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This paper opens with an examination of existing legal restraints on naval forces and arms control agreements and concludes that the U.S. is already heavily engaged in naval arms control. Given the new international security environment and the new U.S. regionally-oriented national security and military strategies, the author then recommends a series of additional naval arms control measures that should be taken: exchanges of data, transparency, INCSEA, cooperative measures, an agreement on the laws of submarine warfare, abolishing NCND, no first tactical nuclear use at sea, NWFZs, advanced notification of operational-level exercises, environmental protection measures, controls over maritime technologies, armed escorts of nuclear shipments, new Roes, PALs, the resolution of outstanding political issues at sea, deep cuts in nuclear forces, CFE follow-on, limits on specific types of naval forces, geographic limits, expanded standing naval forces, and a re negotiation of the ABM Treaty. The paper then addresses verification and compliance issues. Author concludes that since the U.S. Navy has already managed to avoid major arms control while balanced on the precarious 'slippery slope', there is no reason to continue its stonewalling policies ; Director, Conventional Arms Control & Compliance Branch ; http://archive.org/details/newcasefornavala00trit ; Prepared for conventional arms control & compliance branch, Office of the Secretary of Defense ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This article examines the effect of prior military service on hiring for entry-level jobs in a major metropolitan labor market. The research employs an audit method in which resumes differing only in the presentation of military experience versus civilian work experience are faxed in response to an advertised position. Results suggest that employers exhibit preferential treatment of black military veterans with transferable skills over black nonveterans. Veterans with traditional military experience in the combat arms do not experience preferential treatment by employers, regardless of racial/ethnic background. These findings suggest a possible mechanism generating the postmilitary employment benefit among blacks found in prior observational studies. A veteran premium in hiring may stem from the concentration of blacks in military occupational specialties with a high degree of civilian transferability, combined with employer preferences for military veterans with such work experience over their nonveteran peers.

A study was carried out to find out the effects of prior physical activity, sports participation and prior military training on the incidence of stress fractures among Gentlemen Cadets (GC's) undergoing military training at Indian Military Academy (IMA). One thousand and fourteen GC's were followed up for a period of 12 weeks. Thirty-seven GC's developed stress fractures during the study period. The incidence of stress fractures was significantly higher in GC's without any prior military training (p=0.0009). They were compared with 100 healthy controls drawn from the study population to study the influence of the other mentioned factors. There was no significant association between prior physical activity and stress fractures (OR=0.74, 95% CL=0.26 to 2.05, p=0.688). There was also no significant relationship between sports participation and stress fractures (OR=0.79. 95% CCL=0.35 to 1.81, p=0.684).

Delegalization of arms control is now an accomplished fact. In this period of potential dramatic revision of the international order, it is not surprising that the US is seeking increased flexibility in pursuing several strategies, including the full use of military and technological advantages. The motivations behind this include US interests, as well as long run global interests. What may be surprising, however, is the potential risk to our democratic processes from delegalization of arms control-that is to say, the danger posed by reduced use of arms control treaties with built-in processes of transparency and democratic accountability. The potential risk is particularly apparent in those cases where arms control treaties function in effect as treaties of peace, alliance, or neutrality that arguably should be subject to the control of the constitutional treaty makers. Notwithstanding these concerns, this Article argues that on balance the constitutional text, structure, and history compel the conclusion that the democracy deficit risked by delegalization of arms control is adequately attenuated through continuing congressional participation in the arms control process and, in any event, outweighed by the need for a vigorous executive to exercise the role it assumed at the very beginning of this Republic when "regime change" in Europe was also the question of the day.

Meeting of US Secretary of State James A. Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, held in Jackson Hole, Sept. 22-23, 1989. Contents: Baker-Shevardnadze: joint statement on arms control; Chemical weapons: verification and data exchange; Agreement on verification and stability measures; Agreement on notification of strategic exercises.

There were new developments in 2003 in all four international informal export control regimes (the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technology), as well as in export control-related policies in the European Union and international non-proliferation disarmament and assistance efforts. During 2003 activities in the export control regimes focused on adapting export controls to achieve two objectives: first, to combat the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (and missile delivery systems for them); and second, to combat terrorism. There has been a particular focus on measures to prevent the acquisition of weapon of mass destruction-related materials and technology as well as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) by groups planning terrorist acts. The MTCR amended its agreed Guidelines to ensure that all participating states have 'a legal basis to control the export of items that are not on a control list, when such items are destined for missile programs'. Participating states also agreed to apply controls to the transfer of technology by intangible means, for example, via email or by word of mouth. States participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement changed the founding document to include an exchange of information on transfers of small arms and light weapons and MANPADS. States agreed to strengthen export controls on MANPADS, arms brokering and unlisted items that can be used for both military and civilian purposes. The European Union took steps to ensure that export controls remain effective in the enlarged EU. National controls on the export of dual-use items are being evaluated, and the first fundamental review of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports is under way. Effective export control in the majority of new EU member states is undermined by their exclusion from one or more of the information exchanges that take place in the export control cooperation arrangements. Full participation by all EU member states in all regimes will be a critical issue in 2004. In 2003, governments participating in the G8 Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction eliminated obstacles to the implementation of some international non-proliferation and disarmament assistance projects. In 2004 projects to eliminate chemical weapons and dismantle decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines in Russia are expected to be the main focus of activity. Adapted from the source document.

