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"To speak of human rights is to speak of proportionality. It is no exaggeration to claim that proportionality has overtaken rights as the orienting idea in contemporary human rights law and scholarship. Proportionality has been received into the constitutional doctrine of courts in continental Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Israel, and South Africa, as well as the jurisprudence of treaty-based legal systems like the European Court of Human Rights, giving rise to claims of a global model, a received approach, or, simply, the best-practice standard of rights adjudication. Even in the United States, which is widely understood to have formally rejected proportionality, some argue that the various levels of scrutiny adopted by the US Supreme Court are analogous to the standard questions posed by proportionality. As proportionality scholars are well aware, some of the early literature on balancing and rights is American, with special reference to the First Amendment. Notwithstanding proportionality's popularity, there is no consensus on its methodology. Much less does the use of a proportionality doctrine guarantee consensus on substantive rights questions. What the principle of proportionality promises is a common analytical framework, a framework the significance of which is not in its ubiquity (a mere fact), but because its structure influences (some would say controls) how courts reason to conclusions in many of the great moral and political questions confronting political communities. As a framework, proportionality analysis is superficially straightforward, setting out four questions in evaluating whether the limitation of a right is justifiable. A serviceable - but by no means canonical"--
In: IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Band 45, Heft 8, S. 889-914
ISSN: 2195-0237
In: European journal of risk regulation: EJRR ; at the intersection of global law, science and policy, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 73-78
ISSN: 2190-8249
In: New York University journal of international law & politics, Band 46, Heft 3, S. 911-954
ISSN: 0028-7873
In: Common Market Law Review, Band 51, Heft 4, S. 1292-1293
ISSN: 0165-0750
In: Journal of conflict & security law, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 451-469
ISSN: 1467-7962
When interpreting the fundamental liberties in the Singapore Constitution, courts presently do not engage in a proportionality analysis – that is, a consideration of whether limitations on rights imposed by executive or legislative action bear a rational relation with the object of the action, and, if so, whether the limitations restrict rights as minimally as possible. The main reason for this appears to be the expansive manner in which exceptions to the fundamental liberties are phrased, and the courts' deferential attitude towards the political branches of government. This paper considers how the rejection of proportionality has affected the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, and freedom of religion, and argues that although proportionality was originally a European legal doctrine, its use in Singapore is not only desirable but necessary if the Constitution is to be regarded as guaranteeing fundamental liberties instead of merely setting out privileges that may be abridged at will by the Government.
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Fight against terrorism is an important public interest. Data on natural persons that belongs to the area of their private life could help the state in the aforementioned fight. Therefore, the state may be interested in collecting the data on all the natural persons within its jurisdiction in order to prevent terrorist attacks. This raises the question if the state could collect that information without any legal restrictions. In this work, the relevant provisions of universal international law, the law of the Council of Europe, the European Union and Lithuania will be examined and the answer to the question will be provided. In the universal international law, 17 "sectorial" treaties describe certain types of behaviour that can be called terrorism. Therefore, the present concept of terrorism is very fragmented, i. e. different treaties directly or indirectly provide the definition of terrorism applied just for that certain treaty. It is important to mention that the inclusion of certain features in the concept of terrorism endangers the human rights protected by the international law and may unreasonably restrict the possibilities of freedom fighters to defend themselves from illegal foreign occupation or to seek to realise the right to self-determination. For example, the inclusion of substantial harm to the environment in the definition of terrorism as an alternative feature of this crime may unreasonably restrict the possibilities of freedom fighters, as they may have no viable alternatives to resist illegal violence used against them. The serious harm to property, as an alternative feature of terrorism, may lead to the infringement of the rights of legal protesters. It is also important to mention that some features of the crime of terrorism are not comprehensively defined concepts, e. g. serious harm to property, serious injury or substantial harm to the environment. Therefore, there is the risk that even not considerably dangerous behaviour may be mistakenly called terrorism. As a result, various human rights may be infringed. On the other hand, many