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"10 years after NATO Membership. An Anniversary in the Shadow of a Crisis", indeholder artikler fra politiske aktører, diplomater og forskere, der alle bidrog til til konferencen af samme navn, hvor den 10-året for baltisk medlemskab af NATO var omdrejningspunktet. Udover den danske forsvarsminister, er den estiske og litauiske forsvarsminister og NATO's vicegeneralsekretær blandt bidragyderne. Konferencens formål var at fejre, inddrage og diskutere 10 års forsvarspolitisk NATO-samarbejde i Østersøområdet. Den internationale udvikling i Europa betød at konferencens dagsorden i stedet for kom til at stå i skyggen af krisen i Ukraine, og det anspændte europæiske forhold til Rusland. Dette afspejledes ikke kun på selve konferencen, men har også sat et dybt fodaftryk på publikationen, der dels belyser det forsvarspolitiske samarbejde mellem Danmark og de baltiske stater, dels tegner et billede af hvordan den russiske aggression på Krimhalvøen blev italesat af de repræsenterede landes Forsvarsministre samt fra hovedkvarteret i NATO. Konferencen blev afholdt tidligere i år i København, og var et resultat af et tæt samarbejde mellem Forsvarsakademiet, Forsvarsministeriet og ambassadørerne for Estland, Letland og Litauen i Danmark. ; Since the recognition of their independence in 1921, the three Baltic States Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have enjoyed a special status in Danish foreign policy that has continued into present-day times. Being one of the few countries that never officially recognized the Soviet annexation in 1940, Denmark became an early advocate in relation to Baltic membership of NATO in the wake of the Cold War. Defence cooperation, such as the joint contribution to the missions in the Balkans in the early 1990s, as well as the present air policing mission, first initiated in 2004, has been an important part of the political relationship. A conference celebrating and evaluating the first ten years of NATO membership was quite naturally a high-level event to be placed in Copenhagen. As progress with planning the conference proceeded, the international security community suddenly faced a crisis in Crimea, when separatists, with Russian support, gradually took control of the Crimean Peninsula. In only 24 days, what had initially been demonstrations and protests evolved into a complete Russian annexation, through a very dubious local democratic election, where independence from Ukraine, as well as affi liation to Russia, was declared with 96% of voters in favor of joining Russia. These events naturally had a massive impact on this conference, which resulted in an anniversary in the shadow of a crisis. This turn of events forced a new discussion upon the member states of NATO: What is the main purpose of the Alliance? This question became a focal point for the conference, as well as the articles presented here.

Doomsdays preachers suggested that Brexit and Trump would mean the end of the liberal world order as we know it and thus the end of the EU. The research presented here suggests the opposite. Not only have Europeans turned their back to populism by voting yes to reforms and pro-EU-parties and governments in different member states over the past months, but Brexit and Trump also seems to have given a complete new momentum to the European project. This article demonstrates why Brexit cannot be generalized to the rest of the continent but is the result of a complicated and special British conception of what it means to be a sovereign state in the 21st century. Moreover and paradoxically, surveys show that the greatest fear among Europeans today is not more European integration but right wing populism and European Disunion.

This brief synthesises the IECEU project's most essential findings on the effectiveness of European Union (EU) missions in four Africa countries: Libya, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). It describes the main elements and impact of the EU missions in these countries, identifies key strategic and operational shortfalls and offers recommendations on how the EU can improve its effectiveness in future conflict prevention and crisis management missions. The EU missions investigated differ in scale, length, objective, budget, priority and context. However, the EU missions presented in this brief share the main characteristic that they have all been deployed under the union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2 with the explicit intent of improving the overall security situation and addressing conflicts in Africa. This brief will start by providing a short overview of each case, describing the conflict(s), security situation, mission objectives and obstacles. In this way, it compares the overall effectiveness of EU operational conflict prevention across the four African countries and discusses what lessons can be learned from them. The brief does not include all factors needed to answer thisquestion, but highlights the IECEU project's most significant findings in these cases.

