Suchergebnisse

The author applies a variant of the common pool resources theory to the problem of public spending under the coalition governments elected by proportional representation. The claim is that proportional representation produces cabinets with a large number of parties, and that a large number of parties brings about higher public spending (measured by budget deficit and public debt). The author constructs and deploys the concept of budgetary dilemma to the effect that, absent institutional constraints, public spending results in expansionary fiscal policy. In the second part, the author empirically tests the budgetary dilemma in two postcommunist democracies - Serbia and Croatia, which in 2000-2013 had cabinets with a large number of actors and increasing public spending. The analysis shows a statistically unreliable predictive capacity of the main independent variable - the number of parties in the cabinet. Statistical analysis is followed by several illustrations of the budgetary dilemma. Adapted from the source document.

The author applies a variant of the common pool resources theory to the problem of public spending under the coalition governments elected by proportional representation. The claim is that proportional representation produces cabinets with a large number of parties, and that a large number of parties brings about higher public spending (measured by budget deficit and public debt). The author constructs and deploys the concept of budgetary dilemma to the effect that, absent institutional constraints, public spending results in expansionary fiscal policy. In the second part, the author empirically tests the budgetary dilemma in two postcommunist democracies - Serbia and Croatia, which in 2000-2013 had cabinets with a large number of actors and increasing public spending. The analysis shows a statistically unreliable predictive capacity of the main independent variable - the number of parties in the cabinet. Statistical analysis is followed by several illustrations of the budgetary dilemma. Adapted from the source document.

Over the period of its independence, Ukraine has gone through several stages of modernization of its electoral system, moving from system of absolute and mixed majority to proportional representation. What can this signify? Either the democratic principles of the national political system are strengthening and political institutions fully function in society, or a system of state authorities has actually transformed into the rule of oligarchic parties which control the activities of the government via parliament and are sufficiently independent from the President. By virtue of the constitutional reform from late 2004, Ukraine has transformed into a parliamentary-presidential republic, where the parliament is the core of control over executive power. Therefore, it is quite significant which parties win the elections. ; Over the period of its independence, Ukraine has gone through several stages of modernization of its electoral system, moving from system of absolute and mixed majority to proportional representation. What can this signify? Either the democratic principles of the national political system are strengthening and political institutions fully function in society, or a system of state authorities has actually transformed into the rule of oligarchic parties which control the activities of the government via parliament and are sufficiently independent from the President. By virtue of the constitutional reform from late 2004, Ukraine has transformed into a parliamentary-presidential republic, where the parliament is the core of control over executive power. Therefore, it is quite significant which parties win the elections.

The analysis of the elections treated as a tool for selecting representatives in commune councils, district councils and province assemblies as well as selecting provincial governors, and mayors of the cities, demonstrates that the aforementioned kinds of elections are significantly different from presidential, parliamentary and European elections. It can be stated that the main aim of the local government elections is to unite society. In addition, the years 2010 to 2014 were marked by a major decline in the number of voters in Opole Voivodeship. It is worth mentioning that, in 2014, there was an increase in the threshold which appeared to be a differentiating factor between the majority election system and proportional representation system. This has not led to changes in the number of local election committees, but it has resulted in a decline in the number of candidates in elections as well as an increase in the voter turnout. Furthermore, the implementation of the single mandate constituencies in municipalities in Opole Voivodeship has given an opportunity for independent candidates to be successful. Interestingly, political affiliations have not affected the commune council elections. What is more, significant changes were mainly visible in municipalities in which proportional representation system and multiple mandate constituencies used to be applicable during previous elections. It can be claimed that the independent candidates have obtained equal opportunities in competition with the candidates belonging to parties. ; Analiza wyborów do rad gmin, rad powiatów i sejmików województw oraz wójtów, burmistrzów i prezydentów miast wskazuje na ich odmienny charakter od elekcji prezydenckich i parlamentarnych oraz euroelekcji. Zasadniczą ich rolą jest integracja społeczności. W województwie opolskim w latach 2010-2014 zanotowano znaczny spadek liczby wyborców. Główną zmianą prawną było podniesienie w 2014 r. progu rozgraniczającego system wyborów większościowych od systemu wyborów proporcjonalnych. W regionie nie zmieniło to liczby komitetów wyborczych o charakterze regionalnym i lokalnym, uczestniczących w elekcji, zmalała łączna liczba kandydatów na radnych wszystkich szczebli, wzrosła natomiast frekwencja wyborcza. Wprowadzenie jednomandatowych okręgów wyborczych we wszystkich gminach województwa dało wyraźnie większą szansę na końcowy sukces kandydatom niezależnym. Szyld partyjny kandydatom do rad gminnych nie pomagał. Zmiany były widoczne szczególnie w tych gminach, w których wcześniej obowiązywał system proporcjonalny oraz istniały wielomandatowe okręgi wyborcze. Tam po raz pierwszy kandydaci niezależni mieli równe szanse na sukces z kandydatami zgłoszonymi przez partie polityczne.