of these problems could be avoided by the appropriate interpretation of the provisions of the treaties, as all of them directly or indirectly emphasize the necessity to respect human rights, provides for the possibility to reject a request for extradition if it is reasonably believed that the person will be prosecuted for his nationality, ethnic origin, race, religion or political opinion and as states have other international obligations. The Council of Europe defines the concept of terrorism by making references to universal "sectorial" treaties, but it also define some aspects of the crime of terrorism directly. The European Union has chosen a different way, as it provides the general definition of the crime of terrorism. It is important to mention that both the law of the Council of Europe and the law of the European Union recognize the need to respect human rights during the fight against terrorism. Concerning the definition of terrorism, Lithuania has obliged itself by some universal international treaties and certain treaties of the Council of Europe. Moreover, Lithuania is a member of the European Union therefore the law of the latter is also applied in this country. Thus the provisions of the aforementioned types of law have affected the national criminal law of Lithuania. The criminal code of Lithuania defines two groups of crimes related to terrorism, i. e. the crimes of terrorism and the crimes related to terrorist activities. It is important to mention that the two groups of crimes are not necessarily especially dangerous. All the aforementioned levels of law emphasize the necessity to respect human rights in the fight against terrorism. And the right to private life is one of them. According to the universal international law, the law of the Council of Europe, the European Union and Lithuania, the private life of an individual is a concept that cannot be defined comprehensively. This concept is a very broad one and the essence of it is explained by giving examples of different aspects of the private life of natural persons. All the aforementioned levels of law recognise that the right to private life can be limited. However, this may be done only if certain legal requirements, including the principles of necessity and proportionality, are met. It must be noted that the sensitive areas of the private life of individuals have greater protection, therefore it is harder to justify the interference into them. Automatic measures may also cause problems as, in certain cases, they may be inconsistent with the obligation of the state to take into account the circumstances of the situation and to follow the principles of necessity and proportionality (Lithuanian law does not allow such measures, as, according to the Constitution, the information about the private life of an individual can be collected only if a court has authorized it by a reasoned decision). According to the universal international law, the law of the Council of Europe and Lithuanian law, it may be derogated from the right to private life in an extraordinary situation, but certain legal requirements, including the principles of necessity and proportionality, must also be fulfilled. In conclusion, the state may limit the right to private life of individuals during the fight against terrorism. However, there are legal restrictions for such interference.
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In: The Cambridge yearbook of European legal studies: CYELS, Band 16, S. 335-345
ISSN: 2049-7636
AbstractThe aim of this chapter is to illustrate how the principle of proportionality as derived from the legal orders of the Member States has been incorporated in the legal order of the European Union as well as codified in the Treaties. The chapter revolves around two key arguments. It emphasises, first, that the principle of proportionality has been used as a criterion for controlling the legality of the acts of the Union and of those of the Member States when implementing Union law. Secondly, it is argued that, more recently, the same principle has been used by the Court of Justice of the European Union as a useful instrument towards ensuring an even stronger coordination with national judges.
Report of the Texas State Auditor's Office related to determining whether selected state entities required to pay benefits proportionally by fund complied with the Office of the Comptroller of Public Accounts' (Comptroller) Accounting Policy Statement (APS) 011 reporting requirements and processed needed adjustments to accomplish proportionality.
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In: Laws ; Volume 3 ; Issue 1 ; Pages 117-140
This paper demonstrates how the legitimate interests of immigrants are gradually being recognized through judicial application of EU immigration law. A philosophical and theoretical introduction demonstrates how this recognition constitutes a political momentum. After a brief review of the impact of the ECtHR, we discuss the case law of the ECJEU on the Return Directive to show how, through the principles of proportionality and sincere cooperation, this legitimate interest is indirectly being calculated by the Luxembourg court. This means that national courts will have to follow suite, as is demonstrated in the last section of this paper. Hence the title of the article: the political potential is due to this indirect recognition. In the conclusion, a suggestion is made to further develop this potential.
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