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part Part I Why Privacy is Valuable -- chapter 1 Glenn Negley (1966), 'Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy', Law and Contemporary Problems, 31, pp. 319-25 -- chapter 2 James Rachels (1975), 'Why Privacy is Important', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4, pp. 323-33 -- chapter 3 Jeffrey H. Reiman (1976), 'Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6, pp. 26-44 -- chapter 4 Richard S. Murphy (1996), 'Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy', Georgetown Law Journal, 84, pp. 2381-2417 -- part Part II The Definition and Scope of Privacy -- chapter 5 Richard B. Parker (1974), 'A Definition of Privacy', Rutgers Law Review, 27, pp. 275-96 -- chapter 6W.A. Parent (1983), 'Privacy, Morality, and the Law', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12, pp. 269-88 -- chapter 7 Robert C. Post (1991), 'Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation', Case Western Reserve Law Review, 41, pp. 647-80 -- chapter 8 Jeffrey H. Reiman (1995), 'Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future', Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal, 11, pp. 27-44 -- chapter 9 Helen Nissenbaum (1998), 'Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public', Law and Philosophy, 17, pp. 559-96 -- part Part III The Feminist Critique of Privacy -- chapter 10 Ruth Gavison (1992), 'Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction', Stanford Law Review, 45, pp. 1-45 -- chapter 11 Elizabeth M. Schneider (1991), 'The Violence of Privacy', Connecticut Law Review, 23, pp. 973-99 -- chapter 12 Laura W. Stein (1993), 'Living with the Risk of Backfire: A Response to the Feminist Critiques of Privacy and Equality', Minnesota Law Review, 77, pp. 1153-91 -- part Part IV Privacy, The Media and Data Protection -- chapter 13 Randall P. Bezanson (1992), 'The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 1890-1990', California Law Review, 80, pp. 1133-75 -- chapter 14 Peter Blume (1997), 'Privacy as a Theoretical and Practical Concept', International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 11, pp. 193-202 -- chapter 15 Katrin Schatz Byford (1998), 'Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of Privacy for the Electronic Communications Environment', Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal, 24, pp. 1-74.

Cover Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1: The Constitution Does Not Include a Right to Privacy -- 2: The Right to Privacy Is a Fundamental Right -- 3: The Right to Privacy Is Threatened -- 4: The Public's Right to Know Supersedes the Right to Privacy -- 5: National ID Cards Threaten Privacy -- 6: Privacy Concernsover National ID Cards Are Exaggerated -- 7: Surveillance Cameras Keep the Public Safe -- 8: Surveillance Cameras Are an Invasion of Privacy -- 9: Using Full-Body Scanners Is an Invasion of Privacy -- 10: Full-Body Scanners Minimize Passengers' Invasion of Privacy -- 11: Facebook Does Not Protect Its Users' Privacy -- 12: Facebook's Privacy Policy Provides Trade-offs to Its Users -- 13: The Benefits of Student Drug Testing Outweigh Potential Harms -- 14: Student Drug Testing Is an Invasion of Privacy -- Appendix -- What You Should Know About Privacy -- What You Should Do About Privacy -- Organizations to Contact -- Bibliography -- Index -- Picture Credits -- Back Cover

"Perhaps the most striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it is. Consider, for example, the familiar proposal that the right to privacy is the right "to be let alone." On the one hand, this doesn't seem to take in enough. The police might say, "We grant we used a special X-ray device on Smith, so as to be able to watch him through the walls of his house; we grant we trained an amplifying device on him so as to be able to hear everything he said; but we let him strictly alone: we didn't touch him, we didn't even go near him-our devices operate at a distance." Anyone who believes there is a right to privacy would presumably believe that it has been violated in Smith's case; yet he would be hard put to ex-plain precisely how, if the right to privacy is the right to be let alone. And on the other hand, this account of the right to privacy lets in far too much. If I hit Jones on the head with a brick I have not let him alone. Yet, while hitting Jones on the head with a brick is surely violating some right of Jones', doing it should surely not turn out to violate his right to privacy. Else, where is this to end? Is every violation of a right a violation of the right to privacy? It seems best to be less ambitious, to begin with at least. I suggest, then, that we look at some specific, imaginary cases in which people would say, "There, in that case, the right to privacy has been violated," and ask ourselves precisely why this would be said, and what, if anything, would justify saying it"--

This volume explores and discusses how privacy is understood today. What is privacy? What strategies are used to achieve or to protect the individual's privacy? How are our conceptions of privacy evolved throughout times and cultures? Given the multidimensional character of privacy, the book analyses the variety and complexity of its meanings by adopting a cross-disciplinary position. The contributions collected here approach the topic from a multiplicity of perspectives and with the support of modern critical theories in sociology, anthropology, philosophy, visual art, and media. In discussin

Information systems are essential for crisis management; therefore, maintaining the security of those systems is important. Furthermore, during a crisis, privacy and personal integrity issues can sometimes be overlooked. Yet, both security and privacy are fundamental to the survival of a civilized and democratic society. If an information system's security plan also includes privacy considerations, then the resilience of the system can provide for the resilience of privacy. The problem is that privacy principles as they have traditionally been identified are not amenable to being incorporated into system design. This study discusses the NIST Privacy Framework, privacy engineering and its relevance to crisis planning and response.

This book explores the Janus-faced features of privacy, and looks at their implications for the control of personal information, for sexual and reproductive freedom, and for democratic politics. It asks what, if anything, is wrong with asking women to get licenses in order to have children, given that pregnancy and childbirth can seriously damage your health. It considers whether employers should be able to monitor the friendships and financial affairs of employees, and whether we are entitled to know whenever someone rich, famous or powerful has cancer, or an adulterous affair. It considers whether we are entitled to privacy in public and, if so, what this might mean for the use of CCTV cameras, the treatment of the homeless and the provision of public facilities such as parks, libraries and lavatories. Above all, the book seeks to understand whether and, if so, why privacy is valuable in a democratic society, and what implications privacy has for the ways we see and treat each other. The ideas about privacy we have inherited from the past are marked by beliefs about what is desirable, realistic and possible which predate democratic government and, in some cases, predate constitutional government as well. Hence, this book argues, although privacy is an important democratic value, we can only realise that value if we use democratic ideas about the freedom, equality, security and rights of individuals to guide our understanding of privacy. -- Book Cover.