This study takes a novel approach to the study of threatening communications by arguing that they can be characterized as a genre – a genre that generally carries strong connotations of intimidation, fear, aggression, power, and coercion. We combine the theoretical framework of Rhetorical Genre Studies (RGS) with results from theoretical and empirical analyses of threats to arrive at a more comprehensive perspective of threats. Since threats do not form part of any regular curriculum of genres, we designed a survey to test how recognizable they are. While scholars on threats describe threatening communications as remarkably varied in form and contextual features, the majority of our respondents categorized test items as threats without prompts of any kind, indicating that threats are a recognizable genre. We propose that threatening communications belong to a wider category of illicit genres: i.e. genres that generally disrupt and upset society and commonly affect their targets negatively. The uptakes of illicit genres are very different from those of other genres, as the users of the genres often actively avoid naming them, making uptake communities significant shapers of illicit genres. The present study contributes to research on threatening communications, since genre theory sheds light on important situational factors affecting the interpretation of a text as a threat – this is a particularly contentious question when it comes to threats that are indirectly phrased. The study also contributes to genre theory by pointing to new territory for genre scholars to examine, namely illicit genres. Studies of illicit genres also have wider, societal benefits as they shed light on different kinds of problematic rhetorical behavior that are generally considered destructive or even dangerous. ; Denne artikel anlægger et nyt perspektiv på studiet af sproglige trusler ved at argumentere for at de kan karakteriseres som en genre – en genre der generelt giver stærke konnotationer til intimidering, frygt, aggression, magt og tvang. Vi kombinerer Retoriske Genrestudiers (RGS) teoretiske ramme med resultater fra teoretiske og empiriske analyser af trusler for at nå frem til en mere nuanceret og fyldestgørende forståelse af trusler. Sproglige trusler er som udgangspunkt ikke at finde i gængse oversigter over genrer, og man lærer heller ikke om dem i skolen. Derfor designede vi et spørgeskema der skulle teste hvor genkendelige trusler egentlig er. Selvom trusselsforskere rapporterer at trusler har en bemærkelsesværdig variation i deres formmæssige og kontekstuelle træk, kategoriserede størstedelen af vores respondenter testemnerne som trusler, på trods af at de ikke fik præsenteret nogen tekstuel, kontekstuel eller layoutmæssig ramme for fortolkningen. Dette indikerer at truslen er en genkendelig genre. Vi argumenterer for at truslen hører under en bredere kategori af illegitime genrer: genrer der generelt set har skadelige eller ubehagelige konsekvenser for samfundet, og som almindeligvis påvirker deres ofre negativt. Den måde illegitime genrer tages op på i samfundet, deres uptake, adskiller sig meget fra hvordan andre genrer tages op. De der benytter illegitime genrer, undgår ofte aktivt at navn-give dem, hvilket indebærer at de grupper der reagerer på illegitime genrer, på ganske betydelig vis er med til at definere dem. Dette studie bidrager til forskning i sproglige trusler, idet genreteori kaster lys over vigtige situationelle faktorer der påvirker fortolkningen af en tekst som en trussel – dette er et særligt omstridt spørgsmål i forhold til trusler der er indirekte formuleret. Studiet bidrager også til genreteori ved at pege på et nyt område genreforskere kan undersøge, nemlig illegitime genrer. Undersøgelser af illegitime genrer har også bredere samfundsmæssig relevans da de belyser forskellige slags problematisk, retorisk opførsel der kan have destruktive konsekvenser for det enkelte menneske og for den demokratiske samfundsorden bredt set. ; Denne artikel anlægger et nyt perspektiv på studiet af sproglige trusler ved at argumentere for at de kan karakteriseres som en genre – en genre der generelt giver stærke konnotationer til intimidering, frygt, aggression, magt og tvang. Vi kombinerer Retoriske Genrestudiers (RGS) teoretiske ramme med resultater fra teoretiske og empiriske analyser af trusler for at nå frem til en mere nuanceret og fyldestgørende forståelse af trusler. Sproglige trusler er som udgangspunkt ikke at finde i gængse oversigter over genrer, og man lærer heller ikke om dem i skolen. Derfor designede vi et spørgeskema der skulle teste hvor genkendelige trusler egentlig er. Selvom trusselsforskere rapporterer at trusler har en bemærkelsesværdig variation i deres formmæssige og kontekstuelle træk, kategoriserede størstedelen af vores respondenter testemnerne som trusler, på trods af at de ikke fik præsenteret nogen tekstuel, kontekstuel eller layoutmæssig ramme for fortolkningen. Dette indikerer at truslen er en genkendelig genre. Vi argumenterer for at truslen hører under en bredere kategori af illegitime genrer: genrer der generelt set har skadelige eller ubehagelige konsekvenser for samfundet, og som almindeligvis påvirker deres ofre negativt. Den måde illegitime genrer tages op på i samfundet, deres uptake, adskiller sig meget fra hvordan andre genrer tages op. De der benytter illegitime genrer, undgår ofte aktivt at navn-give dem, hvilket indebærer at de grupper der reagerer på illegitime genrer, på ganske betydelig vis er med til at definere dem. Dette studie bidrager til forskning i sproglige trusler, idet genreteori kaster lys over vigtige situationelle faktorer der påvirker fortolkningen af en tekst som en trussel – dette er et særligt omstridt spørgsmål i forhold til trusler der er indirekte formuleret. Studiet bidrager også til genreteori ved at pege på et nyt område genreforskere kan undersøge, nemlig illegitime genrer. Undersøgelser af illegitime genrer har også bredere samfundsmæssig relevans da de belyser forskellige slags problematisk, retorisk opførsel der kan have destruktive konsekvenser for det enkelte menneske og for den demokratiske samfundsorden bredt set.

