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Proportionality is a fundamental component of the law on the use of force and the law of armed conflict—the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. In the former, it refers to a belligerent's response to a grievance and, in the latter, to the balance to be struck between the achievement of a military goal and the cost in terms of lives. The legitimate resort to force under the United Nations system is regarded by most commentators as restricted to the use of force in self-defense under Article 51 and collective security action under chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resort to force in both these situations is limited by the customary law requirement that it be proportionate to the unlawful aggression that gave rise to the right. In the law of armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is based on the fundamental principle that belligerents do not enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict damage on the enemy. Since the entry into force of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, proportionality has been both a conventional and a customary principle of the law of armed conflict.

AbstractThe proportionality principle plays a key role in constitutional review of public acts. Its use legitimises the constitutional claims of EU law in the context of a multi-level polity system. The application of proportionality in the EU differs based on whether legal acts of the EU or of its Member States are concerned. In the former case, a manifestly disproportionate test is usually applied, while in the latter case, a least restrictive means test (LRM) is normally used. Both are conditioned by the degree of integration achieved. In future, the use of the principle may involve increasing attention being paid to individual rights.

In courts and tribunals, political arenas like the United Nations Security Council, and popular and scholarly journals, discursive recourse to the principle of proportionality has become frequent and vehement. It tends most audibly to arise in the midst of military conflicts pitting states against each other. But it also emerges in interstate trade disputes and when states, seeking to protect national security or public health, restrict internationally protected human rights.

AbstractThe principle of proportionality constitutes a complex principle that could be seen as the keystone of the general principles of Community law and ECHR. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the influence of European Community (EC) law and the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) on the definition and application of the principle of proportionality in Swedish public law from 1996 to 2006. The Supreme Administrative Court has given some indications as to the application of the principle of proportionality, notably as to the importance of the balancing of interests. Interestingly, this Court has also been proactive as to the application of the principle of proportionality in internal law, e.g. concerning environmental law, tax law, administrative licenses. Moreover, the principle has influenced national legislation in many fields. It is argued, finally, that these jurisprudential and legislative developments increase the judicial protection of the individual and also modifies the structure of traditional judicial review by attributing a new role to Swedish national courts.

AbstractThis article presents a functional explanation of why proportionality has become one of the most successful legal transplants in contemporary constitutional law. It argues that proportionality helps judges mitigate what Robert Cover called the 'inherent difficulty presented by the violence of the state's law acting upon the free interpretative process'. More than alternative methods, proportionality calibrates the violence that the justification of state coercion inflicts on private (non-official) jurisgenerative interpretative processes in constitutional cases. The first three sections show, through an analysis of different constitutional styles which I label Doric, Ionic and Corinthian, how proportionality seeks to place a non-deontological conception of rights within a categorical structure of formal legal analysis. This method aims to synthesize fidelity to form and institutional structure (thesis) with 'fact-sensitivity' to contexts in which specific controversies arise (antithesis). Proportionality positions judges vis-à-vis the parties and the parties in relation to one another differently from other constitutional methods. The next sections distinguish between constitutional perception and reality. While the normative appeal of proportionality can be traced to the perception of its integrative aims, in reality, judicial technique does not entirely live up to those aims. Proportionality succumbs to pressures from the centrifugal forces of universalism and particularism that it seeks to integrate. The final section draws on the works of Kant and Arendt and discusses the implications of an approach to constitutional method such as that reflected in the advent of proportionality for the project of constitutionalism more generally.