Closed primaries versus top-two primaries
In: Public choice, Band 167, Heft 1-2, S. 21-35
ISSN: 1573-7101
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In: Public choice, Band 167, Heft 1-2, S. 21-35
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uiuo.ark:/13960/t1qg6645c
John M. Avery, legislative reference librarian. ; Mode of access: Internet.
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In: http://hdl.handle.net/10612/5226
The top-two primary recently approved in several states in the U.S. eliminates the closed party primaries and creates instead a single ballot in which the Örst and second place winners pass to the general election. We conduct a theoretical analysis to compare the electoral consequences of the top-two primary with those of the closed primaries. Each primary procedure induces a sequential game with three stages: candidate-entry stage, primary election, and general election. We analyze the equilibria of these games and show that the top-two primary contributes to political moderation. In particular, when the median voter is an extremist, the closed primaries always generate an extreme winner and yet the top-two primary can generate an equilibrium with a moderate winner. Further- more, when the median voter is a moderate but his/her partyís median partisan is an extremist (and some additional mild conditions hold), the closed primaries always generate an extreme winner while the top-two primary always generates a moderate winner. We also show that the top-two primary may increase the number of swing states since, in certain cases, the party-affiliation of the winner under the top-two primary may not coincide with the party affiliation of the median voter
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In: National civic review: promoting civic engagement and effective local governance for more than 100 years, Band 56, Heft 3, S. 129-129
ISSN: 1542-7811
In: American political science review, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 116-120
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: American political science review, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 309-312
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: California journal: the monthly analysis of State government and politics, Band 26, Heft 11, S. 35-39
ISSN: 0008-1205
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 106, Heft 1, S. 11-17
ISSN: 1552-3349
In: Simplifying Presidential Primaries, in The Best Candidate (Eugene D. Mazo & Michael R. Dimino eds., Cambridge University Press 2020)
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In: Congressional quarterly weekly report, Band 37, S. 1609-1614
ISSN: 0010-5910, 1521-5997
In: Perspectives on political science, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 99-106
ISSN: 1045-7097