BILATERAL RELATIONS ON THE MEND: Transforming the Mosaic of Opportunities into Policies of Stability and Reconciliation between Afghanistan & PakistanBilateral reconciliation and trust building between Afghanistan and Pakistan require determined individuals who will prioritize identification of workable solutions to regional instability.This report summarizes recommendations on how to approach such solutions. The recommendations emerged during two rounds of track-II dialogue – one in Kabul in May, and one in Islamabad in September, 2017 - between influential individuals from Afghanistan and Pakistan, organized by the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC) and the Regional Peace Institute (RPI).In addition to discussing a host of other issues, the two rounds of the conference generated ideas and innovative suggestions on how to deal with peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban, the future of Western engagement in Afghanistan, ways to resolve the Afghan refugee crisis and increasing the volume of trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan.The constructive and innovative development of recommendations during both rounds went beyond initial expectations in terms of volume and quality. However, generating innovative policy recommendations, by itself, is insufficient without their effective implementation.This report can be viewed as a mosaic of ideas and opportunities to enter a path of reconciliation and stability. If implemented, these ideas and recommendations can lead to addressing the outstanding issues between Afghanistan & Pakistan.By presenting this mosaic of progress, this report, and the authors behind it aspire to contribute in a meaningful manner to mending the existing relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.

During the 17th and 18th century the German nobility called a planned marriage a pro-ject of marriage, because marriages had a long phase of planning, in which more then two people were involved. Noble projects of marriage had at least the function to create ever-lasting friendship between two noble families. This custom was part of the economic and po-litical strategies of the families involved and had often effects on the development of whole territories. Noble projects of marriage consequently concerned the family law as well as the law of the nobility and the church.I shall discuss the strategies of marriage of a special social group, the so-called Cath-olic German Reichsritterschaft during the 17th and 18th centuries. This noble group was re-garded as a strong partner of the German Imperial Catholic Church, the Reichskirche. Last but not least its members owed their remarkable political careers to the Church, but their idea of marriage were never-the-less in opposition to the canonical marriage laws; in fact, in planning exactly these political careers, which they owed to the Church, their concept of marriage clashed with the impediments to marriage that too close kinship posed. My paper aims at ana-lysing the marriage law of the Church as a papal instrument of influence over this special group of nobles. ; During the 17th and 18th century the German nobility called a planned marriage a pro-ject of marriage, because marriages had a long phase of planning, in which more then two people were involved. Noble projects of marriage had at least the function to create ever-lasting friendship between two noble families. This custom was part of the economic and po-litical strategies of the families involved and had often effects on the development of whole territories. Noble projects of marriage consequently concerned the family law as well as the law of the nobility and the church.I shall discuss the strategies of marriage of a special social group, the so-called Cath-olic German Reichsritterschaft during the 17th ...

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.

