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While much has been written about the special design of Rwanda's judiciary in order to handle the aftermath of the genocide in 1994, other institutional actions resulting from the 2003 constitution have rarely been addressed in research. However, the second (partial) par-liamentary elections in September 2008 revealed some of the implications which the care-fully designed electoral system has for Rwanda's political development. As a starting point, the paper emphasises the need to link the debates on institutional design in divided societies with elections in authoritarian regimes. Under different regime types, 'institutional engineers' may pursue different goals. The paper concludes that in the case of Rwanda propor-tional representation (PR) has been implemented to support undemocratic goals. PR limits the local accountability of politicians in a political environment in which the government is not controlled by a democratic opposition. Thus, Rwanda's current PR system facilitates the maintenance of authoritarian power in the country, whereas small constituencies would es-tablish closer links between the local populations and their representatives. ; Während das besondere institutionelle Design der ruandischen Justiz, das dazu dienen soll, die Folgen des Völkermords von 1994 zu bewältigen, Gegenstand vieler Untersuchungen ist, wurden andere institutionelle Reaktionen der Verfassung von 2003 nur sehr selten betrachtet. Die zweiten (partiellen) Parlamentswahlen im September 2008 haben jedoch einige Folgen des sorgfältig entworfenen Wahlsystems des Landes für dessen politische Entwicklung erkennen lassen. Für die Analyse dieser Wahlen führt der Verfasser dieses Beitrags die Literatur zu Institutional Design in konfliktträchtigen Gesellschaften und zu Wahlen in autoritären Regimen zusammen und wertet sie aus. Dadurch kommt er zu folgendem Schluss: Zumindest im politischen Kontext Ruandas, in dem die Regierung nicht von einer demokrati-schen Opposition kontrolliert wird, weil diese entweder erfolgreich kooptiert oder von politischer Einflussnahme ausgeschlossen wurde, schränken Verhältniswahlsysteme mit großen Wahlkreisen die Möglichkeit ein, Politiker lokal für ihr Handeln verantwortlich zu machen. Daher trägt das ruandische Wahlsystem tendenziell dazu bei, autoritäre Herrschaft auf-rechtzuerhalten. Hingegen wären kleinere Wahlkreise, die mit der lokalen Bevölkerung enger verbunden sind, besser geeignet, eine kulturell und historisch angepasste Grundlage für mehr politische Verantwortlichkeit gewählter Politiker herzustellen.

Many studies show that the order of candidates' names on the ballot has an effect on voting. Less informed and indifferent voters may simplify the voting process by using the ballot position of candidates as a voting cue. By studying six parliamentary elections in Finland, this study first demonstrates that the relationship between ballot position and preference votes follows a reversed J-shaped curve. Candidates listed early on the ballot win the most preference votes, while candidates listed near the end have an advantage over those listed in the middle. Furthermore, the ballot position effect grows stronger with the complexity of the electoral environment. The ballot position effect increases as the number of candidates on the party list increases, the candidates-to-seats ratio increases and the number of incumbents on the list decreases. ; Peer reviewed

"Proportional Representation League annual meeting. [Summary]": p. 63. ; "All-America Cities Contest, 1957": p. 62. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This paper studies three novel electoral systems and the concept of the electoral region on which they are all founded upon. The electoral region is a concept that preserves traditionally independent electoral districts but allows them to influence each other s voting results in order to generate greater proportionality in the overall election result. The three new and as-yet untested electoral systems presented in this paper are applications of the electoral region concept that combine all electoral districts of a country into a single, nation-wide electoral region for calculating the seat distribution of the national parliament. This allows the electoral systems to distribute seats among parties as if there was only one nation-wide electoral district while still maintaining any number of electoral districts as vehicles of regional representation. If applied to federal elections, the electoral region concept would similarly permit individual states to elect their own representatives while ensuring that the overall seat distribution between parties at the federal level remains as perfectly proportional as the size of the representative body allows. Using Finland s parliamentary elections of 2007 as a test case, this paper proves that the electoral region concept allows a degree of proportionality that is either on par with or greater than in any earlier system of proportional representation. As the three electoral systems presented demonstrate, this unmatched level of proportionality is achievable with a method that is far simpler than the multi-tiered systems that have thus far been required for achieving similar levels of proportionality in multi-district elections; Two of the three electoral systems introduced in this paper utilize only one electoral formula in their seat distribution from the national level down to the districts the widely adopted d Hondt formula and in all three the voter is only expected to cast a single vote in favor of a single candidate and party.