In some political and science circles (including Poland) there are articulated views on the crucial role of electoral systems in the process of political competition. Therefore they express the opinion about prevalence of certain electoral arrangements in terms of the implementation of certain political preferences. Often hopes for the reform of the political system are associated with the changes of the electoral systems. In the Great Britain (the United Kingdom) and other English-speaking countries citizens have formed community associations whose aim is the change from the majority to the proportional electoral system. In the effect we have more proportional election result and extension of real electoral bid to a larger number of political parties. On the other hand, in Poland, we have seen the opposite trend. Proponents of single-mandate constituencies depreciate the system of proportional representation. They express the belief in the positive effects of the majority system in the parliamentary elections. Radicals endorse the idea that only those electoral solutions are synonymous with electoral democracy and they are a way to reduce the pathologies of political life. In terms of these issues there have arisen many misconceptions and political myths. The main purpose of this article is to pay attention to trends in the areas of electoral reforms in the world. The author tries to answer the following research questions: 1) What electoral systems were popular in the world in individual periods from the 19th to the 21st centuries? 2) What tendencies appear in changes of electoral systems in the recent years? 3) What is the being of popularity phenomenon of mixed-member electoral systems? In the recent years the most popular electoral systems are: proportional representation with open lists and majority rules in single member-districts. ; W niektórych środowiskach politycznych (w tym w Polsce), a także naukowych artykułowane są poglądy o – decydującej w procesie rywalizacji politycznej – roli systemów wyborczych oraz w związku z tym wyrażane jest przekonanie o przewadze niektórych rozwiązań wyborczych w zakresie realizacji określonych preferencji politycznych. Często nadzieje w zakresie reformy systemu politycznego wiąże się ze zmianami systemów wyborczych. W Wielkiej Brytanii i innych krajach anglosaskich powstały stowarzyszenia społeczne, których celem jest zmiana systemu większościowego na proporcjonalny. Jego zwolennicy opowiadają się za proporcjonalnością wyniku wyborczego i rozszerzeniem realnej oferty wyborczej do większej liczby podmiotów partyjnych. Z kolei w Polsce można zauważyć odwrotną tendencję. Zwolennicy jednomandatowych okręgów wyborczych, deprecjonując system proporcjonalnejreprezentacji, wyrażają przekonanie o pozytywnych efektach systemu większościowego w wyborach do Sejmu. W wariancie radykalnym lansowana jest teza, że tylko powyższe rozwiązania wyborcze stanowią synonim demokracji i są sposobem na ograniczenie patologii życia politycznego. Wokół tej problematyki narosło wiele nieporozumień i mitów politycznych. Celem przedstawionego artykułu jest zwrócenie uwagi na tendencje w zakresie polityki reform wyborczych w świecie i odpowiedź na takie pytania badawcze jak: 1) Jakie systemy wyborcze były popularne w świecie w poszczególnych okresach od XIX do XXI wieku?; 2) Jakie są tendencje w zakresie zmian systemów wyborczych w ostatnich latach?; 3) Z czego wynika fenomen popularności mieszanych systemów wyborczych? W ostatnich latach najbardziej popularnymi rozwiązaniami wyborczymi są system proporcjonalny z listami otwartymi oraz system większościowy z jednomandatowymi okręgami wyborczymi.