Denne artikel foretager en diskursanalyse af en række centrale tekster fra partierne Nye Borgerlige og Dansk Folkeparti med fokus på disses brug af den populistiske figur hjertelandet: Et narrativ om det altid allerede tabte eller truede harmoniske fællesskab, der skal forsvares imod folkets fjender. Det konkluder-es, at idéen om hjertelandet er stærkt til stede i partiernes respektive diskurser, og at det i Nye Borgerliges diskurs i lige høj grad trues af de fremmede og eliten, mens det i Dansk Folkepartis diskurs mest trues af de fremmede, og antagonismen til eliten er nedtonet. ; This paper analyzes a series of central texts from the Danish parties The New Right and the Danish People's Party with emphasis on their use of the populist figure of the heartland: A narrative about the always already lost or threatened harmonic community that needs to be protected against enemies of the people. The paper concludes that the idea of the heartland is strongly present in the discourses of both parties, and that in The New Right's discourse the heartland is equally threated by foreigners and the elite, while in the discourse of the Danish People's Party it is mostly threatened by immigrants whereas the antagonism to the elite is downplayed.

Recent trends towards openness and technical connectivity have offered the ability to drive massive social and economic change; however they demand a redefinition of relationships. We have observed a move from a polarized world where companies operate in economic markets while governments drive social progress, to an interconnected, networked world of shared resources and co-creation. One of the trends driving this change is open government data. This paper presents a framework of four value generating mechanisms from use of OGD. The framework makes it easier to compare and communicate different pathways to value generation, while highlighting the current tensions between the private/public and economic/social domains. Our proposition is that these tensions bring about possibilites for synergies and value enhancement.

Recent trends towards openness and technical connectivity have offered the ability to drive massive social and economic change; however they demand a redefinition of relationships. We have observed a move from a polarized world where companies operate in economic markets while governments drive social progress, to an interconnected, networked world of shared resources and co-creation. One of the trends driving this change is open government data. This paper presents a framework of four value generating mechanisms from use of OGD. The framework makes it easier to compare and communicate different pathways to value generation, while highlighting the current tensions between the private/public and economic/social domains. Our proposition is that these tensions bring about possibilites for synergies and value enhancement.

Grønlands udenrigspolitiske repræsentanter benytter den store internationale interesse for Arktis til at positionere Grønland som en mere selvstændig udenrigspolitisk aktør. Det er muligt, da Danmark er afhængig af Grønland for at opretholde sin status som "arktisk stat", og fordi Grønlands udenrigspolitiske kompetence er åben for fortolkning. Denne artikel analyserer, hvordan repræsentanter for skiftende grønlandske regeringer har udvidet det udenrigspolitiske handlerum ved i diskurs og praksis at styrke Grønlands position i en arktisk kontekst. Det er blandt andet opnået ved 1) højlydt at italesætte utilfredshed i Arktisk Råd, 2) stiltiende symbolske handlinger ved Ilulissat-erklæringens tiårs jubilæum, og 3) ved at mime suverænitet ved Arctic Circle konferencen, der pga. sin mere uformelle struktur er særligt nyttig til at styrke bilaterale internationale relationer. ; Greenland's foreign policy representatives use the great international attention to the Arctic to appear and act as a more sovereign foreign policy actor. This is possible due to Denmark's dependence on Greenland to maintain its "Arctic state" status and because Greenland's foreign policy competence is open to interpretation. The article analyzes how representatives of shifting Greenlandic governments have expanded the foreign policy room for manoeuvre in discourse and praxis to strengthen Greenland's position at Arctic-related events. This has been achieved by, among other things, 1) outspoken discontent in the Arctic Council, 2) tacit gestures at the Ilulissat Declaration's 10-year anniversary, and 3) by mimicking full sovereignty at the Arctic Circle conference serving as a particularly useful platform for enhancing bilateral international relations due to its more informal setup.

The Nordic countries have long been renowned for their contribution to international peace and security. This contribution – occasionally viewed by both Nordic and non-Nordic policy-makers and academics as a particular model for facilitating peace and development in international affairs – is based on a combination of active contributions to peaceful conflict resolution, a high level of development aid and a continuous commitment to strengthening international society. However, recently Scandinavians have been making headlines for reasons that seem to contrast with their well-established brand as humane internationalist peacemakers. This article identifies the characteristics of the Nordic model for international peace and security and discusses how and why it has changed.