Parties' motivation to include locals depends on the characteristics of the electoral system. This article analyzes where on the lists parties choose to position locals under closed-list proportional representation systems. Furthermore, it also investigates how that choice varies depending on two key district factors, namely district magnitude and whether or not the district is in a peripheral region. To that end, it draws on an original biographical data set of candidates for the Portuguese National Parliament (1983, 1995, 2002, 2005 and 2009). The findings show that there are fewer locals among the higher positions on the candidates' lists and among heads of lists. District magnitude and peripheral region effects go in the expected direction, but these effects are small. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

We propose that leaders play a more important role in voters' party sympathy in proportional representation systems (PR) than previous research has suggested. Voters, from the 2018 Swedish General Election, were in an experiment asked to describe leaders and parties with three indicative keywords. Statistical models were conducted on these text data to predict their vote choice. The results show that despite that the voters vote for a party, the descriptions of leaders predicted vote choice to a similar extent as descriptions of parties. However, the order of the questions mattered, so that the first questions were more predictive than the second question. These analyses indicate that voters tend to conflate characteristics of leaders with their parties during election campaigns, and that leaders are a more important aspect of voting under PR than previous literature has suggested. Overall, this suggests that statistical analysis of words sheds new light of underlying sympathies related to voting.

After decades of scholarship, there is still little agreement about the usefulness of territorial self-governance in managing territory-centred conflicts. We argue that the effectiveness of territorial self-governance as a tool of territory-centred conflict management increases when combined with a proportional representation (PR) electoral system for the national legislature in basically open political regimes, but not when combined with a parliamentary form of government at the centre. We propose that the combination of territorial self-governance and PR in at least minimally democratic regimes has most conflict-reducing potential, as both institutions follow a logic of widening the input side of representative politics. We find empirical support for this proposition using binary time-series cross-section analysis is found. Our findings highlight the need to consider not just the number but, more importantly, the type of power-sharing institutions that are combined with each other when looking for ways to reduce the risk of territory-centred intrastate violence.

This article examines the ideological position of Indonesia's political parties in addressing the 2019 presidential threshold under the open-list proportional representation system. The article aims to determine the political cleavage among Indonesian political parties, whether classified into the ideological spectrum or the organisational degree. From a methodological standpoint, it is qualitative research by employing in-depth interviews and online news collection as a data gathering technique. The study's finding depicts that the ideological cleavage is no longer relevant under the open-list proportional representation system because political parties eventually have pragmatical orientations rather than ideological onsiderations. It can be proven that the position of nationalist secular parties is not merely in the approval side but also in the denial and dilemma sides. Likewise, the position of nationalist Islamist parties can be found on two sides: denial and dilemma. This finding verifies that Indonesia's ideological contestation is waning and inactive when political parties cope with power issues. On the contrary, the ideology is revived when it deals with religious and tribal affairs.

National audience since the early 1980s, the emergence of radical right-wing populist parties in Europe has relaunched long-standing debates on the impact of electoral regimes. The development of a new pan-European far-right has contributed to renewed interest in analysing the effects of voting methods, their degree of openness and the opportunities they offer new entrants to integrate the politico-electoral arena. With, in essence, an implicit indictment of a proportional regime deemed far too 'favourable' to radical parties, while majority systems would, in contrast, act as a remedy against this new wave of extremism. ; National audience Depuis le début des années 1980, le surgissement sur la scène européenne de partis de droite radicale populiste a relancé des débats déjà anciens quant à l'impact des régimes électoraux. Le développement d'une nouvelle extrême-droite pan-européenne a contribué à renouveler l'intérêt notamment pour l'analyse des effets des modes de scrutin, leur degré d'ouverture et les opportunités qu'ils offrent aux nouveaux entrants d'intégrer l'arène politico-électorale. Avec, pour l'essentiel, une mise en accusation implicite d'un régime proportionnel jugé par beaucoup trop "favorable" aux partis radicaux, tandis que les systèmes majoritaires agiraient, par contraste, comme des remparts contre cette nouvelle vague d'extrémisme.

