In the case of the securitisations analysed in the thesis, the contexts of both narratives have foundations in the conflict between neorealist and neoliberal doctrines in foreign politics, different security strategies of the countries, and change in a global security system, as well as historical, political, societal, economic, geographic and other variables. No EU member state can be a superpower on its own in today's world. This notion and aim to hinder the possibility of another armed conflict in Europe prompted the creation of the Union. After more than 60 years of enlargement and integration, the EU is an economic superpower. Nevertheless, to protect its economic superiority as well as to impose its doctrine in foreign politics and expand its multilateral security strategy, the EU needs to be and defence union. This idea is not a new one but exists and was attempted to be implemented from the beginning of the EU existence. The securitising actors of the positive securitisation believe that with the establishment of the EU army, the EU can keep the US hegemony in the global security system and the Russian renewal of bloc-system aspirations under control. Some securitising actors of the positive securitisation also believe that the further integration of the EU is necessary to prevent the disintegration. Above all, is the strong desire of the EU elite for the federation of the EU. Expectedly, not least because of the postulate of the security dilemma, the US and Russia are afraid of the military-strong EU which could change the current global security system, while the UK believes that with the strengthening of the EU its military and political strength will wane or disappear. As the UK is the EU member state and its citizens are the most Eurosceptic the public in the EU, both and the US and Russia focused most of their securitisation's efforts toward the UK's citizens. The US also uses the UK as a tool of disruption in the EU – it's right to veto decisions about the further development of CSDP, integration of the EU in the defence field and the establishment of the EU army. The thesis hypothesises that the two opposed narratives that the thesis considers to be securitisations have generated the status quo in the development of CSDP. Through the discourse analysis of speech acts and the official documents of securitising actors of both narratives as well as analysis of the acceptance of narratives by the audience (public opinion analysis), the thesis positively answers the research question: Is the securitisation theory usable the instrument in the effort to implement/block more effective EU integration?
Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.
