Suchergebnisse

In a democratic proportional election system, it is vital that the mandates in the parliament are allocated as proportionally as possible to the number of votes the parties got in the election. We formulate an optimization model for allocation of seats in a parliament so as to minimize the disproportionality. By applying separable programming techniques, we obtain an easily solvable problem, and present a method for solving it optimally. The obtained solution is the feasible solution that has the minimal disproportionality (with the measure chosen), even in the presence of a parliament threshold, which is not always the case for the practical procedures used in many countries. We apply the approach to real life data from the last three elections in Sweden, and show that the result is better, i.e. more proportional, than what was obtained with the modified Sainte-Laguë method, which is presently used. A natural suggestion would be to use our method instead. We also consider the issue about constituencies, and suggest a procedure, based on the same kind of optimization problem, for allocating mandates in the constituencies, without changing the overall allocation with respect to parties. The numbers of mandates for the constituencies are based on the number of votes given, not on estimated numbers of inhabitants entitled to vote. This removes the need for compensatory mandates, and makes the question about sizes of the constituencies less important.

We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters' preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented.

This article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome-oriented voters in elections under proportional representation (PR). I develop a model of elections under PR, in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties, and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage. I use a new solution concept, robust equilibrium, which greatly mitigates the well-known problem of indeterminate predictions in multicandidate competition. Applying the equilibrium concept to the model, I find that PR promotes representation of small parties in general, even when voters are strategic. However, the median voter plays a critical role in shaping policy outcomes, which reflects the majoritarian nature of parliamentary policy making rules. Thus, PR may not be incompatible with the majoritarian vision of representative democracy if voters' main concern is policy outcomes.

The goal of this paper is to examine the incentives to vote insincerely, other than those created by rounding, faced by voters in systems of proportional representation (PR). We rigorously investigate two models of voter behaviour. The first model assumes that a voter is primarily interested in the distribution of seats in the post-election parliament (seat maximizer) while the second considers a voter who is concerned with the distribution of power in it (power maximizer). We show that under pure PR, seat maximizers do not have any incentives to manipulate, which justifies the Bowler and Lanoue (1992) claim, and that such incentives for seat maximizers appear with the introduction of a threshold. We show that, even in the absence of a threshold, there will always exist circumstances where a power maximizer would have an incentive to vote insincerely. We demonstrate that her incentives to make an insincere vote depend on her attitude towards uncertainty. The introduction of a threshold creates new and stronger opportunities for strategic voters regardless of their attitude towards uncertainty. Finally we discuss the overshooting/undershooting phenomenon, when either too many or too few like-minded voters attempt to manipulate. We use the two models to explain voters' behaviour at the 2005 New Zealand general election and demonstrate that rounding creates not only incentives but also disincentives for strategic voting. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

It has been shown by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, using several empirical examples under the Danish electoral system, that proportional representation (PR) can produce 'election inversions' such that a coalition of parties collectively supported by a majority of voters fails to win a majority of parliamentary seats. However, Kurrild-Klitgaard's examples result from imperfections in the Danish PR system introduced to serve goals other than proportionality. In this article, Kurrild-Klitgaard's analysis is carried a step further by showing that election inversions can occur even under the purest type of PR - namely, one with (i) a single national constituency, (ii) no explicit seat threshold, and (iii) a highly proportional electoral formula. Inversions result from the unavoidable 'whole number problem'. Recent election data from Israel and the Netherlands is examined and examples of inversions under their relatively pure PR systems are found. Inversions are also found after recalculating seat allocations without a threshold, and on the basis of the most proportional electoral formulas and when the analysis is restricted to seat-winning parties. Kurrild-Klitgaard's Danish data is then re-examined in the same fashion, as is the most recent apportionment of seats in the United States House of Representatives, and more examples of inversions are found. Adapted from the source document.

Understanding voter preferences in proportional representation (PR) systems is an essential first step towards understanding candidate selection and behavior. We unearth conceptual challenges of constructing a theory of sincere voting in PR elections. Using a rich but tractable framework, we propose a foundational theory of voting behavior in list PR systems. We show how voters' expectations about the election outcome shape the relative salience of different candidates on a party's ballot and ultimately determine their induced preferences over a party's list. Our framework shows how voters allocate their attention across different ranks on a party's ballot, and how this depends on each party's relative popularity.

AbstractWe provide closed-form solutions for measuring electoral closeness of candidates in proportional representation (PR) systems. In contrast to plurality systems, closeness in PR systems cannot be directly inferred from votes. Our measure captures electoral closeness for both open- and closed-list systems and for both main families of seat allocation mechanisms. This unified measure quantifies the vote surplus (shortfall) for elected (nonelected) candidates. It can serve as an assignment variable in regression discontinuity designs or as a measure of electoral competitiveness. For illustration, we estimate the incumbency advantage for the parliaments in Switzerland, Honduras, and Norway.

The goal of this paper is to examine the incentives to vote insincerely, other than those created by rounding, faced by voters in systems of proportional representation (PR). We rigorously investigate two models of voter behaviour. The first model assumes that a voter is primarily interested in the distribution of seats in the post-election parliament (seat maximizer) while the second considers a voter who is concerned with the distribution of power in it (power maximizer). We show that under pure PR, seat maximizers do not have any incentives to manipulate, which justifies the Bowler and Lanoue (1992) claim, and that such incentives for seat maximizers appear with the introduction of a threshold. We show that, even in the absence of a threshold, there will always exist circumstances where a power maximizer would have an incentive to vote insincerely. We demonstrate that her incentives to make an insincere vote depend on her attitude towards uncertainty. The introduction of a threshold creates new and stronger opportunities for strategic voters regardless of their attitude towards uncertainty. Finally we discuss the overshooting/undershooting phenomenon, when either too many or too few like-minded voters attempt to manipulate. We use the two models to explain voters' behaviour at the 2005 New Zealand general election and demonstrate that rounding creates not only incentives but also disincentives for strategic voting.

I consider the decision of a parliament that might change the electoral system for the forthcoming elections from plurality rule to proportional representation. Parties are office-motivated. They care about winning and about the share of seats obtained. I consider two di¤erent scenarios of how parties in the government share the spoils of office: Equally or proportionally to their share of seats. If the government is formed by a single party and parties expect that each party will obtain the same share of votes in the next election the electoral rule will never be changed. That is, for a change to occur the government should be formed by a coalition. I ?nd that a change is more likely to occur when the number of parties is larger and also when the spoils of o¢ ce are shared equally among the members in the governing coalition. I extend these results to analyze the decision of a change from a less proportional rule to a more proportional one.

This article asks, "What effect does the choice of a nation's electoral system have on the gender composition of its parliament over time?" I find that the electoral system has an important part to play, but previous work has overstated, by factors of between two and three, how much of a difference an electoral system can make. This article contributes an updated nonlinear theory of female representation, an improved dataset on women's representation across space and time, and more modern statistical techniques than previously used in research on this question.