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Since the fall of the Berlin Wall & the nature of international conflict has changed. At the same time, the Canadian Forces & the Department of National Defense have seen dramatic reductions in their budgets & personnel strength, with an increase in operational tempo amid missions in the former Yugoslavia, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Haiti & other areas. Concurrently, the European Union, as a grouping of twenty-five Member States, has begun to coordinate their foreign & defense policy, establishing a Security Strategy, a Defense Agency, & a Rapid Reaction Force. In the academic literature, the Canada- EU military relationship, specifically in the area of procurement, tends to be overlooked, but is important in understanding the wider context of transatlantic security, defense & foreign policy. This paper will explore the procurement of major capital equipment, specifically aircraft, naval ships & mobile ground equipment & the factors influencing those decisions, including bilateral relationships between Canada & the United States & the European Union (EU). This paper will argue that Canada's procurement decisions are based on domestic & economic considerations combined with our increasing interdependence with the United States in both the economic & military fields, which is making it difficult to cooperate with the European Union in the area of procurement & defense related research & development. Adapted from the source document.

Signed petition by various officers of the Nauvoo Legion asking Smith to request arms and other military supplies from the Illinois state government. ; Electronic version ; 32 x 16 cm ; Holograph, signed.

The procurement of military weapons and equipment in Canada has historically been controlled by partisan political considerations rather than by a clear desire to increase the capability of the military. Civilian leaders have typically given actual combat strength a low priority, thus Canada has often failed to effectively design, produce, or even to purchase the weapons and equipment its military needs to carry out the priorities of the civil power. Distributing regional economical benefits equally among the provinces instead of acquiring equipment in the most efficient manner possible resulted in numerous contract scandals and exceedingly long procurement timelines.To secure even the most modest materiel, officials within the Department of National Defence (DND) have had to comply with a succession of rules that can only be described as illogical from a standpoint of military performance. Rather than designing a more efficient method, the DND's internal process has continually evolved into an amorphous mass of bureaucracy involving myriad committees requiring endless analysis, re-evalauations, and approvals, thus compounding the problem. This research demonstrates the ahistorical nature of military acquisitions in Canada and how few lessons have been learned from a long list of project failures. This results largely from the political midsirection of the procurement process and the weakness of the civil-military relationship in Canada.

Although often conjectured, there is a lack of empirical evidence whether international inflows of military technology render intrastate conflicts more violent. We address this question and argue that expansions in governments' ability to fight aggravate the lethality of intrastate war. However, we expect this effect to be conditioned by rebels' military endowments and their choice of tactics. Where rebels are weak, they avoid open combat, and additional governmental arms imports have no effect on the number of casualties. In contrast, governmental arms imports cause human losses to multiply when rebels have achieved military parity or superiority and, as a consequence, use conventional combat tactics. This hypothesis is tested on the number of battle-related deaths in intrastate conflict, 1989 to 2011, using, for the first time, data on governmental imports of both major conventional weapons and small arms. Results support our propositions and are robust to instrumenting for imports of both types of weapons.

In a situation when government expenditures for defense are more restrictive, any investment in the acquisition of arms and military equipment (AME) is a question that does not allow errors in decisions. Accordingly, the economic analysis of the investment must be detailed and unavoidable. In the past, the initial cost of procurement of AME was often the primary, and sometimes the only one criterion in decision-making. Neglecting the analysis of costs throughout the life of assets in prefeasibility studies is the main cause of unplanned investment in the later stages of the life cycle of investment, and also of a number of problems in the functioning and unfulfilling or partially fulfilling the goals of the system.