During its 2019/2020 term as a member of the UN Security Council, Germany aims to generate impetus for disarmament and arms control. A particular challenge in this regard is presented by North Korea's development of its nuclear and missile arsenals. In 2017, Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump escalated the conflict surrounding this issue. Then in 2018, summit meetings between Washington and Pyongyang and between the two Koreas opened up the possibility of future cooperation. However, the US and North Korean positions on denuclearisation remain far apart.
The summits in 2018 led to a decrease in tensions. Diplomacy, rather than the threatening gestures of 2017, was the focus. This was a significant step forward.
North Korea halted its nuclear and missile tests, and the USA suspended its military exercises with South Korea. However, North Korea does not want to comply with the demand for rapid and complete denuclearisation.
Without substantial advances regarding the nuclear question, the sanctions on North Korea will remain in place. The opportunities for inter-Korean cooperation will also remain limited.
The summit agreement between Kim and Trump from June 2018 and the second summit planned for the end of February 2019 offer a chance to achieve normal bilateral relations, a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and the curbing of the nuclear threat in the medium term.
It would now make sense to agree on clear interim steps related to stopping the production of nuclear fissile material and its use in weapons technology, and the dismantling of the North Korean missile arsenal. In return, suitable corresponding steps should be offered.
The complete dismantling of North Korea's nuclear arsenal should remain the goal, but is unrealistic in the short term. The German government should use its seat on the UN Security Council to push for pragmatic interim steps, as these offer the best chance of increasing security in Korea and the region. In line with German priorities, the focus should now be on effective disarmament and arms-control measures.

Author makes case that due to recent events, initiatives in areas of naval arms control are extremely poorly timed. These events include political changes in USSR, the changing international security environment, the new Soviet military doctrine and strategy, ongoing arms control negotiations, unarticulated U.S. and NATO goals, and changes in Soviet and U.S. planning assumptions and scenarios. Author then analyses three major areas for naval arms control proposals: (1) restrictions on strategic antisubmarine warfare, (2) naval operations, and (3) strategic antisubmarine warfare technology and fanks them on technical grounds. Author reviews the goals of arms control and finds none of these three areas in need of formal regulation. Author concludes with a number of innovative areas for naval arms control in areas of doctrine, strategy, operations, and exercises with concrete recommendations and acceptable (to USN) fallback positions. (Author) (kr) ; Prepared for: Director, Defense Nuclear Agency and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations ; http://archive.org/details/navalarmscontrol90012trit ; MIPR-90-581 ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

In the West, Russia's nuclear deterrence strategy is often described as one of "escalate to deescalate". The thinking goes that Moscow is prepared to use nuclear weapons at an early stage in a conflict in order to "deescalate" and terminate the confrontation quickly in its favour. However, Russia's official military doctrine, nuclear exercises of the Russian military, and debates among political and military elites have so far pointed in a different direction. With the concept of "strategic deterrence", Russia has developed a holistic deterrence strategy in which nuclear weapons remain an important element. Yet, to gain more flexibility below the nuclear threshold in order to manage escalation, the strategy also conceptualises a broad range of non-military and conventional means. Given Russia's dwindling arsenal of conventional precision weapons due to its war against Ukraine as well as the strategic adaptation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia's strategy is likely to change: In the coming years, Russia's reliance on its non-strategic nuclear weapons will probably increase. These developments could both undermine crisis stability in Europe and further impede the prospects for nuclear arms control in the future.

Receiving the news following death in service is widely referred to among the Armed Forces population as the "knock on the door". This research uniquely considered how casualty notification is undertaken when reporting the death of a member of the UK Armed Forces and the impact of this on the family and/or significant other. For this study, 15 individuals (spouses, parents, and children) participated in semi-structured interviews and this data was analyzed using Thematic Analysis. Many participants could not remember what they were told and could not remember who told them. In particular, misunderstanding and confusion arose about the roles and responsibilities of the notification officers as well as responsibility for informing other family members, including children. Media intrusion was also highlighted as a significant issue. Results also indicated that the long-term impact of loss affected participants in a variety of ways—from dealing with unexpected "triggers" to an accumulation of feelings of regret, uncertainty, and guilt resulting in a loss of control. The impact on physical and mental health is problematic without support to address this. Results also indicated a lack of access to psychological support for bereaved adults and for young children. The study findings illustrated key issues with the notification itself, short-term procedures and provisions, and the long-term impact. However, these were diverse, multi-faceted issues across the cohort and were not homogenous. Fundamentally, the information and support provided when delivering the notification of death needs to be re-addressed, as well as the longer-term support provided for bereaved families.

ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE CRITERIA FOR GOALS OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL MUST, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, RECOGNIZE AND ACCEPT THE REALITY THAT ARMS CONTROL IS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. AS WELL AS FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIES, ARMS CONTROL HAS ALWAYS HELD FUNDAMENTAL IMPLICATIONS NOT ONLY FOR THE STABILITY OF THE MILITARY BALANCE BUT ALSO FOR THE NATURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND FOR THE SHAPE OF THE GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN POLITICAL ORDER. THE CENTRAL AXIOM OF ARMS CONTROL IS SUPPORTED BY THE HISTORICAL RECORD. PRIOR TO THE ADVENT OF STRATEGIC PARITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, NEITHER SUPERPOWER HAD A COMPELLING INTEREST TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.