Proportionality is an intrinsic feature of parliamentary democracy. It is a principle stating that, depending on its size, each political party has a commensurate ability to influence legislature. This is confirmed by comparative studies which show that proportionality is a significant principle in the distribution of parliamentary posts in a majority of West European states. Consequently, even deputies from the smallest parties can chair commissions or lead sessions of the chambers, and by this token participate in the political decision-making process. This softens the domination of the majority party and – in line with Arend Lijphart's concept – generates consensual democracy, based on the search for broad compromises instead of simply outvoting the opponent. Given this picture, a question emerges whether the situation is similar in the representative institution of the European Union, i.e. the European Parliament. The paper answers this question positively. The standard of proportionality has strong roots in the European Parliament forming a fundamental principle expressed in terms of d'Hondt's formula applied to distribute posts among different political groups. This mainly concerns the division of the members of the Presidium and commission chairmen, who exercise the most important decisive functions. The implementation of the idea of appropriate representation may not be ideal, but divergences are rare, insignificant and usually they result from political bargaining that favors smaller fractions. The proportionality principle is also binding when distributing parliamentary posts inside political groups. There is a strong and positive correlation between the size of national delegations and the number of key posts they obtain in the Parliament – members of the Presidium, commission chairmen and coordinators. Only in the case of the latter is proportionality subjected to certain distortions, following from their key political importance. This, however, does not interfere with the general picture of symmetric participation of national groups in appointing parliamentary posts. In conclusion, the standard of proportionality allows all political groups to adequately participate in the work of the European Parliament, which deserves to be emphasized, the more so, as it is not formalized. ; Proportionality is an intrinsic feature of parliamentary democracy. It is a principle stating that, depending on its size, each political party has a commensurate ability to influence legislature. This is confirmed by comparative studies which show that proportionality is a significant principle in the distribution of parliamentary posts in a majority of West European states. Consequently, even deputies from the smallest parties can chair commissions or lead sessions of the chambers, and by this token participate in the political decision-making process. This softens the domination of the majority party and – in line with Arend Lijphart's concept – generates consensual democracy, based on the search for broad compromises instead of simply outvoting the opponent. Given this picture, a question emerges whether the situation is similar in the representative institution of the European Union, i.e. the European Parliament. The paper answers this question positively. The standard of proportionality has strong roots in the European Parliament forming a fundamental principle expressed in terms of d'Hondt's formula applied to distribute posts among different political groups. This mainly concerns the division of the members of the Presidium and commission chairmen, who exercise the most important decisive functions. The implementation of the idea of appropriate representation may not be ideal, but divergences are rare, insignificant and usually they result from political bargaining that favors smaller fractions. The proportionality principle is also binding when distributing parliamentary posts inside political groups. There is a strong and positive correlation between the size of national delegations and the number of key posts they obtain in the Parliament – members of the Presidium, commission chairmen and coordinators. Only in the case of the latter is proportionality subjected to certain distortions, following from their key political importance. This, however, does not interfere with the general picture of symmetric participation of national groups in appointing parliamentary posts. In conclusion, the standard of proportionality allows all political groups to adequately participate in the work of the European Parliament, which deserves to be emphasized, the more so, as it is not formalized.

