Suchergebnisse

SHOWS HOW THE IRISH ELECTORAL SYSTEM HAS TRANSFERRED VOTES WON BY POLITICAL GROUPINGS INTO SEATS AT GENERAL ELECTIONS JUNE 1927-1973. DESCRIBES PATTERNS AT AGGREGATE LEVEL WITH COMPARATIVE REFERENCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES. MEASURES IMPACT OF CHANGES IN NUMBER AND SIZES OF CONSTITUENCIES FOLLOWING EACH ELECTORAL ACT. FINDS LITTLE DELIBERATE GERRYMANDERING BY PARTIES. CITES UNIQUENESS OF IRISH PR SYSTEM.

IN 1982 JAPAN BROKE WITH ALL PRECEDENT AND ENACTED A PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEM FOR THE ELECTION OF PART OF THE UPPER HOUSE. THE MOTIVES OF THE PARTIES WERE MIXED AND THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS RAISED MANY PRACTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS. ESSENTIALLY THE NEW LAW CONFUSED THE CONCEPTS OF EQUALITY AND FAIRNESS. HOWEVER, IN THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THE NEW SYSTEM ON 26 JUNE 1983 PARTY STRENGTHS WERE VERY LITTLE CHANGED.

Several of the earliest advocates of proportional representation upheld the "principle of free association": that electors should be free to choose the constituencies to which they belong. This article analyzes this principle in game-theoretic terms and investigates how far the free association "game" can be simulated through proportional representation. It is assumed that each voter's prime concern is that his most-preferred candidate should be elected. If preferences are single peaked, the outcome of an election based on free association can be predicted; the same outcome would result from a modified form of the single transferable vote.

ABSTRACTBuilding on to the earlier work by Stein Rokkan and by Douglas Rae, Victor Hanby, and John Loosemore on the relationship of parties' vote shares and seat shares at the district level in list proportional representation (P.R.) systems, we propose sets of formulas for (1) the thresholds of representation and exclusion that a party has to cross to win its first seat, and (2) the minimum and maximum proportions of the vote required to obtain a given number of seats. The electoral systems on which we focus our analysis are the main variants of list P.R. that have been used in practice: the d'Hondt, modified Saint‐Laguë, and largest remainder systems. The thresholds of representation and the minimum vote shares tend to show greater differences among systems than the thresholds of exclusion and the maximum vote shares. These differences, however, may be outweighed by two other factors: the number of seats in a district, and the number of parties presenting lists.

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ON WHICH WE FOCUS OUR ANALYSIS ARE THE MAIN VARIANTS OF LIST P.R. THAT HAVE BEEN USED IN PRACTICE: THE D'HONDT, MODIFIED SAINT-LAGUE, AND LARGEST REMAINDER SYSTEMS. THE THRESHOLDS OF REPRESENTATION AND THE MINIMUM VOTE SHARES TEND TO SHOW GREATER DIFFERENCES AMONG SYSTEMS THAN THE THRESHOLDS OF EXCLUSION & THE MAXIMUM VOTE SHARES.