A Zambezia article on political interest groups. ; Any survey of political behavior in South Africa, ought to begin with a consideration of the role of pressure groups or interest groups. The term "interest group" is to be preferred to "pressure group" because the latter has tended, inter alia, to become a term of abuse, consequently losing some of its scientific potency.5 Once the interest group analysis has been made, it then becomes possible to judge the party system, and, finally, the reaction of global governmental authority to the various pressures.
Consumerism has experienced fantastic growth over the last decade and as a result its influence is felt in almost every decision making process. Consumer groups have operated as potent pressure groups and have encouraged the reform of laws to protect the "little man".' Federal and provincial legislative bodies have reacted and attempted to protect the consuming public from unfair or unconscionable business practices and established agencies to do research and co-ordinate consumer concerns. Until recently, consumers have fixed their attention on business and have largely ignored services, particularly those provided by self-governing professions such as the medical profession. The historical reasons for allowing self-government are complex. Basically it was (and is) thought that the public interest would best be served if professions governed themselves. To this end, the state has delegated authority to the professions.
It is now generally recognized that special interest group influence on economic decision making is not in theory a phenomenon restricted to democratic capitalism. Governments which have attained power by non-democratic means must eventually seek legitimacy, either by populist appeals to the masses or by cultivating the support of important sectors (e.g. Lovell (1975)). They may therefore be no less immune to interest group lobbying than governments which face electoral scrutiny. Likewise, it has been argued that the incentive for interest groups to exert political pressure is in fact greater under socialism than under capitalism (e.g. Becker (1983)). The purpose of this paper is to present evidence on the role of special interest groups in economic policy making in the Republic of Korea (South Korea), a country which differs from a western capitalist democracy in at least one important respect.
The basic feature and specificity of Yugoslav pluralism are the institutional interest groups. These groups are the elements of the structure of the political system itself, and therefore directly included — institutionally and legislatively in the consideration is here primarily given to the enterprise. As the enterprise is given a special status in the constitutional political system of Yugoslavia in which it is legally recognized as a political category par excellence, the consideration is here primarily given to the enterprise. Analyzing the results of the interviews with the presidents of Communal Assemblies in Socialist Republic of Croatia and directors of some bigger enterprises in the same republic, the author investigates whether and to what extent the enterprise uses its power and influence in the political process — in what degree it is a policy making factor. The research results show considerable differences between the formal authority and factual power of the enterprises. Although all the enterprises have the same status constitutionally, the real differences are so great, that some enterprises make the policy of communes and even larger regions, and the influence of others is meager. The factor is the economic power. Besides the differences between the enterprises in power and influence, the research results give the evidence to the author's thesis that the enterprises significantly influence the process of political decision making. The actual possibility of the enterprise to act as an interest group is determined by many conditions — some of political and legislative, some of factual nature, primarily: a) by political and legal status in the total system, b) unstable normative structure which is subject to many influences and constant change, c) lack of the more stable criteria that would provide an evaluation of organizations and individuals according to their results, and last but not least; d) democratization of the system itself which is becoming more open to the expression of different interests and actions of interest groups. Finally, author examines some relevant theoretical and political aspects of the strike as a mean of the political pressure in the self-management system in Yugoslavia.
1 p. A typed letter from University of Oregon President Robert D. Clark, dated Mar. 1, 1971, to Mrs. Clara Huggins. The letter responds to Huggins' concerns about the Oregon Student Public Research Interest Group.
1 p. A typed letter from University of Oregon President Robert D. Clark, stamped Mar. 30, 1971, to Mrs. Anita B. Hale, regarding her concerns about funding of the Oregon Student Public Interest Research Group (OSPIRG).
1 p. A typed draft of a letter with hand-written corrections from University of Oregon President Robert D. Clark, stamped Mar. 19, 1971, to Francis J. Ivancie, Commissioner, Dept. of Public Affairs, Portland, Or. The letter responds to a statement by Ivancie regarding the Oregon Student Public Interest Research Group.
1 p. A typed draft of a letter with handwritten notation from University of Oregon President Robert D. Clark, stamped Mar. 19, 1971, to James A. Larpenteur, Jr. The letter responds to Larpenteur's concerns about the funding of the Oregon Student Public Interest Research Group.
[EN] The causes of disagreement subsequent to the 1854 revolt in Madrid are to be found in the characteristics of that uprising. The National Militia of Madrid was mainly formed by groups of barricade fighters belonging to the popular clases; when the economic crisis severely affected them, they channelled their discontent through the Militia, and thus put on armed pressure on the government which used legislative measures to quench down protest. ; [ES] Las causas de las discrepancias posteriores a la Revolución de 1854 en Madrid tienen su base en las características propias de los sucesos en esta ciudad. La Milicia nacional madrileña se formó tomando como base los grupos de combatientes de las barricadas, integrados en gran medida por integrantes de las clases populares. Y cuando la crisis económica les afectó severamente, canalizaron su descontento a través de la Milicia, a lo que el Gobierno respondió con una serie de medidas que restringieron los derechos de la Institución. ; Peer reviewed
This paper seeks to account for the development of a public health education policy with respect to venereal disease during the period 1916-1926. Two competing pressure groups, the National Council for Combatting Venereal Disease and the Society for the Prevention of Venereal Disease, defended opposing programmes; the one based on moral education (NCCVD) and the other (SPVD) on medical prophylaxis. Many of the interests represented by the groups and the political dimensions that they took, were influenced by factors only very tangentially connected to health education.
"This article will not present another review of the many flat-tax proposals, with a criticism of their shortcomings…Rather, it is the purpose here to look at the flat-tax as the economist would, divorced from the political pressure groups clamoring for the maintenance of their own special tax treatment. It is important that the flat-tax be viewed in its ideal state, so that its economic efficiency can be seen clearly. With an understanding of the ideal, we can then make judgments about the acceptabilities of the flat-tax proposals that come forth." (p.44)
"This article will not present another review of the many flat-tax proposals, with a criticism of their shortcomings…Rather, it is the purpose here to look at the flat-tax as the economist would, divorced from the political pressure groups clamoring for the maintenance of their own special tax treatment. It is important that the flat-tax be viewed in its ideal state, so that its economic efficiency can be seen clearly. With an understanding of the ideal, we can then make judgments about the acceptabilities of the flat-tax proposals that come forth." (p.44)