Proportionality is an intrinsic feature of parliamentary democracy. It is a principle stating that, depending on its size, each political party has a commensurate ability to influence legislature. This is confirmed by comparative studies which show that proportionality is a significant principle in the distribution of parliamentary posts in a majority of West European states. Consequently, even deputies from the smallest parties can chair commissions or lead sessions of the chambers, and by this token participate in the political decision-making process. This softens the domination of the majority party and – in line with Arend Lijphart's concept – generates consensual democracy, based on the search for broad compromises instead of simply outvoting the opponent. Given this picture, a question emerges whether the situation is similar in the representative institution of the European Union, i.e. the European Parliament. The paper answers this question positively. The standard of proportionality has strong roots in the European Parliament forming a fundamental principle expressed in terms of d'Hondt's formula applied to distribute posts among different political groups. This mainly concerns the division of the members of the Presidium and commission chairmen, who exercise the most important decisive functions. The implementation of the idea of appropriate representation may not be ideal, but divergences are rare, insignificant and usually they result from political bargaining that favors smaller fractions. The proportionality principle is also binding when distributing parliamentary posts inside political groups. There is a strong and positive correlation between the size of national delegations and the number of key posts they obtain in the Parliament – members of the Presidium, commission chairmen and coordinators. Only in the case of the latter is proportionality subjected to certain distortions, following from their key political importance. This, however, does not interfere with the general picture of symmetric participation of national groups in appointing parliamentary posts. In conclusion, the standard of proportionality allows all political groups to adequately participate in the work of the European Parliament, which deserves to be emphasized, the more so, as it is not formalized.

For Croatia as an independent state, the regulation & the realization of the freedoms & rights of national minorities have become a major test & measure of the degree of the democratization of the society as well as one of the essential conditions for economic & political integration into Europe. Taking the Croatian legal framework as our starting point, the realization of the rights of national minorities in the Republic of Croatia can be viewed at four levels: cultural autonomy, education in minority languages & alphabets, proportional representation in government both at the national & the local level, & the cross-border cooperation of national minorities. A review of the condition of the rights of national minorities in Croatia shows that the cultural autonomy rights are optimally utilized, due to their good organization, by those national minorities that enjoyed those rights before the creation of the independent Croatia. The "new" national minorities are still organizing themselves in order to realize more fully their minority rights. A variety of European organizations & institutions that promote European stability & security are especially active in encouraging the protection of national minorities in Croatia. 2 Tables, 14 References. Adapted from the source document.

For Croatia as an independent state, the regulation & the realization of the freedoms & rights of national minorities have become a major test & measure of the degree of the democratization of the society as well as one of the essential conditions for economic & political integration into Europe. Taking the Croatian legal framework as our starting point, the realization of the rights of national minorities in the Republic of Croatia can be viewed at four levels: cultural autonomy, education in minority languages & alphabets, proportional representation in government both at the national & the local level, & the cross-border cooperation of national minorities. A review of the condition of the rights of national minorities in Croatia shows that the cultural autonomy rights are optimally utilized, due to their good organization, by those national minorities that enjoyed those rights before the creation of the independent Croatia. The "new" national minorities are still organizing themselves in order to realize more fully their minority rights. A variety of European organizations & institutions that promote European stability & security are especially active in encouraging the protection of national minorities in Croatia. 2 Tables, 14 References. Adapted from the source document.