The current paper discloses a distinctive trait of the open-list proportional representation adopted in Brazil. In such a system, congressmen are in fact elected from four spatial patterns or constituencies: concentrated-dominant municipalities, shared municipalities, scattered-shared municipalities and dominant municipalities. Through the analysis of budgetary amendments made by congressmen the article sheds light on pork barrel practices that stem from our electoral system. The article also correlates variables of political career with spatial patterns of vote distribution, tries to discriminate safe seats in Brazil and, finally, the payoff of distributive and parochial attitudes. ; Este texto revela de forma inovadora traço distintivodo nosso sistema eleitoral proporcional de lista aberta, a saber, a existência de quatro modalidades de distribuição espacial do voto a partir das quais se elegem quatro tipos de representantes para nossas casas legislativas: deputados com votação concentrada e dominante, deputados com base fragmentada e dominante, deputados com votação concentrada e partilhada e deputados com votação fragmentada e partilhada. O texto aponta, por meio da análise de emendas ao orçamento, o incentivo ao distributivismo e a práticas clientelistas decorrentes de propriedades de nosso sistema eleitoral. Correlaciona dados de carreira política às modalidades diversas de distribuição do voto, discrimina as circunscrições eleitorais seguras e avalia, por fim, o retorno eleitoral de práticas distributivas.

This paper examines the importance of electoral rules for legislators' behavior. The German electoral system includes a mechanism which assigns whether legislators are elected under the first-past-the-post (FPTP), or the proportional representation (PR) electoral rule. Using this institution, we identify the effect of electoral rules on legislators' behavior and disentangle whether so-called pork barrel politics are due to political climate in a country or due to the electoral rule employed. We find significant differences in committee membership, depending whether the legislator is elected though FPTP or PR. legislators elected through FPTP system are members of committees that allows them to service their geographically based constituency. Legislators elected through PR are members of committees that service the party constituencies, which are not necessarily geographically based.

[At head of title: 1920, second session. Legislative Assembly. New South Wales. General election for Legislative Assembly, March 20, 1920] ; Mode of access: Internet.

Tables. ; Caption title. ; Electronic reproduction. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 44

Tables. ; Cover title. ; "(Reprinted from the "Westminster review," Vancouver, B.C.)" ; Electronic reproduction. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 44

Mit Urteil vom 3. Juli 2008 erteilte das Bundesverfassungsgericht dem Bundestag den Gesetzgebungsauftrag, die als grundgesetzwidrig erkannten negativen Stimmgewichte aus dem Bundeswahlgesetz zu entfernen. Der Aufsatz entwickelt eine neue Reparaturoption, die direktmandatsorientierte Proporzanpassung. Das Verfahren ist frei von den verfassungswidrigen negativen Stimmgewichten und erscheint als direkte Fortschreibung des alten Wahlsystems. Es ist eine mit der Personenwahl verbundene Verhältniswahl und es bewahrt das Zweistimmen-System. Es garantiert jedem Wahlkreissieger das Direktmandat und es gewährleistet einheitliche Erfolgswertgleichheit der Zweitstimmen im gesamten Wahlgebiet. ; In its decision of 3 July 2008 the German Federal Constitutional Court called upon the Bundestag to amend the Federal Election Act (Bundeswahlgesetz) in order to dispose of negative voting weights. The paper presents a novel repair option, the direct-seat oriented proportional fit. The procedure is devoid of negative voting weights and appears as a straightforward adaptation of the old electoral system. It is a proportional representation method combined with the election of persons and it retains the two-ballot system. It guarantees each plurality winner in a constituency a direct seat and it preserves equal success values of list votes (Zweitstimmen) throughout the whole electoral region.