Ukrainekrisen har forstyrret det ellers velfungerende samarbejde i Arktis, og det er blevet vanskeligere at samarbejde om både militære, diplomatiske og økonomiske forhold. Dog er krisens betydning mere begrænset, end man kunne have frygtet. Ruslands vigtige interesse i arktisk olie og gas gør, at Moskva har ført en mindre aggressiv politik i det høje nord. I stedet er det særligt Vesten, der har bragt krisen til polarregionen ved at inddrage regionen i sine sanktionspakker, og det kan betyde, at Rusland skifter kurs i fremtiden. I så fald vil Rusland ikke søge en direkte militær konfrontation, men i stedet udnytte politiske svagheder i den vestlige alliance ved hjælp af provokationer, obstruktion af samarbejde og suverænitetskrænkelser. Rigsfællesskabet bør fortsætte sin samarbejdsorienterede politik i Arktis. Praktisk samarbejde og åbne kommunikationskanaler til Moskva vil gøre det muligt at afspænde situationen og undgå, at misforståelser og enkeltstående episoder fører til en unødig eskalering. Samtidig bør Rigsfællesskabet dog forberede sig på, at Rusland kan skifte kurs i Arktis i det omfang, at disse forberedelser ikke underminerer den samarbejdsorienterede politik. ; The Ukraine crisis has made it more difficult to cooperate over military, diplomatic, and economic matters in the Arctic, but the impact of the crisis is less severe than it could have been. Oil and gas exploration and exploitation in the Arctic is central to Russia's grand strategy and it makes Russia more dependent on the other states in the Arctic, and thus more prone to cooperate in the region. Instead, it is mainly the West that has brought the crisis to the High North by including the region in its sanction packages. It may become rational for Russia to change to a more aggressive course in the Arctic. Russia will not seek a military confrontation in that case, but will instead exploit political weaknesses in the Western alliance through provocations, obstructions of cooperation, and violations of sovereignty. The Kingdom of Denmark (Denmark, the Faeroe Islands, and Greenland) should continue its cooperation-oriented policy in the Arctic. Practical cooperation and open channels of communication enable Denmark and the Western states to lower tensions and to avoid that a single incident or misunderstanding escalates the situation. The Kingdom of Denmark should concurrently prepare for how to handle a more assertive Russia in the Arctic, insofar as these preparations do not undermine its cooperation-oriented policy in the High North.

Dansk Folkeparti har i større udstrækning end andre partier anvendt pressemeddelelser som led i deres kommunikation. Samtidig har deres pressemeddelelser været af en anden karakter end de øvrige partiers. Med udgangspunkt i George Lakoffs teori om moralpolitik og med anvendelse af en Toulmin-inspireret argumentationsanalyse analyseres partiets pressemeddelelser fra en tilfældigt valgt måned i 2010. Analysen viser, at pressemeddelelserne udtrykker meget tydelige positioner med baggrund i moralske standpunkter. Politiske modsætninger behandles som moralske, men der er ikke tale om, at man på populistisk vis vender kappen efter vinden. Tværtimod er der tale om et særdeles homogent syn på politik som moral. På den baggrund diskuteres Lees-Marshments skelnen mellem markeds-, salgs- og produktorienterede partier, og konklusionen er, at man kan se Dansk Folkeparti som et salgsorienteret parti, som anvender pressemeddelelserne som et (billigt) middel for at nå ud til vælgerne. ; Dansk Folkeparti (the Danish People's Party) uses press releases to a much larger extent than any other Danish party. But they also use them in a different way. Through an analysis of press releases from a randomly chosen month in 2010, this article discusses the party's use of press releases not only as a source of information about the party's political initiatives but as a way of doing what George Lakoff has called Moral Politics. The use of press releases is then discussed in relation to the distinction presented by Lees-Marshement between product oriented, sales oriented and market oriented parties. The conclusion is that Dansk Folkeparti use the press releases as a part of their political marketing, but that the party due to its moral politics has to be classified as a sales oriented party.