Rad se bavi istraživanjem učinaka personalizacije izbornog sustava prije svega na političke stranke i kandidate za zastupnike. Pod personalizacijom izbornog sustava smatra se uvođenje mehanizama u izborni sustav koji osiguravaju veću ulogu birača u izboru njihovih parlamentarnih zastupnika. U radu su predstavljene četiri gusto opisane studije slučaja koje su služile kao temelj za testiranje temeljne i pomoćnih hipoteza. Rad sadrži fokusiranu poredbenu analizu dometa personalizacije izbornog sustava u odnosu na tri ključna slučaja (Austrija, Nizozemska i Finska), kao i u odnosu na kontrolni slučaj Kosovo. U radu je dokazano da snažni personalizirani izborni sustavi, koji imaju najveće vrijednosti personalizacije, odnosno izmjerene vrijednosti utjecaja dva institucionalna potičuća mehanizma koji su predstavljali nezavisne varijable ovog istraživanja (a. preferencijsko glasovanje unutar razmjernog sustava stranačkih lista i b. procedura selekcije kandidata), dovode do personalizacije političkih stranaka na razini zastupnika. Kroz dokazivanje pomoćnih hipoteza ispraćeni su učinci personalizacije izbornog sustava na političke stranke, kandidate/zastupnike, birače odnosno stranački/politički sustav. U radu predstavljeni nalazi fokusirane poredbene analize potvrđuju da snažna personalizacija izbornog sustava vodi personalizaciji izborne kampanje te smanjenoj ulozi političkih stranaka u političkom životu. Smanjena uloga stranaka u kampanjama otvara prostor jačanju uloge konkretnih donatora. Poslanici postaju nezavisniji u odnosu na stranku, ali s druge strane otvoreni za utjecaje donatora svojih kampanja. Nemogućnost opoziva, odnosno tekovina da je zastupnik, a ne stranka vlasnik mandata, dodatno ojačava poziciju zastupnika, a slabi poziciju stranke. Pozicija zastupnika jača, kao i birača koji imaju u snažno personaliziranim izbornim sustavima mogućnost presudnog utjecanja na to tko će ih zastupati u parlamentu, odnosno na koga će privremeno prenijeti suverenitet kao njegovi nositelji. Finski primjer najbolje pokazuje utjecaj snažne personalizacije izbornog sustava na političke stranke, kandidate i birače u konsolidiranoj demokraciji. Slučaj Kosova kao kontrolni slučaj govori da ukoliko izostane prevlast osobnog u odnosu na stranačko u unutarstranačkim procesima, učinci snažnog preferencijskog sustava bit će umanjeni. Izostanak vladavine prava utječe na ravnopravnost kandidata u predizbornim kampanjama, ali snažno preferencijsko glasovanje umanjuje negativne efekte izostanka demokratskih procedura unutar stranke te potiče daljnju demokratsku konsolidaciju u nekonsolidiranim demokracijama. ; The doctoral dissertation deals with research into the effects of personalization of the electoral system primarily on political parties and candidates for deputies. The personalization of the electoral system means the introduction of mechanisms in the electoral system that ensure a greater role for voters in the election of their parliamentary representatives. I define the electoral system as a "set of laws and party rules governing electoral competition between and within the parties" (Cox 1997: 38). This wider definition of the electoral system gives us space to build a more complete picture of the electoral system's impact on political parties, candidates and voters as main actors in the electoral process. The focus of the research is the relationship between personal and party representation. In order to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the effects of personalization on political parties, the research framework is narrowed down to list proportional electoral systems with preferential voting. Contemporary liberal democracy is characterized by a highly personalized politics. Governments are more recognizable by their leaders than by the parties that are the basis of their constitution. This personalization trend is not characteristic exclusively of presidential systems, but has become a feature of parliamentary political systems. In addition to personalization of the party at the leader level, there is also the personalization of politics at the level of members of parliament (MPs). In this paper, we only use the term 'personalization of a party' in reference to personalization at the level of the MP. We will not deal with the question of the presidentialization of political parties. Under the personalization of a political party at the level of MPs, we mean strengthening the position of deputies in the intra-party decision-making process. Thanks to the introduction of preferential voting in list proportional list systems, the group of electoral systems in which voters play an important role in the selection of their representatives has significantly expanded. Historically speaking, the representative position has been strengthened by the accepted attitude that the MP, not the party, is the 'owner of the mandate'; preferential voting supports this. This paper deals with the personalization of politics at the level of the representative—the political party. That is to say, it explores the question of to what degree personalization of the electoral system affects the political party, its intra- and its inter-party dimension. Moreover, the paper deals with personal and party representation, an area that is a new field of interest for political scientists. Through this relationship, I explore the effect of electoral systems on political parties, candidates and voters. in developing this work, I was guided by the results achieved by Katz (1980, 1986) and Marsh 9 (1985) who first dealt with this issue. In his book A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (1980), Katz took his first steps in the research of preferential systems. Five years later, Marsh (1985) was dealing with differences between the preferential systems in Europe. In their works, Katz and Marsh set forth the first hypotheses about the effects of preferential voting. Although there has been a growing interest in research in this area over the last decade, no significant progress has yet been made. Karvonen (2004) made a significant step in systematizing the hypotheses of Katz and Marsh, and he added some more points. In his last paper on this subject (2011), Karvonen was working within the same group of hypotheses, which were open to further research. They are the basis of this research, with additional contributions. A major impetus for this work was one of the most influential articles in this field, 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas' by Carey and Shugart (1995), which examines the question of the influence of electoral systems on the candidate's electoral strategies—that is, how electoral systems influence the pre-election roles of parties and their candidates. The authors developed three variables: (1) lack of party leadership control over access to and rank in ballots; (2) degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes independent of copartisans; and (3) whether voters cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote. By combining these three variables, there are up to thirteen combinations. This approach set me up to explore the impact that personalization creates when it comes to the relationship between the MP candidate and the party, or the MP and the party. Most authors agree that the introduction of personalization of the electoral system significantly affects interparty relations, which are sometimes reflected in a high degree of autonomy in campaigning and even in the collection and spending of funds for funding of their personal campaign. The bidding of candidates from the same party exercises a strong influence on intra-party relations, and it often happens that rival relations within the parties remain in the shadow of rival relations between the parties.

Artykuł opisuje najpopularniejsze wskaźniki (tzw. indeksy) oraz sposoby ich łączenia i interpretacji w politologicznych badaniach porównawczych. Przy ich pomocy analizować można wpływ systemu wyborczego na kształt struktury systemu partyjnego. Autor, na przykładzie mieszanych systemów wyborczych w Rosji i na Ukrainie oraz systemu proporcjonalnej reprezentacji w Polsce, przedstawia wpływ wybranych elementów systemów wyborczych na konfigurację systemów partyjnych mierzoną przy wykorzystaniu m.in efektywnej liczby partii politycznych. Zwraca także uwagę na poziom koncentracji systemu partyjnego jako jedną z konsekwencji systemu wyborczego. Artykuł weryfikuje wiele obiegowych poglądów na temat politycznych skutków systemów wyborczych oraz uczy jak przy pomocy metody indeksowej można weryfikować twierdzenia na temat wpływu poszczególnych elementów systemu wyborczego na system partyjny. Jednocześnie pokazuje jak interpretować uzyskane w toku badania wskazania indeksów. ; The article describes the most common indicators (so-called indices) and the methods of combining as well as interpreting them in the political science comparative studies. An employment of these indices allows the analysis of the impact of electoral systems on party ones. Using Russian and Ukrainian mixed electoral systems and Polish proportional representation as an example, the author expounds the impact of given elements of electoral systems on configuration of party systems. Proceeding so, he gauges the effects of the influence in question by deploying the so-called effective number of parties formula. The author points out that amongst others effects of this interconnection of systems there is also the impact on the concentration level of party systems. Additionally, this paper debunks a plethora of popular opinions concerning political effects of electoral systems and teaches how one can verify those opinions employing the index method and how to interpret the indices.

The paper looks into the effectiveness of the application of preferential quotas for electoral posts & compares the different quota systems in the EU countries. Starting from the assumption that political parties in contemporary democracies are major actors in the representation of women in national parliaments, the author analyses the (un)favourable conditions for women in candidacy procedures & some examples of (un)successful quota implementations. The conclusion is that a successful application of the quotas for women depends on a set of additional variables such as the quota application in proportional electoral systems, the entrenchment of the quotas in women's movements & their consistent & long-term implementation. Tables, Graphs, References. Adapted from the source document.

The author explores the genesis & development of electoral systems in the states created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The paper does a comparative analysis of the most significant components & characteristics of the electoral systems in the South Slavic states -- the highest averages methods, forms of candidature, modes of voting, levels of electoral constituency, methods of translating votes into seats & levels of a qualified suffrage. It also deals with the effects of implementation of the majority, mixed & proportional electoral systems in the mentioned group of countries during the last decade, particularly considering the representation of minority ethnic communities in their supreme legislative bodies. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

The paper looks into the effectiveness of the application of preferential quotas for electoral posts & compares the different quota systems in the EU countries. Starting from the assumption that political parties in contemporary democracies are major actors in the representation of women in national parliaments, the author analyses the (un)favourable conditions for women in candidacy procedures & some examples of (un)successful quota implementations. The conclusion is that a successful application of the quotas for women depends on a set of additional variables such as the quota application in proportional electoral systems, the entrenchment of the quotas in women's movements & their consistent & long-term implementation. Tables, Graphs, References. Adapted from the source document.